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ABSTRACT 
The research work embodied in this thesis constitutes a critical analysis of 
classical and modem aspects of the concept of istihsän (juristic preference) in Islamic 
law, an important principle in Islamic legal legislation throughout history. This area of 
legislation has been investigated by many researchers and scholars; however, the research 
work conducted to evaluate the true nature and role of istihsän with regard a combination 
of classical and modem approaches still requires further investigation. 
The thesis consists of four chapters. The introductory chapter is the theoretical 
basis of the study and comprises a brief understanding of some general principles of 
Islamic law; the Qur'an, the Sunnah, ijmä' (consensus), q yas (analogy), macla/iah 
mursalah (consideration of public interest), istiýizib (presumption of continuity), qawl al- 
, Sal b1 (the saying of the Companion of the Prophet), 
`urf (custom), sadd al-dharä'i ` 
(blocking the means), spar' man gablanä (revealed laws preceding to the shari`ah of 
Islam) and istigrä' and so on. 
Chapter II deals with the development of ray and ijtihäd in the context of 
istihsän. This chapter introduces the concept of ray and ijtihäd as related to historical 
background and implementation, with their methods of development where isti/tsän 
originated from. Istihsän was practiced well before the formation of the Islamic legal 
schools of thought and can be referred back to the time of the Prophet, the Companions 
and the Successors. 
Chapter III begins with definitions of the term of istihsdn, identifying its true 
nature with an extensive analysis both linguistically and technically. Historical 
development is investigated, and then the viewpoints of the scholars and their discourses 
11 
that form the main cornerstone of this study. Also in this chapter the validity of istihsän is 
discussed and explained with special reference to the reason behind the disagreement 
over istihsän as the scholars introduce their evidences to justify the claims of those who 
consider it a valid source of law and those who do not recognize it as such. Consideration 
of isti? zsän and its implementation in the early Hanafi school of thought by eminent 
scholars is also elaborated. 
Chapter IV is devoted to the types of isti/zsän and the division among the scholars 
with practical examples. Other related terms as i/xiyäj (need), ctrar (harm), rafa! - laaraj 
(avoiding hardship), mashaqqah (hardship), 4zrürah (necessity). 
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INTRODUCTION 
a- Objective of the research 
1 
Justice is one of the fundamental principles to keep a society alive, and thus 
law has to be based on justice. It is a fact that abusing the system of justice causes 
corruption for the society. The subject that I have researched has a vital role that has 
substantially contributed to the development of law based on justice and equity. 
The objective of my research is to investigate the concept of istiiicän from 
every possible aspect. Islamic law has been developed over the centuries using the 
methods of ray and ijtihäd However, the development of the principle of istilxsdn 
opened for Islamic law a new horizon for the future phenomenon. 
The present work initially began as a study of the nature and reality of the 
concept of istThsr n. In the very early stage of legislation of Islamic law, the growth of 
the Islamic world presented people with new challenges. These included rapid 
urbanization, multi-cultural relationships and new responses that required the Islamic 
jurists to provide vigorous efforts to resolve the problems and issues of the Muslim 
community using their personal discretion and ijtihäd based on nags (text). The 
process of systematic reasoning, which is analogy (giyäs), began as a methodological 
solution to operate with the appearance of the juristic schools of thought; in fact the 
process of legal reasoning is technically called model of legal reasoning (ijtihäd). 
However, the application of the process of systematic reasoning (analogy) in 
certain situation has not always responded to the needs of the people and sometimes 
was detrimental to the objectives of the Lawgiver. In such cases, the situation has to 
be studied in the light of justice, wisdom, equity and necessity in order to remove its 
rigidity and harms by way of departing from the already established rule. One who 
studied such cases on that manner and developed justifying it as a principle of Islamic 
J, n` 
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law was the Hanafl school of thought, on the basis of a number of verses in the Qur'an 
and in traditions. "And follow the best (i. e., this Qur'an) of that which is sent down to 
you from your Lord. "1 "Those who listen to the Word (good advice) and follow the 
best. "2 "Whatever the Muslim community views as good, it is also considered by God 
as good"3 . Later on, 
despite much opposition, istitndn was embraced and used by 
many other schools of thought, including the Shäfi`i school of thought who never 
accepted the term istifardn, but implemented the same principle under the name of 
masla/aah, istisfxib, istisläh and so on. 
In this context, I have faced many issues, and have had to question whether 
Islamic law can accommodate the challenges of modem life, providing adequate 
solutions to it without violating the religion and interfering with God's commands. 
Are there any possibilities that the jurist in Islam might interpret the revealed laws 
without being accused of legislating arbitrarily? The reply to this question is the focal 
point of the investigation carried out in this research, benefiting from the institution of 
ijtihäd that created the power of the concept of istihsän to provide adequate solutions 
to modem problems. Istikdn is a form of ijtihdd in which jurists use their personal 
discretion within the guidelines of the shari'ah to choose the better legal judgment in 
a case which has more than one possible solution. As explained in the liadith of 
Mu'ädh4 the better and adequate solution is required by jurists to secure what is 
deemed to be of benefit, easier and most suitable for a community without 
contradicting the objectives of the Lawgiver. 
Qur'dn: 39/55. 
2 Qur'an: 39/18. 
3 Ibn Fianbal, "Al-Musnad", v: 1, p: 379; Ibn Mäjah "Sunan", II, 784, ftzdith No: 2340. 
4 Abü Däwud, "Sunan", tr. Ahmad Hasan (Lahore: sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1984 HL 1019 jbdi-th 
no: 3585. 
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Istilxsän, therefore, is an attempt on the part of the jurist to understand the 
commands and objectives of God. It goes back to the time of the Prophet, and from 
the outset opened the way for the development of Islamic law. 
b- The importance of the research 
Few works of note have been done on the sources of Islamic law, which is 
why I was encouraged to carry out this research on the concept of istihsän. 
Whilst much academic attention is given to Islamic law in the western world, 
the Muslim world itself is sadly lacking in this area. This reflects the extent to which 
the Muslim world has fallen behind, not only in terms of science and technology, but 
also in the social sciences and the study of religion. And one of the reasons for the 
academic and intellectual stagnation in the Muslim world is the perception which 
many have that the gate of ijtihOd -of which istibsan is an important part- is closed. 
The present work is a study of an extremely under-researched area- namely isti/zsän or 
juristic preference- which is itself a long-forgotten source of law and principle of 
ijtihäd; hence the title of this thesis: "Isti/isän (juristic preference): the forgotten 
principle of Islamic law. " 
During the early Islamic period the term istifsän was neither known nor 
directly defined, and therefore when it was applied in judgments, it was applied 
without giving any specific definition or explanation. Supporters of istihsän 
considered the fundamental principle of ease and the avoidance of hardships as the 
sole basis for the concept of isti/zsän. It could be said that the opponents of istihrän 
misunderstood the procedure of the usage of istihsän. Applying istihsän without 
giving precise definitions to the term led even those who support istihsän to fall into 
the trap that sparked intense debates amongst the various schools of thought. The 
opponents of istihsän were- and still are- those who consider it to be "Arbitrary law- 
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making within religion", thus possibly missing what its supporters, Hanafis, Mälikis, 
Hanbalis meant by istihrän. 
Although acquainted with the distinction between the concept of ray and the 
concept of ijtihäd in Islamic legal philosophy, my general assumption was that they 
are two complementary facets of a similar approach to the Islamic concept of law. 
However, what gradually became clear was that these two aspects have been used 
interchangeably. It is difficult to distinguish between ray, ijtihdd and isti/zsän, all of 
which are based on personal judgment. Moreover, it is viewed that istiludn is a 
product of ijtihäd. 
In fact, Abü Flanifah used to implement ijtihäd based on his personal opinions, 
but conforming to the Qur'än and the Sunnah by saying, "Qiyäs rules this, but we 
`Nastatuinü' (prefer) that; or we proved this by istitndn contrary to giyäs; or, the 
giyäs of this is so and so and the ijtihäd of this is so and so, and the ijtihad we take 95 . 
For the development of Islamic law ijtihäd plays one of the most important roles in 
comprehending the purposes of the Qur'än and the Sunnah. 
With this realization, I then began to explore the concept of istihrän from 
every possible aspect. Historically the technical term istihsän began with Abü 
Harnfah, although its practical implementation goes back to the period of `Umar. in 
my extensive research, I realized that this concept was used on various occasions in 
the very early period of legislation, without its name being mentioned. Eventually my 
investigation led me to believe that istihsän as a juristic term was not in use before 
`Iyäs bin Mu`dwiyah (d. 1221740). 
I then began to study the viewpoints of scholars from different schools. Hanafi 
scholars perceive istihsdn as a valid source of shari`ah, according to which action 
5 Shalabi Muhammad Mustafa, "U$V al-Fiqh al-Isldmr', p: 258, Beirut 1986. 
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could be taken in juristic rulings; it is also recognized by the Mild, Oanball and 
Zaydi Schools. However, the first scholar who rejected and strongly criticized istihsän 
was Imäm Shäfi`i (d. 204)6 who wrote a book titled "Ib(l a1-Isti? ndn" (Invalidating 
Juristic Preference) and made his famous statement: "Man istafxrana fagad sharra `a" 
(whoever approves of juristic preference is making himself the Lawmaker)7; his 
disciples also followed this view: 8 Isnawi (d. 772/1370), Bishr b. Qays (d. 218/833), 
Shiräzi (d. 476/1083), and Ghazäli (d. 505/1111). Däwüd al-Miff (d. 270/884)9, and 
Ibn Hazen (d. 456/1064)1° who founded the Zdhiri School, not only rejected giyäs, but 
was also strongly opposed to istifzsän, " as were the Imami Shi`ah. 12 
The concept of istitWin in Islamic law has been discussed and commented 
upon by both its supporters and its detractors. One of the major factors behind the 
tendency to reject, or the inability to distinguish between arbitrary law-making and 
personal judgment based on evidence, is the fact that the early Hanaff scholars had not 
provided any direct definitions to identify their claims and the usage of the concept. In 
that respect, the earlier Fianaff scholars' examples of how to apply the concept has 
been discussed and their ramifications for Islamic law pointed out. 
More importantly, the validity of isti/zsän, namely whether it is a source of 
law, was also the subject of debate amongst the various scholars. I have discussed 
their arguments through the evidence supplied and have covered the reasons behind 
the disagreements among the `ulamä'. 
6 Shäft'i "Al-Rirälah", p: 503; and, "Al-Umm", v: 7, p: 309. 
7 Ansäri, "Ghäyat al-W40', p: 139; `Alwäni, "The Ethics", p: 75; Ghazali, "Mustas', v: 1, p: 274, 
ibid, "Mankhäl", p: 374; Isnawl (d. 772/1370), "Nihäyat al-Sül", iv, p: 399. 
8 Shiräzi, "Sharp al-Luma"', v: 2, p: 969; 7uwaynT, "Talkhis", v: 3, p: 310; Ghazalf, "Mustaga", v: 1, 
274; GhazAll, "Al-Mankhul", p: 374; Räzl, "Ma/Tsül", v: 2, p: 559; Amid, "Al-Ii /cäm", v: 4, p: 390. ýSbiräzi, 
"Tabagät al-Fugahä', p: 92-93; Ibn Subki, "Tabagät", v: 2, p: 284-293. 
10 Ibn ýazm, "A! Ihýcäm", v: 6, p: 192. 
lI Shäfi'Y, "Al-Umm", v: 7, p: 298; ShAfi'I, "Risälah", v: 3, p: 219; Ibn Fiazm, "Al-llöcäm" v: 6, p: 757; 
Ghazäli, "Al-Mankhul", p: 374; Ghaza-li, "Al-MustagN', vol. 1, p: 275; Isnawl, "Sharif' v: 3, pp. 139. 
12 Abü Zahrah, "Al-Imäm al-. diq f: (ayätuhu ve 'Apuhu Äräuhu wa Fighuhu", p: 527-529, Cairo. 
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In addition the various types of isti/uän have also been explored. There are 
many types of isti, sdn, and the scholars give basic and general classifications which 
have been identified and simplified in this study. Another interesting aspect related to 
the concept of istihsän is the objectives of the lawgiver (magä, cid al-Shäri ). Those 
objectives, also, have been discussed and explored in this final chapter. 
During my research, I have realized the importance of the concept of isti/zsän 
in terms of development and renewal in Islamic law. Over the past four years, I have 
gained the experience that the concept of istihsän is a crucial factor in the 
development of Islamic law. As Karnali says, "A clear and well-defined role for 
istihsän would hopefully mark a new opening in the evolutionary process of Islamic 
laws13 
c- Method and sources: 
My main concern throughout has been to make an extremely complex subject 
as approachable as possible, without compromising either detail or depth of analysis. 
My main approach has been a phenomenological one, based on a comparative 
analysis of the main historical sources. My base has been the works of the Hanafi 
School, which is the source and origin of istiixsdn in its technical sense. 
AND Hanifah and his disciples often used many works on isti judn which are no 
longer extant. An example is "Kitab al-Istihsän" which is attributed to Shayb ni but 
which has not reached us, despite the many quotations made by Sarakhsi and Jassäs. 
The principle was not often expounded in Hanafi texts as an independent subject but 
was usually dealt with in connection with related concepts such as giyäs (analogy). 
13 M. Häshim Karrmäli, "Principles", p; 264. 
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Information on istii san could also be found in the books of "al-Qawä'id al- 
fiqhiyyah", and the Ottoman Courts Manual "Al-Majallah", from which I have 
benefited. 
Single works dedicated to istihsän are conspicuous by their absence in juristic 
circles. However, as I have indicated above the true nature of istihsän can be gleaned 
from Hanafi books. 
Some selected Hance usul books are Abü Bakr al-Jassas's "A1-Full ft al- 
Ue1", Abü Zayd al-Dabbüsi s "TaqwTm a1-Adillah", Fakhr al-Isläm al-Bazdawi s 
"U fl al-Bazdawi on the Margin of `Abd al-`Aziz al-Bukhäri Kashf al-Asrär", and 
Sarakhsi s "Al-U: Rti' and this "Kitäb al-Mabsüf'. 
I have realized that, despite the many contemporary research works that have 
been made, there is much that is left to be desired, especially in those works that 
emphasize the classical understanding of fcgh and its connection with the principles. 
In addition, general usül al-fiqh (principles of Islamic law) books, 
independent works about principles of Islamic law such as gryds, ijma', masiahah, 
`urf, ckZrürah, istis h etc; With collections; dictionaries; and general books which 
are related to my work have been used and benefited from. Also a wide range of 
contemporary works related to ijtihäd and sharl- ah reform have been consulted. 
The introductory chapter (chapter I) looks at a number of important juristic 
terms relevant to the study, such as usül, fiqh, afiküm, adillah, shad ah and so on. It 
also defines and critically analyses all of the main sources of law: These are divided 
into two categories: the unanimously accepted sources; and the controversial sources. 
The former comprises the Qur'an, the Sunnah, ijma' giyäs; the latter includes 
`forgotten principles' such as masiahah, istislah, 'urf and so on. The main works 
consulted for this have been the major classical works of jurisprudence such as Ibn al- 
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Qayyim, Laknawi, Ibn Amir al-Hajj, Ibn Taymiyyah, Sadr al-Shari'ah, M. Häshim 
Kamäli, Wahbah Zuhayli, and so on. 
The fundamental sources of istihsän, namely ray and' ijtihäd form the subject 
of chapter 11. This area has been covered extensively in classical and modem works 
by a wealth of eminent scholars such as Amid-i, Ibn al-Qayyim, Bazdawi, `Abd al- 
`Azzz al-Bukhar , Ibn Khaldün, Ibn Hazm, Shafi`i, Ghazäli, Sarakhsi, Shawkäni, Ibn 
Taymiyyah, Isnawi, Qarafi, Ibn al-Humärn, etc. as well as western scholars such as 
Schacht, Hallaq, Emile Tyan, Noel 1. Coulson, George Makdisi, and Yasin Dutton 
and it is upon their works and other erudite contemporary individuals that I have 
drawn for inspiration in the development of this chapter. 
The heart of the study, namely the main arguments concerning the concept of 
istiIndn, is chapter III. In the definition of istilndn, linguistically and technically, I 
have referred to many classical dictionaries such as Ibn Manzür's "Lisän al-'Arab", 
Jowhar s "Taj al-Lughah and 5thrrh al- `Arabiyyah", Zabldi s "Týrj al-'Aras from 
Jawilhir al-Qämüs", Fuvzabädi s "Qämüs al-Muff. I have also referred to classical 
and modem usül al-fiqh (principles of Islamic law) books whilst introducing scholars' 
viewpoints and arguments about istitudn. Several previously neglected works have 
been used extensively in the research for this chapter, and also throughout the study. 
On the application of istitVdn, my main sources were Sarakhsrs "Kitäb al-MabsüP' 
and his "Usül", Jassäs's "Al-Fusül f al-Usül", Abü Yüsuf s "Kititb al-Kharäj"and 
"Kitäb al-Atha? ', Ibn al-Humäm's "Sharp Fath al-Qadir", Shaybäni's 'W-Apr' and 
"Al-Siyar al-Kabis", Sha`bän Muhammad Isniä`il's "Al-Istihsän Bayn al-Nagariyyah 
wa al-Tamiq", Madihah 'Ali `Abd al-Häfiz's "Al-IstiIndn wa Atharuh fi Binä' al-Figh 
al-Islämi"', Ridwän Aremü Yüsuf's "The Theory of Istikdn in Islamic law", 
Muharrem Önder's "h(anaf Mezhebinde Istihsän Anlaytsz ve Uygulamast" and so on. 
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Besides these sources, other primary source materials have also been used; a complete 
list of sources is presented in the Bibliography. 
I have made an effort to access as many sources as possible. To this end I 
travelled to Egypt twice, spending approximately four months on my second trip, and 
travelled to Jordan and Saudi `Arabia as well as Turkey. I conducted research in the 
places mentioned at many independent and university libraries, as well as through 
personal discussions with eminent scholars such as Prof. Muhammad `Ali Sawwä', 
University of Jordan Faculty of Shad'ah; Dr. Ahmad al-Raissouni, the University of 
Muhammad Khamis, Rabat; Prof. Muhammad M. `Abd al-Latef Jamal al-Din, 
University of Al-Azhar; Prof. Dr. Orhan ceker and Prof. Dr. Ahmed Yaman Konya 
Selcuk University /Turkey; Prof. Taha Jäbir al-'Alwani, the president of the Fiqh 
Council of North America; and Ustädh Shaikh Shu'ayb al-Arnawntu in Jordan. 
Chapter N, on the different types of isti'zsän, draws almost entirely upon the 
classical and modem sources that I have introduced previously. Besides the previous 
sources, I have also benefited from the works of many contemporary scholars to 
develop my thesis, particularly on issues such as the concept of magäsid al-shari'ah. 
Some of the selected sources that I have referred to include Shätibi's "Muwäfagät", 
Ibn 'Ashnr's "Magdýid al-Shari`ah al-Islämiyyah", and "Nazarryyäh al-Magäsid' by 
Ahmad al-Raissouni, which is an academic dissertation on Imäm Shätibi. It 
investigates his perception of magäýid and is now a text book being taught at the 
University of Jordan by Muhammad `Ali Sawwä'. Other sources include `A11ä1 Fa-s s, 
"Magd. d', Juwayni's "Al-Burffin", Ghazäli s "A1-Mushza", Tiiff's "Risälah ft al- 
Massa, ah al-Mursalah" and "Shark Mukhtasar a1-Raw *ih", etc. 
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1.0 THE SOURCES OF ISLAMIC LAW 
As a starting point for understanding the concept of isti/zsän, an explanation of 
some basic components of Islamic law is necessary. Basically, all rulings of Islamic law 
are based ultimately on the Qur'än and the Sunnah. In other words, the ahkirm shari`ah 
(legal rules) are produced using particular methods and mechanisms which are applied to 
the general rules given originally by God Himself. 
Islamic legal theory is, in general, based on four sources' -the Qur'an, the 
Sunnah, ijmä ` (consensus), and q yäs (analogy)- which are unanimously accepted by all 
the Sunni schools of law. Shi'i and Zähi 1 legal theory is different. 
The Qur'an is the first source of law for Muslims who seek guidance. If one finds 
the answer within the Qur'an there is no need to resort to other sources. However, if one 
does not find his answers within the Qur'an, one should seek enlightenment from the 
Sunnah. If the required knowledge is not obtained from these two sources, one should 
look to ijmd' (consensus) for an answer; if the desired information is still not 
forthcoming, one must finally turn to q yäs (analogy). 
The tndith below, narrated from Mu`ädh ibn Jabal (d. 18/640), shows the 
sequence in which rulings are to be sought from the sources. Explaining the methodology 
of the jurists in discovering and applying the law, scholars usually quote this Tradition. 
When the Prophet intended to send Mu`ädh ibn Jabal to Yemen, the Prophet asked him: 
"How will you judge when the occasion of deciding a case arises? " He replied: "I shall 
1 The Qur'dn and the Sunnah are the two main sources of Islamic Legal Theory. However, the majority of 
jurists are of the view that Islamic law is based on four sources. It took the jurists considerable time to 
prove through the texts of the Qur'dn and the Sunnah that ijmä` is a valid source of law, and any that htrkm 
(ruling) based on it should be accorded the status of the fXskm of God. And glyäs was also successfully used 
to deduce the law from the Qur'än and the Sunnah. The law deduced by Qiyas and ijmä' are actually 
dependent on evidence from the two main sources. 
2 Imran Ahsan Khan Nyazee, "Theories of Islamic Law" Delhi 1996, p: 131. 
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judge in accordance with God's book. " The Prophet asked: "What will you do if you do 
not find guidance in God's book? " He replied: "I will act in accordance with the Sunnah 
of the Messenger of God. " The Prophet asked: "What will you do if you do not find 
guidance in the Sunnah of the Apostle of God and in God's Book? " He replied: "I shall 
do my best to form an opinion and spare no pains in my search for truth". The apostle of 
God then patted him on the chest and said: "Praise be to God who helped the messenger 
of the Apostle of God to find an answer which pleases the Apostle of God. "3 
Also, the same method of discovering and applying the law was used by the 
Companions of the Prophet. Mthrän bin Maymün reports that Abü Bakr (d. 13 Ali) 
referred to the Qur'an whenever a claimant-defendant asked him for guidance. If he was 
unable to find the result in the Qur'an, he would then seek a judgment in the Sunnah. 
Failing to discover the answer within these sources, he would then consult the righteous 
men of the community who would convene to discuss the matter and arrive at a solution. 
If they arrived at an opinion which was unanimously accepted, the consensus was that he 
should judge accordingly. `Umar and other companions of the Prophet applied these 
methods of judgment and consequently the Muslim community also accepted this 
procedure. 5 
This shows that Islamic Law is able to find answers for human problems and 
develops itself naturally. Based on Mu`ädh's answer, "I shall do my best to form an 
opinion and spare no pains" can we say that human opinion influences Islamic law? Is 
3 See Abü Däwud, "Sunan", tr. Ahmad Hasan (Lahore: sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1984 iii. 1019 ludfith no: 
3585. 
` ibn al-Qayyim Muhammad b. Abü Bakr b. Ay]b b. Sa'd Shams al-Din Dimishgi (d. 751/1350), "Y'läin al- 
Muwagqi'fn min Rabb al-'Älamin", edt: 'Abd al-Rahmän al-Wakil, Cairo v: 1 p: 51; Zaydän 'Abd al- 
Karim: ibid, p: 143. 
5 WahbahZuhayli, "U 1 al-Figh al-IslIImi', Där al-Fikr al-Mu'äsir, Beirut 1406/1986, v: 1 p: 418. 
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this a proof that Islamic Law can deal with any issues relating to human life? And, is 
Islamic law itself developing further and evolving over time? 
I. I. Definition of some Juristic terms: 
We shall now explain some important terms that are crucial to an understanding 
of the discipline of usill al-figh (the principle of jurisprudence), and thus for our central 
topic, which is isti? san. 
1.1.1 U)cQl: In certain cases, this is defined as something upon which another thing is 
constructed, be it material or spiritual; here it gives the meaning of foundation (asäs) 6 
The term a-s-l is used in the sense of the `Arabic word "ma, riar" (source). The term ucül 
is the plural of a#, and it is "something from which another thing originates or is 
sourced. " Thus, the origin of a thing is its asl that is the reason for translating the word 
ac! as "root" (judhr). It also means nasab (lineage and stock), `illah (cause and reason). 
Another meaning is hagiqi which means true, genuine, authentic and real. 7 
Technical applications of the word (a-s1) in Islamic Law are as follows: One of 
the uses of a-4; -1 is the meaning of dalil. The word dalil was applied to mean a guide 
leading a caravan, or scout finding the trail. In this sense, a directory, like a telephone 
directory, may be called a dalil, because it leads us to a number or an address. 
In Islamic law, the word darl is used in two ways: dalfl taf li is like an individual 
verse of the Qur'an or an individual Sunnah in a nth. We may refer to it as "specific 
evidence", though it is sometimes translated as "detailed proof'. For example, God says 
6 Mollah Husraw, Muhammad bin Firazmi Z (885/1480), "Mir'ät al-Usu1 Sharp Mirkät al-Wusül", Matha'ah 
al-Armrah, Istanbul, 1309. v: I p: 56 ; Laknawi, 'Abd al-'Ali Muhammad bin Nizäm al-Din Ansäri, Bahr 
al-'Ulüm, Abu al-'Abbas, Hand-1 (d. 1180/1767), "Fawätih al-Rahamüt sharp Musallam al-Subüt ft 0921 
al-Fiqh", Matba'ah al-Amiriyyah, Buläq, Cairo 1906, v: 1, p: 8; Ansärr, Abü Zakariyyah Shaikh al-Isläm 
"Ghäyat al-Wuszii sharp lub al-Ust-ei", MuAafä bib al-Halabi wa awlädub, 1360/1941 Cairo, v: 1, p: 18. 7 See Elias: ibid; Joseph Catafago: ibid; Hans Wehr: ibid; Nyazee: ibid, pp: 26-27. 
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"Forbidden to you (for marriage) are your mothers, your daughters, your sisters... ". 8 It 
indicates a hukm (rule), which is obvious, that marriage to mothers, daughters and sisters 
is forbidden. "And come not near to unlawful sexual intercourse... "9 This verse indicates 
ahukm (rule), which is also obvious: do not commit adultery. 
As compared to dalil taf ili (specific evidence), the daM ijmäli or kul1F is general 
evidence, because it contains within it a large amount of specific evidence. The datit 
ijmdl7 has nothing to do with direct, absolute order and prohibition. However, it produces 
general rulings as wujüb (necessity) and tahrim (prohibition). The Qur'an is general 
evidence: it contains a large number of specific evidences: 10 "And perform as--wlät"11 is 
the as! which makes prayer obligatory in the Qur'an. 
The word (a-sd) is also used to indicate the foundation upon which analogy is 
constructed. An example in the Qur'an: "0 you who believe! Intoxicants (all kinds of 
alcoholic drinks)... are an abomination of Satan's handiwork. So avoid (strictly all). "12 
This is the general prohibition of drinks which contain intoxicants. As ftadith confirms it: 
. "Every 
drink which contains intoxicant is khamr (wine) and every khamr is forbidden" 13 
Therefore, khamr is an original case (a-; -1) or basis for the prohibition of nabidh 
(fermented dates); the illah of intoxication is found in both, but is extrapolated from 
khamr, which is the ad. 14 
a Qur'an: 4123 
9 Qur'an: 17/32 
10 Ibn Amir al-Hajj Muhammad bin Muflammad Shams al-Din (d. 879) "Al-Tagrir wa a! -Takhbir 'ali 
Tahrer al-Kamäl ibn al-Humane fi 71m al-UsüY', Matba'ah al-Amiriyyah, Buläq, 1316, v: 1 p: 17; See 
Nyazee: ibid, pp: 27-28. 
" Qur'an: 2/43. 
11 Qur'an: 5/90. 
13 Abi Däwüd SulaymAn bin al-Ash'äs (d. 275/888) "Sunnan" iii, 1043, hadith no: 3672, tr. Ahmad Hasan, 
Lahore: MuFlammad Ashraf 1984. 
14 See Nyazee, p: 27. 
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In addition, asl is sometimes applied in the sense of the original rule. Hence, the 
maxim says: "AI-aýiu fi al-ashyä' al-ibaixih", which means the original rule for all things 
is permissibility. Another use of asl is that the meaning of general principles of 
jurisprudence (al-gawdi'd al-fiqhiyyah) governs the law and its interpretation. An 
example is "Id cfzrara walä afrär" which means "Harm is neither inflicted nor 
reciprocated in Isläms15 is an acl in the principle of Islamic Law. It also means al-rujhrrn 
(preference, preferability), and as jurists say: "al-a4 ft al-kalami al-fxrgiqah" which 
means in that literal meaning rather than metaphor is to be understood. 16 
Dalil (proof) is distinguished from amärah (indication), which literally means 
sign or allusion. A sign indicates the existence of a thing without the need for rational 
proofs like the minärdh of a mosque, and milestone of the road. " Dalli could only relate 
to evidence which leads to a definitive ruling or to positive knowledge (71m). Amarah on 
the other hand is reserved for evidence or indication that only leads to a zanni 
(speculative) rulingi. In this way, the term dalil could only be concerned with the 
definitive proofs, namely the Qur'an, the Sunnah, and ijmä', while the remaining proof 
which contains a measure of speculation, such as giyds, istihsän, istishdb, maAleh 
mursalah, etc, could fall under the category of amdrah (signs or allusions, probable 
evidence). However, most jurists consider both dalil and amärah whether qa `i 
is Ibn Mäjah Abü 'Abd Allah Muhammad (d. 2731886), "Sonn", ii, 784, hadith no: 2340, Istanbul, 1981. 16 See Laknaw% ibid, v: 1, p: 8; JamAl al-DIn 'Abd al-Rahim al-Fiusayn Isnawi Shäfi 7 (d. 772/1370), 
"Nihäyät al-Siel fi Sharhal- Minhdj al-U$ l ", Beirut 1982,1, p: 18. 
17 'Abd al-`AzTz bin Ahmad bin Muhammed, 'ALS al-Din al-Bukhär7. (d. 730/1329), "Shark Kashf al-Asrär 
'Ala Usül al-Bazdawi ', Där al Kutab al-'Arabi, Beirut, 1394, p: 1086. '" Amid, ibid: v: 1, p: 9. 
Chapter One (Introductory Chapter) 15 
(definitive) or ranni(speculative), as a dar! (proof). Amdrah becomes dali! if hukm shar i 
is deduced from it. 19 
After all these explanations of the concept of the term as! we can say that the term 
a, cl is actually dalil, which is a proof or an evidence of Islamic Law 2° 
The jurist seeks the dali! ijmdli or kulr (general evidence), yet the adillah al- 
tafsiliyyah (specific evidence) is the subject field of the mufti. Therefore, the usül al-figh 
(principles of Islamic Jurisprudence) is called adillah al figh a1-kulliyyah (proofs or 
evidences of general figh). 
The juristic scholars (usüli) define the term of usül al-figh in two separated parts 
as usül and figh. As I have covered the term of usül (plural of api) above, the term of fiqh 
now will be elaborated. 
1.1.2 Fiqh: In the linguistic sense, the term fiqh is synonymous with al fahm 
(understanding). 21 The Qur'an has used the word figh in its general sense of 
"understanding" as: `50 Shu'ayb! We do not understand much of what you say, '22 and 
"So what is wrong with these people that they fail to understand a single fact '123 , "They 
have hearts wherewith they understand not. "24 It implies an understanding of Islam and 
consideration of religion. The same meaning is also revealed in the zdith of the Prophet 
as saying: "He for whom God wills His blessings is granted the understanding of din. "25 
19 Tagiy al-Din Abii al-'Abbas Ahmad b. 'Abd al-HalTm Ibn Taymiyyab (d. 728/1328), "AI-Musawwadah fr 
U; W1 al-Fiqh", A1-Matba'ah al-Madani, Cairo 1964, p: 573. 
20 Abü 'Ali Badr al-Din Muhammad bin 'All Sbawkäni (d. 1250/1834), "Irshad al-Fuhi7l i1ä Talkliq al-hýaq 
min 'Iim al-U, W", Cairo 1937, p: 3; Ibn Amir al-ft: ibid, v: 1, p: 17. 
21 For the transformation of the Muslim understanding of the concept of frgh in the last two centuries, see: 
Murteza Bedir, "Fikih to Law: Secularization Through Curriculum", in Islamic Law and Society 11,3, 
Leiden, 2004, pp: 378-401. 
22 Qur'an: 11/91 
23 Qur'ärr. 4178 
24 Qur'an: 7/179 
25 Muslim: ibid, Kitab al-AmäralL 
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In addition the term, `ilm (knowledge) was used for the same meaning of figh 
(understanding) in the early time of Isläm, as the Prophet blessed Ibn 'Abbas (d. 68) 
saying: "Allahumma faqqihhu ft al-dirn" (0 God, give him understanding in religion) 26 . 
The Prophet could not have meant absolute knowledge of the law. However, it is clear 
that the Prophet meant a deeper understanding of Islam in general. 
The term figh also means kaläm, which Abt Hanzfah (d. 150) defines as "Ma `rifat 
al-nafsi mä lahd wamn `alayhd' which means "A person's knowledge of his rights and 
obligations i27. Al-Fiqh al Akbar which is attributed to Abü Han1fah (d. 150) against the 
beliefs of ahl al-gadar deals with the basic tenets of Isläm like faith, unity of God, His 
attributes, the life hereafter, prophecy, etc. These are problems which are dealt with in 
kaldm and not in the discipline of law. 8 
Fiqh is used for the meaning of exercise of intelligence as the Successors of the 
Companions of the Prophet at most werefugahd' (jurists), who gave legal judgments 
using their own intelligence and reason in solving legal problems, in that respect the term 
figh is also used for the knowledge of the law. 
Technically, the definition of fiqh is confined to Islamic law alone. Among the 
scholars, Shäfi`i s (d. 2041819) definition is widely known: "The knowledge of the legal 
rules (abkam al-shar'iyya), pertaining to conduct, have been derived from their specific 
evidences. " On the other hand "It is a compilation of the legal rules pertaining to conduct 
26 Muhammad ibn Sa'd (d. 230/844), "Al-Tabag4tal-Kubra", Beirut 1957, v: 2, p: 363. 27'Ubayd Allah Ibn Mas'nd bin Täj al-Shari'ah al-Hanafi , Sadr al-Shari'ah (d. 747/1346), "AI-Tawdihfi hhll lawamid al-Tangill', Karachi, 1979, pp: 22-25. Explaining the definition given by Abu Hanlfah, he 
says that it includes three things: 1-knowledge of the tenth of faith, 2-knowledge of ethics and mysticism 
(Sufism), 3-knowledge pertaining to acts. The first is covered by "'jim kaldm", the second by ethics and 
mysticism and the third by fqh. Therefore, he says if you wish to confine the definition to figh alone, that 
is, "Al-ftgh al Aftha? ', you must add at the end of the definition the word "'amalan" (with respect to acts). 28 Ahmad Hasan, "The Early Development of Islamic Jurisprudence", Islamic Research Institute, 
International Islamic University, Islamabad, Pakistan 1994, p: 3. 
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that have been derived from their specific evidences. "29 The definition of fiqh can be 
understood in stages. Then the meaning of fiqh will be the knowledge of the a? *äm al- 
shar`iyya. 
1.1.3 Usül al- fcgh: The meaning of uül al-fiqh (principle of Islamic jurisprudence) is 
combined by the understanding of the meaning of uAl and figh individually. The term of 
u, l al-fiqh now can be defined as: "The principles by the use of which the mujtahid 
arrives at legal rules through the specific evidences. s30 It is a discipline of Law, a kind of 
methodology, which explains the reasoning behind istilzrän (juristic preference), gyds 
(analogy), isti$ eb (presumption of continuity). These are taken from general evidences, 
the rules of interpretation, deduction and the sources of Islamic law. Usül al-fiqh also 
includes the kind of general evidences that are indicative to the ai m of God and the 
sources of Islamic law, as well as proofs or evidences on how to arrive at the altem. 
1.1.4 ANram: aWm (rules) is the plural form of hinan (rule), which means rule, 
command, the absolute, order, judgment, injunction, prescription, and decree. 1 This rule 
could be a rule of any kind; it is to command one to delegate an order to another whether 
approval or disapproval. You could say that the moon is rising or the moon is not rising, 32 
or that fire burns. 
Technically, it is considered a rule of Islamic law. Amidi (d. 631/1234)33 defines 
adillah as the science of the proofs of fiqh and the indications that they provide with 
regard to the al/rfrm of the shari `ah. The Ivkm shay i is therefore defined as: "A 
29 'Abd al-Ral)man bin Jad Allah al-Bannani, al-Maghribi (d. 119811784), "/tshiah 'aid Shari)laldl al-Din 
al-Mahttlli 'a1ä lam' al-lawdmi' ii Ibn Subki", Cairo 1937, v: I p: 32; Molla Husraw, "Mir'at al-Usüf', v: 
I. p: 50; $adr al-Shari'ah, "Al-Tawdi/Y', v: 1, p: 26. He did not use the word "al-muktasabah". 
30 'Uthman b. 'Amr b. Abü-Bakr b. Y inns Abra 'Amr Jamal al-Din Ibn Häjib (d. 646/1249), "Mukhtag r 
Muntahd' a1-Shc wa a! - : Aal ", Constantinople, al-Maktabah al-Islämiyyah, 1310, v: l p: 4. 31 See: Elias: ibid; Joseph Catafago: ibid; Hans Wehr; ibid. 
32 Zuhayli: ibid, v: 1, p: 21. 
33 Amid!, v: 1, p: 7. 
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communication from God, the Exalted, related to the acts of the subjects through a 
demand or option, or through a declaration. " 
The above definition of al-hukm is found only amongst the usüli (juristic 
scholars). The first point of the definition is that any communication must be from God 
otherwise it is not accepted and cannot be considered as a hukm. This communication is 
related to the actions of the mukallaf (subjects). The relationship also enables the 
mujtahid (jurist) to evaluate the requirements, and to judge whether it is for the command 
for the act or the prohibition. God says "0 you who believe! Observe yawm (fasting)" 35 
This contains a Man which demands obedience. "And come not near to the unlawful 
sexual intercourse. "36 This verse contains a hukm which requires prohibition. 
The hthn (rule) is clarified through a request ((ulab or igtipä'). The request in this 
case is communicated in the form of a command of an act or its prohibition. The request 
may or may not be binding. When the request is binding, it creates wujüb (an obligation) 
or tahrim (prohibition), which are established by darf gat'i (definite proof). When the 
request is not binding, then the ruling creates nadb (recommendation) or makrüh 
(discouraged), which are established without definitive proof. God says "0 you who 
believe! Fulfil (your) obligations. 07 This verse is addressed to the mukallaf (subject), and 
consists of a particular demand. And "0 you who believe! Let not a group scoff at 
another group, it may be that the latter are better than the former. .. ". 
38 This Qur'anic text 
conveys a prohibition to the mukallaf. The freedom of choice is given to the mukallaf 
(subject) a choice to commit the act or avoid it. 
34 $adr al-Shari'ah, ibid, v: 1, p: 13; Bannani, "/ shiah, v: 1 p: 32; Nyazee: ibid, p: 64. 
35 Qur'an: 2/183 
36 Qur'an: 17/32 
37 Qur'an: 5/1 
39 Qur'an: 49/11 
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On the other hand if the subject is free to perform the act it is known as mubah 
(permissible). For example `But when you finish the ihram pilgrimage (of (ijj or 
`umrah), you may hunt... "39 This hulan conveys an option for the mukallaf (subject) and 
he has the freedom to act or not to. As a final point of the definition, the communication 
may be clarified through an enactment or declaration; this is neither a demand nor an 
option. However, it is in relation to an act which is connected to another act by reason of 
sabab (cause), shart (condition) or mirni ` (impediment). "... and hrljj to the House is a 
duty that mankind owe to God for those who can afford the expenses. .. i40 Financial 
ability is the condition for the application of the rule 4' 
The identification of hukm shay'! is perceived differently between the usülis 
(juristic scholars) and the fugahä. For instance God says "And perform al-, vläts42 which 
is a hukm shar`F itself according to the usülss. However, according to the fugahä', it is the 
effect or the result of the demand in this verse, namely the wujüb (obligation), which 
represents the hukm spar i 43 
Basically, hukm shar'T (legal rule) is divided into two main categories: the first is 
al-talon al-takrfi (the obligation, creating rule, defining law) and the other is al-hukm al- 
watfi (declaratory law). In contemporary common law, Hart has divided it into primary 
and secondary rules. The only difference is that the rules of Islamic law are based on 
religious law. The Muslim jurists designate the category of primary rules as al-bahn a! - 
takilf (defining law). The category of secondary rules is designated as the al-faukm al- 
79 Qur'dn: 5/2 
40 Qur'än: 3/97 
41 Abu iiätnid Muhammad ibn Muhammad Ghazäli (d. 505/1111), "A1-Mustaya' min 'Jim al-U 21', al- 
Maktabah al-Tijäriyyah Cairo 135611937, v: I p: 42; Shawkäni, "Irshad" p: 6; zuhayll, "U1" pp: 37-43. 
42 Qur'än: 2143 
43 $adr al-Shari'ah, "Al-Tawdi/1' v: 1, p: 13; Isnawi, "Sallam al-Wusül' v: 1, p: 24. 
The Sources of Islamic Law 20 
waci i» Al-hukm al-taklift (defining law) is a communication from God, the exalted, 
related to the acts of the mukallaf (subjects), which consists of a demand or an option; it 
arises in the five categories of wajib or farcl (obligatory), mandüb (recommended), 
makrüh (adversity), kzräm (prohibited) and mubah (permissible). In addition, the Hanafi 
school deduces seven varieties from the same definition: 1. far(i (obligatory) 2. wä ib 
(obligatory) 3. mandüb (recommended) 4. makrüh karä/xrt al-tahrim (strongly 
disapproved) 5. makrüh kard/m al-tanzih (disapproval) 6. hriräm (prohibited) 7. mubäh 
(permissible). 
Al- hukm al-watt i is a communication from God which is related to the acts of the 
mukallaf (subject) in a manner that is declaratory. It is classified into: 1. sabab (cause) 2. 
shart(condition) 3. mäni`(impediment). 45 
1.1.5 Shar`yyah: Shar`iyyah derived from "sh-r-`a (legal); ta-sh rr-`a" (legislation), it 
excludes al-ahkäm al-hissiyyah (law of sense perception: for instance fire burns, wood 
floats on water, the sun shines), al-af*&n al-`agliyyah (rational rules, for instance one is 
half of two, etc. ), al-ahkäm al-lughawiyyah (linguistic rules, like the doer of an act is 
called the subject) and al-a/aam al-wad`ryyah (declaratory rules). 46 
1.1.6 `Amallyyah: al-at"m al-`amaliyyah are divided into three types: fi`li (physically), 
galbi (which takes place in the heart) and gawli (relating to speech). The physical acts, as 
the acts of prayer, murder, homicide, the galbi acts as intention, love, hate, etc. and gawli 
acts as recitation during prayers, offer and acceptance in a contract, etc. 
44 Herbert Lionel Adolphus Hart, "The Concept of I_aw" pp: 77-96 quoted from Nyazee: ibid: pp: 57-5 8. 
°s Zuhayli, ibid, v: 1, p: 37; Khalläf, 'Abd al-Wahhäb (d. 1376/1956), "'Ilm Usül al-Figh", 12th edn. Dar al- 
Qalain, Kuwait 1398/1978. See for the use of English terminology: Nyazee, ibid; Muhammad Häshim 
Kanal-1, "Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence", Islamic Text Society, 1997, Cambridge, pp: 321-353. 
46 Bannäni, ibid, v: 1 p: 33, Isnawi, "Sallam al-Wusül", v: 1, p: 25. For more about Shan-'ah see: 'Abd al- 
RahrnAn I. Doi, "Shari'ah the Islamic Law", Ta Ha Publishers, London, 1997. 
46 Qur'än: 2143 
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According to Imäm al-Räzi (d. 606) the meaning of the term al-`amaliyyah does 
not contain all of al-atcam al-fiqhiyyah, since al-atkam al-fiqhiyyah contains also namrT 
(theoretical) rules 47 Some sources of law such as ijmä' (consensus), giyäs (analogy) are 
considered to be na? nri (theoretical). Al-al*äm al-`amalryyah excludes al-at/cam al- 
i `tigädiyyah, which is belief in the existence of God, His oneness, His qualities, the truth 
of the mission of the Prophet, belief in the Day of Judgment etc. 
1.1.7 Adillah: is a plural of datil, which contains the meanings of ishärah (indication, 
sign, token, and symptom), murshid (guide, conductor), burhäm (proof, evidence), and 
shähid (witness). It also means "kitäbun yustarshad bihi' (guide book, itinerary), or 
jihrist (index) 48 Linguistically dalil means that which leads or guides to anything 
sensible or moral. The term means in a literal sense a proof, evidence, indication or guide. 
Technically al-dalil means a proof or evidence of a practical hukm (rule) of the 
shad'ah which is inferred. It is also defined as something which guides one to the 
practical rule of the shari'ah by the correct understanding. 49 
One of the main features of the Islamic shad'ah is that it is based on evidence or 
proof deduced from the Qur'an or the Sunnah through ijtihid which conforms to these 
two sources of Islamic law. Consequently, it can be stated that the sources of Islamic Law 
are mainly either revelation or non-revelationso: 
Revelation is considered to be of two types: 
47 Isnawi, "Sallam al-Wusul", v: 1, p; 26; Molla Husraw, "Mar'at al-Usul', v: 1, pp: 48-54. 
48 Elias A. Elias, "Elias Modern Dictionary", 5`h edition, Cairo, 1950; Joseph Catafago "English and Arabic 
Dictionary", London, 1958; Hans Wehr "A Dictionary of Modem Written Arabic", edited by J. Milton 
Cowan, 4th edition, Germany, 1979. 
49 Zuhayll, ibid, v: 1, p: 417. 
50 Ismail Sha'bAn Muhammad, "U171 al-Fiqh al-Muyassar", KitAb al-Jämi' Tawf giyyah, Cairo, 1994, v: 
1, p: 47. 
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1. Al-wafry al-matlü or wary ähir (recited or manifest revelation), which is defined as 
communication from God to the Prophet Muhammad, conveyed by the angel Gabriel, i. e. 
the Qur'an. 
2. Al-wafry ghair al-matlü or wahy bäßn (un-recited or internal revelation). This consists 
of the inspiration (ilhäm) of concepts only: God inspired the Prophet and the latter 
conveyed the concepts in his own words, i. e. the Sunnah, which comprises the sayings 
ahädith of the Prophet s' 
Non-revelation refers to ijmä` (consensus of mujtahidt-n of the Muslim 
community), gyös (analogy) or istidO (inference). In addition, I äm al-Shätibi 
(d. 790/1388) divided the sources of the shari`ah into two types: either pure transmitted 
(al-nagl al-mahd or pure opinion (al-ray al-maho. Opinion (ray) is not considered as a 
source of sharI'ah unless it is based on transmitted proof52. 
Another classification of adillah shari`ah is the gat`F (definitive) and the ? unni 
(speculative). 53 
The adillah shari`ah have also been categorized into transmitted (nagli) and 
rational (agli). The transmitted proofs, adillah nagliyyah, are the Qur'an, the Sunnah, and 
ijmä `. Two other transmitted proofs are the rulings of the Companions and the laws 
revealed prior to the advent of Islam. (spar` man gablanä). Rational proofs are adillah 
`aglryyah namely giyas, istiWb, etc. 54 Adillah is further classified by al-Amidi 
st ZuhaylY, ibid, v: 1, p: 417. 
52 Abü Ishi; q Ibrähim bin Müsa al-Ghirn5G' Shätibi (d. 79011388), "Al Muwirfagät j-UA al-Shari'ah", ed. 
'Abd-Allah Diraz. Där al-Ma'rifah, Beirut, v: 3 p: 36. 
33 Abü 'Ali Badr al-Din Muhammad bin 'Ali Shawkänl (d. 125011834), "Irsiwd al-Fuhul ilä Ta/kgiq al-hk q 
min 'Ilm al-U21", Cairo 1937, p: 47; Abu al-'Aynayn Badran, "Upl al-Figh al-Islänu", Muassasah 
Shabäb al-Jämi'ah, Alaxandria, 1404/1984, p: 53. 
Badrän, "Use! al-Figh al-Islämi", pp: 54-55. 
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(d. 631/1233) into mustaqil (independent) -such as the first three sources of the sharz `ah- 
and muqayyad (dependent) ., 
55 
The sources of the shad 'ah are further divided into two types: 
A. Unanimously accepted sources: 1. the Qur'än, 2. the Sunnah, 3. ijmä', (consensus), 
4. giyäs (analogy). 
B. Controversial sources: 1. istihsän (Juristic Preference), which is the main subject of 
this research, 2. masia/aah mursalah (consideration of public interest), 3. isti#. V-b 
(presumption of continuity), 4. qawl a1-$aizibi (The sayings of a Companion of the 
Prophet), 5. `urf (custom), 6. sadd al-dharä'i ` (blocking the means), 7. shar' man 
s 
gabland (revealed laws preceding to the shari `ah of Islam) and 8. istigrä' (induction) 
6 
The sources of spar 'ah are identified in the Qur'an as follows: "0 you who 
believe! Obey God and obey the Messenger (Muhammad) and those of you (Muslims) 
who are in authority. (And) if you differ in anything amongst yourselves refer it to God 
and His Messenger. "57 The reference to Qur'än is pointed out in the verse as "Obey God" 
and the reference to the Sunnah as "Obey the Messenger". Ijmä' is also referred to in the 
idea of obedience to "Those of you who are in authority" and the last part of the verse "If 
you differ in anything amongst yourselves refer it to God and His Messenger" which 
requires the referral of disagreement to God and His Messenger, is in effect a clear 
authorisation for the principle of gyds 58 
55 'Ali bin Abt `Ali Muhammad bin Sälimt Al-Tha`labi, Sayf al-Din Al- Amidi (d. 631/1233), "Al-Ihkäm fr 
U$ l al-Ahknm", ed. `Abd al-Razzäq `Afifi, 2nd cdt Maktabah al-Islämi Beirut 1402/1982, v: 1, p: 260. 
56 Controversial sources number as many as 45. (See TO, "Risalah al-Ma$ahah") 19 of them, as Qäsimi 
indicated, were daläil quoted from Qarafi (d. 684/1285); Qäsimi then discovered 26 more by the way of 
induction (istigra). See: Kasif Hamdi Okur "Magä¢id ve Icti/xid', in Islamic Legal Philosophy 
Researches, Yediveren, Konya, 2002, p: 275. 
57 Qur'an: 4/59 
saKamälT, "Principles", p: 10. 
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1.1.8 Muklasabah: means that which is obtained, thus, any type of knowledge which are 
not obtained are not considered as fgh. 59 The obtained knowledge is the knowledge of 
the jurist (fagih) and the follower (mugalli4 The term al-muktasabah excludes the 
knowledge of the char i altem (legal rules) which pertains to man's knowledge of God. 
This knowledge is not granted by the way of performing YAW but only by way of divine 
revelations concerning God's angels and prophets etc 60 Finally, adillah taf 1iyyah 
(specific'%vidences) which is excluded from the definition offiqh, thus the knowledge of 
the mugallid (one who follows the opinion of another)- is different from the knowledge of 
jurists and the knowledge of the leaders of the schools of thought 61 It is not permitted for 
the mugallid to obtain his knowledge of figh directly from the Qur'dn and the Sunnah. 
However, a faglh can obtain his knowledge from the Qur'än and the Sunnah directly. 
1.2.0 Unanimous sources of Islamic law 
1.2.1 The Qur'8n 
The first unanimously accepted source of Islamic law is the Qur'an which is not 
only the first source of Islamic law but also, as far as it is concerned, is the only source 
and all other sources are explanatory to the Qur'an. Alternatively, all other sources are 
dependant on the Qur'än in respect of the focal principle of Islamic law. 
1.2.1.2 The Qur'dn in 'Um a1-upiIf at figk:. 
The theologians when discussing the attributes of God, define Qur'an as the 
meaning of the essence of God expressed in utterances or words, yet the `ulam4' al-usul 
treat the Qur'an as a connection of utterances from which al*äm (practical rules) may be 
derived. Here the utterances are `Arabic words. Consequently, they define Qur'an as 
$adr al-Shari'ah, "AI-Tawdtlf', v: I p: 26. 
60 Ibn al-Häjib, "Mukhra$ar" v: 1, p: 25; Ibn Amir al-Hajj", AI-Tagrrr wa al-TakhbL', v: I p: 20. 
61 Mollah Husraw, "Mir'at al-U. iel", v: I p: 56; Isnawl, "Sallam al-Wash! "; v: i, p: 27. 
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derived. Here the utterances are `Arabic words. Consequently, they define Qur'än as 
Arabic utterance or words indicating or explaining the meaning of the speech of God sent 
down to the Prophet, conveyed by the Angel Gabriel and written in the book, transmitted 
to us by tawätur (continuous testimony). It is a proof of the prophecy of Muhammad, the 
most authoritative guide for Muslims and the first source of the shari `ah62. It should be 
noted that some words of non-Arabic origin occur in the Qur'an but this usage is 
confined to odd words. A phrase or a sentence of non-Arabic origin does not occur in the 
Qur'an 63 
1.2.1.3 Characteristics of the Qur'8n: 
The definition of the Qur'an reveals the following obvious characteristics: 
a- Any speech other than that of God is excluded. 
b- Any non-Arabic speech of the previously revealed books is excluded. 
c- Any Arabic non-revealed speech including the Sunnah and ¬vdith qudsi 154 is excluded. 
d- Any part that is not established by continuous testimony, such as variant readings, is 
excluded. 
e- Any revelation sent down without the challenge of i jäz (inimitability) such as previous 
revelations and the Sunnah is excluded65. 
62 Bannäni, "", shiah", part 1, p: 223. 
63 Mal müt Shaltüt, "A1-Islam 'Agidah wa Shari 'ah", Maktabi Dar al-Qalam, Kuwait, 1966, p: 23. 
64 hfadith qudsi or holy I dith is a sub-category of hadith which is saying of the Prophet. It is considered to 
be the word of God, repeated by the Prophet and recorded on the condition of an isnad (chain of 
verification by authorities who heard from the Prophet) but this report is not part of the Qur'an. 
65 Ghazäli, "Al-Mu2a "', Al-Maktabah al-Tijaziyyah Cairo I356/1937, part 1, p: 68; Abü Muhammad 
Muwaffiq al-Din, 'Abd Allah bin Ahmad bin Muhammad bin Qudämah, Al-Magdisi (d. 62011223): 
"Raw ih al-Naar wa Jannat al-Manälfr", Matba'ah al-Salafiyyah Cairo, 1342, part: 1. p: 184; Imam Abi 
'Abd Allah Muhammad bin Idris Shaft'! (d. 204/819), "A1-Risdlah", ed. Muhammad Sayyid Mani, 2nd 
edn, Mustafa al-Bäbi al-Halabi Cairo, 1983, p: 41. 
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1.2.1.5Aficära (ordinances) of the Qur'an: 
The Qur'än ordinance /legislation cover several aspects of the life of the mukallaf 
(the subject). The a/ikäm include the following types: 
1- A/i<im i `tigddTTyyah (creed/ convictional). 
2- A/*im khulugryyah (ethical and moral). 
3- A, kdm `amaCryyah (practical): This type of a/iäm is related to sayings, actions, 
contracts and behaviour of the mukallaf (the subject). AlMm `amalriyyah is the fcgh of the 
Qur'än and is the aim of `ilm u. ci 1 al figh (principles of jurisprudence). They are 
classified into two types: 
a- A/*am a1-`ibäddt (worship or devotional matters) which regulate the relationship 
between the mukallaf and his God such as prayers, fasting, zakäh (alms), (ajj 
(pilgrimage). 
The a/I am in the Qur'an about `ibädat (worshipping) consists of approximately 90 
verses. 
66 
b- Abram al-mu'&=I& (transactions) which regulate the dealings of the mukallaf with 
others as individuals or groups, such as commercial, civil, criminal, constitutional, 
international, economical and financial legislations67. Of these, family matrimonial law 
accounts for 70 verses; law of contracts and torts accounts for 70 verses; judiciary 13 
verses; criminal law 30 verses; administrative law 10 verses; international law 25 verses 
and fiscal law about public revenues, public expenditures altogether are 317 verses 
6B 
M. Mustafa- Azami, "Al-Mustashriq Schacht wa al-Swuzah a1-Nabawiyyah", Riyad, 1985, p: 77. 
67 Khalläf, "'Ibn", p: 33; Zuhaili, ibid: part 1, p: 438; Zakiy al-DTn Sha`bän, "U i", p: 42. 
68 Khalläf, ibid: pp: 32-33; Zaydan. "Al-Wajizfi Upil al-Figh", pp: 126-127; Fahrettin Atar, "Fikeh Usulil", 
MÜIFY, Istanbul, 1996, pp: 33-34; See: M. Mumma Azami, "Al Mustashriq", pp: 74-77. According to him 
ahEnm verses reaches up to 393. 
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1.2.2 The Sunnah: 
The concept of the Sunnah is also unanimously accepted as the second source of 
Islamic law (shari `ah). The Sunnah of the Prophet is a proof of Islamic law, and attests to 
the Qur'än's authority. As the Qur'än indicates the Prophet's teachings are also divinely 
inspired. "Nor does he speak of (his own) desire. It is only a revelation revealed. "69 
Therefore, the Prophet's words are hujjah (dalil, evidence, proof) for Muslims; and may 
have power like that of the Qur'an. The Qur'an commands submission to the Prophet and 
makes it a sense of duty for Muslims to bow to its judgment and its authority without 
question. As is indicated in the Qur'än: "And whatever the Messenger (Muhammad) 
gives you, take it and whatsoever he forbids you, abstain"70 "He who obeys the 
Messenger (Muhammad), has indeed obeyed God '71. 
The word Sunnah is derived from the root verb s-n-n, which the `Arabs used to 
describe the continuous and gentle flow of water; the water flows so gently it appears as 
one cohesive body72. The literal meaning was used by `Arabs to describe a clear path or 
to imply a customary practice, or an established route of conduct whether good or bad; 
this conduct was set by an individual or a community. The opposite of the Sunnah is 
bid 'ah (innovation), which is characterised by lack of precedent or continuity with the 
past. Azhari (d. 3701980) maintains that Sunnah is the good path only, hence the term ahl 
al-sunnah which means those who follow the Sunnah correctly73. It also means "The 
69 Qur'än: 5313-4. 
70 Qur'an: 59/1 
71 Qur'dn: 4/80 
72 Ibn Manzür, ibid: part 17, p: 92. 
73 Abü Mansur Muhammad b. Ahmad AI-Azhar (d. 370(980), "Tahdbib Al-L. ughah". al-Dar al-Misriyyah, 
Cairo, 1966, part 4, p: 298. 
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trodden path and was used by the pre-Islamic `Arabs to denote the model behaviour 
established by the forefathers of a tribe. "74 
As a general legislative term, the Sunnah is used to imply the practical reality of 
Islamic shari'ah and its concepts, whether it came from the Qur'an, With or was 
deduced from these two sources. In this manner, the Sunnah includes khabar (news or 
report) and athar about the Prophet and the precedent of the Companions. 
1.2.2.1 The Mu¢addithrn (narrators) refer to the Sunnah as all that is narrated from the 
Prophet, his acts, his sayings and whatever he has tacitly approved, in addition, all of the 
reports describing his physical attributes and characters before and after the revelations. 
Su}n1 (d. 91111505) reports Ibn I anbal (d. 241/855) as saying "For us the Sunnah 
refers to athar (impressions, impacts) of the Prophet, the Sunnah is the tafsir 
(interpretation) of the Qur'an and it is the dalä'il (indications or proofs) of the Qur'än". 76 
1.2.2.2 `Ulamä' of figh: the main concern for these scholars is to search for the kin 
(ruling) of shari'ah with regard to the acts of an individual or group. For these `ulamä', 
the Sunnah primarily refers to "Al-fzrigah al-muttaba'ah (the path followed or the way 
shown) in the religion, excluding fart/ / wäjib (obligatory)". Laknawi (d. 1304/1886) 
defines the Sunnah as an act which, when it is performed results in thawäb (reward) and 
when it is not performed, results in `itäb (blame) but not in 'igäb (punishment). 
According to Baidäwi (d. 68511286), the Sunnah refers to the mandüb (commendable), 
74 Fazlur Rahmän "Islam", London, 1966, p: 44. 75 Shawkäni, "IrsirM', p: 33. 76 Jaläl al-Din 'Abd al-Rahm9n bin AT Bakt bin Muhanunad bin Säbiq al-Din al-Khudayr7 al-Suyüti (d. 
911/1505), "Muftah al-Jannah fi al-Ihtijdj bi al-Sunnah", Beirut 1987, p: 46. 77 Laknawl, "Tuhfat al-Akhbär fi Ihyä' Sunnah Sayyid al-Abrdr", "Al Bid'ah", p: 119-120. See in M. 
Ismä'f Sha'ban. "U$-d al-Figh al-Muyassar", v: 1 p: 176. 
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which he defines as any act that will gain praise for the dutiful person and will not lay 
blame on the one who abandons the duty; such an act is called both Sunnah and näfilah7e. 
1.2.2.3 `Ulamd' of u il al-flqh: the main concern for the `ulamä' of uc1 al-figh is to 
search for a daltl shar'i (legal proof) with regards to the afkäm al-shariyyah (juristic 
rulings). Their search into the life of the Prophet is based on his position as messenger of 
God conveying the laws that govern the lives of people. The Prophet set the principles for 
mujtahidin (competent jurists) after him. 
Consequently their interest in the life of the Prophet is in his agwäl (sayings), 
of `äl (acts) and tacit tagrir (approval) of the acts or sayings of the Companions. They 
believe that the af>am legislate them as the second source of shari-`ah next to the Qur'än. 
For the 'ulamä' of usül al-figh, the Sunnah refers to whatever came from the Prophet in 
the form of a saying, act or tacit approval, other than the Qur'an 
79. 
The juristic usage of the Sunnah has two different meanings. According to the 
`ulamä' of usül al-fiqh, Sunnah refers to a source of the shari'ah (Islamic law) where 
legal proofs accompany the Qur'an. According to the 'ulamd' of figh (juristic scholars), 
the Sunnah primarily refers to a legal value, which falls under the category of mandüb. 
1.2.3Ijmä` (consensus): 
The Qur'än and the Sunnah are the main sources of Islamic law as mentioned 
above. Ijmä' is, in reality, subsidiary to them and applied when the original sources are 
silent on a certain problem. Ijmd' plays a very important role and undertakes the most 
essential role in the development of Islamic law in the history. Ijmä' is the third source of 
Shari `ah as the following verses and 'vdith indicate. 
78 Nasr al-Din 'Abd Allah bin 'Umar bin Muhammed bin 'Ali Al-Shiyrazi Baidhäwi (d. 68511286), "AI- 
Ibhäj fi Sharh Al-Minhdj 'ald' Minhaj al-Wu sl ild 'Ilm al-U ü1', Beirut, part: 1, p: 56. 79 Amidi, "Al-I/*. äm", part 1, p: 169; BaidhAwl, ibid, part 2, p: 170; Shawkäni, "Irshäd', p: 33. 
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The Qur'an: "0 who believe! Obey God and obey the 
Messenger (Muhammad) and those of you (Muslims) who 
are in authority. If you differ in anything amongst 
yourselves refer it to God and His Messenger, if you believe 
in God and in the Last Day. That is better and more suitable 
for final determination. "80 
There are different interpretations of `ulül amr (those in authority). They can be leaders, 
commanders of an expedition, scholars, jurists, the Companions of the Prophet, Abn Bakr 
and `Umar, and the Sultän81. `U191 amr, according to Fakbr al-Din al-Räzt (d. 606/1210), 
means the scholars. 82 
Shims` i quotes the following ayäh (verse) to support the authority for ijmä ` 
83 
"And hold fast all of you together the Rope of God (Qur'än), and be not divided amongst 
yourselves, "TM, In addition, here are some hndith: 
"My community shall never agree on an error. "85 "God will 
not let my community agree upon an error. " "I beseeched 
Almighty God not to bring my community to the point of 
agreeing on daldlah (error) and He granted me this. " "Me 
hand of God is with the community and (its safety) is not 
endangered by isolated oppositions. " "Whoever leaves the 
10 Qur'an: 4159 
81 Abü Ja'far Muhammad b. Jarir Tabari (d. 310/922), "Jami' al-Baydn Ta'wTI al-Qur'än", Egypt, Buläq, 
1329 viii, pp: 486-490. 
62 Muhammad b. 'Umar b. al-Husayn Abü 'Abd Allah Fakhr al-Din Räzi (d. 606/1210), "Mafati i al-Ghayb: 
Al-mushtahar bi-al-Tafsfr al-Kabir", al-Matha'ah al-Amirah al-Sharafiyah, Cairo, 1324-1327, iii, pp: 242- 
43. 
83 GhazalT, "A1-Musa. "', v: 1, p: 111. 
64 Qur'an: 3/113 
" Abü 'Abd Allah Muhammad Thu Majah (d. 273/886), "Sonn", 11,1303, hadith no: 3950, Istanbul, 1981. 
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community or separates himself from it by the length of a 
span is breaking his bond with Isläm. " "Whatever the 
Muslims deem to be good is good in the eyes of God. s86 
1.2.3.1 Definition of ijma': 
Ijmä ` is the verbal noun of the `Arabic word ajma `a , which is derived 
from (j-m- 
a'. ajma `a, ijmä `). The root meaning of ijmd' is "to collect, to gather up, assemble, and 
congregate". 87 
Ijma' has another meaning "composing and settling a thing that has been 
unsettled, as an opinion which one determines, resolves or decides upon. " Therefore, it 
stands for determining, resolving or deciding an affair so as to make it firmly settled 
(after it had been unsettled in the mind). Alternatively after considering what might be its 
issues or result, and saying at one time `I shall do this', and at another time, `I shall do 
that'. Hence the phrase, (ajma `tu `ala al-amr or ajma `tu al-amr) which means I 
determined, resolved and decided whom the affair. 88 The word ajma `a has another 
meaning, which is, to reach unanimous agreement. As an example: "ajma'a al-qawm `alä 
kadhä "' which means the people reached a unanimous agreement on such and such 
89. 
1.2.3.2 Technical Definition: ijmd ` is a unanimous agreement of the jurists of the 
Community of a particular era on a certain issue. 90 Amidi (d. 631/1233) defines it as: the 
unanimous agreement of the mujtahidin (competent scholars) of the Muslim community 
86 Ghäzäll, "Al-Musrasfd"', i, p: 111; Amid! "I/&inn", i, pp: 220-221. 
67 E. W. Lane "'Arabic English Lexicon" London, 1863; Ibn Manzür: ibid. 
so E. W. Lane: ibid; Abmad Hasan, "The Doctrine of ljmä' in Islam", Islamic Research Institute Islamabad, 
1992, p: 15. 
"Amidi, "Al-I/iuim" part 1, p: 101; Mas'üd bin 'Umar bin 'Abd Allah Sa'd al-Din Taftazäni (d. 793/1390), 
" Al-Talwih 'ald Al-Tawd/1' on the margin of 'Ubayd Allah bin Mas`nd Sadr al-Shari'ah", 'Isä al-Bäbi al- 
Halabi 1327/1957 Cairo, part 2, p: 41; Bukhäri, "Kashf, part 1, p: 946; Shawkäni, "Irshäd", p: 63; Ibn 
'Abd al-Shakür, Muhib Allah al-Bahar7 al-Hindry (d. 1119/1707) "Musallam al-7hubat ma'a Fawätihal- 
Rallzmüt fi Ucul al-Fiqh", Cairo 1906, part 2, p: 166. 
90 Bukhazi, "Kashf', Y. iii, p: 227. 
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of any period following the demise of the Prophet Muhammad on any matter. 
91 Ghazäli's 
view on ijmä' is an agreement of the community of Muhammad on a religious point. 
92 
Briefly ijmä ` is defined as the "agreement of the scholars". 3 Ijmä ` applies to all the 
religious legal questions and agreements on any point whatsoever (amr or amrun mä) 
94 
All problems relating to the shari `ah are covered by ijmd `. 
1.2.3.3 Types of ijma': 
Based on the way it is formed, ijmä' may be divided into two types: a- ijmä' 
gzrih, b- ijmä ` suküti. 95 
a-al-ijmä' a1-xrih (explicit ijmä' `aämah): occurs when all mujtahids (jurists) are united 
on a specific issue and express opinions which are unanimous. `Aämah in the context of 
ijmd' means the agreement of Muslims on the essentials of Ishim. It contains the 
fundamentals of religion over which there is no dispute, such as the necessity of prayer, 
fasting during Ramacn, the /aajj (pilgrimage), prohibition of adultery, of usury, and of 
marrying one's own mother or sister, etc. 
b- al-ijma' al-suk&i (tacit ijnO' rukhgzh): This occurs when some of the mujtahidin 
(jurists) of the community express an opinion on disputed issue and others, after 
examining the expressed opinion remain silent. The silence is a sign of acceptance. 
96 This 
kind of ijmd' is a presumptive ijmä `, which only creates a probability (mnn). 
91 Amidi, "Ihkcan", i, p: 196. 
Ghazäli, "Musaä"', i, p: 110. 
93 Ahmad bin Idris bin'Abd al-Rahman, Abü 'Abbas Sha'b al-Din al-Sanhäjl al-Milikl Qarafi 
(d. 684/1285), "Shark Tangi) al-Fu4Q71 ft Ikhtisär a1-Mah 921 fi al-U571", edt: TahM 'Abd al-Rauf Sa'd, 
Maktabah al-Azhariyyah, Cairo, p: 141. 
94 'Ubayd Allah Ibn Mas'Gd bin Täj al-Shari'ah al-lianafi $adr al-Shari'ah (d. 747/1346), 'Al-Tawcühfi 
WI Jawämid a1-Tangi 1', Matba'ah Muhammad 'ALT $abih, Cairo, ii, p: 41. 
95 Sha'bän, "U, fl", p: 45. 
96 GhazäLI, "Al-Mu9a'd"', v: 1, p: 121; Amidi, "Al-Ihkrnn", v: 1, p: 129; Shawkäni, "Irshäd', p: 74; Molla 
Husraw, "Mar'ät al-UNI", v: 2 p: 259; Laknawi, "Fawätihal-Ra/kzmüt", v: 2, p: 232; Ibn Amir al-ft, 
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Sarakhsi (d. 483/1090) states that God has not put the community in hardship, 
therefore the silence of scholars over an opinion will be considered sufficient for the 
validity of ijmä`. 97 Bazdawi (482/1089) indicates that ijmd' by silence is valid on two 
conditions: the opinion of a single scholar or a group of scholars should reach all the 
remaining scholars; and that the time of consideration of the disputed problem should 
lapse 98 Ghazäli (d. 505/1111) rejected the validity of ijma' sukütI saying that tacit 
agreement was neither an ijmä' nor an authority. 99 
ljmä' is also sub-divided into the following categories: 1-religious-legal (shar'i), 2- 
worldly (dunyawi or ghayr shar`l), 3-intellectual ('agiT), 4-sensory (hissi) 5-customary 
('urfi), 6-etymological (lughawi)10°. 
1.2.3.4 Arkdn (essential requirements) of ijmd`: 
It is obvious from the definition of ijmä' that the pillar or prerequisite of ijmd' is 
the consensus of the competent scholars (ittifäq al-mujtahidin) and without a unanimous 
agreement no ijmä ` will materialise. Similarly, the condition that all mujtahidin should be 
from the Muslim community is in fact a condition that the mujtahidl-n themselves have to 
fulfil and does not constitute an independent rukn (condition) of the agreement. Also, 
where there is only one mujtahid in the Muslim community or mujtahidin of a certain 
locality, race, colour, school or following, no ijmd ` is expected to materialise; nor does it 
constitute an essential requirement (rukn) of the agreement in question. They are merely 
"al-Tagrir", v: 3, p: 101; Bukhäfff, "Kashf', p: 2 p: 948; Isnawº, "Sallarn al-Wusül", v: 2, p: 375; Bannänl 
"trwhiah", v: 2 p: 163. 
97 Muhammad bin Ahmad bin Sahl Abra Bakr Shams al-Aimmah al-Hanafi Sarakhsi (d. 483/1090), "Al- 
U F', edt: Abu al-Waf-a' al-Afghäni, Där al-Fiqr , Beirut, 1991, v: 
1, pp: 305-306. 
"'Ali bin Muhammed bin 'Abd al-Karim Aba al-Hasan Fakhr al-Isläm al-Bazdawi al-Hanafi (482J1089), 
"11921 A1-Bazdawi on the margin of 'Abd al-'Aziz al-Bukhäri Khashf al Asrär", Istanbul 1308,, p: 339. 
Reprint, Beirut Där al-Kitäb al-Arabi 1394/1974. 
" Ghazäli, "Al-Mus a, ß'ä "', i, pp: 121-122. 
100 Ahmad Hasan, "The Doctrine of IjnO' in Islam", p: 104. 
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conditions and controlling factors to achieve the agreement which is the pillar of ijmä`IOI. 
Ghazäli 102 maintained that the layman's opinion should be taken into account because of 
the hridith "My community does not agree on error", which includes both laymen and 
mujtahid. Ismah (infallibility, immunity from making errors) is a grace of God bestowed 
on the whole community and is the doctrinal basis of ijma"03. Bazdawi 
(482/1089)104suggested that no discrimination should be made between the laymen and 
the jurists regarding the essentials of the faith; ijmä' is confined to the mujtahidEn only 
with regard to matters which require expert knowledge. 
1.2.4 QiyJs (analogical deduction): 
The fourth unanimous principle of Islamic law is analogy (giyäs) which is the 
developed version of opinion (ray). The tradition of Mu`ädh Ibn Jabal, which I have 
touched upon at the beginning of the thesis, is that the jurist was permitted to give his 
own opinion, and act upon it as a source of law for a solution. 
1.2.4.1 Definition of giyds: 
Qiyäs and gä'is are verbal nouns, which have the same meaning; measuring or 
ascertaining the amount, value or quality of something. It is derived from root q-y-s and 
that is why the scales are called migyäs. An Arabic idiom "gäsat al-thawba bi al-dhirä"" 
means the cloth was measured by the yardstick. '()5 
Qiyäs also means similarity, with a view to suggesting equality or similarity 
between two things whether sensible or moral. For example `I have compared this book 
with this book', 'Zayd compares with Khälid in intelligence and descent', 'this person is 
101 Zuhayli, "u9 ', part 1, p: 536-537. 
102, GhazäC, "Al- Musta ä", v: 1 p: 101. 
103 Amidi, "Al-Ihkäm", part 1, p: 226. 
1°4 Bazdawi, ibid: part 3, p: 239. 
103 Amid!, "Ihkäm", iii, p: 183 
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not evaluated with that person' which means they are not the same value. As the term 
gyäs is used for measuring and comparing, disagreement among `ulamd' emerged as to 
whether giyis in both of the meanings are real or whether one is real and the other is 
metaphorical. 106 
In the uAli (juristic) definition, technically, the gyäs is the extension or 
application of shad'ah value from an original case (ail), to a new case (far`), where the 
latter has the same effective cause (111ah) as the former. The original case is regulated by 
a given text (the Qur'än and the Sunnah), and giyäs seeks to extend the same textual 
ruling to a new case. '°7 
Amid! (d. 631/1233) gives some definitions of giyäs as follows: a- giyäs means 
attaining the truth, b- qiyas is the use of effort to derive the truth, c- giyäs stands for 
similitude, d- giyäs is an indication leading to the truth, e- giyäs is a knowledge acquired 
through reflection on a known case. 108 
Bagilläni (d. 403/1013) defines giyäs as: "To arrive at a judgement on (hnml) a 
known, using a precedent set with a previous, by establishing or rejecting a law on the 
basis of a connecting link (amr jdm'). "1°9 The Hanafi jurist, . idr al-Shari`ah ('Ubayd 
Allah bin Mas `üd d. 747/1346) defines giyäs as "extending the shar7`ah value from the 
original case (aýl) over to the subsidiary (far') by reason of an effective cause ('illah) 
which is common to both cases and which cannot be understood from the expression 
(concerning the original case) alone. "' 10 
106 Amidi, "Al-Mane', part 3, p: 183; Ibn `Abd al-Shakür, "Musallam al-Thubit", part 2, p: 246. 
107 Amidi, "Al-IMcern", part 3, p: 186; Shawkdnl, "Irshdd', p: 198; Kamäl! "Principles", p: 198. 
108 Amidi, ibid: v: 3, pp: 262-65. 
109 Amidi, ibid, v: 3, p: 273. See in Ahunad Flasan, "Analogical Reasoning in Islamic Jurisprudence", 
Islamic research Institute, Islamabad 1986, p: 101. 
110 Kamäli "Principles", p: 200. 
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Abü Bahr al-Jassäs (370/955) gave his own definition, stating "Qiyäs is nothing 
but the return of the parallel case (far') to the original (ad) on the bases of the idea or 
reason (ma`nä') which combines both cases and necessitates equality between the rules 
of law about them". 111 
The main sphere for the operation of human judgement in giyäs is identification 
of a common 711ah between the original and the new case. Once `illah is identified the 
rules of analogy necessitate the ruling of the text be followed without any interference or 
change. 
1.2.4.2 Arkin of giyäs: 
The essential requirements (arkän) of giyäs as indicated in the above definitions 
are summarized with the following explanation. 
The main requirement is the original case (a#), namely a ruling given in the text, and 
which the analogy seeks to extend to a new case. The second requirement is the new case 
(far') where a ruling is needed. The new case must not be covered by the text or ijmä' 
and must not result in altering the law of the text; this would mean over-ruling the text by 
giyäs. The third essential is the effective cause (`illah), which is an attribute (wasf) of the 
asi and is found to be in common between the original and the new case. The final 
element is the rule (hukm) governing the original case, which is extended to the new case. 
An example of q yäs is as follows: 
"0 you who believe! Intoxicants (all kinds of alcoholic 
drinks), and gambling, and al-ansäb, and azläm (arrows for 
seeking luck or decision) are an abomination of Satan's 
1ý1 Abt Bakr Ahmad b. `Ali al-Rä lJas$5$ (d. 370/981), "Al-Fupii fi al-Usul", edt: Ajil Jasim al-Nashmº, 
Wazäräh al-Awkäf wa al-Shu`ün al-Isl&niyyah, Kuwait 1988. Quoted from Ahmad Hasan "Analogical 
reasoning", p: 100. 
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handiwork. So avoid (strictly all) that (abomination) in 
order that you may be successful. "'12 
In this verse, the drinking of wine is clearly forbidden. If this prohibition is extended by 
analogy to nabidh, the original case (ash) would be wine that is forbidden by the Qur'an; 
the parallel case (far`) is nabidh; the cause (`illah) is intoxication, which is common to 
both cases, and the rule of law of the original case (hukm) is prohibition. Nabidh is also 
forbidden because of the same cause ('illah), which is intoxication, according to the nass 
(text) "Every intoxicant is khamr and every khamr is forbidden. "' 13 
The Hanafi jurist Bazdawi (d. 482f1088) confined the essential requirements of 
giyas to the common effective cause (`illah) alone. Both Bazdawi and Amid! 
(d. 631/1233) are of the view that the result of giyäs, namely the hukm al far` (ruling 
extended to the new case), should not be included in the essential requirements (arkirn) of 
giyäs. Isnawi has, on the other hand, included the huian al far` in the essential 
requirements of giy4s. 
114 
1.2.4.3 Variety of giyäs: 
Qiyäs is divided into three categories based on the strength or weakness of 'illah 
(cause)' 
15 Its types will be briefly illustrated. 
1- Qiyäs al-awlä (analogy of the superior). This is when the effective cause is more 
evident in the parallel case than the original case; it is then called giyds al-awlä. Giving 
an example we can illustrate the Qur'än text in respect of parents "Say not to them 
112 Qur'an: 5/90 
113 Sulaymän bin al-Ash`äs Abu Däwüd (d. 275/888), "Sunnan", iii, 1043, /adith no: 3672. Tr. Ahmad 
Hasan, Lahore: Muhammad Ashraf 1984. 
114 Amid!, "Al-II äm", part 3, p: 193; BukhAr , "U$I1", part 3, p: 344; IsnawT, "Nihäyät", v: 4, p: 53; 
I. amä1i, "Principles", pp: 200-216. 
III Isnawi, "Nihäyät", v: 3, p: 33; Amid!, "AI-I, '1 am", v: 3, p: 22; Ibn Abd al-Shakür, "Musallam", part 2, 
p. 320; Ibn `Ainir al-ft, "Al-Tagrtr", v: iii, p: 221; Baidhawi, "Al-Ibfrijft", v: 3, p: 18. 
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(parents) a word of disrespect, nor shout at them but address them in terms of honour. "' 16 
From this one may understand that rebuking or beating them is prohibited too, and in fact 
is even more obvious than verbal abuse -a deduction made based on analogy. 
2- Qiyäs al-musäwät (analogy of equals): This is when the `illah is common to both the 
parallel case and the original case, as deduced by analogy. An example is: "If they 
commit illegal sexual intercourse, their punishment is half that of free women. "' 17 The 
text of the Qur'an prescribes half the punishment for the bondswoman (slave women) if 
they are guilty of adultery. This rule will also apply to a male slave by analogy if they 
commit illegal sexual intercourse (zinä'); the punishment is fifty lashes. Making analogy 
over the bondman (slave) is the same punishment as that of bondswomen. 
3- Qiyäs al-adnd (analogy of the inferior): This is when the effective cause is less evident 
in the parallel case than in the original case. The prohibition of nabidh on the analogy of 
prohibition of wine and inflicting the same punishment for the drinking of nabr"dh fall 
under the category of giyäs. In this example the intoxication of nabidh is less in severity 
than that of wine. 
Qiyds has been divided into a further two categories: 118 
a- Qiyäs jally (obvious analogy): This type of giyäs is one where the inability to 
differentiate (nafy al fariq) between the original case and the parallel case is certain, or 
one where the possibility of differentiation is weak. It has been illustrated in the tradition 
of the Prophet by the analogy of a female slave with a male slave therefore the equation 
116 Qur'dn: 17123. 
117 Qur'än: 4125. 
"I Amid-e, "Al-Ifdcäm", v: 3, p: 63; Taftazäni, "Ik2shiyah", part 2, p: 247; Ibn `Abd al Shamir, "Musallam", 
part 2, p: 320; Molla Fiusraw, "Mir'ät al-UWI", v: 2 p: 336; Sadr al-Shag 'ah, "Al-Tawd1H', ii, p: 82; Ibn 
'Azmiyr al-ft, "AI-TagrIº", v: iii, p: 222; Ahmad Fiasan, "Analogical Reasoning", p: 83. 
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between the as1 (original case) and far' (parallel case) is obvious and the disagreement 
between them is removed by clear evidence. 
b- Q yas khafi (latent, hidden analogy) is one where the possibility of differentiating 
between the original and the parallel case is strong, or uncertain. Shawkäni illustrates this 
with a reference to the two types of wine, namely nabidh, and khamr. Nabidh is obtained 
from dates and khamr is obtained from grapes. The rule of prohibition is analogically 
extended to nabidh despite some difference that might exist between the two. 
119 In other 
words, the removal of uncertainty in the giyäs khaft, between the a, fl (original case) and 
far' (parallel case) is by means of presumption (tann). Qiyas khaft and giyäs al-adna are 
significantly parallel. Consequently, according to HanafT jurists, giyäs khafi is actually 
considered to be isti&an. 
120 
1.2.4.4 Various views over qiyas: 
The `ulamä' al-usül (juristic scholars) are in agreement on the necessity of giyäs 
in affairs of life (al-'umür al-dunyawfyyah) such as medicine and food. The `ulamä' are 
also in agreement on giyäs which came from the Prophet. However, regarding shar'i 
affairs (legal matters), the `ulamä' are not united. Is giyäs approved by shari `ah? There 
are five views: 
121 
1. The majority of jurists believe that giyäs is a source of legislation in sharl'ah and 
practical at*äm. According to Subki (771/1369) 
122 gyäs suits the religious communal 
119 ShawkänT, "Irshad", p: 222; Ibn Qayyim, i, p: 178. See in Karnali "Principles", p: 215, and 
Ahmad Hasan, ibid, p: 83. 
'2° Bukhäri, "Kashf ,, part: 2, p: 
1122; Taftazäni, "TalwiH', v: 2, p: 81; Ibn 'Abd al-Shakür, "Musallam", part 
2, p: 320. 
121 Ghazfili, "Al- Mustagd', part: 2, pp: 56,59,70; Amid-i, "Al-I/ cäm", part: 3 p: 64; Shäshi Ishäq bin 
Ibrähim Abü Ya`qüp al-Khorasäni al-Shäshi (d. 3251937), "U-991 al-Shäshi with 'Uradah al-I-Iawäshi , Delhi 
1303,, p: 91; Taftazäni, "Talwfh', part2 p: 53; Bukhäri, "U*r', part: 2 p: 990. 
122 Subki, 'Abd al-Wahhäb bin `Ali bin 'Abd al-Käfi Täjj al-Din al-Subki (d. 77111370), "Jam` al-Shar/) al- 
Jalal al-Maibltt 'Ala' Jam' al-Jawdmi "', Maktabah al Tijar yyah, Cairo, part: 2 p: 177. 
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requirement, and accords with the Qur'änic verse: "Consider, 0 you possessors of 
eyes! "123 Consideration in this context means attention to similitude and comparison 
between similar things. 
2. Both reason (`aql) and transmitted evidence (dalil naglT) indicate that acting according 
to giyäs is wäjib (obligatory). This is the view of Qaffal (d. 365) and Hasan al-Basri 
(d. 436/1044). 
3. Qiyas is wäjib for only two situations otherwise it is prohibited to act according to 
giyäs, this is the view of Qäshäni (d. 427), Nahrawäni (d. 390/999) and Däwüd al-Isfahänt 
(d. 270/884): 
a-The 'illah (cause) of the ail (original cause) should either be clearly stated or hinted at. 
b-The 'illah (cause) of the far' (parallel case) is more evident than in the original case. 
Their view is that 'aql has nothing to do with these two forms, neither with wäjib nor 
with tahrTm of giyäs, because the `illah is evidently clear (thäbitah bi yagm). 
4. Zähiri School and Shawk5ni (d. 1250/1834) held the view that giyäs is rationally 
permitted. However, they do not consider that it works in shari'ah. Ibn Hazm's claim is 
based mainly on two points: first one is that the nass (texts, verses) of the Qur'än and the 
Sunnah accommodate all incidents. The second one is that giyäs is an unnecessary 
addition to the na$s, therefore the giyas abuses the integrity of the text. ' 
5. Shi'ah Imamiyah and Naaäm (d. 221/836) from among the Mu`tazilah hold the view 
that to perform giyäs through reasoning in shari `ah is impossible 125. They concluded that 
1'3 Qur'dn: 59/2 
124 Abü Zahrah, Muhammad (d. 1395/1974), "Until al-Figh", Dir al-Fikr al-'Arabi, Cairo 1958, pp: 179-180. 
See in KamM "Principles", p: 220. 
125 'Ali Tagiy Fiaydart, "U$71 al-Istinbät', Matba'ah al-Räbitah, Baghdat 1959, pp: 259-73; Häshim 
Maghrüf Husayni, "Mabadi' al-'knmah Ii al-Fiqh al-Jaghfan"', DAr al-Nashr li al-Jam'ryyiyn Maktabah 
a1-Nab iah, Baghdat, p: 290. 
Chapter One (Introductory Chapter) 41 
the two different giyäs will lead to contradictions for one Nkm. These `ulamä' do not 
consider giyäs as a proof of shad "ah. 
Dihlawi (d. 1762) expresses the following statement stating the necessity of taking 
into consideration maiafah while performing giyäs: 
"When God had revealed to His Prophet a statute of the 
shad'ah and had demonstrated the wisdom and good reason 
for it, the latter was then qualified to operate with the 
consideration of expediency (macia/ah) set out to him, and 
to take the ma#ahah as the effective cause ('illah) and pivot 
of the stature. This was the giyäs practiced by the Prophet. 
The giyäs left to the community (ummah) is to find out the 
effective cause underlying a stature and to take that as its 
pivot" 
126. 
Given Dihlawi s acceptance of giyäs, his rejection of the use of ray and istihsän 
comes as ,a 
surprise, "For ray in connection with the shari-`ah leads to tahrif 
(distortion). 127 Hence the Prophetic tradition: "He who inserts into our religion something 
that is foreign is to be repulsed". This also has a bearing on anybody who makes use of 
istihsän advancing a discretionary opinion contrary to strict analogy for reasons of public 
 128 convenience . 
'? 16 Shah Wali Allah Dihlawr (d. 1176/1776), "f jjah Allah al-Bälighah", 1954/5,1,130, Delhi. Quoted 
from JMS Baljon, "Religion and thought of 
Shah Wali Allah Dihlawi", Leiden E. J. Brill, Netherlands, 
1986, p: 169. 
127 Dihlawi, "Tafhimati Ilähiyyah", Dabhel 1936, I, 40; 11,133. Quoted from Baljon ibid, p: 170. 
128 Dihlawi, "Hujjat Allah", I, 169. Quoted from Baljon, ibid, p: 170. 
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It is obvious that istitadn does nothing more than prefer the principle of ma 'afvh 
to giyäs. 129. In reality the principle of istihsän is not a judgment that is merely based on 
ra'y and personal masiafxih (benefit) but in contrast it is a method of activating the 
application of shari-`ah and the general purposes (magäid al- `ämmah), because one who 
performs istihsän must consider the shari `ah's purpose in any matter. For example 
performing giyds in a case would cause one to avoid maslahah and bring about mafsadah 
(harm) from a different angle. 130 In unexpected situations eventually istilzsän replaces 
qiyas. . 
1.3.0 Controversial sources of Islamic law 
In addition to the unanimous sources mentioned above, the Sunni schools consider 
other sources for Islamic law. These sources are somewhat controversial and not 
universally accepted by all Islamic schools of thought. 
This section focus on these further sources, with special emphasis on isti. sän. 
The main controversial sources of Islamic law are as follows: 
1. Istihsan (juristic preference), 2. Maclahah mursalah (consideration of public interest), 
3. Isti#0b (presumption of continuity), 4. Qawl al-Saheabr (the saying of the Companion 
of the Prophet), 5. `Urf (customary law), 6. Sadd al-Dharä'i ` (blocking the means), 
7. Shar' man Qablanä (revealed laws preceding to the shari`ah of Islam) and 8. Istigrä' 
(induction). 
These concepts are briefly outlined as below: 
1.3.1 Istifsamn (juristic preference): 
129 Shatibl, "A1-Muwäfagä", v: 1, p: 40. 
136 Ibid: v: 2, p: 233. 
131 Ibid: v: 4, p: 206. 
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The concept of istihsän is the main topic of my research and I will cover it in 
greater detail later. 
1.3.2 IstiF(*th (presumption of continuity) 
Like the other controversial sources, it is secondary to the Qur'an, the Sunnah, 
ijmä` and giyäs. Istis/vb is validated by the Shäfi`is, the Hanbalis, the Zahins, and the 
Shi'ah schools, but the Hanafis, the M51ikis and the Mutakallimnn, including Abü al- 
Hasan al-Basri, do not consider it as a source of shari `ah. 132 
1.3.2.1 Definition of istiiF/xib: 
Literally, the word istisffib comes from the root (c-h-b), from which verbs such as 
to accompany, to remain along with as opposed to separating or departing from, for 
example, the action of taking a book or a friend along whilst travelling is called 
istig4b. 133 
Technically, the jurists define istishiäb as "a ruling presuming that the present or 
future status of an issue continues to remain invariably the same as it was in the past, 
owing to the unavailability of a reason (evidence) to warrant the establishment of any 
changes of that status' 134 A similar definition considers istishäb as "believing that the 
existence of something in the past or present renders it obligatory to presume the 
variability of that existence in the present and future"135 A third definition given by the 
jurists is as follows: isti. 5W means to adhere to a well-established ruling due to the 
132 AbilMuhammad `Ali al-AndaliisT al-Zähirilbn Hazm (d. 456/1064), "A1-1/ &n ft Uc1 al Aj*am", Dar 
al-Kntup ai-`llmiyyah, Beirut,, v: 5, p: 590; Ibn al-Häjib (d. 646/1249), "Mukhtasar al-Muntaha' al-Sül wa 
al-'Aral ", Constantinople, al Maktabah al-Islämiyyah, 1310, , p: 217; Baidäw-1, "Al Ibhäj', part 3, p: 111; 
Bukhäri, "Kash, f', v: II, p: 1098; Molla Fiusraw "Mar'dt al-U P', v: 2 p: 367; Sarakhsi, "U$0", v: 2, p: 
225; Bannäni, "iOshiah", part: 2, p: 285; Abü Zahrah, "U*r", p: 286. 
133 al-', lim Ahmad b. Muhammad b. 'All al-Fayyümi Mugri, (d. 770), "Missbdh al-Mun r fa Gharib al- 
Sharkh al-Kabir ii al-Rdfl", edt: Abd al-'AZim al-Shannawi, Dar al-Ma'ärif, Cairo. 
134Isnawi "Nihäyat", part 3, p: 131. 
135 Qarafi, "Tangi1', p: 199. 
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unavailability of any evidence to warrant any change"136. When a doubt is raised in 
regard to any issue in existence, the ruling of istiý; fKrb states that the issue can continue to 
exist as before. The same ruling of istis/Xrb is also applied to non-existent issues. For 
example, when a property is transferred from one owner to another, the ownership of the 
property continues to remain the right of the first owner until it is transferred to the 
second owner and the transfer is confirmed by evidence. 
1.3.2.2 Status of istivlb as a source of Islamic law: 
The status of istisfrzb among other sources of shari `ah is well explained in the 
statement of al-Khawärizmi (d. 665/1267) as quoted by Shawkäni, namely that istiFffib is 
the last resort of mufti (judge). If the mufti is asked about an issue he should pursue the 
ruling first from the Book, then the Sunnah, then ijmä', then giyäs. If he fails to find the 
ruling in these sources, he takes the ruling on that issue from istiWb whether the status is 
positive or negative. If the jurist has any hesitation regarding a ruling then the ruling 
continues as it was originally established. If, however, the hesitation was in order to 
prove the ruling, and no proof is established, then the principle to follow is that there is 
no evidence to prove the ruling and the status should be changed". 137 
1.3.2.3 Types of istiFWb (presumption of continuity): 
With regard to the existence of a ruling, istisiaäb is divided into the following 
types: 
1- IstiýF/zib al-ibä/aah al-a#iyyah lil ashyä' (presumption of original permissibility for 
objects): This means that one is to presume the continuation of its permissibility until the 
contrary is proven. When there is no ruling, then it is presumed to be permissible. All 
'36 Bazdawi, "Kashf, part 3, p: 377. 
137 Shawksni, "Irshäd' p: 237. 
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objects, contracts, and services which are beneficial to man are lawful on the grounds of 
original permissibility. In the case of legal prohibition, isti$fflb presumes the continuity 
of this prohibition until evidence is established to suggest that it is no longer prohibited. 
The principle of permissibility (ibäfxrh) begins in the Qur'an: "It is He who has created 
for you all that is on the earth"138 and "God has subjugated to you all that is in the 
heavens and on the earth". 139 These verses indicate that man should be able to use the 
resources of the world around him for his benefit unless he has been clearly prohibited. 'ao 
2- Isticfaäb al-barä'ah al-a yyah (presumption of original freedom from responsibility): 
It is a fundamental principle, according to Islamic law, that a person is free from 
obligations unless there is evidence to the contrary. For example, no one is required to 
perform a sixth salat (prayer) in one day. 141 According to al-Majallah "If one person 
destroys the property of another and a dispute ensues as to the amount thereof the 
statement of the person causing such destruction shall be heard, and the requirement of 
the proof as to any amount in excess thereof is upon the owner of such property. " 42 
3- Isti, ýfaäb al-warf (presumption of attributes). This means that everything remains as it 
was until evidence warranting any changes are established. This was formulated in al- 
Majallah as: "It is a fundamental principle that a thing shall remain as it was 
originally" 43 For example, the "mafqüd' (missing person) is assumed to be alive until 
evidence is established to prove his death. The Jurists agreed by consensus that his heirs 
cannot inherit his property until his death has been established. According to most jurists, 
136 Qur'äre: 2/29. 
139 Qur'dn: 45/13. 
140 Sha'bän Zakiy al-Din "Islam hukuk ilminin Fsaslarc"', tr. Tbrähim Käfi Dönmez, Ankara 1990, p: 189; 
Abu Zahrah, "Usu1', p: 236; Khudari, "U$7r', p: 354-355. 
141 Shawkäni, `Irshdd', p: 238. 
142 Al-Majallah: clause: 8 
143 Suyüh;, "Al-Ashbäh", p: 47; Majallah al-Ahkäm al-`Adliyyah: clause: 5. 
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no one can benefit from any property bequeathed to the missing person until his status is 
established; the condition of inheritance is fulfilled by proving that the heir (missing 
person) is alive at the time of the deceased's death. As opposed to other schools of 
thought, the Hanafi school maintains that a missing person cannot inherit from 144 
1.3.3 Ma$lafvh Mursalah (public interest) or ai-isti4iäsh. 
Another controversial source of Islamic law is maýla/vh which is based on benefit 
and avoiding harm. After the unanimous sources, isti1Iah is a legitimate basis for 
legislation. When the maslafvh is identified and the mujtahid does not find an explicit 
ruling in the main four sources, then the jurist can resort to further steps to protect social 
benefit and to prevent corruption in the earth. 145 However, maslahah should not 
contradict the shari `ah and its general objectives. 
In this context, Shätibi (d. 790/1388) indicates'46 that the purpose of the shari `ah 
is to promote people's welfare and to prevent corruption and hardship; it is clearly 
explained in the Qur'än that "We have not sent you but as a mercy for all creatures"147, 
and "God never intends to impose hardship on people"148. 
1.3.3.1 Definitions of ma aivh: 
Linguistically, mada, ah means: benefit/beneficial, appropriate/suitable, 
convenient and so on. Literally, maclafzih is the opposite of fasäd (evil) according to 
Lisän al-`Arab. In al-Mu jam al-Wasi( maslahah is the removal of evil. The word 
ma, cla th is derived from the root Its plural form is mas51ih and it is synonymous 
with istis 1. Mafsadah is its precise antonym. The verb "miu/n" means something 
'aa Abü Zahrah, "U ül", p: 236; Shawkäni, "Irshäd', p: 238; Kamäli, "Principle", pp: 301-302. 
145 Kamäli, "Principle", p: 268. 
146 AI-ShätibT, "AI-Muwäfagäf', v: 2, p: 3. 
147 Qur'an: 21/107. 
149 Qur'an: 22178. 
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which has become beneficial or suitable. When someone "aslaixz", he removes the evil 
and when something is "iFftdafxzh" it becomes ready to expel the evil in it. 
149 
Mursalah means unrestricted. According to Lisän al-'Arab, the verb "arsala" 
means to remove the restriction or to ignore it150 
Technically, manta iih mursalah is defined by ShätibT as that which concerns the 
subsistence of human life, the completion of man's livelihood, and the acquisition of 
what his emotional and intellectual qualities require of him, in an absolute sensels1 
It is more technically defined as: a consideration which is proper and harmonious 
(wasf munäsib muld'im) with the objectives of the lawgiver; it secures a benefit or 
prevents a harm, when the Qur'dn or the Sunnah provides no indication as to its validity 
or otherwise. 152 
It is obvious that the concept of maslafxih has a very close relationship with 
magasid al-shari `ah (objectives of the shari `ah), as magäsid are defined briefly as 
obtaining ma 1aiz: h (benefit) and preventing mafsadah (evil). These two concepts 
(maslalnh and magäsid) may sometimes be used interchangeably. The first significant 
work in this was done by Ghazäli (d. 505/1111) who wrote: "In a real sense maciafxih 
consists of obtaining manfa'ah (benefit) and preventing maOarrät (evil). However, we do 
not use that meaning... for the term of maclafz: h, we mean, to protect the objectives of 
'49 Hagkali `Abd al-Rahman, "Islam Hukuk Tarihinde Magalht Tammlarc ve Bunlann Analizt"', in Islami 
Ara ermalar Magazine, 2000, v: 13, no: 1, p: 47-61. 
150 Ibn Manzür, ibid. 
151 AI-Shä ibi, "AI-Muwäfagdt", v: 2, p: 25. 
152 Badr . n, Abil al-`Aynäyn Badrän, "U91 al-Figh at-Islämf', Muassasah Shabäb al-Jämi`ah, Alaxandria, 
1404/1984, p: 210. 
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the shari `ah (masla, aah al-shari `ah) which consist of five essential values, namely 
religion, life, intellect, lineage and property, "' 53 
1.3.3.2 Types of masialiah 
Ibn `Äshnr (d. 1973) divides masla ah into two types: a- al- maslahah al-'ämmah 
(public benefit), which is a benefit that is useful to all, or to the majority of the 
community; and b- al- malahzh al-khdsxh (specific benefit), which is individual 
consideration of the benefits for people. '54 
With regard to the social order, it is divided into three categories: a- purariyyät 
(essentials), b- IYajiyyät (complementary), c- Tahsiniyyät (embellishment). 
Regarding the whole community, its groups and individuals masta/ah is either a- 
kuli (whole) or b- juz'i (partial). There are also three types of ma. a/ zh in respect of the 
people's situations: a-gat'i (definite), b-zanni (speculative), c- wahmi (imaginary). '55 
Briefly the main divisions of mas1ahah are as follows: 
1.3.3.3 Varariyyrit (essentials): These are things on which the lives of people depend, 
and the neglect of which causes total disruption and anarchy. Ibn al-Hiijib, Qarafi, and 
Shätibi consider these to be the five essential values, namely religion, life, intellect, 
lineage and property. Qarafi adds a sixth essential, protecting honour; this is attributed to 
Tu 156 The first five essentials must not only be upheld but also protected against any 
real or unexpected threat to their safety. Destroying one of the five essential values is 
153 See: Ghazal!, "Al-Mu9aa', pp: 174-179. 
'54 Ibn 'Ashur, Muhammad Ta-hir (d. 1973), "Magdsid al-Sharf'ah al-Is1dmryyah" (Islam Hukuk Felsefesi, 
Gaye Problemi), Ragbet, translated by Vecdi Akyiiz, Mehmet Erdogan, Istanbul, 1999, p: 123. 155 Ibn `Ashur, ibid, p: 138. 
156 Ibn `Ashur, ibid, p: 139. 
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fxiräm according to GhazälL157 The five values would be protected in two ways: a- 
maintaining the subsistence, b-removing the disruptions. 
lsa 
1.3.3.4 hiäjiyyat: These are those things which, if neglected, many cause hardship to the 
community, but not its collapse. Shä ibi (d. 790/1388) says that hajiyyät are those things 
which are needed to enhance comfort and avoid hardship. If they are not taken into 
consideration, people would face harm and difficulties. However, those difficulties are 
not as dangerous as neglect of the essentials. "159 In the field of `ibädat (worship), l jiyyät 
includes the concessions (rukhac) that the shag `ah grants to the sick and to travellers, 
permitting them to forego the fast and to shorten the prayers (salät), in order to avoid 
hardship. 
1.3.3.5 Tabsiniyyat: These are also known as kamdliyydt (embellishments) and are 
supplementary to the previous types. This category represents the interest and awareness 
of the mukallaf. Shätibi says that it may be summarized as part of social and moral 
etiquette in the field of `ibädät, such as eliminating dirt, considering all types of 
cleanness; or in the field of customary matters, such as good conduct in eating, avoiding 
wastefulness in consumption; in the field of transactions, such as not selling something 
which is impure; and in the field of jinäyat (criminal offence), such as the prohibition on 
the killing of women, children and scholars whilst on jihad. 160 Therefore sadd al-dharäi 
(blocking the means) is considered as a kind of tahsrnryydt. 
" Ghazäli, "Al-Mustasgd', 1/288. 
158 Shätibi, "Al-Muwäfagät", 218. 
'19 Ibid , 2/10-11. 160 Sha-eibi, "A1-Muwäfagät", v: 2, p: 327. 
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1.3.3.6 Shurüt (conditions) of ma4ia#ah mursalah: 
Some strict and indisputable conditions have been set in order that ma4alxih be 
considered a valid source. 
A vital condition of ma, lafxth is that it must be appropriate to the objectives of the 
Shar' (Lawgiver). Ghazäli says that "Interpreting the maslahah as protecting the magäsid 
al-shari'ah (objectives of the lawgiver), nobody would oppose obeying the maciahah 
unless they could produce positive evidence"161. He adds "We occasionally consider 
maslahah and rulings when indications interchangeably reflected one another. s162 
The following conditions are intended to ensure that the concept of maslal ah is 
not established arbitrarily or by individual whim. 
1- Masia nh must not be in conflict with a principle or value which is sustained by a na1: s 
(text) or ijmä `, 
163 
2- Maslaiaah must be genuine (hagiqi)yah) as opposed to imaginary (wahmryyah), which 
is an improper ground for legislation. For example the recording of marriages in the court 
and the issue of marriage certificates or the recording of contracts in the registry 
department prevents shahädät al-zur (false testimony) and stabilizes the mu `dmalät (trade 
contracts)164. 
3- Maelafrrh must be kullryyah (general) so as to secure its benefits and prevent harm as a 
whole, not to a particular person or group of people. 165 
16' Ghazäll, ibid, v: 1, p: 311. 
162 Gbazäl;, "AI-Mankhül min Ta: 'ltgät al-U. l", A1-Tab'ah al-Th niyah, Där al-Filer al-Arabi, Damascus, p: 
355. 
163 Hasan bin Muhammad bin Mahmüd Afar (d. 125011835), "I shiyah `Aid Shart Jaldl al-Malblli 'Aid 
yam' al-Jawämid';, Matba'ah 'Ilmi'yyah, Egypt, h. 1316, part 2. p: 339. 
Zuhayli, "Usi1', part 2, p: 799. 
165 Khalläf, "tim", p: 87; Badrän, "Ucül", p: 214. 
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Besides these conditions, Imäm Mälik (d. 179/795) considers further two other 
conditions: 
4- The ma, clafaah must be ma'qülah (rational) and acceptable. 
5- Maýiatah must prevent or eradicate hardship, which the Qur'an expresses in the sürah 
al-md'idah (5: 6) "God never intends to impose hardship upon people"166 , yet Ghazäli 
(d. 505/1111) maintained that ma4dafaah must involve cfirüriyydt (essentials) for its 
validation. 167 
Consequently, the main purpose of the law is to obtain benefit (falb al-saläh) and 
avoid evil (daf al fasäd). Masla i h. would be obtained by improving man's situation 
and removing evil, because man is the vicegerent on earth and holder of His truth; 
therefore making him peaceful would reflect in world peace too. 168 If the evaluation of 
the ma$lahrh and mafsadah were the responsibility of mankind, the Lawgiver's 
objectives would be in jeopardy. 
In this context, Shätibi says "In the religious context the aim of obtaining benefit 
(falb al-2a1äh) and avoiding evil (daf al fasäd) is to provide the needs of this world for 
the sake of the hereafter, and not to provide personal desires or avoid personal hatreds. 
Religion prevents people from following their desires and guides them to be a servant of 
God". "' God clearly indicates this in the Qur'än: "And if the truth had been in 
accordance with their desires, verily, the heavens and the earth, and whosever is therein 
would have been corrupted. "loo 
1.3.4 1 Urf (customary law) 
166 ShA ibi, "AI-I'tisdm", part 2, p: 307-314. 
'67 Ghazäli, "Al-Mustaffa", part. 1, p: 141. 
168 Ibn 'Ashur, "Magäsfd', p: 121. 
169 Shätibi, "At-Muwäfagät", v: 2, p: 29-30. 
170 Qur'an: 23/71 
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The concept of `urf is also considered to be one of the controversial sources of 
Islamic law amongst the jurists. 
1.3.4.1 Definition of `urf. `Urf as a noun derived from its `Arabic root `a-r f (to know). 
According to Lisän al- Arab, `urf, `ihn and `ärifah all have the same meaning, i. e. 
anything that the people know as good (khayr) as opposed to munkar (evil), or any effort 
you make by speech or action to help others. 
Recognizing someone's service or help offered to another to enable them to 
achieve an ambition is also covered by this concept. Generally, the word is mostly used 
for a higher level of feelings and a good and dignified expression. 171 
`Urf (custom) and its derivative ma `ruf appears in the Qur'an in sürah al-A'räf (7: 199) 
"Keep to forgiveness, enjoin `urf (wa'mur bil `urf) and turn away from the ignorant". 
Zamakhsharl (d. 538/1144) in his commentary on this verse states that: "`Urf is known as 
a beautiful (nice or good) deed". 172 Another word largely synonymous with `urf is `ädah 
(habit- plural `ädah or `awdi'd) which means repetition or recurrent practice of an 
individual or a group. 173 
Technically, `urf is defined as "Habitual practices which are acceptable to people 
of sound nature"174. `, Idah is defined as "habitual practices without a rational 
relations hip". las 
in Ibn Manzür, "Lisan", part 11, p: 144. 
to Zamakhshari, jär Allah Mahmiid bin 'Umar (d. 538/1144), "A! -Kashshäf al-H. agä'iq GhawdmiQIaI-Tanzt' 
wa `Uyan aI-Agawii fi Wujüh al-Ta`wil", Dar al-Kitäb al-'Arabi, Beirut, 1366, part 2, p: 138. 
173 Ibn Manzür, 'Zisän"part 4, p: 311. 
174 `Abd Allah bin Al mad bin Mahmüd, Häfiz al-Din Abu al-Baragat al-lianafii Nasafi (d. 710/1310), "AI- 
Mustard Sharp al-Filch al-Näf "' quoted 
from Zuhayli, "Used", part: 2 p: 828. 
175Kamä1 Muhammed bin `Abd al-Wahid bin `Abd al-Hamid bin Mas'üd al-Hanafii Ibn al-Humäm 
(d. 861/1457), "AI-Taysir Sharp at-TahrIrfi U92l at-Figh", al-Amiyriyyah BulAq Cairo 1317, part 1, pp. 
317. 
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1.3.4.2 Types of 'urf: 
'Urf is primarily divided into two types: gawli (verbal) and f: 'li or 'amali (actual 
or practical). An example of verbal 'urf is the word walad which means the offspring, 
whether a son or daughter, although in its common usage walad is used to denote a son 
only. It occurs in the Qur'an: "God commands you as regards your children's 
(inheritance): to the male, a portion equal to that of two females... ". 176 An example of 
actual 'urf is the bay' al-ta'ät (give-and-take sale) which is normally concluded without 
utterance of offer and acceptance. 
177 These 'urf, either gawli or 'amali, eventually are 
divided into two types: al-'urf al-'ämm general custom and al-'urf al-khäd' (special 
custom). 178 
1.3.4.3 Conditions of the validity of `urf: 
a- `Urf must not contradict a nass or definitive principles of the Islamic law. 179 
b- `Urf must be continual or prevalent in most cases. The practice of that turf by a few 
individuals or of a limited number of people among a large community will not be 
authoritative. '80 
c-The existence of `urf (custom) must be established at the time of the transaction. 18' 
d- `Urf (custom) must not contravene the clear requirements of an agreement. 182 
Consequently, the following principles, mentioned in al-majallah, point out the 
prevalence of `urf in legislation: 
176 Qur'an: 4111 
177 Sha`bän, "Islam Hukuku", p: 175. 
178 Abu Zahrah, "Usul", p: 217; Sha`bän, ibid: p: 176; Fahreddin Atar, "Fikih Ustdu", MUIFY, Istanbul, 
1996, p: 88. Zuhayli, "U*I"v: 2, p: 829; Ismä`il, Muhammad Sha`bän, "Usul al-Fiqh al-Muyassar", , Dar 
al-Kitäb al-Miff', Tawfiqiyyah, Cairo, 1994, v: 2, p: 
285. 
179 Kamäl% "Principles", p: 286; Ismdil, "Usil" v: 2, p: 289; Atar, "Fikih Usulu", p: 89. 
LBO Ismä`i1, "Usul", v: 2, p: 289; Kamäli, "Prenciples", p: 286; Atar, ibid. 
181 Isma'1I, ibid; KamMi, ibid. 
192 Ibid. 
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" Custom is an arbitrator; that is to say, custom, whether public or private, may be 
invoked to justify the giving of judgment. '83 
" In the presence of custom, no regard is paid to the literal meaning of a thing. ' 84 
" Effect is only given to custom where it is of regular occurrence or when 
universally prevailing'85 
"A matter recognized by custom is regarded as though it was a contractual 
obligation. 196 
"A matter established by `urf (custom) is like a matter established by law. 187 
To change 'urf without consideration for the harm that this may cause is clearly 
unacceptable. ' 88 
1.3.5 Sadd al-DharY'i ` (blocking the means) 
The validity of this concept amongst the jurists is considered controversial; the 
Hanafi, Shafi`i and iähir jurists do not recognize it as a source of Islamic jurisprudence, 
yet Mäliki and Hanbali jurists have validated it as a principle of sharr `ah. '89 
1.3.5.1 Definition of sadd al-dhar5'i `: 
Sadd al- dharä'i` (blocking the means) consists of two terms; first, sadd 
(blocking) and second, dhari'a `, plural dharä'i ` (means). Blocking the means implies 
blocking the means of evil but not blocking the means of good. In juridical application, 
the concept of sadd al- dharä'i ` also extends to "Opening the means to beneficence". For 
183 Al-Maja(lah: clause: 36. 
194 ibid: 40. 
185 Ibid: 41. 
196 Ibid: 43. 
117 Ibid: 45. 
188 See: Majma' a1-Figh al-Islämi, "Kardrdt wa al-Tawsiyyät", Kuwait, 1999, in 9. For more about custom 
and its applications, see Chapter Four. 
189 IsmA'il Hakki Izmirlt (d. 1946), "'Iim al-KhiIüf', Istanbul, 1330, p: 130; Shäfi`i, "At-O nm", Beirut, 
1983, v: 3, p: 272; Muhammad Mustafa Shalabi, "U$1 al-Fiqh at-Islämi"', Beirut 1986, p: 304. 
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this reason some jurists use the term dharä'i ` (means) alone as a title for the doctrine. The 
literal meaning of each term will clear this point. According to Mu jam Magayis al- 
Lughah and Mukhtär al-Sipe , 
19° the term sadd literally means a barrier between two 
things, for example a mountain. It also means blocking a gap with landfill to level it; 
dhari'a `h are the means or the causes used to achieve or obtain a certain thing or end. 191 
Shätibi (d. 790/1388) defines dhar 'a`h as "That means by which a prohibited end 
or thing (containing evil) is obtained. "192 It is obvious that this definition refers 
exclusively to meaning evil, evil that must be blocked. Other jurists such as Ibn al- 
Qayyim (d. 751/1350) define dhari'a `h as that which is a means or a way to something. 193 
Here (something) implies juridical obedience or disobedience to God. Qarafi 
(d. 68411285) considers dhari'a `h to be the means to beneficence or evil: the former must 
be embraced whilst the latter must be blocked. He states that "As the means to evil is 
prohibited (and must be blocked), the means to wäjib (obligatory action) is obligatory. 
The bases regulating the rulings on affairs are two parts. The first part is magäýid 
(objectives), which contains the beneficence and evil each in itself. Second, wasä'il 
(means) which are the ways leading to them. The ruling on the ways to obtain the 
objective or end is the same as the ruling on the objective 194 
190 Ibn Fares, Ahmad (d. 39511004), "Mu'äjam Magäyis al-Lughah", Dar Ihyä' al-Turäth al-`Arabi, Beirut, 
part 3, p: 66; Al-Razi, Muhammad b. Abi Bakr (d. 660), "Mukhtär al-. hall", Dar al-Ma'rifah, Beirut, p: 
113. 
19' Ibn Man+lür, "Lisän", part 8, p: 96; Anees Ibrahim, "A1-Mu`jam al-Wash', Dar al-Ma`ärif, Cairo, 1973, 
part 1, p: 310. 
192 Shatibi, "AI-Muwa agät", part 4, p: 198. 
'93 Ibn al-Qayyim, "I'Iäm al-Muwagqi'Fn', part 3, p: 147. 
04 Qaraf!, "Kitäb Anwär", v: 2, p: 33. 
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1.3.5.2 Types of dharä'i ` (means): 
Its types are considered from two perspectives: the result discovered by Ibn al- 
Qayyim in ` I'lýrm al-Muwaqqi ini195; and the degree of probability, or otherwise, of 
leading to an evil as discussed by Shätibi in "Al-Muwäfagät". 196 
First: An example of means which leads to evil or harm is the digging of a deep 
pit next to the entrance to a public place which is not lit at night; thus anyone who enters 
the door is very likely to fall into it. That action is completely forbidden as it might cause 
harm to someone. 197 
Second: Means which are rarely expected to lead to evil and are likely to lead to a 
benefit. An example is digging a water hole situated in a place which is unlikely to harm 
anyone. 198 
Third: Means which are most likely (al-tann al-ghälib) to lead to evil. For 
example selling weapons during warfare or selling grapes to a wine maker. However, 
Shatibi says that these transactions are invalid according to the consensus of the `ulamä'. 
Briefly, when there is a strong likelihood that they would lead to evil, the means may be 
declared 199 
Fourth: Means which frequently lead to evil. An example is deferred sales (buyü` 
al-ajal), which mostly leads to usury (ribä'). 
200 
Consequently, the main understanding of the whole concept of sadd al- dharä'i ` 
was founded on the idea of preventing evil before it happens. When the result is expected 
195 Ibn al-Qayyim, "I `! am", v: 3, p: 147. 
196 Shatibi "Al- Muwäfagdt", v: 2, pp: 358-361. 
117 Ibid, v: 2, p: 358. 
I98 Ibid, v: 2, p: 359. 
199 Abü Zahrah, "UXP', p: 231; Shätibi, ibid, v: 2, p: 361. 
200 Ibid; see them in detail in Kamäli, "Principles", pp: 310-320. 
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to be good or commendable, then the means will be acceptable. However when the result 
is expected to be blameworthy then the means will be considered as being blocked, 
regardless of the intention of the perpetrator, or the actual recognition of the result itself. 
Additionally, if the act performed leads to the situation where the evil is either 
equal to or bigger than the benefit, then the means must be blocked too, according to the 
general principle "repelling an evil is preferable to securing a benefit"201 
1.3.6 Qawl al-9z/bi'(the saying of a Companion of the Prophet): 
Many disputes have occurred over the validity of qawl al-xibi. Briefly the 
Hanafi Mäliki, and danbal schools in general have validated the concept as a source of 
shari `ah, but Shäfi' does not consider it thus 
202 
1.3.6.1 Definition of the Term: 
The word .i ibi is 
derived from the root "s-irb" and the verb sa/nbah or 
pz/wbah (to accompany) and ýufz, ah (companionship), which imply continuity of contact 
and narration of padith from the Prophet. Qawl al- Xfaabi consists of two words; "qawl" 
(saying) and "phabi -plural- Xhiabah" the Companions. According to most jurists203 
anyone who met the Prophet, while believing in him, even for a moment, and died as a 
believer, is considered as "x aabi' (Companion) regardless of whether he or she narrated 
any /v4ith from the Prophet or not. 
Jurists agree that the ijmä ` (consensus) of the Companions of the Prophet is a 
binding proof, and represents the most authoritative form of i jma `. The question arises, 
however, as to whether the saying or fatwä of a single Companion should also be 
201 A1-Majallah: clause: 30. 
202 Shawkäni, "Irshäd", p: 213; Ghazäli, "Al-Musta ', v: 1, p: 135; Amide, "AI-I'1cäm", v: 3, p: 133; 
Shzräzi, "Sharp al-Luma", p: 50; Molla Husräw, "Mar'ät al-U. fl", v: 2 p: 250; Bannani, "hýashiah", part: 
2, p: 288. 
2m Ibn 'Abd al-Shakür, "Musallam", part 2. p: 120; Bannani, "f/shiah", v: 2, p: 146. 
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recognized as a source of law and should take precedence over other sources such as 
giyäs or the fatwä of other mujtahidün. 
There is no disagreement among the jurists that the saying of a Companion is a 
proof, which commands obedience if it is not opposed by other Companions. Rulings on 
which the Companions were known to be in agreement are binding. The jurists are 
however in disagreement with regard to rulings which were based on opinion (ray) and 
ijtihäd, and also in those matters where the Companions differed among themselves. 
There is a general agreement among jurists that the ruling of one Companion is 
not a binding proof over another Companion, regardless of whether the ruling in question 
was issued by one of the Caliphs, a Judge or a leading mujtahid among their number. The 
jurists did differ as to whether the rulings of a Companion are binding on Successors 
(Täbi `ün) and the succeeding generations of mujtahid n. There are four views on this, 
which are briefly summarized as follows:! - The ijtihäd of the Companions is not a proof 
and is not binding on the succeeding generations of mujtahidün or anyone else. This view 
is held by the Ash`aris, Mu'tazilis, Imam Abmad, and al-Karkhi tos 
2- The fatwä' of the Companions takes priority over giyas, regardless of whether it was in 
agreement with q yäs or not. This was the view of Imam Malik, Imam Shdfif`i, Imam 
Ahmäd, and some of the Hanafi jurists. 
3- It is acceptable when it is in agreement with giyäs. In such a case, q yas comes before 
the ruling of the Companion. This is a later view of Imam Shäfi`i 207. 
204 Shawkäni, "Irshäd", p: 213; Isnawi, "Nihayat", part 3, p: 173; Ghazäli, "Al-Musta, 9`ä "', part 1, p: 135; 
AmidT, "Al-I/ rn", part 3, p: 133; Banäni, "/fiashiah", part 2, p: 288; Mahmüd bin Ahmad bin Mahmüd 
Abn al-Manägib Sha'b al-Din, Zanjazn min al-Shäf[`I (d. 656/1258), "Takhr j al-Furü' 'Ala al-US P', edt. 
Muhammad Ad-lb $511h Muassasah al-Risälah, Dimishq 1962, p: 82. 
205 Muilarnmad bin Ahmad bin `Ali a1-Idrisi, al-Sharif Tilmisäni al-Mäliki (d. 771/1370), "Muftahal-Wu, ct l 
1la Bind' al-Furu' `alä al-U$1", Jämi`ah al-Azhar, Kulliyah al-Shari'ah reg. no: 72 Cairo, p: 120. 
206 Bukhri, "Kashf', part 2. p: 937; Ibn al-Qayyim, part I p: 30 and part 4, p: 156. 
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4-It is acceptable when it is in a conflict with giyäs but not when it agrees with giyäs. 
This is the view of Imäm Abra Hanifah. 208 
1.3.7 Shar' man qablana (revealed laws preceding to the shari ah) 
This subject represents the extent to which the shari-`ah of Isläm is related to the 
laws of previous revelations. The Qur'an and the Sunnah have chronicled the lives of 
previous Prophets and some of the rulings of the revelations they received 209 The Qur'an 
confirms the essence of believing in the oneness of God and the need for divine authority 
and guidance to maintain good conduct and the principles of morality and justice that 
represent ordinary reason and the matter of all divine religions210. The same religion has 
been ordained from the previous prophets and nations, as is indicated in the Qur'an: "He 
(God) has ordained for you the same religion (Islamic Monotheism) which He ordained 
for Nub (Noah), and that which We have revealed to you (0 Muhammad), and that which 
We ordained for Ibrähim (Ibraham), Müsä (Moses) and Isä (Jesus) saying you should 
establish religion (i. e. to do what it orders you to do practically), and make no 
divisions. 21' 
For example, several rulings (a/*am) such as fasting and law of retaliation have 
been ordained before in previous revelations, "0 believers, fasting is prescribed for you 
as it was prescribed for those who came before yous212, "And we ordained therein for 
them life for life, eye for eye, nose for nose, ear for ear, tooth for tooth and wounds equal 
for equal" 213 
Banäni, "fIshiah", part 2, p: 289. 
208 Bukhäri, "Kashf', part 2, p: 938. 
zog zuhayli, "Up7l, ", part 2, p: 838. 
210 Kam517, "Principles", p: 229. 
211 Qur'an: 42/13 
212 Qur'an: 2/183 
213 Qur'an: 5148. 
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1.3.8 Istiqra' (Induction): 
60 
Istigrä' is a hujjah (proof) according to the Shäl"i'i, Mäliki and HanbalT schools, 
however, the Hanafi school does not accept istigrd' as an independent da1F1 (proof) in 
proving a (km shar`1.214 
Istigrä' (induction) is a process of reasoning by which a general ruling for a 
certain issue is drawn from a set of principles constituting that issue, based on the fact 
that the ruling applied to the premise must apply to the whole issue or some of the issues. 
The general ruling goes beyond the information contained in the principles and does not 
necessarily follow from them. Istigrä' is divided into two types: 
a- Istigrä' tämm (complete induction) is arrived at by exploring the entire premise with 
the exception of the premise of disagreement. These results give a definitive (qa`z) 
ruling. 
b- Istigrä' nägi$ (incomplete induction) is achieved by following the point of 
disagreement comparing it with other point. The ruling in this case is mostly probable 
(zanni ghälib). Jurists of ucl use complete istigrä' 215 
Condusion: 
A brief introduction to the legal theory (usü1 al fqh) behind the general principles 
of Islamic law is now concluded and the basis for my research has been established. 
The majority of jurists agree that the four fundamental principles are unanimously 
accepted. There are also other principles that are activated when fundamental principles 
are silent and unable to help the law for its continuity. 
214 Ghazälf, "Al-Musta#ä"', part 1, p: 33; Shä ibi, "Al-Muwäfagat", part: 3, pp: 298- 304. 215 Ibid. 
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However, while there is unanimity on the four main sources of law, there are 
considerable differences of opinion on the validity and application of the controversial 
Sources 
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2.0 DEVELOPMENT OF IJTIHdl) BY RA'Y (JURISTIC OPINION) IN THE 
CONTEXT OF ISTIHSÄN 
Following the end of the period of the revelation, Islamic law was developed 
with great effort by those who had the authority and expertise, despite the rapid 
changes in social, economical and political life. It is undeniable that the jurists' 
contributions had added to the great enhancement of Islamic law in its ability to 
manoeuvre and its skill to be flexible; therefore Islamic law is described as a law 
made by jurists. ' 
In order to assess the concept of istihsän (juristic preference) it is necessary to 
first consider its basis, for it is possible that the main source of inspiration behind 
istihsän is the concept of ray (personal opinion in juridical judgment). The criteria of 
personal judgment in isti/zsän indicate a direct relationship between istihsän and 
ijtihäd by ra'y which is a personal judgment. Moreover, it is viewed that istiIndn is a 
product of ijtihäd. In fact, Abi! Hanifah performed ijtihdd from his personal opinions 
(conforming to the Qur'an and the Sunnah) by saying, "Qiyas rules this, but we 
"nastabsinü" (prefer) that, or we proved this by istihsän contrary to giyds, or the giyäs 
of this is so and so and the ijtihäd of this is so and so, and the ijtihäd we take"2 . 
2.1.0 Concept of ray (opinion): 
The word ra'y is derived from the verb r'ä which means to see something or 
somebody; later it was used as a verbal noun. It may also denote a dream or vision; a 
view; or that which is known only by heart but cannot be seen with the eye i. e. an 
Joseph Schacht, "An Introduction to Islamic Law", oxford at the Clarendom Press, 1964, p: 212; See 
also: Sawa Pasha, "Islam Hukuku Nazariyati", translated by Baha Arikan, Ankara 1965,21354. 
2 Muhammad Muýtafä Shalab% "U ü1 al-Figh al-IslämT', Beirut 1986, p: 258. 
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opinion. It can also mean i `tigäd (faith, belief), tann (assumption), `ilm (knowledge, 
science), `aqi (reason, intellect, mentality), tadbYr (precaution), and iAbah (target). 
Ibn al-Qayyim (d. 751/1350) points out that one aspect of ra'y is "after 
considering a subject and making a judgment from the heart, a search through the 
evidence and inferences, both which have their own considerations, is made to 
implement the truth, reality". 5 Raghib al-4fahäni (d. 502/1109) defines the word 
"ru'yah" as "To perceive an object which is seen"; this perception is divided into the 
following parts: 1. the five senses and that which replaces the senses in a similar 
activity. 2. wahm (illusion- false impression) and tahayyul (imagination) 3. tafakkur 
(contemplation), 4. `aql (intellectual faculty), idräk (perception). 6 
2.1.1 Historical perspective of ray: 
Studying the concept of ray from the historical perspective shows that there 
have been different views as to when it was first used. It is the view of the majority of 
scholars that the use of ray began during the period of the Prophet's life time. The 
Sa/Xrbah (Companions) applied ijtihäd by ray according to their perception of an 
action of the Prophet. 
7 
An alternative point of view with regard to the ruling based on ra'y suggests 
that the practice of ray was used only after the death of the Prophet. The practice was 
used when the Companions were faced with issues that had not been detailed in the 
Qur'an and the Sunnah. This view is disputed by scholars such as Ibn Khaldün 
3 Ibn Manzür, Jamal al-Din Muhammad ibn Mukarram al-An ri (d. 711/1311), "Lisen al-'Arab", 
Taba'ah Buläq, Manstirah, Cairo, X1V, 291,295,297,299; Ibn al-Qayyim Muhammad b. AbO Bakr b. 
Äyyüb b. Sa'd Shams al-Din Dimishql (d. 751/1350), "I `läm al-Muwagqi`in min Rabb al-' Alamin", edt: 
°Abd al-Rahmän al-Wakil, Cairo, i, p: 113. 
4 Ibn Manzür, ibid: XIV 300,301 
S Ibn al-Qayyim, "1'1&n", i, 113. 
6 Räghib Isfah ni, Abü Qäsim Husayin (d. 50211 108), "Mufrad& fi Gharibi Qur'dh", edt Muhammad 
Husayin Kayläni, Dar al-Ma'rifah, Beirut, p: 208,209. 
7 ÄmidT, "I/lam", IV, pp: 398-399; Ibn al-Qayyim, "I'läm", i, pp: 257-261; Bazdawr, 'Al! bin 
Muhammad bin `Abd al-Karim Abü al-Masan Fakhr al-Islam al-Bazdawi al-Hanafi (482/1089), "U9gl 
al-Bazdawi on the margin of 'Abd al-`Aziz al-Bukhär Khashf al-Asrär', III, 205, Istanbul 1308. 
Reprint, Beirut DAr al-KitAb al-'Arabi 1394/1974. 
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(d. 808/1405) and Ibn Hazm (d. 456/1064). According to Ibn Khaldün: "The abkam had 
been taught either during the time of the Prophet through revelation, which was sent 
to the Prophet, or his direct speeches and attitudes; therefore it was unnecessary to 
apply intellectual reasoning or analogy (giyäs)". 
8 Ibn Hazm says "The claim that ra'y 
appeared at the time of the Companions had nothing to do with Companion's actions, 
contrary to the report that the Companions used ray (opinion); the validity of such 
reports and narrations is uncertain. "9 According to those scholars, the sources of 
Islamic law at the time of Prophet are confined only to the Qur'an and the Sunnah. 
The ijmä ` took form at a later period than the time of the Companions. The 
application of analogy was used when a ruling on a matter 
did not have a textual 
(nass) reference in the main sources of guidance. 
10 
It is well documented that the use of ijtihäd by ray has been practiced from 
the time of the Prophet; this is evident from several narrations. For example when the 
Prophet saw the people of Medina fertilizing palm trees, the Prophet forbade it; when 
he heard the account that the trees had become barren he said, "I'm a human, if I order 
you to do something in the name of your religion then conform to it. However, if I 
order something which depends on my personal ray (opinion), I am only a human ". 
11 
In the famous tradition of Mu'adh Ibn Jabal (d. 18/640), the Prophet asked: "How will 
you judge when the occasion of deciding a case arises"? He replied: "I shall judge in 
accordance with God's book". The Prophet asked: "(What will you do) if you do not 
find guidance in God's book"? He replied: "(I will act) in accordance with the Sunnah 
of the Messenger of God". The Prophet asked: "(What will you do) if you do not find 
8 Ibn Khaldün 'Abd al-Rahmän bin Muhammad (d. 808/1405), "Mugaddimah",, edt 'Ali Abd al-Wähid 
WAR, Nahdat al-Misr, Cairo, iii, 1061-1062. 
9 Ibn Hazm Abü Muhammad `All al-Andalüsi al-74hiri (d. 456/1064), "Mulakhkhas ib, Ya1 al-Qiyas wa 
al-Ra'y wa a1-1stihsän wa al-Taglid wa al-Ta`iil", edt: Said al-Afghani Ma4ba`ah al-Jami`at al- 
Dimishq, 1960, p: 4. 
10 Bashir Idris Jum'ah, "A1-Ray wa Arharuh fi a! -Figh al-Islam ', p: 24. 
11 Muslim, AN al-Fiusyn Muslim bin IHajjaj (d. 261/874), Istanbul, 1981, p: 140. 
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guidance in the Sunnah of the Apostle of God and in God's book? " He replied: "I 
shall do my best to form an opinion and spare no pains". The apostle of God then 
patted him on the chest and said: "Praise be to God who helped the messenger of the 
Apostle of God to find a thing which pleases the Apostle of God". 12 In support of this 
view, it is well known that the Companions practiced ra'y to achieve solutions on 
issues pertaining to juristic affairs. 
It is obvious that the Prophet applied and practised ijtihäd by ra'y in his 
lifetime. He taught and encouraged the companions to perform ijtihdd by ra'y with 
regard to various issues. 
2.1.2 Ra'y in terms of a judicial meaning: 
The scholars of usiil have called the practice of inference to arrive at a ruling 
ijtihäd, giyas (analogy) or ra'y (opinion)13. There are different views on whether ra'y 
is a kind of ijtihäd or qiyas. 
Shäfi`i (d. 2041819) says that ray is not based on a validated source of 
shahi'ah. He considered it to be only a performance of inferences that depends purely 
on intellectual reasoning and inclination. Therefore, he was critical of scholars who 
used ra'y in their ijtihc d. He also distinguished between ra'y and giyas, and 
considered them opposed to one another. 
14 Ghazäli (d. 5005/1 111) considers ray and 
giyäs as synonyms saying "Ra'y consists of comparing and representing any hulon 
(ruling) to itself '15. 
It is also the view of some Jurists, particularly the Shäfi`i scholars that the 
concept of ra'y is synonymous with giyds (analogy). Also taking into consideration 
12 Abü Däwüd, "Sunnan", iii, 3585,1019; Ibn 'Abd al-Bär, '1mar Ytisuf (d: 463/1071), "Jdmi' Baydn 
al-`Ilm", edt. Muhammad `Abd al-Qadir AtA, Mu'assasat Kutub al-Sagafiyyah, Beirut 1997, II, pp: 
275-276. 
13 Bashir Idris Jum'ah "At-Ra'y wa Asaruh fi Figh al-Islrnnr', p: 10, Cairo. 
14 Shäfi`i Imäm Abi 'Abd Allah Muhammad bin Idr s (d. 204/819), "Jimä' al-'Ilm", edt, Muhammad 
Ahmad `Abd at- `Aziz, Dar al-Kutub al-`Ilmiyyah, Beirut, p: 51-52. 
's GhazAlT, "AI-Musta; sjä', II, 255. 
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the practice of the Companions (sahiäbäh) and the Successors (Täbi `rn), some other 
scholars have considered it to be a kind of a comprehensive method of ijtihäd as well 
as consisting of giyds (analogy), istilasän (juristic preference), al-ma,, Olih al-mursalah 
(consideration of public interest), and sadd al-dhard'r ` (blocking the means). 
16 
Sarakhst (d: 483/1090) is one of the jurists who believe that ray is more extensive 
than giyäs. In an interpretation of the verse `Then take admonition, 0 you with eyes 
(to see)"17 he explains that i `tibilr (admonition) means practising ra'y in place of that 
which has no nag(text) and giyäs". 
18 `Abd al-Wahhäb Khalläf (d. 1956) says that ray 
is more comprehensive than giyäs. He defines it as "Analogising and thinking in order 
to reach the right hukrn (ruling) in a field where no nass (text) is available by the 
shari `ah provided for the purpose of inference19 
Shawkän (d. 1250/1834) points out that ray could have been applied to the 
explanation and interpretation of the nass (text), saying that "Ijtihäd by ra'y can be the 
way of inference from Qur'än and the Sunnah. It was originally permitted in shari'ah 
for the consideration of benefit and in cases of necessity. s2° Fathi Dirini believes that 
the confinement of ijtihäd to ray on issues which have no nass (text) is incorrect. He 
says that the Companions' interpretations of the nass (text) should also be included in 
the circle of ijtihäd by ray. For example, when Abü Bakr was questioned on 
"kaldlah"21, his response was "I will express my point of view on this issue; if it is 
36 Khalläf, `Abd al-Wahhäb (d. 137611956), "Madder al-Tashri ` aI-Islimi fi mä lä Na sah fihr ', Där 
al-Qalam li al-Nashr wa al-Tawdi' 
Kuwait, 1993, p: 8; Shalabi Muhammad Mustafa-, "A! -Madkhal i 
al-Tä`rifc al-Fiqh al-IslmnF', Dar an-Nahdat al-'Arabiyyah, Beirut 1985, p: 108; Abü Zahrah, 
Muhammad (d. 1395/1974), "Tarikh Mazähib al-Islämiyyah", Dar al-Fiqr al-Arabi, Beirut, p: 244. 
17 Qur'an: 59/2 
is Sa akhsi, "u z r', II, p: 106. 
19 Khallaf, "Ma Qder ", p: 7. 
20 Shawkani, "Irshäd", p: 202. 
21 Kaläiah are those who inherit from the deceased who dies leaving neither ascendants nor 
descendants. 
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correct and rightly done then it is from God, if I fall into error it is from me and from 
Satan" 22 
Accordingly, we can see that ray has virtually the same meaning as ijtihäd. 
Technically ijtihäd is defined as "Maximum effort made by jurists to ascertain, in a 
given problem or issue, the shay i rulings deduced from the general principles with 
the injunction of Islam and its real intent"23. At first glance, there is a very close 
relationship between ijtihdd and ray. However, it is clear that ijtihnd is more 
comprehensive than ray. At the time of Companions and Successors, the constituent 
parts of ra'y were clear and extensive, as opposed to the nass which is not obviously 
clarified and defined. Following that period, some jurists continued to use ray in the 
meaning of ijtihäd in a wider range. At the same time, the majority of jurists confined 
the use of inference to issues where there were no nass (text) to reach a right and just 
buken (ruling). In addition to giyäs (analogy), they also used isti'isän (juristic 
preference), al-mas lih al-mursalah (consideration of public interests), sadd al- 
dharä'r ` (blocking the means), and `urf (customary law) which agreed with the 
general aim of shay 'ah and its spirit. Hence, the field of ra'y is narrow as compared 
to that of ijtihäd, but it is more comprehensive than giyäs and consequently it is called 
"ijtihäd by ra'y". 24 
2.1.3 Types of ray (juristic opinion): 
22 ibn al-Qayyim, "I'lirm", i, 122; Fathl Mini, "Al-Manahij al-C ü1rryyah ft at-Ijtihäd bi al-Ra'y fi al- 
Tashri' al-Islami ', al-Sharikat al-Muttahidah, Dimishq 1985, p: 12-14. 
2' Sha'bRn, "Islam Hukuk ilminin Esaslan", p: 373; Khallaf, "Jim", p: 257. 
24 Muhammas Salläm Madkür, "Al-Ijtihdd fi al-Tashri' al-Islnmi', Där al-Nahdat al-`Arabiyya, Cairo, 
1984, p: 40-41. For more information see: Bashir Idris Jum'ah, "AI-Ra'y wa Asaruh ft al-Fiqh al- 
Islam? ', p: 16-18. 
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Many narrations have been reported by the Companions and the Successors 
over the validity of ray, as was the case with isti/xsän 
25 
Generally, Ibn al-Qayyim (d. 751/1350) has divided ra'y into three types: ra'y 
sabih (valid, authentic), ray bä#1 (invalid; null, and void), and ra'y mashkük 
(doubtful, uncertain). 26 
1- Ra'y saWi (valid, authentic): This is ray which does not contradict the textural 
evidence (nag) but rather supports and confirms it; therefore it is true and valid. 
7 
2- Ray bää1 ((invalid, null, and void): This is rejected since it contains elements that 
are harmful and dangerous to the religion. 
28 The following are included in this 
category: ray that is rejected because it is against nass (text), which confirms that it 
is invalid and void, 29 ray which relies on pure `aql (intellect and reason); ra'y which 
causes changes to the Sunnah of Prophet or can lead to heresy. 
30 
3- Ray mashkük (doubtful, uncertain): The early scholars gave permission to perform 
ra'y mashkük to give fatwä (formal legal opinion) and halo: (ruling). However, there 
has to be sufficient grounds to justify this and only then when there is no other option 
to arrive at a solution. No one is forced to perform ray mashkük, nor is opposition 
considered to be haräm (unlawful); no one who follows it is considered to be against 
religion or those who oppose it to be following the religion. Hence, one has the 
freedom to choose between accepting and rejecting this type of ra'y, 31 
25 Ibn `Abd al-Bar, "Jämi ` al-Bayän", pp: 248,276-277,362-369; Ibn al-Qayyim, "I `länt", i, pp: 87-99, 
104-106,111-114,119-126,270-279; Fiatlp, Abü Bala Ahmad bin 'Ali al-Baghdädi (d: 463/1071), 
, AI-Fagih wa al-Mutafagqih", Makkah, 1975, i, p: 179-186,200. 
24 Ibn al-Qayyim, "I'läm", i, p: 103. 
21 Ibn al-Qayylm, "Ighasat al-Lahfan min Masäryid al-Shaytan", edt: Majdi Fathi al-SayyTd, Cairo, 
1310,1, p: 334; and "I `irnm", i, 118-125. 
78 Ibn al-Qayyim "I`läm", i, p: 104. 
29 Ibn al-Qayyim, "Ighäsat al-l ahfan", i, p: 334. 
30 Ibn al-Qayyim, `"1'1mn", i, p: 105-106. 
31 Ibid: p: 103-104. 
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2.2.0 CONCEPT OF IJTTHÄD 
Ijtihäd is one of the most important key words of share `ah (Islamic Law) and 
the aim to comprehend the purpose of the Qur'än and the Sunnah. The main purpose 
of law is to maintain the continuity of answering people's needs. A legal system 
which answers questions of its era while offering solutions for future generations can 
be realized by constantly renewing itself. In this sense, ijtihäd has very important 
functions in keeping the law alive, which is one of the main dynamics of the shari-`ah. 
2.2.1 Exigency of ijtihdd (performing personal judgment): 
The use of ijtihäd to derive shad'ah rulings is crucial for everyday life. 
Today's Muslims actually need two types of ijtihad: the first is to understand its 
nature by preferring and choosing ijtihäd to select the main objectives of the shari`ah 
rules. The most basic of shari `ah rules is to accommodate the benefit of people and 
the most suitable opinions for modem life's circumstances. These rules have been 
handed down from former jurists. The second type is the derivation of new rulings in 
law using legal methods such as giyäs, istifisän, masia/xih, istislah, `urf, and so on, 
where the jurists' performance of ijtihäd has room for manoeuvre, according to 
QaradäwL 32 
Ijtihäd is a very demanding requirement in modem day life, and therefore it is 
sometimes an individual duty (farcf `ayni) and sometimes a collective duty (fart 
ki, Tyah) for Muslims. 33 If the requirement of ijtihäd is ignored then the whole Muslim 
community will be considered sinful. The scholars unanimously agree that ijtihid is 
included in the scope of the following verses: "So keep your duty to God and fear 
32 Yüsuf al-Qaradawi, "Islam Hukuku evrensellik sureklilik", translated by Yusuf Isicik, Ahmet 
yaman, Marifet, Istanbul, Ekim, 1999, p: 12. 
33 Hayreddin Karaman, "Islam Hukukunda JctihdX,, MUIFV, Istanbul, 1996, p: 29. For further details 
on ijtihad see: Maudüdr, Abo al-'Ala' "Islamic Law and Constitution", Islamic publications ltd Lahore, 
translated by Khurshid Ahmad, 1960, p: 79-96. 
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Him as much as you can"34 and "Then take admonition, 0 you with eyes (to see)i35 
Qarafi expresses his anxiety, saying "God save us if there is not an available 
competent mujtahid. '936 
The Qur'an indicates that the use of ijtihäd is a religious duty and encourages 
Muslims to avoid disagreements amongst themselves. When they differ, the Qur'än 
refers them to the Messenger of God or the one who is in authority amongst Muslims 
(`ulul amr): "0 you who have believed, obey God and obey the Messenger and those 
in authority among you. If you differ in anything amongst yourselves, refer it to God 
and His Messenger. If you believe in God and in the Last Day. That is better and more 
suitable for final determination. "37 Referring the disagreements to God and His 
Messenger is an effort made to find solutions according to nass, this is an example of 
ijtihäd 38 and an encouragement to Muslims to perform ijtihdd in the future. 
The Sunnah of the Prophet encourages the use of ijtihäd. 39 "When a judge 
exercises ijtihdd and gives a right judgment, he will have two rewards, but if he errs in 
his judgment, he will still have earned one reward. "40 Another example of this concept 
is the case of the tndith of Mu`ädh. 41 
Shäfi`i (d. 204/819) believes that the rulings inferred by ijtihäd have a divine 
character: "The rulings which are inferred by giyäs are considered to have a divine 
quality' . 42 "The rulings of many cases where there are no direct indications in the 
Book or the Sunnah have to be deduced by means of giyas (analogy) and 
14 Qur'dn: 64/16. 
35 Qur'an: 59/2 
36 Qarafi, "Tanglh", 4th chapter of ijmd', quoted from Ibn Ashur, "Magdsid al-Sharrah", p: 197-198. 37 Qur'dn: 4/59. 
38 Shäfii, "A1-Risalah", 368. 
39 ShAfi`i, "Al-Umm", 7/272. 
40 Abü fwd, "Sunan" iii, 1013, Fladith no: 3567; Bukhw"SaMclf', 8/157. 
41 Abü Däwüd, iii, 1019 Hadith no: 3585. 
42 Shaui'I, "Al-Risälah", 81,368. 
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interpretations of the nas2'. 43 Juwayni (d. 478/1085) says that, "When there is no 
direct trace within the nah;; nine out of ten rulings and legal opinions (fatwd') are 
deduced by way of personal opinions (ra'y) and inferences. ' 44 
According to Fazlur Rahmaa, the Qur'an should be our guidance and the 
Qur'dn's general principles, values, long term purposes must be determined and 
systemized; it is important that these principles and purposes are to be formulated and 
conveyed into the present time. They could become applicable for recent issues 
pertaining to humankind; in other words, determined principles and purposes should 
be rationally integrated into present circumstances 45 
In his model, the principle of ijtihäd would be performed as a `double 
movement': "the process of interpretation proposed here consist of double 
movements, from the present situation to the Qur'än times, and then back to the 
present. , 46 First, travelling to the time of the revelation of the nass verses must be 
investigated, the wisdom behind them discovered, and the purpose of the revelation 
considered along with their historical circumstances. It is necessary to discover and 
comprehend the Qur'än's purpose in its entirety and its detailed response to particular 
circumstances. Generalizing the individual responses sets the precedent for future 
ethical and social structures. Secondly, returning to the present and pertaining the 
general systemized principles to issues. This requires from us that the present 
circumstances be analyzed in detail with its various constitutive components. 
Historians, sociologists, moralists, should co-operate in the ijtihäd of the double 
movement. 7 
43 Ibid: 368; Shafi'i "Al-Umm", 3/85,278. 
44 Sayyid 'Afift, "Us l al-Tashri"', v: 9, p: 344. 
45 Fazlur Rahman, "Islam and Modernity", the University of Chicago, 1982, p: 13. 46 Ibid: p: 5. 
47 Faziur Rahmin, "Islam ve Cagdaslik' pp: 73-76,95; Flayreddin Karaman, "Modernist Proje ve Ijtihöd", in (Magd$d ve Ijtihnd, Ahmed Yaman), p: 433. 
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If people do not consult the Qur'än and give credence to its fixed ideas, the 
double movement process would be the sole hope for an ideal technique for a 
successful interpretation. 8 
Shahristän (d. 54811153) believes that performing ijtihäd is an obligatory duty: 
"Definitely we know that either `ibädät (worshiping) or tasarrurat (transactions) are 
numerous and can not be calculated. We also have to realise that every single matter 
has not been revealed in the nass (text), for it would not be practical. Therefore in 
respect of the unlimited matters, performing ijtihäd is an obligatory duty. " 49 
Ibn $iddiq indicated that a mujtahid has two ways to obtain the objectives of the 
lawgiver in the nass These are as follows: 
a- linguistically investigating nass While doing this investigation, the general 
principles become a part of an activity and if the general principles and particular 
principles are not in harmony then the general principles are preferred. 
b- Investigating nass in the context of the objectives of the shari `ah. 5° 
Generally, the main sources of shari'ah are first divided into two parts: 
1. Al-Qur'an 
2. Al-Sunnah 
Ijtihdd is the main method of making new rulings in Islamic law relying on the 
two main sources. 
The Qur'an has pointed to such issues in sürah al-Nisä': "0 you who believe! 
Obey God and obey the Messenger (Muhammad), and those of you (Muslims) who 
are in authority. (And) if you differ in anything amongst yourselves, refer it to God 
`Fazlur Rahman, "Islami ca gda qa 9na", in Islamic research magazine, p: 318. 
49 ShahristAni, Abu a1-Fath Muhammad b. `Abd al-Karim b. AbU Bakr (d. 54811153), "Al-Milal wa al- 
11 i/ ul", edt. Muhammad Sayyid Kayläni, Cairo, 1976,1/348. 
so 'Abd al-Hay Ibn al-Siddiq, "Nagdu Maqäl Masäilah min `Jim al-nth wa al-Fiqh wa USYdih wa 
Taf$lih Baghdal-Mazähib", Maghrib, 1988, p: 100. 
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and His Messenger, if you believe in God and in the Last Day. That is better and more 
suitable for final determination. 51 
The Prophet taught the Companions how to practice ijtihad. When the Prophet 
intended to send Mu`ädh Ibn-Jabal (d. 18/640) to Yemen, the Prophet asked him: 
"How will you judge when the occasion of deciding a case arises? " He replied: "I 
shall judge in accordance with God's book. " The prophet asked: "(What will you do) 
if you do not find guidance in God's Book? " He replied: "(I will act) in accordance 
with the Sunnah of the Messenger of God. " The Prophet asked: "(What will you do) if 
you do not find guidance in the Sunnah of the Apostle of God and in God's Book? " 
He replied: "I shall do my best to form an opinion and spare no pains. " The apostle of 
God then patted him on the chest and said: Praise be to God who helped the 
messenger of the Apostle of God to find a thing which pleases the apostle of God". 52 
Said Ibn al-Musayyib narrated a hr. dith and said: "I asked the Messenger of 
God. 0! Messenger of God what shall we do when we face a problem, which has no 
answer in the Qur'an and the Sunnah? " The Apostle of God said: "Your scholars 
(`ulama') come together, or worshippers come together from among the believers, and 
make consultation among yourselves; do not judge on the basis of only one 
»63 opinion. 
As we can see, the Prophet encouraged the Companions to perform ijtihäd 
during his life time. The encouragement of people to perform ijtihäd gave them the 
ability to find answers to their problems, and to open doors that would never be 
51 Qur'an: 4/59 
52 Abü Dawüd, iii, 1019 Hadith no: 3585. 
53 TabarAnT, Sulayman b. Ahmad (d. 360/971), "Al-Mu `jam al-Saghir wa al-Ma jam al-Awsäf', 
publisher M. Shakür Mahmüd al-ft Amir, Beirut, 1985, Narated by Tabaräni in al-Awsat. See in 
"Mujmä ` al-Zawd' id", 1(178. 
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closed54. When `Umar ibn Khattäb appointed Shurayh as a judge to Küfah, he said to 
him: "First of all look into the Qur'än as though it was revealed to you without asking 
anyone, then rule with it. If you cannot find what you are looking for in the Qur'än 
then follow the Prophet's Sunnah. If you cannot find the right guidance in the Sunnah 
then perform ijtihäd by ra'y with your personal opinion and consult the people of 
righteousness (virtuousness, justness) and honesty. "55 
2.2.2 Definition of ijtihäd 
21.3 Linguistically: 
Ijtihäd is derived from two words; the word juhd which means exertion of 
effort or energy; and jahd which means the forbearance of hardship, that is striving 
and self-exertion in any activity which entails a measure of hardship. It would thus be 
suitable in order to use jahada in respect of one who carries a heavy load, but not so if 
he carries a trivial weight. Ijtihad is the expenditure of efforts to arrive at righteous 
judgement; it could be either physical such as walking, working or intellectual such as 
inference of a ruling, or juristic and linguistic theory. 56 
2.2.4 Technically: 
The juristic meaning of ijtihäd has several definitions according to the scholars 
of usül. Some define ijtihäd in accordance with the action and activity exerted by the 
jurist to arrive at a solution. Ghazäli (d. 505/1111) defines it as "Total expenditure of 
effort made by a jurist for the purpose of obtaining the religious rulings. "57 
Amidi (d. 631/1233) defines ijtihäd as the expenditure of the total efforts in 
search of znnn (probability), to the extent that the jurist feels obliged to exert himself 
54 This is my view but also it is still a controversial subject. A more detailed discussion on the "gate of 
tihäd' appears in the final chapter of this work. 
55 ihn Taymiyyah, 'Al-Fatmvä al-Kubrd', Dar al-Kutub al-`Ilmiyyah, 19/200-201; Ibn al-Qayyrm 
`"]`lätn", i, 171. 
56 Ibn Manzür `Zisän", subject: Juhidah part: 2 pp: 133-134. 
57 Ghazäli, "Al-Mustas`'d", 2/350. 
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further in proving the ruling being correct. Amidi s definition of ijtihäd implies that it 
is not enough to exert efforts only; the jurist should feel that he has spared no effort to 
ensure he could pursue the issue further. According to Amidi, "ijtihäd is the 
application of the jurist using all of his faculties either in inferring the practical rules 
of shari`ah from the sources, or implementing such rules and applying them to a 
particular issue. "58 The definitive rulings of sharä `ah that are known by necessity are 
therefore excluded from ijtihad, such as the five pillars of Isläm, rulings related to 
Islamic 'aqidah (belief) and realization of the attributions of God; all these are 
determined by explicit textual statements. There is only one correct view in regard to 
these matters and anyone who differs is wrong 59 
Qarafi (d. 684/1285) defines it as "The expenditure of total effort while 
considering a case which is condemned by religion. "60 
Isnawi (d. 772/1370) defines ijtihdd as, "Expenditure of effort to arrive at and 
realize the rulings of shari `ah, whether definitive (gat`i) or probable (zanni)", 61 
Kamäl Ihn Al-Humäm (d. 861/1457) defines ijtihäd as the expenditure of 
efforts by the fagih to arrive at a juristic ruling, such ruling being either rational 
(`agli) or transmitted (nagli), definitive (qat `r )or speculative (zanni) 62 
Ibn Hazm (d. 456/1064) differs and defines ijtihäd as "Investigating the rules of 
God solely in the Qur'an and in the Sunnah"63 
Fazlur Rahmära defines ijtihZd technically as 'The effort to understand the 
meaning of a relevant text or precedent in the past, containing a rule, and to alter that 
59 Amide', "Al-I j *äm" v: 3 p: 204 
59 Ibid. 
60 Qarafi, "Shari', 189. 
61 Isnawi, "Nihäyät", v: 2 p: 232. 
621bn a1-Hum5m, "Al-Tahrir f al- Usul", v: 3 p: 291. 
63 Ibn Ham, "A1-11ýcäm", 41, pp: 977,1155; and "Ibtal al-Qryps", 42. 
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rule by extending, restricting or otherwise modifying it in such a manner that a new 
situation can be subsumed by a new solution. , 64 
2.2.5 Validity of ijtihad: 
There are many verses which appear to validate ijtihäd in the Qur'an: "Verily, 
in these things, there are äyät (proof, evidences, lessons, signs, etc. ) for people who 
reflect. "65 "Verily, in these things, there are äyät for the people who understand. "66, 
"Surely, We have sent down to you (0 Muhammad) the book (this Qur'an) in truth 
that you might judge between men by that which God has shown you". 67 These verses 
support the use of ijtihäd by way of giyäs (analogy). 69 The following verses obviously 
indicate the validity of ijtihäd: "... and consult them in the affair. "69, ".... and who 
s7 (conduct) their affairs by mutual consultation. 0 
In addition, many hiadith also validate ijtihäd: It is narrated that `Amr Ibn al- 
`Äs heard the Prophet say: "If a jurist exerts efforts and arrives at a correct ruling he 
will be rewarded twice, and if he arrives at a ruling which is in error he will be 
rewarded once"71. 
The hadith of Mu`ädh Ibn Jabal, as mentioned above, is a very good example 
of validation. "I shall spare no pains to do my best to form an opinion. "72 
According to Dasügi, ijtihäd which is valid and unanimously accepted is to be 
used by all jurists. The practice of ijtihäd is a key to the progress of the development 
of Islamic law, and opens a gate to Islamicfiqh that will develop the law when dealing 
64 Fazlur Rahmära, "Isldm and Modernity", p: 8. 
65 Qur'an: 13/3 
66 Qur'an: 13/4 
67 Qur'an: 41105 
68 Amidi, "AI-Iaflcäm' v: 3 p: 140. 
69 Qur'an, 3/159 
70 Qur'an, 42/38 
71 Abu DawUd, "Sunan", iii/1013, Hadith no: 3567; Bukhw ". hrft', 8/157. 
72 Narrated from TirmizT, DärimT, "Sunan", Abü Däwüd, iii, 1019 hadith no: 3585. 
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with new issues. Muhammad Al-Dasiiq says that the use of ijtihäd is a kind of 
revelation of Islamic figh 73 
2.2.6 Types of ijtihäd: 
After considering the divisions of ijtihäd based on the magä5id (objectives of 
the shari `ah), we should assess its classical typology. As for ijtihäd based on the 
magäsid, Muhammad Tahir b. `Ashur (d. 1973) says that it has five main divisions 74 
a- Comprehending the commands of the shari`ah and its naffs, which must be in the 
context of linguistic meanings and shar`r (legal) meanings. 
b- Cases which are contradictory to nass must be examined with a view to naskh 
(abrogation), takhss(specifying the general), and räjih (preference). 
c- To perform analogy based on the effective cause, which is obtained from the 
rulings. 
d- Creating a rule in an area where there is no availability of na$. (text) and analogy. 
e- The to `abbudi (worship) rulings would be accepted as they are. 
In performing ijtihäd the jurist is to consider these five divisions; a jurist needs to 
know the objectives of the shari `ah (magäsid al-shari `ah). 
Ijtihäd with regard to the amount of effort exerted by the mujtahid is divided 
into two types: 
a-Full or Complete ijtihäd: The mujtahid exerts all efforts possible in searching and 
investigating until he feels that he is incapable of further efforts. This is what Mu`ädh 
Ibn Jabal indicated in the h. ad(th stated above "I shall spare no pains to do my best to 
7s form an opinion. 
73 Muhammad DasilgT, "Al-ljtihäd wa al-Tagrd fr' al-Sharrah al-Islämiah", Där al-Thagäfah, Doha, p: 39. 
741bn `Ashur, "MagäOd', p: 27-28. 
75 AN DäwÜd, "sunan", iii, 1019 fkidith no: 3585 
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b-Imperfect (Incomplete) ijtihäd: when there is a lack of effort in searching and 
investigating. This type of ijtihäd is not considered as shar'T ijtihäd. 76 
Ghazäli (d. 505/1 11) was the first to divide ijtihäd into two categories in general77: 
1-Absolute (mudaq) ijtihdd: This is where the mujtahid is unrestricted by the rules of 
a particular madhhab. This level of ijtihäd is for those who have fulfilled all the 
requirements of ijtihäd, and also deduced the a/m from the evidence in the sources. 
2-Limited (muqayyad) ijtih4d: This is where the mujtahid expounds the law within the 
confines of a particular school while adhering to the principles laid down by their 
i, näms. 
7 
Ijtihäd is also divided into the general and the specific: 
1-General (`äm) ijtihäd: deals with all sections of Islamic figh. 
2-Specific, individual (khac) ijtihäd: deals with a particular section of figh or evidence 
such as ijmä` and giyäs. 79 
Further classifications are individual and collective as follows: 
1-Individual ijtihird: is when a person fulfils the conditions or requirements of a 
mujtahid without any contribution or participation by another mujtahid. 
Alternatively, it is an ijtihäd performed by several mujtahids on an issue in which 
there is no evidence of agreement on an opinion. The above type of ijtihdd is that 
which the hadith of Mu`ädh Ibn Jabal has indicated. 
2-Collective (ja ina `i) ijtihäd: This is the ijtihäd where consultations take place 
amongst scholars and jurists regarding current issues of importance to the general 
76 Ghazäli, "Al-Mustasfa", v: 2 p: 350. 
77 Wael B. Hallaq, "The Gate of Ijtihdd: A study in Islamic Legal History", PhD dissertation, University 
of Washington, p: 18. 
' Ibn al-Qayyim, "1 `larn", v: 4 p: 212. 
79 Ibn TaymTyyah, "Al-Musawwadah", p: 356. 
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public. This type of ijtihäd has been proven by the textual statement of the Qur'än 
and the Sunnah as well as the works of the Companions and their Successors. 80 
2.2.7 Conditions of ijtihad: 
The aims of the conditions are to ensure the ability of a person to perform 
ijtihad. The earliest complete account of the qualifications of a mujtahid was given in 
Abü al-Husayn al-Basrrs (d. 436/1044) "Al-Mu `tamad ft Us l al-Figh ". Shiräz! 
(d. 467/1083), Ghazäl (d. 50511111) and Amid! (d. 632/1234) later accepted the broad 
outline of Basri's exposition, with minor changes. This does not mean that the 
requirements of ijtihäd received no attention from the `ulamä' who came before 
Basri, 81 
The first condition is "to perceive the magäsid (objectives) of the Lawgiver. 
The second condition, in the same context, is to have the ability to infer rules based on 
awareness of the magäsid. "82 Uüli scholars for many centuries prepared extensive 
lists of the abilities jurists must possess to enable them to perform ijtihäd. Some 
increased and others decreased the conditions. An outstanding scholar, Shätibi, 
ignored these lists83 and reduced the conditions of ijtihäd to one comprehensive point: 
the precise comprehension of the magäsid and in the light of this comprehension the 
ability to deduce rules from the sources. 
84 
80 Qaradäwi, "Al-Ijtihad fi Shari'ah al-Islämiah", Kuwait, 1989, p: 182. 
al Hallaq, "The Gate", p: 14-17. 
87, Shätibi, "Al-Muwäfagät", v: 4 pp: 105-106. 
83 For more about conditions of al-Ijtihad see: Shatibi, "Al-Muwäfagät", v: 4 pp: 60,105-106,111, 
114,162,170; BannAnl, "Jam' al-Jawämi , v: 2 p: 832; Isnawi, "AI-Minhäj", v: 3 p: 175,200; 
GhazälT, "AI-MustasfF, v: 2, pp: 54,101,102; ShawkAni, "Irshäd", pp: 250-252; Abü Zahrah, "U, SUP', 
pp: 302-307; KaradAwi, "Al-Ijtihäd", p: 47; Badrän, "Usul", p: 208; Qaraff, "Kitäb Anwär al-Burüq fl 
Anwär al-Furügh", Dar al-MA`rifah, Beirut, v: 1, p: 78; Qurtübi, "Al-J5mT' li A/1 äm al-Qur'an", Dar 
al-ihyä' al-Turäs al-`Arabi, Beirut, 1967, part: 11, pp: 310-311; Zuhayr, Muhammad Aba al-Nür, 
"Mudhakkarät f al-U$ l al-Fiqh", Dar al-Ta'lif, Kulliyyat al-Sharl'ah, al-Azhar, v: 4, p: 226. 
$4 Ahmad RaysilnT, "Nazariyyät al-Magacid `inda al Imäm al-Shäitbi', the HIT, Maryland USA, 1995, 
p: 353; Wael B. Hallaq, "The Origins and Evolution of Islamic Law", p: 146, Cabrnridge University 
press, 2005. 
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Ibn al-Subki (d. 771/1370) mentions the conditions of ijtihäd in his book "Jam' 
al-Jawämi "'. 85 In the explanation of "Minfzrj", Ibn al-Subl stated that one of the 
conditions of ijtihdd is "to know the objectives of the Lawgiver before specializing in 
that field". 86 
$uyüti (d. 911/1505) quotes from "Al-Tangiß' of Aminuddin b. Muhammad 
Tabrizi (d. 621/1224) the following statement: "Knowledge of providing evidence of 
rulings is obtained by investigating every single word of the main sources (the Qur'än 
and Sunnah) in the context of the magäsid". 87 
Shä ibi believes that there are some who think that they are competent in the 
concept of ijtihäd but who are unable to perceive the objectives of the Lawgiver. 
Their self- belief in their ability to arrive at a just ruling undermines Islamic law. 
Shätibi says: "the incorrect use of partial ruling destroys the general principles. 
Without realizing their lack of knowledge in understanding the magdýid al-sharf'ah 
questions are never asked, and the ruling is established with the first thought that 
comes to mind, with no further investigation deemed necessary... 
If a ruling relating to people's needs is adequate and the mufti does not 
possess the ability to comprehend God's purposes the ruling may cause problems and 
therefore it is necessary for the mufti to understand the magäýid al-Shad'ah . 
89 
2.2.8 Status of the gate of ijtihad: 
The conditions of ijtihnd stated above are the criteria for anyone who wants to 
qualify in practicing ijtihäd, irrespective of the era in which the person may live. In 
later centuries, restrictions were imposed on ijtihdd which, by the end of the third 
century, led to the allegation that the Gate of ijtihäd was closed. The closure of the 
85 Ibn al-Subki, "Jam` al-Jawämi", v: 2, p: 383. 
86 Subkt and Ibn al-Subk3, "Al-lbhäj fi Sharhal-Minhäf', Beirut, 1984, v. 3, p: 206. g Raysüni, ibid, p: 355. 
88 Shätibi, "Ar-Muwdfagät", v: 4 pp: 174-175. 
89 Orhan %eker, "Ifta ve Bir Fetva Defter! brneg2-"', Damla offset, Konya, 2000. 
Development of ijtihird by ra'y in the context of istiIn n 81 
gate of ijtihad arose in order to prevent those who were incapable of practicing ijtihdd 
-yet who claimed to do so- from bringing the concept into disrepute. To those who are 
capable, the doors to the gate of ijtihäd remained opened. 90 
Furthermore, recent western scholars, in particular Wael Hallaq, and W. 
Montgomery Watt, have indicated that the door of ijtihäd is still open and the term 
"The closing of the door of ijtihäd"is a myth. 91 In reality, the door of ijtihäd was 
never completely closed, as properly qualified scholars must have the right to perform 
ijtihäd continuously. Ijtihäd is not confined to the four schools of law and can be 
performed by all capable scholars. Consequently, the gate of ijtihäd, in my personal 
opinion, is still and must remain open. 
Dihlawi (1703/1762) strongly criticizes those who claimed that the door of 
ijtihdd was closed. He calls them: 'vMe simpletons of our time" who are, "totally 
averse to ijtihäd. Like she-camels, in the nose of which a piece of wood is put to 
guide them, they do not know where they are going". Ijtihäd is actually a fard kifäyah 
(a collective duty, the fulfilment of which by a sufficient number of individuals 
excuses the other individuals from fulfilling it) for every epoch since "every age has 
its own countless specific problems, and cognisance of the divine decisions with 
respect to them is essential"92. He continues: `The occupant of this office is qualified 
to exercise ijtihäd whenever an affair arises for which he does not find an unequivocal 
judgement of the founder (imäm) of the madhhab; he has the right to elicit judgements 
in the same manner and by preceding analogously the verdicts of the imäm. "93 
I shall elaborate about this study further in the final chapter. 
90 Sha`bän, "US7l", pp: 332-333. 
91 Wael B. Hallaq, "Was the Gate of tjtihad Closed? ", in International Journal of Middle East Studies. 
Xvi, 1,1984,3-41; Montgomery Watt, "The closing of the door of ijtihad"in Oriehtakia hispanica, sive 
studia FM Pareja octogenaria dictata edenda curavit JM Barras, Leiden 1974, I, 675-8. 
1* Dihlaw% "Al-Musa"', Delhi, I, 11. Quoted from Baljon, "Religion and thought of Shah Wali Allah 
Dihlawr', p: 167. 
93 Dihlawi, "lqd" quoted from Baljon, "Religion and thought of Shah wall Allah Dihlawi ', p: 167. 
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2.3.0 Implementations of ijtihdd at the time of the Prophet: 
At the time of the Prophet many af* m (rulings) and legislations were 
determined by wa 5y (revelation). The solution of an issue or problem encountered 
during the life of the Prophet was either by revelation or by the Prophet through 
inspirations. Even in situations where there was no revelation, the Prophet used his 
knowledge based on experience and the use of ray (opinion) to perform ijtihäd. The 
Prophet is reported to have said, "When I do not receive a revelation I adjudicate 
among you on the basis of my opinion. 94 
If the Prophet made a mistake, it was corrected through subsequent 
revelations. 95 Revelation was brought down to the Prophet revealing the messages to 
give general rules of guidance for issues pertaining to social life during his time and 
thereafter, ensuring that Muslims could carry out their affairs. 96 However, according 
to Ash`aris, Mu'tazilah, Ibn Hazm al-Zähm and some Hanbali and Shäfi`i scholars the 
Qur'än provides clear evidence that every utterance of the Prophet partakes of wary. 
A specific reference is made to the verse, which provides: "He says nothing of his 
own desire; it is nothing other than revelation sent down to him. "97 This verse is quite 
categorical on the point that the Prophet is guided by divine revelation and that all his 
utterances are to be seen in this light. This would mean that all the rulings of the 
Prophet consist of divine revelations and are not considered to be ijti; 0d. 98 
Another view is that we can not judge the situation of the Prophet, owing to 
the conflicting nature of the evidence. This view is attributed to Shy `i (d. 204/819) 
and upheld by Bagilläni (d. 403 AH) and Ghazäli (d. 505/1111). Shawkäni 
94 Abü Däwüd, v: III, p: 1017, hadith no: 3578; Kassab, al-Sayyid 'Abd al-Latif, "AQ4vä"", p: 58. 
95 Khalläf, "Kflu1äcat al-Tdrikh al-Tashfi' al-Islänu"', al-Maktabat al-Isliimiyyah, Istanbul 1984, p: 284; 
Hayreddin Karaman, "Yeni geli 9neler karstsmda Islam. Hukuk'u", iz yayincilik Istanbul, p: 56. 
96 Karaman "Yeni gell 9neler", p: 56; Zaydän, "Al-madkhal' p: 11 o. 
9' Qur'än: 53/ 3. 
91 Shawkäni, "Irshäd", p: 255. 
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(d. 1250/1834) however rejects this saying that the Qur'än gives us clear indications 
not only to the effect that ijtihäd was permissible for the Prophet but also that he was 
capable of making errors. 99 On the other hand the `ulamä' who have supported this 
view say that such errors were not sustained, meaning that any errors the Prophet 
might have made were rectified by the Prophet himself or through subsequent 
revelation. 100 To give an example on this point, the Prophet was blamed in the Qur'än 
for his errors. In 8: 67 we read that "It is not fitting for a Prophet that he should have 
prisoners (of war) until he has thoroughly subdued the earth"' 01 
This verse was revealed concerning the captives of the Battle of Badr. It was 
reported that seventy people were taken prisoner. The Prophet first consulted Abu 
Bakr asking, what they should do with the prisoners? He suggested that they should 
be ransomed, whereas `Umar bin al-KhatO held the view that they should be 
executed. The Prophet approved of Abu Bakr's view but then the verse was revealed, 
disapproving of taking ransom for the captives' release. Elsewhere, in siürah al-tauba 
in an address to the Prophet, we read: "God granted you pardon, but why did you 
permit them to do so before it became clear to you who was telling the truth? "' 02 This 
verse shows that the Prophet granted a pardon to those who did not participate in the 
Battle of Tabuk These passages in the Qur'dn indicate that the Prophet had on some 
occasions acted on his own ijtihdd; had he acted in pursuance of a divine command 
there would have been no cause for a reprimand, or the granting of divine pardon for 
his mistakes. 
The subject of whether or not ijtihdd was used by the Prophet has been, from a 
very early period, discussed and disagreed upon by the scholars. 
99 GhazälT, "Mustaa", v: 2 p: 104; Shawkäni, "Irshad', p: 256. 
'00 Kassab, "AQtvd"", p: 61. 
10! Qur'an: 8167 
102 Qur'an: 9143 
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Muslim scholars disagree as to whether the Prophet performed ijtihdd by his 
personal opinion on issues such as daily maintenance, war and peace rules, rules 
relating to attack and defence, the solutions of disputes, or juridical and political 
issues. 103 According to Ibn al-Humäm some jurists of the Hanafi School have confined 
the ijtihäd of the Prophet by ra'y to giyäs in situations where there was no 
revelation. 
104 
The Prophet performed ijtihäd by his own ra'y on several occasions and he 
educated the Companions to follow his examples; his instruction of the companions 
was practical rather than theoretical. The Prophet's practice of ijtihdd by ra'y 
provided the example for giyäs (analogy), istihsän (juristic preference), maslahah 
(consideration of public interest), sadd al-dharä'i ` (blocking the means), and 'urf 
(customary law). 
For example a woman from Juhaynä came to the Prophet and asked: `My 
mother vowed to make a pilgrimage, but she died before she could fulfil the vow. Can 
I do it in her name? The Prophet said: "Yes, fulfil the pilgrimage instead of her; if 
your mother had a debt, would you not pay it? Pay your debts (fulfil your promises) 
because God fulfils promises to. "las Here the Prophet has made a comparison between 
two similar things: he wanted to show that to fulfil a promise to God is the same as 
fulfilling a promise made to a human being. This type of analogy is called awlä'. 106 
Another example of an analogy is as follows. A nomad tried to reject his 
ancestors by telling the Prophet: `My wife gave birth to a black baby'. The Prophet 
asked him "Do you have grey camels among your red ones? " When the nomad said 
that he did the Prophet asked him "Where did they come from? " The nomad said 
103 Bukhäri, "Kashf', v: iii, pp: 205-206; Ibn liazm, "AI-Iflküm", v: V, pp: 127-128. 
104 Ibn Humam, " Tahrir", v: IV, p: 183; Ibn 'Abd al-Shakiir, "Musallam", v: II, p: 366. 
105 Bukhäri, "Wasa-ya~', 19; Muslim, "Nadhr", 1. 
106 Ibn al-Qayyim, "I `lam", v: i, p: 258. 
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`They presumably look like his ancestors. ' The Prophet then told him: "Your child 
presumably also looks like his ancestors. "107 
The Prophet allowed most of the pre-Islamic `Arab customs to be preserved, 
although a few were changed, such as trade, pawn, rent, salam (contract of purchase 
of goods with pre-payment), marriage, the equality between husband and wife and 
murder cases. 108 When the Prophet came to Medina, he saw that the people there had 
made salam (forward sale) agreements for 1 or 2 years. To emphasise this he said: 
"Anyone who makes salam agreements should do this according to specific 
measurements and for determined periods. "109 This practice, which was common 
among the `Arabs, was practiced freely after a few amendments. 
110 
2.3.1.1 The practices of ijtihdd in terms of isti/udn: 
Abü al-Hasan al-Karkhi (d. 340/952) defines isti1 sän as "The principle which 
authorizes departure from an established ruling to similar cases and authorizes 
applying an alternative established ruling to cases similar to those which set the 
precedent. " The departure is authorised only when there is enough reason to justify 
that departure. "' The departure from a ruling on a certain issue- one that has been 
applied to a similar case previously- to another ruling, must be based on clear 
evidence. The evidence which necessitates this departure, as viewed by the jurist, 
should be established by nass, or ijmd ` (consensus), thrürah (necessity), `urf 
(custom), maýlafxxh (benefit), giyäs khafly (Implicit analogy), or other sources, 
irrespective of the methods which the earlier, similar ruling depended on, such as daft 
, am. (general evidence), gä'idah fighiyyah (jurisprudence rule) or giyäs gähir jaliy 
107 Bukhäri, "1'tisäm", 12; Muslim, "Liän", 18. 
108 Sha'bän, "Islam Hukuk Ilminin Esaslari", pp: 176-177. 
109 Bukhäri, "Salam", 1,2; Muslim, "Musäq&", 25; Tirmizi, "Buyii"', 70; Abti Dawat, "Buyü"', 57; 
Nasfi, "Buyü °', 63. 
110 Khayyat, `Abd al-'AzTz, "Nazariyyät al- `Urf', Maktabat al-Agsä', Amman 1997, pp: 116-117. 
111 BukhUT, "Kashf', v: 4 p: 3. 
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(apparent clear analogy). This meaning of istihsän is according to Hanaff jurists; other 
jurists, especially Mäliki scholars, also applied this definition. 112 
Sometimes an issue is included within the range of a settled general rule with 
the common characteristic of nass or in the light of some evidence. However 
regarding the issue, another specific evidence is to be found which can be a nass, 
darürah, 'urf or masiahah that can be used to judge in opposition to the common nass 
or the common rule. The mujtahid (competent jurist) must be convinced that this 
specific evidence is to be preferred before abandoning the practice of the common 
nass or common rule judgements that are used in such issues, and judging according 
to the specific evidence. 
Sometimes when an issue is not within the range of a nass, giyäs is then used 
to judge. Here we come across two different possibilities, apparent clear analogy and 
implicit analogy. If the mujtahid finds that the second one is stronger (khaff giyäs) the 
judgment given accordingly is called istifzsän. 113 
Through istikdn some issues within the range of common nah and criteria 
such as difficulty, complexity, necessity, and need are removed because of their 
specific nature and a new judgement is given to this special situation to implement 
ma ia/vh. 
If one studies nass from the Qur'an and the Sunnah, it is possible to find many 
examples on this issue. The principle of istifzrän is used to remove the common nass 
or a settled rule from its area application. The mujtahid who applies this principle 
applies the essence of what the Shari ` wants for the people in any given situation or 
'12 Sha`bän, "Islam Hukuk Ilminin Esaslari", pp: 162-163. 
113 ibid pp: 162-163. 
Development of ijtihad by ra'y in the context of istiInan 87 
place in order to remove harm or discomfort, and establish masia/nh. 
114 Istiixrän is in 
the general sense concerned with the public interest and the mujtahid uses his 
judgement in the context of general rules by proving stronger evidence pertaining to 
the particular situation. The basis for the mujtahid's judgment could be darürah 
(necessity), maslahah, 'urf (custom), ijmä ` or the nass of the Qur'an or the Sunnah. 
When this evidence is nass from the Qur'an or the Sunnah, God becomes the 
one who actually gives this exceptional judgement, the one who makes istihNän, and it 
is by His announcement that this isti, sän becomes legal. 
' 15 
As such it is the Shari' who considers the special situations and circumstances 
with specific conditions, and who abolishes the difficulty, complexity and harm. This 
provides an ideal guide for the mujtahid. On this issue Mustafa Zargä' says: "The 
Qur'an and the Sunnah are both isti j7sän, which is the creation of the Shard'. The 
concept of isti jndn is to guide the mujtahid when applying the nass of the Shari' to 
issues of life. The mujtahid makes isti/zsän inspired by the method that the Ada' 
applies and in this way, the mujtahid implements the Shari "s purpose and 
intentions. ' 16 
The messenger and the explorer of the Qur'an is the Prophet who applied the 
method, taught by the Qur'an, from the general nass and established rules to 
exceptional conditions and circumstances. There are a lot of examples on this issue to 
be found in the Prophet's Sunnah. Before we examine these issues, I shall give a few 
examples mentioned in the Qur'an: 
Verse 4 of the sürah an-Nür says: "And those who accuse chaste women, and 
produce not four witnesses, flog them with eighty stripes and reject their testimony 
114 Usämah Oamawi, "NaZarfyyät al-Istihsän", MA dissertation at the Faculty of Shari ah at the 
Dimashq University, Dar al-Khayr, Beirut, 1992, p: 123. 
115 Ibid. 
116 ZargA', "Matkhaf', v: I, p: 86. 
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forever". As seen in this verse, the accusation of adultery has a more damaging effect 
on society than the action itself. The `general sentence' for a man that has seen a 
woman commit adultery is flogging. However, if the man who sees the woman 
commit adultery is her husband, then, according to the general sentence, the husband 
should stay silent or bring forward four witnesses; failure to produce these witnesses 
will result in his facing the sentence of flogging for qadhf (slander, accusation). This 
sentence obviously causes the husband to suffer. Therefore, in the case of a husband 
who accuses his wife of committing adultery but is unable to produce four witnesses 
to substantiate his claim, the court can, according to verse 6 of the same sürah and the 
following sürah, declare their marriage dissolved and the husband will not be 
punished for gadhf. 
117 
According to the general rules, fasting during Ramadan is an obligatory duty 
for every adult Muslim. It is a condition that the Ramadan fast should be fulfilled 
during the month of Ramadan with the exception of those who are sick or travelling, 
"And whoever is ill or on a journey, the same number - 
of days which one did not fast must be made up- from 
other days. God intends for you ease, and He does not 
want to make things difficult for you". 118 
This is prescribed because of the special circumstances; a ruling is passed for 
difficulties that may arise. 119 If the general sentence of the obligation of fasting 
applied to the sick and the travellers, such difficulties and sufferings might only delay 
117 Hamza Aktan, "Ticaret Hukukunun Yeni Bazt Problemleri Üzerine Islam Hukuku Actsrndan Bir 
De_&rlendirme", in I. Uluslararasc Islam Ticaret Hukukunun Günümüzdeki Meseleleri Kongresi, 1996, 
Konya, p: 210. 
118 Qur' : 2J 185. 
119 Aktan, "Ticaret", p: 211. For more examples see: HamawT "Nazariyyät al-Istilkdn" pp: 125-131; 
Muhammad Farfür, "Nazariyyät al-Istihcän ft al-Tashri i al-Islämf wa $1atuhä bi al-Ma$afkit al- 
Mursalah", Där al-Dimashq, Sham 1987, pp: 26-36. 
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the healing process or lead to death of the sick. This would be in total contradiction to 
the Shäri "s general aims, among which are `to protect human life'. 
Among the Prophet's Sunnah based on istitndn, some of the ijtihäd by ra'y 
practices are these: 
The contract known as salaf or salam (forward sale), is to sell something in 
return for cash and to show a commitment to deliver it in the future. 120 There are two 
nass concerning this issue. One is general and concerns the invalidity of the contract. 
The Prophet told Hakim b. Hizam: "Do not sell something that you don't own. "121 
The second nag is more specific and concerns the validity of the contract. 
When the Prophet came to Medina, he saw that the people of Medina made salam 
(forward sale) for one and two years regarding the fruits of their labour. On this issue, 
the Prophet said "Those of you who sell goods with salam should do this according to 
stated measurements, scales and time"122 The reason the Prophet changed his ruling 
on the permissibility of salam contracts was the present needs of the people. '23 
The general sentence for theft in the Qur'än is: "Cut off (from the wrist 
joint) the (right) hand of the thief, male or female, as a recompense for that which 
they committed, a punishment by way of example from God"124 . 
During a war, a man was caught stealing, and was brought to the commander 
Busr bin Artäi. The commander ordered him to be beaten and not have his hand cut 
off. He explained: 'The Prophet prohibited us from severing hands during 
wartime. "125 The Prophet did not want the severing of the hand. The general ruling of 
the nass was leniency shown to the thief therefore lessening the possibility the thief 
120 M. Rawäs Kal`aji, Kanibx Hämid Sädik, "Mujäm al-Lughat al-Fugahä"', Där an-Nafäis, Beirut 
1988, p: 248. 
121 Abu Ddwdd, "Buyü "', no: 70; TirmlzT, "Buyu"', no: 19; Nasdi, "Buyv"', no: 60. 
122 Bukhäri, "Salam", nos: 1,2 ; Muslim, "Musdkdl" 25; Abu Däwüd, "Buyu~" 57. 
123 Sha`bän, "Islam Hukuk Ilminin Esaslari", p: 163-164; Fiamawi, ` Nazariyyat', pp: 135-136 
124 Qur'am: 5/38. 
125 Ahmad, "Musnad" IV, 181; Abu Däwüd, "Hudud" 19. 
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might join the enemy. The thief joining the enemy would cause serious problems; 
therefore, the leniency was justified. 126 When two problems occur, the lesser of two 
evils is to be preferred. 
127 This principle is taken from the general na$$ of the Shari'. 
During the Battle of Badr, hiabäb b. Mundhir asked the Prophet about the 
first place picked for the camp: "0, Messenger of God! Is this a place that God has 
disclosed and we have to accept, or is it a ra'y or a war strategy? When the Prophet 
answered; "No, it is a ray and a war strategy", Habbäb said; "This is not an 
appropriate place. I suggest that we set up camp by the water, make ourselves a pond, 
fill it with water and close all of the other wells. This will deprive the enemy of 
water. " The Prophet accepted Habbäb's suggestion and changed the place. 
128 ne 
Prophet by comparing the enemy to other living beings might have made the analogy. 
,, you can't deprive them of water just as you can't deprive these of water. " However, 
Habbäb, considering it was a time of war and that the enemy did not have the right to 
live, came to a different conclusion. 
129 At the end, the opinion that Habbäb suggested 
was chosen and applied above the others, as it was more likely to further the cause of 
the Muslims. 
The Prophet consulted his friends on the day of the Battle of Khandaq. They 
discussed coming to an agreement with the Gatafan polytheists, offering them one 
third of the fruits of Medina in exchange for leaving the battlefield. Sa'd bin Mu'adh 
and Sa'd bin `Ubädah stood up and said: `If this is the will of God we will listen and 
obey God's order. If this is not a revelation but a ray we will only give them swords, 
because during `the age of ignorance', when neither of us had a religion, they could 
126 Hamawi, "Na ariyyär" pp: 138-139. 
127 Ibn Nujäym, Zayn al-`Abidin b. ibrähim al-Shähir (d. 97011562), "Al-Ashbäh wa al-Nazair", p: 89, 
Där al-Kutub al-`llmiyyah, Beirut 1985. 
128 Ibn phsham, `Abd al-Malik, "Al-Sirat al-Nabaviyyah", edt. Mustafa al-Saga, Ibrdhim al-Abyäri, 
`Abd al-Häfiz Shalabi, Där al-Khayr, Beirut 1992, ii, pp: 197-198; Sarakhsi, "U, Afl", II, p: 91; Bukhäri, 
`, Kashf', iii, 210. 
129 Karaman, "Islam Hukuk Tarihi", tz Yayincilik, Istanbul, 1999, p: 71. 
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only get the fruits of Medina by buying them from us or if we treated them. Now 
when God has honoured us with His religion, we refuse to offer them anything except 
disparagement, and we swear that we can only give them our swords'. After this, the 
Prophet said: "I saw that the Arabs came together to be one against you and I wanted 
to send them away. You have the right not to accept it, there is no problem" 130 and 
they insisted on their views. 
The examples I have given are nass from the Qur'än and the Sunnah and 
show that in special circumstances, it is one of the Sharri "s common goals to remove 
difficulties and complexities and thus confirm the principles of public need and 
interest. These rulings show that it is important to note the differences between similar 
events. One should not always look at events categorically, generally or 
prescriptively. If there are differences between events, it is necessary to give the 
ruling on merit. It would be apparently wrong to apply to analogy to events that 
appear to be in the scope of general rules and then attempt to include it as a general 
rule when in fact it is an exceptional one. In circumstances like these, the right way is 
to evaluate events with special features on merit, namely to apply isti judn. "' 
The Prophet rejected an application to fix the price of goods, as it might be 
unfair to the seller. 
132 However Said b. al-Musayyab (d. 94), Rabi'a b. Abt `Abd al- 
Rahmän (d. 1361753) Yahyä b. Said al-Ansar (d. 147/760) and other jurists made a 
juridical decision regarding the pricing of goods based on their personal opinions 
regarding the economic climate of the day. 
133 Those scholars believed that an 
130 Sarakhs% "Usul", II, pp: 91-92; Bukhäri, "Kashf', III, 210. 
131 Aktan, "Ticaret", pp: 211-212; Hamawi, "Nazariyyat", p: 140. 
132 Aba Däwüd, "Bi O"', 51; Tirmizi, "Buyü °,, 73. 
133 BAAJt, "Al-Muntagä', v, 18. 
Chapter Two 92 
understanding of public interest is crucial in order to protect people from incorrect 
ai käm. 
134 
According to Shaybäni, Ibrahim al-Nakhä`i said: "Supposing someone 
murdered someone else at his front door and alleged that he committed the crime in 
order to protect his goods and honour. To be able to give a verdict an investigation is 
carried out. The case may have two possible outcomes. In the first scenario, the law of 
retaliation is not applied, but the blood-money has to be paid even if the victim is 
guilty of stealing. However if the victim is known to be a respectable man, then the 
law of retaliation must come into effect. In the second scenario, the law of retaliation 
is also dropped, but the blood-money is paid, even if the victim is guilty of adultery 
and/or fornication. However, the murderer will be prosecuted if the victim is known 
as a person who is chaste and virtuous. "135 Ibrahim al-Nakhä'i gives more 
consideration to the spirit of the nass rather than the literal meaning, neither rejecting 
nor applying the law of retaliation based on false testimony but supporting his claims 
with evidence, thus avoiding incorrect judgements. Nakhä'i, with this legal opinion, 
considers nothing other than the public good. 
136 
In the view of some Iraqi scholars, the law of retaliation with regard to stolen 
goods comes into effect only when the value of the goods stolen exceeds a certain 
amount. For them, this minimum was set at five dirham (silver coin), although the 
generally accepted minimum is usually ten. The minimum value of stolen goods is 
extrapolated by analogy from the minimum value of the marriage dowry. The Iraqi 
scholars, however, disagreed saying: "We are surprised that entering into a sexual 
relationship is allowed by so little an amount. " In addition, Ibrahim al-Nakhä' i did not 
134 Shalabi, "Ta `lir', p: 79; Sha`bän, "Islam Hukuk Ilminin Esaslari"', p: 108. 
135 Shaybäni Muhammad b. iasan (d. 189), "Kitilb al-Äthär", Lahore, 1329, p: 102. 
136 Shalabi, "Ta`lr1', pp: 80-81; Karaman, "Ictihäd', p: 89. 
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take a favourable view of the dowry being less than forty dirhams and resorted instead 
to istiizsän which yielded more useful results than analogy. 137 
At the time of the Companions and the Followers, to be a witness in court for 
the defence of close relatives -for one's father, say, or one's child- was allowed in 
accordance with the belief that "everybody's testimony is valid if he is Muslim and 
righteous". 138 However, with the passage of time and the inevitable weakening of 
faith which occurred among the Muslim populace as a whole, jurists concluded that 
this ruling might no longer serve the needs of society, since the possibility of bias and 
injustice would bring untold harm to the social fabric. They rejected the testimony of 
relatives in order to prevent corruption and to preserve justice and social harmony. 
The juristic decision was confined to offspring, fathers, brothers and spouses. 139 
It is a rule of Islamic Law when a woman is widowed that her mourning 
period should last for four months and ten days, during this which time she should not 
use kohl or perfume. A woman applied to the Prophet asking whether or not her 
widowed daughter could use kohl to aid her painful eyes. In spite of her insistence, the 
Prophet said "No" three times. 140 However, Imam Malik (d. 179), Salim b. `Abd 
Allah (d. 106/724) and Sulaymän b. Yasär (d. 1071725) rule that a woman in such a 
situation may cure her eyes with kohl or another medicine. 141 While there is no 
possibility that these followers would oppose the saying of the Prophet, they 
considered his prohibition as applying only to that particular woman, as her condition 
did not necessitate the use of kohl. Their judgement was correct, based on their 
137 Schacht, "Introduction", pp: 48-49. 
138 Ibn al-Qayyim, "I`lrnn", i, pp: 158-159. 
139 Ibn a]-Qayyim, "I'Inm", i, p: 158; Shalabl, "Ta'lil", p: 75; Sha`bän, "Islam Hukuk ilminin Esaslan" 
p: 109. 
14° Buhkäri, "Taläq", 47; Muslim, "Taläq", 9; Bäji, "aI-Muntaga", vi, pp: 143-144; Mi lik, "Muwattä"' 
ii, 597. 
141 BAjI, "AI-Muntagä", vi, 145. 
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consideration of the avoidance of hardship (raf' al-(x rdj) and the attainment of 
benefit. 142 
23.1.2 Ijtihbd by ra'y of the Companions at the time of the Prophet: 
At the time of the Prophet there is evidence that the Companions performed 
ijtihad by ray; these happened in the presence of the Prophet and during his 
absence. 143 During this time, the concept of ijtihäd dealt with adhan (call to prayer), 
ghusl (ritual ablution of the whole body) and the postponement of the prayer. The 
Prophet included rulings pertaining to law within the range of ijtihäd. 
'44 During the 
time of revelation and as long as there were no explanations or prohibitions from God, 
the Companions considered ijtihäd to be permissible. 
145 
When an issue arose and no relevant verses could be found in the Qur'än the 
prophet performed ijtihäd by his ray (opinion); he authorized the companions to use 
the same method under the same circumstances. 
146 
The Companions Mu'adh (d. 18 AH), `Amr b. al-`Äs (d. 65 AH) and 'Ugbah bin `Amir 
(d. 58 AH) performed ijtihäd in the presence of the Prophet. 
'47 
Examples of this are as follow: During the battle of Dhät thaläsi `Amr b. al- 
'M was the head of a group of soldiers. During the war he became junub (a state 
requiring a ritual ablution of the whole body). His opinion was that if he washed 
himself as required the severe cold might kill him; consequently he made tayammum 
(to wash with clean sand or earth where water is unavailable) and led the prayer in 
front of his friends, saying: `God says in the Qur'än "Do not kill yourselves". When 
342 Shalabi, "Ta'Ill", p: 77; Karaman, "Ictihäd" p: 87. 
143 Ghazgll, "Mustafa", II, p: 354; Amid-1, "Ai-Ifýcäm", N, p: 407; Amir Býdishäh, "Taysir", IV, p: 
193. 
144 Sarakhsi, "U$21", II, pp: 93-94,130-131; Shawkäni, , Irsha r', p: 257. 
145 Ibn al-Qayyim, "I'läm", I, pp: 281-282. 
I" Hamid A11äh, Muhammad, "Ai-Ijtihäd ft `AST al-$z(dbah", Majallah al-Kulliyah al-Diräsah al- 
Islämiyyah wa al-`Arabiyyah, 1984, v: 3, issue: 4, p: 23. 
147 Armir Bädishäh, "Taysh", IV, p: 195; , midi, "A1-Ihkäm", IV, p: 408; Ghazäli, "Mustasfa~", 11, p: 
355; Shawhäni, "Irshäd' p: 257. 
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he returned he recalled this incident to the Prophet and the Prophet approved of it. 
148 
Because of his fear that the severity of the weather might cause death, `Amr applied a 
practice which was permissible when there was no water or when the person was too 
ill to use water. I agree that `Amr has implemented a form of istihsän by taking ease 
as the basis in accordance with the spirit of the shari `ah, but contrary to the general 
rule. 
When `Ali was a qä (Muslim judge) in Yemen he gave a ruling with ijtihäd 
by ra'y. Three men had intercourse with the same woman over a certain period of 
time, the result of which was that, the woman gave birth to a child. `Ali asked the men 
to draw straws whoever drew the short straw would have the child acknowledged as 
his, and would pay two diyah (monetary compensation of blood) to the other two 
men. When this incident was narrated to the Prophet, he acknowledged it. 
149 
Muhammad bin Hasan al-Hajawi (d. 1956), evaluates this ruling during the Prophet's 
lifetime as a form of istiisän. 150 If this or any similar issues arose today modern 
technology would be the vehicle used to confirm paternity, therefore using technology 
can be a method of istifz n which is based on maslal h. 
During the Prophet's lifetime ijtihäd was performed either by the Prophet or, 
with the permission of the Prophet, the companions, who were responsible for the 
concept of ijtihäd. Performing if tihäd in this period was under the control of the 
Shari`. Accordingly, personal judgment and human contributions were integrated into 
the life of Islamic law. This integration into the revelation is not regarded as strange. 
The corner stone, which is the magäsid al-Shari` (objectives of the Lawgiver), has to 
be taken into consideration when performing ijtihäd. 
148 Bukha , 
"Tayanimum", no: 7; Abü DAwild, "Tahäraf', no: 124. 
149 Ahmad, "Musnad', N, 373,374; Abu Ddwßd, "Taläq", 32; Ibn Mäjah, "A/lCä? n", no: 20. 
1S0 Hajawd, Muhammad b. Hassan, "Al-Figh al-Sämif Tä-ikh al-Fiqh al-Islämi', Där al-Turns Cairo, 
1396, i, P: 94. 
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2.3.2.1 IjtihJd at the time of Companions: 
96 
It is difficult to distinguish between the Prophet's lifetime and the beginning 
of the era of the Companions. Basically we have the period of the Companions (11- 
40/632-660); the period of the Successors (40-120/660-738); the period of the 
Successors of the Successors; and the mujtahid imäms (120-160/738-777). An 
alternative break down would be political, the Companions' period occurs during the 
Räshidin caliphate, the Followers period would be during the Umayyad dynasty (40- 
132/660-750); and the last period spans both the Umayyad and `Abbäsids dynasty. '51 
After the time of the Prophet the Muslims invaded other countries with the 
intention to convince them to embrace the Islamic way of life. The borderlines of the 
Islamic countries stretched from Iran to Central Asia in the east, to Syria in the north, 
to Egypt in the west and later to other North African countries. These were the first 
contacts and relationships sprung up between the nations and the Muslims who settled 
there. Consequently, Medina and the surrounding areas were populated by foreigners. 
Muslims visited Mecca for hajj (pilgrimage) and umrah. 152 All these factors created 
mutual influences between `Arabs and the visitors in every aspect of life. The 
traditions and customs of the people of Iran and Byzantium became mixed with those 
of the `Arab Muslims', and the Islamic norm and systems of law based on the Qur'än 
and the Sunnah were challenged. 
'53 
When Muslims became aware of the events and traditions of the cities they 
visited, they recognised the values and the wisdoms to incorporate them into the 
151 ICaraman, "Ijtihad", p: 47. 
152 Amin, "Fajr al-Islam", pp: 92-93; Karaman, "Islam Hukuk Tarihi", p: 101. 
153 Abt' Bakr Ismail Mika, "Al-Ra'y wa Asaruh fi Madrasah al-Madinah", Muassasah al-Risälah, 
Beirut, 1985, pp: 69-70; Amin, "Fair al-Islam" pp: 92-93. 
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Islamic law. This was the beginning of new developments within figh (Islamic 
law). 154 
2.3.2.2 Concept of ray at the time of Companions: 
The Companions from time to time used the name ra'y and, according to 
Shäfi`i, giyäs and ijtihäd have the same meaning. '55 Most of the S1 i is have adopted 
their imäm's view. 156 Al-Isnawi (d. 772/1310), alleges that ijmd ` and ra'y are giyäs. 157 
Muhammad Khudari (d. 1927) defends the view that the Companions used giyäs as a 
reference for new issues where no nass was evident, and called this ra'y. lsg 
Most of the jurists are of the view that the ray that the Companions employed 
was more extensive than giyäs, but was an ijtihäd that also included giyäs. When a 
Hanau jurist `Abd al-`Aziz al-Bukhäri (d. 730/1330) was answering the objections to 
the /x: dith of Mu'adh he made this statement: `I'm making ijtihi d according to the 
ra'y of Mu'adh. The Prophet confirmed this through his silence. The reason for his 
silence was that he knew that ijtihird was sufficient for all rulings. If ijtihäd was 
confined only to a giyäs with a known reason it would not be sufficient for even one 
in a hundred rulings. A prime example is the exchange between the Prophet and 
Mu'adh. When Mu'adh replied, "I act by the Book and the Sunnah", the Prophet 
asked: "And then with what! ", '. 159 Consequently, ray is a general term that includes 
analogy and other inferences. At that time, ray included an explanation of the nass 
and a comparison of similar cases, which in time led to the establishment of methods 
154 'Abd al-Qadrr, `Ali Hassan, "Nazariyüt al-`Ämmaht Tärlkh a! figh al-Islämr, Mr al-Kutub al- 
Hädisah Cairo, 1965, pp: 54-55; Khallaf, "Tarikh al-Tashri', p: 297; ZarkA, "Madkhal", i, pp: 142-143. iss Shäfr'T, "Al-Risälah", p: 477. 
156 Isnawi, "Nii7ayaP", IV, p: 16; RAji, "AI-Ma1'Z 2I", 11, P: 265; Subki, "AI-Ib/)äf', III, p: 16. 
151 Isnawi, "Nina-yat", IV, PP: 16-17. 
iss Khudari, "Tärikh", p: 88. 
159 Bukhäri, "Kashf', III, p: 279. 
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of inference such as istifuän, ma a(ih (benefit), `urf (custom) and sadd al-dharä'i' 
(blocking the means). 16° 
2.3.2.3 Analogy among the Companions: 
During the time of the Companions, methods of ijtihäd had not yet been 
codified. Ray is the given name for the rulings found through ijtihdd for issues where 
na ,V could not 
be found. Analogy came under the name of `understanding' (fahm), 
ra'y or ijtihdd. 161 There were of course principles that they regarded when they made 
ijtihäd. One example is as follows: 'Umar wrote a letter to Abü Müsä al-Ash`arT (d. 44 
AH) whom he had appointed as gaäi to Basra: "On cases where you are not satisfied, 
you should think very carefully. Research them and try to find the similarities 
between two things. When you find similarities that effect the rulings then apply the 
method of analogy. , 162 These words conveyed the fact that he wanted Abü Müsä to 
use analogy. Jassäs (d. 370) says the first generations used the same method, making 
analogies to establish rulings. 
163 
When the Companions chose Abü Bakr to be caliph they said: "Just as the 
Prophet chose him to be prayer leader, why do we not choose him to be political 
leader? s164 Thus the Companions made an analogy between the Prophet's choice of 
Abu Bakr as imAm and their election of him as Caliph. 
Umar was told: "Samrä' took wine from Jewish merchants as a tithe 
(`ushr)"165 from which vinegar was made and sold', `Umar replied: `God will give 
Samrä' what he deserves. Does he not know that the Prophet says: `God has damned 
the Jews because, despite it being forbidden, they took the inner fat of animals, 
160 Mika, "Al-Ra'y', p: 83; Khallaf, "Masädir", p: 8; Karaman, "Ijtihäd", pp: 73,74. 161 ZarqA, "Madkhal", i, p: 139. 
162 Ibn a[-Qayyim, "I'läm", i, p: 126. 
163 Jasses, "AI-Fu; Sll", p: 23. 
161 Ibn al-Qayyim, ` I'läm", i, p: 270. 
165 This is a kind of tax which is taken from non -Muslim traders to allow them access to Muslim 
countries. 
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changed its appearance, sold it and spent the money. "166 In this incident, `Umar makes 
an analogy between the prohibited fat of animals and wine. In both cases, the 
prohibition includes the selling and spending of the money. 167 
2.3.2.4 Istilsän among the Companions: 
Even though the term istihsän had not been used in the technical sense before 
the Iraqi school, it existed in practice during the time of the Companions and was 
widely applied. 168 An allusion to the lind of isti? udn that existed in the periods 
following the Companions can be found in the letter that `Umar wrote to Abu Musa 
al-Ash'ari: "... Research similar cases and when you find similarities that effect the 
ruling, apply the method of analogy. Using the results of the analogy select the ruling 
that adheres to the Islamic principles and ensures your conscience is satisfied that 
justice has been served. "169 According to the first part of his sentence, `Umar wanted 
the analogy applied as soon as the similarities are found and the result is deemed just. 
However, in the second part of his sentence he says that if this is not possible then a 
ruling that is in accordance with the basic principles of justice and equity should be 
given. In other -words, if the analogy is not in keeping with the spirit of the shari `ah, 
then the ruling of similarities should be abandoned in order to give a ruling according 
to the special evidence that is justice and equity (istifzsän). loo 
Some examples of istii cän as applied by the Companions: 
'66 Bukhäri, "Buyü"', no: 103,112; Muslim, "Musdgdt", 12,13; Abü DäwUd, "Buyü"', 64; Ahmad, 
"Musnad", III, p: 324, Abd al-Razzaq, "Musannaf', VI, p: 75. 
167 Sha`bän, "Islam Hukuk Ilminin Esaslarr', p: 117. 
161 Shalabi, "Until", i, p: 267; Alhmad Hasan, "The early", p: 145. See Muharrem Önder, "ffinefi 
Mezhebinde Istifzsän anlayi z ve uygulamasc", Unpublished Phi) dissertation, The University of Selcuk, Konya, 2000. 
169 H atib, "Al-Fagih", i, p: 200; Ibn al-Qayyim, "I `lam", i, p: 126. 
170 Abu Sulaymän, "Al Fikr", p: 32. 
Chapter Two 100 
1. Muslim men are allowed to marry women from among the people of the 
Book (Christian and Jewish women), as stated in the Qur'an 5: 6.171 `Umar (d. 23 AH) 
accepts this in principle, but he prohibited it because he believed it would be 
detrimental to Muslim women. 172 In this example, we see conformity to maslal ah, 
together with the principle of understanding and applying verses and Izadith by 
considering all the nan. `Umar has given a ruling that is in opposition to the general 
ruling of the nass in this special situation, according to the objective and spirit of the 
Shari 'ah. 
173 
2. According to the general ruling of nass those who inherit through `asabah 
(agnates) inherit what remains when those who are entitled (aslObi furüq) have first 
received their shares. If nothing remains then they will be deprived of an 
inheritance. 174 In one particular case `Umar acted according to the general basic 
rule 175; the wife, the mother, siblings from the same maternal mother but from a 
different father, full brothers and half brothers from `acabah all acted according to its 
basic rule. Full brothers share by virtue of having the same mother. It is called 
"shared" (mushtarika) because the brothers share in the third, and is every question in 
which there is a husband and mother or grandmother, and two or more of the mother's 
17 Qur'dn: 5/6. 
172 Ibn AbT Shaybah, "Musannaf', iii, p: 474; `Abd al-Razzäq, "Musannaf', VII, pp: 176-178. 
173 Karaman, "Ictihäd", pp: 67-68; Shalabi, "Ta'liI", pp: 44-45. 
174 See: Bukhärl, "Faräid', 3; Muslim, "Faräid', 1,2; Abü Däwüd, "Faräid', 7; Ibn Majah, "Faräid', 
10. For more on inheritance and its terms; 'asabah, asl)äbi farad etc, see: 'Abd aI-Rahmän I. Doi, 
"Sharr'ah the Islamic Law", p: 271-327, Tä Nä 
Publishers, London, 1997. 
175 The situation of full and consanguine brothers is as follows. If a man has no 
brothers, he inherits everything. If he has a full brother or a half brother with the same 
father the consanguine brother is excluded by the full brother if the latter is considered 
one of the 'a9abah, when there is no full brother a consanguine brother has this 
judgment. If there is a full brother, he excludes the half brother. If nothing remains, 
they receive nothing unless there are uterine brothers among the heirs who inherit a 
third. Then any full siblings, male and female, share equally with the uterine brothers 
in their third. This partion is called "shared" (mushtarika). Consanguine brothers do 
not share with the uterine brothers because they do not have the same mother. The rest 
of the heirs- Males only, or females only, or both- inherit two-thirds, like the wife, 
mother or grandfather, and this completes the estate. 
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offspring, and `asabah in the form of full siblings. This is also known as the 
himariyyah case. That is because the case was presented to `Umar, and he wanted to 
judge the exclusion of the full brothers. Despite they are full brothers of `asabah, they 
were not entitled for the share. The full brothers objected to this judgment and said, 
"Consider if our father was a donkey (himär), do we not have the same mother? " So 
`Umar studied the case again and judged a third for all of them equally, full and 
uterine siblings, the portion of the man the same as the portion of the female. 176 
In this matter the full brothers should, according to the general ruling of the 
nah be deprived of inheritance as mentioned above. However, when Umar 
understood that this was not in accordance with the general objective and spirit of the 
shag `ah, and did not accord with justice and equity, he changed his opinion and gave 
sentence in accordance with the principle of isti/zsän. 
3. The general ruling of Islam regarding conquered land and war booty is that 
it should be divided between the war veterans: 
"And know that whatever of war booty that you may gain, 
verily one fifth of it is assigned to God, and to the Messenger, 
(Muhammad), (and also) the orphans, the poor who beg and 
the wayfarer, if you have believed in God and in that which 
We sent down to Our slave (Muhammad) on the Day of 
criterion (between right and wrong), the Day when the two 
forces met (the battle of Badr) and God is able to do all 
things. "177 "And what God gave as booty to his Messenger 
(Muhammed) from them, for which you made no expedition 
with either cavalry or camelry. " "What God gave as booty to 
176 Shalabi, "USQd", i, p: 267; Farrür, "Nazariyyar", p: 51; for further details on this see: Yasin Dutton, 
" he Origins", pp: 108-109. 
177 Qur'än: 8/41. 
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His Messenger (Mut)ammded) from the people of the 
townships, it is for God, His Messenger (Muhammad), the 
kindred (of Messenger Muhammad), the orphans, the poor 
who beg, and the wayfarer, in order that it may not become a 
fortune used by the rich among youi178. 
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Nevertheless, this general ruling was not applied to the conquest of Iraq and Syria 
during the time of `Umar. On the contrary, `Umar thought that it would be more 
convenient to make this land the common property of Muslims. The land was to be 
left in the hands of its owners and taxes would be levied which would be used to pay 
the wages of judges, officials and soldiers. The taxes would also be used to help 
widows, orphans and those in need; in this `Umar was forward thinking, believing that 
these taxes would be for the benefit of future generations. 179 In this example of ijtihäd 
`Umar has abandoned the general ruling and adopted a ruling that would implement 
the maslallah for the future of the Muslims. '80 
4. A women from Sand' plotted with her lover to kill her husband. The 
incident was reported to Umaa by the governor of the city, Yä' lä bin `Umayyah. 
Umar's view was the same as the general ruling of the nass namely that two people 
should not be executed for the killing of one. `Ali defended the judgement to have 
them both executed in accordance with the spirit of the law of retaliation. Eventually 
`Umar was persuaded and wrote to Yä'1ä: `Execute them both. If, by any chance, the 
whole city of Sand' were involved in this murder I would have had them all 
I's Qur'dn: 59/6-7. 
179 Abo Yüsuf, Yaqub Ibrahim, (d. 182), "Kitdb al-Kharaf ', Dar al-Ma'rifah, Beirut, 1970, p: 24-27. ISO Shalabi, "Ta'lil" p: 48-56. 
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killed. " 181. By this example of ijtihäd `Umar and `Ali have given a ruling that is not 
in accordance with the Qur'anic verses which deal with of equity in punishment: 
"0 you who believe! Al-gi; säs (the law of equality in 
punishment) is prescribed for you in the case of a murder: the 
free for the free, the slave for the slave, and the female for the 
female. But if the relatives (or one of them) of the murdered 
(person) forgive their brother (the killer) something (i. e. not to 
kill the killer by accepting the blood-money in intentional 
murders), then the relatives (of the victim) should demand 
blood money in a reasonable manner, and the killer must pay 
with handsome, gratitude. This is alleviation and a mercy from 
your Lord. So after this whoever transgresses the limits he 
shall have a painful torment. 182, "And We ordained therein for 
them: Life for life, eye for eye, nose for nose, ear for ear, tooth 
for tooth, and wounds equal for equal. 77183 
`Umar considered this in the beginning and was why he didn't want to apply the giäs 
(retaliation) punishment. However with `Ali's contribution, the incident was studied 
in greater detail, which led to the view that the punishment of qi äs should be applied 
in keeping with the demands of ma, clafnh, and the goal and spirit of the shar`Fah. The 
basis of gisds is to implement justice and prevent further injustice. In this way if 
istiludn had not been applied to this case, then justice would not have been 
implemented and it would have opened the door for people with evil intentions. 184 
181 Malik, "Muwatfä"' II, 871; Ibn Abi Shaybah, "Musinnaf', V, 410,429. 
182 Qur'dn: 2/178 
183 Qur'an: 5/45 
184 Nadiyah Shar f`Umarr, "Ijtihü d al-Rasül', Beirut, 1987, pp: 293-296; Ghälib `Abd al-Käfi Qurasht, 
,, Awwaliyyät al-Färuq ai-Siyäsiyyah". Dar al-Wafa, Mansvrah, Egypt, 1990, pp: 402-408. 
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As seen the ijtihäd of the Companions is covered by the term istihsän: in all of 
these examples the rule of law is changed when conditions change and a fresh 
situation emerges. 
185 The Companions, when performing their ijtihäd, have not acted 
in accordance with the given rules; instead, they have acted according to their own 
initiatives and principles, in keeping with the demands of maslahah and the removal 
of harm. 186 
Consequently, as has been indicated, the work of ijtihäd never stops; it 
continues progressively. 
Thus we see that the Companions actually practiced ijtihäd. Their method of 
ijtihäd was mostly based on the shürah (consultation), with there being no written 
juristic principles on which to base their rulings. In this period, the muftahid 
(competent jurists) and the muqallid (the close and faithful followers of established 
rules) are indistinguishable from each other. Ijtihäd was not restricted to any one 
individual or school of thought. Where nass was silent or not clearly identified, the 
Companions applied their personal opinions, and anyone had the liberty to perform 
ijtihäd. '87 
2.3.3.1 Ijlihird at the time of the Successors and after: 
The Successors and the Successors of the Successors were the generation 
following the Companions. They also used ray in cases where nass was silent. 
The term ra'y was not limited to giyäs (analogy) during the period of the 
Companions; it also meant to understand and comment on the nass One of the 
Successors of the Successors, `Abd Allah b. Mubärak (d. 1811797) said: "So long as it 
iss Hasan, "The Early", p: 145. 
186 Shalabi, "Al-Ma d ha ", p: 218; Karaman, "Ictihäd', pp: 63-73. 
187 Karaman, "Ictihäd", pp: 73-74. 
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does not contradict it, use your personal opinion to interpret theth: '188 This 
emphasizes the role of ray in commenting on the nass and the objectives of the 
shari-`ah. 
Ra'y is also used in areas where there is no nass. When Hasan al-Basri 
(d. 110/728) was asked if the fatwäs he uttered were rulings based on hadith or based 
on his ray?, he answered: "All the fatwäs I utter are based on the narrations of nth, 
however our ra'y is more beneficial to them than their own ra'y. "189 It is possible to 
understand that the Successors used ray in the way the Companions understood and 
applied it. It is understood that they used ra'y to understand the nag. They also used 
other forms of ray such as giyirs, istihsän, and ma lahah where there was no nag. 190 
To the end of the period of the Successors, ra'y was used particularly in the 
areas of belief, regarding `the superstitious beliefs of foreigners' 
191 and in the areas of 
fcgh to define giyäs. In the Tabagdt of Abü Ishäq Ibrähim al-Shiräzi (d. 476/1083), 
first, he was with those who applied fzidith, later he was with those who applied ray; 
ra'y is the giyäs of Abü Hanifah (d. 150/767); by this he meant ray is the last 
192 
meaning. 
We can see the practice of ijtihdd by ray at the time of the Successors and 
after them. The jurists among the Successors, as their predecessors the Companions 
did, used ijtihad by ray to give a ruling only when they could not find a ruling in the 
Book, the Sunnah and the fatwä' of the Companions. 193 The use of this method can 
191 Jamal al-Din Yüsuf b. `Abd Allah Zayla'T (d. 76211360), "Nasb al-Ra'yaie fz Tashri 7 Almdis al- 
Hidiyah", edited by Muhammad Yüsuf al-Bannuri Egypt, 1357, IV, p: 64; Ibn Qayyim, "I `lam", I, p: 
121; Ibn `Abd al-Bär, "Jämi ", ii, pp: 251,367. 
189 Ibn `Abd al-Bär "Jämi ",, ii, p: 280; Ibn al-Qayyim, "1'1&n", i, p: 102. 
190 Zargä, "Madhkal", i, p: 168; Muhammad Anis`Ubädah, "Tdrikh al-Figh al-Islämi', Cairo 1980, p: 
274. 
191 Muhammad Zähid Kawthad (d. 1952), "Fiqh Ahli Iraq wa 6Fid1zuhwn", edt: `Abd a1-FattAh 'Abu 
Ghuddah, Beirut, p: 23. 
192 Karaman, "Ictihäd", p: 102. 
193 Karaman, "Ictihäd" p: 82-83. 
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clearly be seen in the letter that `Umar wrote to Qadi Shuräyh194 and in Sha'bi 
(d. 1031712) answer to the question: "When giving a ruling in court there are three 
principles: the Sunnah followed by ray and then ijtihäd'. 
195 The ra'y they used 
included methods such as giyäs, istihsän, masiak h, and `urf, 196 Even though methods 
were unnamed they were used widely and were in accordance with the spirit, meaning 
and efficiency of the shariah. 
197 In their ijtihäd they observed the changing of social 
conditions, the needs of people and their maslafah. 198 Muhammad Khudari describes 
the way the Companions and the Successors used ray: "When the Companions and 
the Successors could not find a nass in the Book of God or in the Sunnah of the 
Prophet they used a method they would eventually call ray. They practiced ra'y 
based on the general rules of the religion such as "Removing harms199 and 
"Abandoning that which is doubtful" 200 
Khudari goes on to say: 
`'Me experts of ray and giyäs consider the meaning 
and the true nature of the ruling of the Shari`. According 
to them the shar `iah has general rules which the Qur'än 
states and the Sunnah confirms. Accordingly there are 
principles which were taken from the Book and the 
Sunnah belonging to every part of fiqh and where there 
is no nass on a certain case, jurists still attempt to 
produce a ruling. Their attitudes toward the Sunnah were 
such that so long as they were satisfied that a kadith did 
194 Khatib, "Al-Fagih", i, pp: 199-200; Ibn al-Qayyim, i, p: 124. 
195 Jassäs, "Fusül", IV, p: 67. 
196 'Abd a1-Qadir, "Nazrät al-`Ammah", p: 167. 
197 Karaman, "Ictihäd', pp: 101,102,108 
198 Karaman, "Ictihäd', p: 85. 
199 Mglik, "Muwattd', ii, pp: 745,805. 
201 Ibn NujAym, "Al-Ashbäh", p: 85. 
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not contradict the main principles, they would use it as 
the basis of isti/zsän. Amongst the predecessors of those 
who made isti/zsdn with this giyäs are `Umar who was 
among the Companions in the first period; in the second 
period there was Ibn `Abbäs (d. 68) and later Ibrahim al- 
Nakhä' (d. 95) who was among the Successors ". 201 
Hammäd b. Abü Sulaymän (d. 1201738), the mufti of Küfa and one of 
Nakhä`i s better students, was an authority in fiqh; he was also the teacher of Abra 
Han fah who followed in the footsteps of his teacher in ijtihdd by ray. Hamnmad was 
the bridge between Nakhä' and Abn Hanifah. The knowledge he acquired from his 
teacher he passed to his student particularly on the importance of thorough research 
when faced with complex cases, the goals of Shari, and interpretations of the Qur'an 
and / dith 202 
Zayd b. `Ali (d. 122/740), and his contemporary Abn Hanifah used ijtihiid by 
ra'y to understand and comment on naA and where there was no nass methods such 
as giyäs and isti/rsän were implemented . 
203 For example, when a pregnant woman 
dies, but the child in her womb is still alive, then a caesarean section is performed in 
order to save the baby, because God prescribes: "The one who saves one's life is seen 
as have saved all human beings. "204 In this ijtihäd of Imäm Zayd, a meaning of 
istifzsän based on maclafxah and need can be seen. Abü Hanifah gave the same fatwä 
in similar cases. 
201 Khudar!, "Tärikh al-Tashri"', pp: 147-148. 
202 M. Özgü Aras, "/Yammird b. Abi Sulaymdn", DIA, Ankara, 485. 
203 Baltaji, "Manarhij al-Tashri`", i, pp: 154,158. 
204 Qur'än: 5/32. 
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Another contemporary of Abü Hanifah is Ibn Abi Laylä (d. 148/765) a fagih 
who based his opinions on ijtihad by ra'y when giving fatwa. 205 The Hanafi jurist 
Abü Zayd al-Dabbüsi (d. 430/1039) is one of the first of those who laid out the 
differences, based on ijtiha4, between Abn Han%fah, his followers and Ibn Abi Laylä. 
Amongst the ijtihäd by ra'y methods that Ibn AbY Laylä' uses are giyäs, istihsän, `urf, 
sadd al-dharä'i `, and istisl b. 206 Sarakhsi records that Ibn Ab! Laylä practiced 
`rational giyäs' which is a kind of istihsän. This practice was abandoned because of 
some of the practices of the Companions. Ibn Ab! Laylä uses this method in the case 
of terminally ill men who divorced their wives to deprive them of their inheritance. 
According to `rational giyäs' the husband's intentions were deemed to be vindictive 
and their wives were permitted to inherit on the understanding that they would not re- 
marry. 207 Ibn Abi Laylä has applied this isti judn based on `urf. 20B 
Was it Ibn Abi Laylä himself who called isti judn the `abandoning of giyäs' he 
himself preserving to have his rulings on `urf and the utterances of the Companions, 
or was it the Hanau jurists who came after him who called istihsän Ibn Abi Laylä's 
ijtihäd'? There is no doubt that istiiziän was Ibn Abi Laylä's ijtihäd. 209 However, the 
method that the Hanafis called istihsdn is something that Ibn Abi Laylä practiced in 
his ijtihäd. Another contemporary of Abn Hanifah, `Abd Allah b. al-Mugaffä' 
210(d. 139/756) was also well known for his opinion on ra'y, giyäs and isti/z n. Ibn al- 
Mugaffa' notes that giyäs might cause discrepancies between rulings, and commented 
on how giyäs should be practised. 
205 Baltaji, "Manähif', i, p: 246. 
20' Ibid, i, pp: 249-257. 
20' Sarakhsi, "Al-Mabsut", IV, p: 154. 
208 See further examples: Sarakhsi, "Al-Mabsut", XXX, pp: 137- 150. 
209 Baltaji, "Manähil",, i, p: 254. 
210 On Ibn al-Mugaffä, see: `All SAmi Nashshär, "Nash'at al-Fikr al-Falsaj'a", DAr al-Ma`ärif, Cairo 
1977, i, 204; Ibn Nadim, "Fihrist", p: 172; Oxen, "Akiiie.. ne Süreci"', p: 362. 
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As Schacht (d. 1969) indicates, the personal use of ra'y and isti jean can 
achieve unwanted results of giyäs. 
211 According to Ibn al-Mugafffä', giyds should be 
practised as long as it leads to ma; 1ahah, and applied if a positive result is achieved; 
however, if the result is negative then giyäs should be abandoned and the case with 
legal evidence should be used 2'2 
There are parallels between the thoughts of Ibn al-Mugaffa-' and Abü Hanifah, 
who both abandoned giyC7s for istihsän. However, it is not apparent whether there has 
been interaction between these two, although it can be said that Ibn al-Mugaffa' 
shares similar thoughts to those of AND Hanifah, who became known for his teachings 
on giyits and isti3 sän 213 
Conclusion: 
The source of law in the first period was the Qur'än and the Sunnah. The 
growth of the Muslim society engendered different social issues and problems, which 
meant that the established law based on the Qur'än and the Sunnah needed to be re- 
considered, expanded and re-interpreted to give adequate answers to new questions. 
As a result, Islamic law made improvements according to the circumstances of the 
era, and this practice is ongoing. 
The independent re-considering and interpretation of the law was known as 
ijtih. äd. Personal opinion (ray) was the main element in ijtihäd and become 
widespread, gradually paving the way for the development of giyäs (analogy) and 
istiInan 
214 
For many years, it was the belief that only those with outstanding intellectual 
ability could be involved in the process of rational rule-making. The Qur'än strongly 
211 Schacht, "The Origins", p: 103. 
212 Amin, "Duhel al-Isläm", i, p: 210; Üzen, "Akillesme Süreci", p: 370. 
213 Olen, ibid. 
211 Hasan, "The early", p: 115 
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encourages people to contemplate every single Qur'änic verse, and then use their 
intellect and personal opinions on the legal issues . 
215 The Prophet is a good example, 
for he always considered the opinions of the Companions on issues where the nass 
was silent. 216 
The problems faced by the Muslim community during the period of the 
Prophet Muhammad were easily and effectively solved, as he was the supreme 
authority to make comment on the verses and explain them to the people. Following 
the death of the Prophet, the problems increased and were of a more complex nature. 
The Companions had the Qur'än and the Sunnah to decide on the new obstacles 
stemming from the social life. 217 They also needed to use their own opinion to decide 
upon which verse or iiadith could be applied to a case. Thus, the Companions 
employed their own opinion not only to understand the verses correctly and apply 
them to new problems, but also to achieve a solution for the more problematic cases 
on which no verses were directly available. The most striking example of this could 
be seen from the interpretation of `Umar, the second caliph: his abrogation of the 
share from the zaknh given for muallafa' al-qulilb (conciliation of hearts) can be seen 
as an example of this. 218 Although, this practice apparently seems to be conflicting 
with the holy Qur'an, `Umar considered the practical conditions along with the spirit 
of the holy Qur'an for his judgment. He decided upon this matter by assuming that if 
the Prophet were still alive, he would also seek the solution in the same manner. 219 
The land of Iraq and Syria was not distributed among the Companions; rather, it was 
left to the original owners who were forced to pay taxes, which were used where 
215 Qur'an: 47/24. 
216 Hasan, "The early", p: 117 
217 ibid. 
218 Jasses, "Ahkan ", v: iii, pp: 123-124. 
219 Hasan, "The early", p: 119. 
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required. '10 This appears to be in opposition to the traditional applications and rules 
in which the land is confiscated and shared along with other properties obtained 
through war. However, `Umar preferred the common benefits of the community to 
those of the individual. Social justice necessitated that those lands should not be 
shared amongst the soldiers. This outstanding example symbolizes the fact that the 
general rules can be ignored for the sake of the supreme interest of society. This is 
known as istifisr n in Islamic law. 221 
As can be seen, the opinion of the Companions appeared to be another type of 
istihsän. This unique method was often preferred over the common practice, general 
rules and obvious analogy, especially where the justice, equality and the benefit to the 
society were concerned. Isti, sän is preferable to an established ruling in a certain 
scenario or a decision based on absolute reasoning rather than on analogical 
reasoning. A jurist may have to abandon a compulsory decision and, in fact, relies 
upon the person's sagacity to differentiate whether a rule should be applied or 
otherwise. Isti/zsän is not an arbitrary, despotic or capricious personal opinion; rather 
it is the way of making a proper decision by considering the specific nature of the 
individual 222 
The Successors of the Companions and the Successors of the Successors also 
used their own opinions widely to solve the problems through resorting to istifsän. 
However, during this period two different approaches emerged: one of them 
prioritized the fiadith; the other employed the scholars' opinions (ray). Ahmad Hasan 
has claimed that these two groups -the ahi al-hadith (the traditionalist group) and ahl 
al-ra'y (the rationalist group) did not regard their own approaches as the only 
methods. This is due to the fact that the fvdith scholars of that period also used their 
220 Aba Ytisuf , "Al-Khardf"', pp: 13-15 221 Hasan, ibid. 
222 145. 
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opinions alongside the Padith for their juristic inference, while the ahl al-ra'y scholars 
often prioritized faadith 2 23 This is because Muslim jurists were committed to 
reinterpreting the verses in the light of the current needs of society. 
Although analogy (giyäs) may be regarded as one form of ra'y, there is a 
difference between them. Ra'y is flexible and dynamic in nature and the cases are 
decided upon in the light of the spirit, justice and the wisdom of Islam. 224 Ibn al- 
Qayyim states that ra'y is the decision of a scholar to find the right solution after 
making a sincere research where the evidence conflicts. 225 In other words, the person 
who uses ray trusts that he is making the same kind of decision on a case that the 
Prophet would have made were he still alive. 226 Analogy is the comparison of two 
different cases to obtain a solution for the new case. The scope of giyäs is narrower 
than that of ra'y, while the emphasis in ray is on the current situation or the specific 
conditions of the problem; the emphasis in giyäs is on the intangible (abstract) 
similarities. As stated by Ibn al-Mugaffa, results may not be satisfying in giyäs due to 
the narrowness of its coverage. 227 As can be seen from the time of the Companions 
and the Successors, the decision is reached through istihsän by focusing on common 
interests and consideration of justice. On the other hand, especially in the Iraqi 
schools, giyäs was practiced in a more comprehensive way by hiding the meaning of 
ra'y. 228 
213 ibid, p: 126. 
2 24 Ibid, p: 146. 
225 Ibn al-Qayyim, "I `lrnn", i, p: 103. 
226 Hasan, "The early", p: 146. 
227 Ibid. 
228 Ibid, p: 147. 
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In later years, the scholars of Iraq narrowed the scope of giyäs by developing 
isti jsr n, which was a new method in the coverage of giyäs 229 The main reason for 
this was to avoid the inconsistency in giyäs. 
Like the Companions, Muslim jurists produced many new legal rulings 
regarding the current problems of the society. They justified their decisions on the 
grounds that the new cases must be tackled by considering new conditions and 
situations. 230 Sometimes they found that it was satisfactory to act according to 
absolute verses by taking into consideration the general interest and benefit 
(mMiahah) of the society. They were prepared to apply those decisions which were 
much more in harmony with society's requirements. 231 
229 ! bid, p: 149. 
230 Muhammad Yüsuf MtisA, "TärIkh al-Fiqh al-Isläm? ', Maktabah al-Sundus, Kuwait ii, 9; Karaman, 
"Ictihäd', pp: 86-89,93. 
231. Müsa, "Tärikh", ii, 10. 
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3.1.0 DEFINITION OF ISTIIBAN AND ANALYSIS 
As I have previously stated the concept of istihsän is the main theme of my 
research and the two definitions -the linguistic and technical- are very important parts 
of the concept and will be elaborated in the usage of its various aspects. 
3.1.1 The Technical (i#*Jlu) definition of istihsän: 
No technical definitions of istihsän have reached us from the early Islamic 
period, simply because there was no reason for istiIndn to be defined. Abü Hanifah 
and other early Hanafi jurists such as Abü Ytisuf (d. 182) and Shaybäni (d. 189) have 
directly given rulings using the concept of isti jisän without giving any specific 
definitions or explanations. Their judgments were based on the fundamental principles 
of securing ease and avoiding hardship: "God intends facility and ease for you, He 
does not intend to put you to hardship". 1 
The fact that the Hanafis were attacked by the Shäfi`i jurists, and especially by 
Shäfi i himself, shows that the Shäfi`Y schools did not recognize isti, 7sän as a basis of 
Islamic Law. They dismissed it as "Arbitrary law-making in religion". Indeed, Shäfi`i 
jurists did not understand what the Hanafis meant by isti/zsan. Hanafi jurists spent 
much time defending their position and trying to show that istihsän is a valid source 
of law, and not merely an ad hoc method. 
However, among the jurists there was no consensus as to the precise meaning 
and definition of istibsän. Yet in spite of all the different definitions, the meanings are 
very close. In fact all the definitions may be derived from that of Karkhi which is 
arguably more comprehensive than the others, as we shall see. 
I Qur'an: 2/185 
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Among the lianafi jurists definitions were given by Karkhi, Sarakhsi, Jassäs, 
Bazdawi, Nasafi, and Ibn Humäm; jurists from the other schools remained flexible, as 
will be seen later. 
It is of course that the jurists living in the 9 `h century had been influenced by 
the jurists from the earlier centuries. The jurists in my examples are widely spread 
over six or seven centuries: Karkhi lived in the 
0 century AH and Ibn Humam lived 
in 9th century AH. 
The definitions of the Fianafi jurists will be presented in chronological order, 
and then investigated to discover whether these definitions changed over time. The 
position of the Shäfi`i jurists will also be elaborated accordingly. 
Other jurists who recognize isti/tsän will also be covered, and their definitions 
may help to throw more light on the subject. 
3.2.0 Ist ssän: a historical perfective: 
In the early period of Islamic legislation, the sources of the shad'ah were 
confined to the Qur'an, the Sunnah, and the use of personal opinion (ray), with the 
permission of a competent authority. It is pointless to debate whether istihsän was 
applied at the time of the Prophet as a source of law, since both the Prophet himself 
and the Qur'an -the actual sources of the sharr'ah- were all that was needed. 
Although the terminology of Uü1 al-Figh had not been systemized yet, some 
Companions such as caliph `Umar, `Ali, Ibn `Abbäs and Ibn Mas`üd applied the spirit 
of Istitncin, if not the technical method itself. 
According to Khudari (d. 1927) whoever uses istifsdn as a method of 
legislation is not doing anything new or innovative, and jurists merely codified a 
method which had been used from the early times of the Islamic period. During the 
formative period, there were many important leaders who applied this unnamed 
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method. These leaders were appointed to solve obstacles and to eliminate obstructions 
to legislation which the community encountered. Examples include `Umar (d. 23 AH) 
at the first stage; and Ibn `Abbas (d. 68 AH) RabT'ah (d. 136 AH) and Ibrahim al- 
Nakhä'i (d. 96 AH) at the second stage. 2 The fundamental sources of Islamic law for 
them were the Qur'an and the Sunnah, which were developed by using personal 
judgment by competent, guided and intellectual jurists, interpreting in accordance 
with the needs of the age. Serious consideration of the fundamental sources can 
produce new meanings, which in turn give rise to new obstacles and different 
circumstances, thus enabling the jurists to arrive at a solution. 
The concept of istiludn is a developed form of ray. One could extend the 
fundamental basis of istihsän to the time of the Prophet, given his advice to Mu'adh 
(d. 18). This actually advocates a defining role for the community, teaching the people 
how to use their own discretion and understanding; in this context, if the Prophet had 
not persuaded Mu'adh to use his own judgment after considering the main sources, 
the development of Islamic law would not have been successful, and would have 
remained stagnant. The Prophet's question "What will you do if you do not find 
guidance in the Sunnah of the Apostle of God and in God's Book? "3 and Mu'adh's 
response, "I shall do my best to form an opinion and spare no pains"4, contains the 
key to the evolution and dynamism of Islamic law. 
In the early periods of Isläm the rules of shari `ah were never rigidly applied 
but the main objective was to ensure that the spirit of the action conformed to the 
shari`ah. As we saw in the event of the battle of Banü Qurayzah, some companions of 
the Prophet were despatched to the enemy's territory and were instructed to perform 
the asr prayer on arrival at their destination. The air prayer time arrived during their 
2 Khudari, "Tärikh", p: 210. 
3 Abu DaWud, "Sunan", iii, 1019 Hadith no: 3585. 
4 Ibid. 
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journey and an argument ensued: some of the Companions chose to pray on time, 
believing that the Prophet had not meant for the prayers to be delayed, while others 
went on, taking the Prophet's command literally, and performed the prayer on their 
arrival at the place of destination at sunset. 
They reported this incident to the Prophet, who said nothing. His silence was 
taken as tacit approval of both sides, indicating that no-one was in the wrong. 
5 An 
important lesson may be learned from his case: it teaches the community not to be 
rigid, so long as their actions do not conflict with the spirit of the shari `ah obedience 
to divine commands. Both sides were seeking the aim of the shari `ah, one party 
abiding by the command literally and the other abiding by the spirit of the command 
in order to demonstrate their allegiance to God and to the Prophet. 
Hence, personal interpretations were given credence at a very early time, and 
these examples inspired jurists to develop or formulate their understanding of religion 
and express their feelings without any fear or obstruction. The Battle of Badr yields 
another example of the use of personal opinion (ra'y) by the Companions. The 
Prophet had chosen a particular battle position for the Muslim army. However, 
Hubbäb ibn al-Mundhir considered the place unsuitable and wanted to know whether 
the Prophet had chosen that place by revelation from God or by his own judgment 
(ra'y). It soon became clear that the Prophet had used his own judgment. Then 
Hubbäb suggested a more suitable place whereupon the Prophet said: "You have 
made a suggestion with your opinion (laqad asharta bi al-ra'y)"6. The examples 
given here indicate that the use of personal opinion became a basis for the use of 
istihsän later on. 
S Muhammad Ibn Sa'd (d. 2301844), "A1-Tabagät al-Kubrd", Beirut 1957, v: 2 p: 76. 
6 'Abd al-Malik Ibn Hishem, (d. 218/833) "At-Sirat a1-Nabawiyyah", edt. Mu aa al-Saga, Ibrahim al- 
AbyärY, `Abd al-Häfiz Shalabi, Dar al-Khayr, Beirut 1992, II, pp: 210-211. 
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After the demise of the Prophet, the same doctrine continued amongst the 
Companions, as can be seen in the decision of `Umar ibn Khattäb regarding the 
inheritance of two half brothers. The case concerned a woman who died and left 
behind her husband, her mother, two half brothers, and two full brothers. Initially the 
Caliph applied the usual ruling, based on an established precedent, as laid out by the 
Prophet. This involved two categories: the ahl al farä'iv (those portions for heirs 
designated in the Qur'än)7 and ahl al-asabah (the residual heirs)8. The ahl al farä'id 
have definite priority over the ahl al-axbah in the distribution of the property. 
According to this basis, `Umar gave one half of the property to the husband of the 
deceased woman; one sixth to her mother, and one third to the uterine brothers. No 
portion was given to the half-brothers as they were considered residual heirs. The 
half-brothers contested the case saying, "Suppose our father was a donkey (himar), do 
we not still have the same mother as the deceased? " 
Consequently, `Umar revised his first decision based on the consideration of 
equity and justice. Then he found a stronger reason to depart from the already 
established ruling to a new ruling, which he `istalzsana' (approved as the better 
judgment): he ordered a new ruling that one third of the property that remained should 
be distributed equally among both frill- and half-brothers. This distribution would take 
place after the deduction of the husband's and mother's portion. 
9 The case later came 
to be known as "The Donkey Case (al-himariyyah)". 
`Umar's decision appears to be a basic application of istihsän and brings to 
mind Karkhi s definition: his decision differs from the established one, and is based 
on the consideration of justice and equity. `Umar made giyäs (analogy) with regard to 
7 For details of the heirs see: Qur'Qn: 4/ 1-40 
a `A, sabah: those who are entitled to the remainders of the shares. See: Doi, "Shari `ah", p: 277. 
9 Noel j. Coulson, "Succession in the Muslim Family", Cambridge university Press, London 1971, pp: 
73-74; Abu Zahrah, "Imäm MäIik", p: 324; Noel 1. Coulson, "Conflicts and tensions in Islamic 
Jurisprudence", The University of Chicago press, USA, 1969, p: 17. 
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the precept of the Prophet (athar), and the appeal by half-brothers caused him to 
change his decision, departing from giyäs to istik n. 
How do we apprise `Umar's ruling? Was his judgment based solely on 
personal opinion, or did he endeavour to act in conformity with the spirit of the 
shari`ah? 
When `Umar was faced with such issues, he applied Abü Bakr's methods, 
looking for the solution first in the Qur'dn and the Sunnah; if, after much scrutiny and 
deliberation, no solution was determined, he then gave a ruling from his personal view 
of what best accorded with the shad'ah. 
When `Umar appointed Shurayh as judge of Küfa, he advised him with the 
following principle: "Seek a clear ruling in the Qur'an, if you find what you are 
searching for, do not seek advice from another. However, if you could not find any 
guidance therein, then conform to the Sunnah. Should that fail you, then proceed with 
your personal judgment. "10 It is obvious that the use of this guidance enables justice to 
be administered and Umar's departure from the set precedent to the new ruling is 
justified when stronger evidence comes to light. 
The basic notion of istitsän had been exercised since the time of the 
Companions even if there is no definite evidence that the exact term was used at the 
time of `Umar. 
Another example is the water conflict between the two Companions Dahhäk b. 
al-Muzähim and Muhammad ibn Maslamah (d. 46). The Caliph `Umar sided with 
Dahhäk b. al-Muzähim, when Dahhäk asked for permission to extend a water canal 
through Maslamah's property. Maslamah objected. The Caliph granted Dahhäk his 
request on the grounds that it was unlikely to cause any harm to Maslamah, as 
10 Khudari, "Tärikh", pp: 142-143. 
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indicated in the Prophet's saying, "Harm is to be neither inflicted nor reciprocated in 
Islärns11. The Caliph did not base this decision on any source or compare it to any 
established rule as such; he believed his decision on this case was not contradictory to 
the general spirit and purpose of the shari `ah. 
Another example of the legal practice of the Caliph was to suspend the 
prescribed punishment for theft of food during the year of the famine. 
12 In the Kitäb 
al-Kharäj the example of theft during the year of the famine was explored. A man had 
stolen something from Bayt al-M611 (treasury, exchequer) and `Umar had not 
amputated his hand 
13; he suspended the rule of amputation during famine. At first 
glance, the Caliph's practice seems to contradict the command of the Qur'an- "Cut 
off (from the wrist joint) the (right) hand of the thief, male or female, as a recompense 
for that which they committed, a punishment. " 
14 However, the Qur'an is silent on the 
circumstances attending such punishments. In fact, `Umar in this case departed from 
the established rule to a new rule, i. e. not to amputate a thief's hand during the time of 
famine. Considering the circumstances of the famine to be exceptional, `Umar 
discontinued amputation for all thieves during the time of famine. 
A similar example was reported regarding a case of a stolen she-camel. A 
slave stole a she-camel, slaughtered and ate it. When the incident reached `Umar and 
he investigated the crime, he ordered the thief's hand to be amputated. `Umar then 
departed from his first decision, decided not to amputate the slave's hand and ordered 
the owner's slave in for questioning. Judging that the slave-owner had probably 
starved the slave, `Umar departed from the precedent to a new ruling not to amputate 
II Ibn Mäjah "Sunan", ii, 784, badith no: 2340. 
L2 Abii Zahrah, "Imam Malik", p: 324. 
13 Abn Yüsuf, "Kitäb al-Kharaf, p: 14. 
14 Qur'an: 5138. 
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the thief s hand. However, he penalized his master and ordered him to pay double the 
price of the she-camel. 's 
According to the Prophet's practice, war booty was distributed among the 
Companions. However, `Umar decided not to distribute the lands of Iraq and Syria 
among the Companions out of consideration for the general public welfares, which 
dictated that borders and newly conquered lands should be protected. He therefore 
distributed the lands amongst the Muslims in general. Biläl and other companions 
asked him the reason for his decision after `Abd a1-Rahm5n ibn Awf and others 
apposed him. `Umar's response was to point out that the distribution of land amongst 
the new Muslims would ensure that all land would be worked and protected at all 
times. However, to distribute it among only the army, for example, would expose 
borders and conquered lands to danger once the army had returned to the homeland. 
Then they finally gave their consent as "al-ra'y ra'yuka" (the opinion to be followed 
is yours). This case is illustrated in the Qur'än: (59: 6-10) in justification of `Umar's 
decision. 16 Thus, `Umar has departed from an established rule to a different rule in 
favour of the general benefit of Muslims. 
The basis of `Umar's ijtihäd was to help the public in their day to day life by 
removing any difficulties, so that the objectives purpose of the shad'ah might be 
accomplished. When `Umar's ijtihäd is studied, 
17 it is obvious that his established 
reforms were recognised by the shad 'ah; however, `Umar did not attempt to alter the 
obligatory (farg principles. 
The Qur'än and the Sunnah are not based only on obligatory commands; some 
of the rules exist in the form of recommendations and requests. An authorised 
15 Mälik, "AI-Muwatf "", v: 2, p: 748. 
16 Abü Yüsuf, "Kitäb al-Kharäj", pp: 13-15; Fazlur Rahmän "Islamic Methodology in History", 
Lahore, 1965, pp: 180-181. 
17 Nu`m , "Omar" v: 
2. 
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individual ('ulu al-amr) can attempt to alter non-obligatory rules only. However, 
attempting to alter obligatory rules and prohibitions is considered destructive to 
religion. 
"Any decision taken by the authorised person ('ulu al- 
amr) makes his orders obligatory (fard) and whatever he 
decides to ban becomes prohibited (/xiräm). However, 
as the rulings of the `ulu al-amr are restricted within the 
time of his reign those rulings are likely to be temporary. 
In addition the `ulu al-amr's interference in obligatory 
rulings (farq) must be continued only to postponing or 
bringing these forward under certain circumstances. "18 
It is quite difficult to determine the applications of istihsän in the very early 
periods. However, `Umar's decisions provided the means by which researchers have 
been able to gain some indication of how to implement istihsän in legal matters. Early 
isti/zsän then, involved making a decision which was a departure from an established 
rule for the sake of equity and public interest. 
At the beginning it was seen that the appearance of istihsän could affect 
judicial and legal proceedings, and social or political issues that were possibly 
influenced by the caliphs during both the Umayyad dynasty (661-750/41-132), and 
the period of the Abbasid dynasty (750-1258/132-656). The administration of justice 
was in the hands of provincial governors throughout most of the Umayyad period. 
They also appointed particular judges, whose task was to act as agents of the 
governors in various areas. 
18 Orhan ceker, verbally given information by him at the University of Selcuk dated on 29.03.04 in 
Konya/ Turkey. 
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Mu`äwiyah ibn Abi Sufyän, Marwän Ibn al-Hakam, `Umar ibn al-Abd al-`Aziz 
of the Umayyad Caliphs and other members of the family were directly or indirectly 
involved in Umayyad legal practice. 19 For example, normally when divorce happens 
before the consummation of the marriage, the husband has to pay only half of the 
fixed dower, whether or not khulwah (privacy) has taken place 2021 However, during 
the Umayyad period, the full dower was paid whether consummation and/or khulwah 
had taken place or not. The right to claim the full dowry for divorce which followed 
an unconsummated marriage was abolished in Umayyad times and this is attributed to 
Marwän Ibn al-Hakam or to the governor. 2 However, in Abbasid times, the judicial 
system was separated from the political administration. 
3 
After the `Arab conquests, the Companions of the Prophet spread out in 
different parts of the Islamic world, and soon faced the problem of finding solutions to 
various hitherto unencountered problems. As Muslims, including the Companions 
settled in conquered areas, 
24 `Umar appointed many Companions to take 
responsibility for legal activities in the different cities. Shurayh b. al-Harith (d. 78) was 
appointed judge of Knfa under the guidance of Abü Müsa al-Ash`an (d. 44), who told 
him: "Think again and again over a point so long as it remains doubtful in your mind- 
a point which you do not find in the Qur'än or in the Sunnah of the Prophet. Get 
yourself acquainted with precedents and similar cases; then weigh up the matters (qis 
al-umiiir). Then adopt the one that is more favourable in the eyes of God and identical 
19 Schacht, "The Origins", p: 192. 
20 Khulwah: where a man and woman are left alone together. 
zL Qur'an: 21237 
22 See: Schacht, "The Origins", p: 193. 
23 Tyan E. "Histoire de I'organisation judiciaire en pays distant", v: 1, p: 132,1938-43; see in 
Schacht, "The Origins", p: 191. 
24 Khudar , "Tärikh", p: 
135. 
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with the truth in your opinion. "25 The legal methods and doctrines of the Küfi jurists 
were mainly inherited from Ibn Mas`üd and `Ali ibn Abi Tälib's thoughts, opinions, 
and judgments . 
26 
The Iraqi jurists claimed that their opinions were likely to coincide with the 
decisions of the Prophet. The following examples illustrate the harmony between the 
Companions and the Prophet. One-day Ibn Mas `üd was asked about a matter. He 
responded by saying "I am not aware of any decision of the Prophet on such a 
matter". He was then asked to give his personal opinion (ra'y), which he did. One of 
the men in his circle declared that the Prophet had given the same decision, and Ihn 
Mas `ad was exceedingly happy that his opinion had coincided with the decision of the 
Prophet'. 27 Therefore, the same idea and spirit was held to have transferred from the 
Prophet to the Successors through the Companions and through the light of traditions. 
Later on, the Successors inherited the role of the Companions, with scholars 
such as Alqamah bin Qays (d. 62), al-Aswad bin Yazid (d. 75), Shurayh bin Härith (d. 
78), al-Shä`bi abn `Amr (d. 103), Tbrähim al-Nakhä' i (d. 95), Hammad bin Sulaymän 
al-Ash`ar (d. 120) all of whom lived in Iraq, the scholarly environment in which Abü 
Hanlfah developed. He learned fcgh from his teacher Hammad b. Sulaymän, student of 
Ibrähim al-Nakhä`i, Ibrähim learned iqh from the associates of Ibn Mas'üd, who in 
turn were students of Companions of the Prophet, such as Umar, Ibn Mas'üd and 
'Ali. 28 Their opinions were not expressed arbitrarily; rather they were inspired by the 
Qur'än and the Sunnah. For example, `Umar was reported to have asked a man who 
had once come to him with a problem, whether his case had yet been solved. The man 
ZS Abi Uthmän `Amr b. Bahr Jähiz (d. 2551869), "Al-Bayan wa al-Tabyin", Beirut, 1967, v: 1, p: 49. 
Quoted from Hasan, "Analogical Reasoning", p: 42; Khudari, "Tärikh", p: 143. 
26 Hasan, "The Early", p: 21; Schacht, "The Origins", p: 31. 
2' Abü Yüsuf, "Kitäbal-Athdr", p: 607; Shaybäni, "Kitäb al-Äthär", p: 22; ShaybänT, "Al-Muwatta-, 
p: 244, versions of Mäliki's Muwaä, Lucknow, 1297 and 1306 (Muw, Shaib), with a commentary by 
`Abd Allahi Laknawi (d. 1304). See in Schacht, "The Origins", p: 29. 
28 Schacht, "The Origins", p: 32. 
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replied: "`Ali and Zayd b. Thäbit have given a ruling". `Umar said: "I would have 
given a similar ruling if I had not been able to find a solution in the Qur'än and the 
Sunnah. My opinion is as theirs. "29 
The Companions did, however, always endeavour to make the Qur'an and the 
Sunnah the main source of their decisions, and to ensure that their rulings did not 
contradict the Qur'an and the Prophet's traditions. 
Isti judn found a very appropriate atmosphere in Iraq, in which to develop. 
Iraqi jurists used personal reasoning (ra'y) and giyäs (analogy), which they saw as an 
interesting intellectual challenge, given that they were more interested in the theory of 
the law, unlike the Medina School, which focused on the actual practice of the law. 30 
According to Ahmad Hassan the term istitVdn was not used in its technical sense with 
era of the aforementioned Iraq scholars. 
31 The idea was prevalent in juristic practice, 
as we shall see when we look at the "application of istihsän in the early Hanafi 
School". While Iraqi jurists applied the concept of istifzsän by departing from the 
established ruling, they did not give any reason for their practice. 32 Abd al-RahmAn b. 
Hujairah, a judge between the years 69 and 83 AH; Thaubah b. Nimr between 115 
and 120 AH; and Khair b. Nu'aym between 120 and 127 AH 33 all gave rulings based 
on personal reasoning, yet never made any reference to the principle of istib an in its 
strictly technical sense. 
I have not been able to discover any authentic source that leads me to believe 
that the form of isti? än was used prior to the time of 'Umar ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz. 
However Iyäs b. Mu`äwiyah (d. 1221740) who was the judge of Basra between 101 
and 102 A. H, said: "Use q yäs as a basis for judgment so far as it is beneficial to 
29 Khudari, "Tärkh", p: 143. 
30 Kamal A. Färuki, "Islamic Jurisprudence", Pakistan Publishing House, Karachi, 1962, p: 24. 
31 Hasan "The Early", p: 145. 
32 Ibid, p: 146. 
33 Schacht, "The Origins", pp: 100-1. 
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people, but when it leads to undesirable results then use juristic preference 
(fastahsinü). "34 He suggested that if the present juristic rulings are not sufficient to 
prevent evil, then in order to arrive at rulings which are more effective, the principle 
of isti/zsän would be used. Muwaffaq b. Al mad al-Makki (d. 568/1198) adds: "If giyäs 
leads to undesirable results you should apply the more accurate of the two 
"35 opinions. 
Iyäs b. Mu`äwiyah also says "I understand that the judgments given in the 
courts should be in accordance with istihsän. i36 This shows that rulings must not 
contradict the consideration of maslalaah, and must provide justice and equity. 
The research thus shows that the use of the term of istihsän came to light 
before the time of Abü Wifah and was not confined to him. When Iyäs b. 
Mu`äwiyah's use of the term istifxsän is compared to Abti Hanifah's, much similarity 
can be seen. For them, the main purpose of applying istiIndn was to avoid the 
possibility of causing harm to the public interest. The reason for their emphasis on 
istilzsän was their desire to avoid the negative results that often occurred when giyäs 
was applied incorrectly. However, istifasän owes its existence to giyäs, and would not 
have superseded it had giyäs not proved to be ineffective in some cases. 
The use of isti/xrän appears in a different guise in the early Abbasid period, 
namely as "discretion" (istiýwäb). Ibn al-Muqaffa' (d. 137/756) observed that 
discretion must be taken into account in cases where there is no established ruling, 
and where guidance from the Qur'än and the Sunnah is not forthcoming. In 
exceptional circumstances, the guardians of the shari `ah should be aware that unfair 
and unjust results sometimes obtain from performing giyäs, and that therefore the use 
34 Abü Sulaymän, "Al-Filer al-Ucü ', p: 152; Makki, "Manägib", v: I, p: 84; Jassäs, "Fu iE", v: 4, p: 
229. 
35 MAU, "Manägib", v: I, p: 84. 
36 Jas s, "Fusil', v: 4, p: 229. 
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of discretion is necessary in order to ensure justice. He ruled that unreserved 
adherence to giyäs sometimes leads to injustice, and that flexibility was advisable in 
law in order to prevent an unjust ruling based on analogical deduction. 
7 
From the very early days of Islam, the use of the principle of isti&dn was not 
clear. Its validity was never open to question, as is clear from the rulings of 'Umar 
and, later on, Iyäs b. Mu'äwiyah who declared that analogical deduction is valid so 
long as it is beneficial to people; if the analogy is not beneficial it is then abandoned. 
The door of solution is therefore always left open. 
It is evident that all the previous critical disputes appeared over istifxsän after 
AND Hanifah's famous saying "giyäs is such and such but we apply istil sän". Abü 
Hanifah did not elaborate the reason why he applied those judgments of his which 
were based on istikdn 
38 On the other hand, whenever Hanafi jurists realized that a 
/xrdith they were using was reliable and proven, even if it contradicted the principles 
of their school, they acted upon the hadith: the application of this ruling is called 
isti1ndn 39 The following statements will demonstrate that Abü Hanifah used to base 
his rulings on padith, be they the Prophet's acta or dicta. Apart from Prophetic hadith, 
he also relied on the practices of the Companions and those who followed them. He 
said: "If it had not been for precedents (athar) I would have judged here according to 
giyäs", or "If it had not been for the sake of riwäyah (transmitted lxidith), I would 
have judged the case by giyäss40 
Ibn Hazm suggests that the term istitndn first appears in the third generational 
He discovered no proof of istilarän being used before Abü Hanifah, explaining that the 
31 Ibn MuqaffA, "Risdlah", pp: 125-126. 
38 Bazdawl, "Us F', p: 1125. 
39 Khudarl, "UW", p: 210. 
'° Bazdawi, "Kashf', p: 1126. 
41 Ibn Hazm, "Mulakhkha$', p: 5; Ibn Flazm had used the term `asr'=(one hundred years) to mean 
'generation'. See also: AI-I j* m, v: 6, p: 289. This term was also used by the Prophet in the famous 
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Hanafis say, "QiAs is such and such but we apply isti? ndn". He adds that even Imäm 
Malik performed istilzsän on occasion 42 Schacht (d. 1969) mentions Ibn al-Muqaffa's 
views, reiterating that the usage of ray and istihsän might remove the undesired 
results of analogical reasoning. 43 
Goldziher (d. 1921) claims that the first use of the term istifxsän was by Abü 
Hanifah, in spite of the fact that, according to Schacht, a method and concept similar 
to istifx än existed before Abü Hanifah. Schacht claims that the first technical use of 
Istitnan was by AN Han fan's pupil, Abn Yiisuf (d. 182/798). `4 
Although we do not have the works of Abü Hanifah as evidence, we do have 
the works of his pupils, especially those of Shaybani, who attributed the term istihsän 
to Abü Hanifah 45 This fact clearly indicates the weakness of Schacht's claims. 
Hence, contrary to the claim of Schacht, the term istif än was not first used by Abu 
yüsuf, who attributes the term itself to his master Abü Hanifah 46 
An alternative view, proposed by Khaddüri and Liebesny, is that istihsän was 
practiced in Mäliki School, although the idea is now more common to the Hanafis. 47 
In short, despite the fact that the concept of isti/zcän was used in the very early 
days of juristic legislation, my research leads me to believe that the term isriizrän was 
not used in its technical sense before Iyas bin Mu`äwiyah (d. 122/740). 
3.3.0 VIEW POINT OF ISTIHSAN AMONGST THE SCHOLARS 
3.3.1.0 Isti! sän: according to the Hanafi School 
hadith which is known as `praising three generations'; see: Bukhäri, "Fadäil al-. bbah", 1; Rikak, 7; 
Muslim, "Fadäfl al- ribah", 52; Abü Däwüd, "Sunnan", 10, 
42 Ibn Ham, "Mulakhkha"', p: 9. 
43 Schacht, "The Origins", p: 112. 
44 Ibid. 
45 ShaybNni, "Al-ABI", v: 1, pp: 55,201-202,368; v: 2, pp: 358-359; v: 4, pp: 465-466, v: 5, pp: 103- 
104,128-129; "A1-J6mi` at-. Saghir", pp: 90,212,245,295,319. 
46 Hasan, "The early", p: 146. 
47 ghaddüri, Majid and Liebesny, J. Herbert, `Law in the Middle Ease', the Middle East Institute, 
Washington, 1955, v: 1, p: 101. 
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Hanafi scholars see istihsän as a valid source of shari `ah and a basis for the 
formulation of legal rulings. They also see most criticism of istihsän as the product of 
misunderstanding, and the imputation to Abü Hýah this is because of ulterior 
motives. However, it is difficult to believe that he would have abandoned a ruling that 
had been established on true shaert ` foundations for his personal preference. 48 
Al-Tagrir wa al-Tafibir" of Ibn Amir al-Hajj mentions Shy `i's famous 
dictum, "Whoever rules according to personal preference has set himself up as 
legislator", but goes on to say that Shäfi`i was unaware of the true meaning of istitnan 
and thus had judged the issue rather hastily. This misunderstanding may come about 
because of the different meanings of the word istihsän, one of which is indeed 
connected to the notion of personal desire. 
9 
Hanafi scholars are adamant that isti1 sän is a source of law and not in any way 
a form of ruling made according to personal desire. For the Hanaf-i school isiihsän 
means acting according to one of the two forms of giyäs. Istihsän may also be acted 
upon based on athar (fx. dith), ijmC7' or necessity. Based on this, the denial of istihsän 
is unwarranted since, the Hanaffs say, cases are resorted to when they come in 
opposition to giyäs jai (explicit analogy), making the departure from giyäs in this 
situation a priority. This means that isti/tsän is agreed upon when it is opposed to 
giyäs jar and is acted upon if it is stronger than the giyäs jail. Therefore, there is no 
point in denying it. 
0 
In order to explain the Hanafi viewpoint, I will try to summarize what Shaikh 
`Abd al-'Aziz a1-Bukhäri pointed out in his commentary of Usü1 al-Bazdawi 1. 
48 Bukhär , "Kashf', v: 
4, p: 3. 
49 Ibn AmTr al-Hajj, "Al-Tagrir", v: 3, pp: 222,223. 
so $adr a]-Shari ah, "Al-Tawdill', v: 2, pp: 81,82. 
51 This is not the actual statement of Bukhari but rather what could be understood from his statement. A 
reference to this can be found in "Sharp Uhl al-Bazdawy by al-Bukhäri', v. 4, pp: 3,4,5,13. 
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Bukhäri's view is that those who deny istifisän as defined by Abü Hanifah do 
not deny isti jndn if it is based on athar, ijmä ` or necessity, since departure from giyiis 
that is based on these indications (dald'il) is generally preferred in such cases, and all 
scholars accept this. Those scholars who refute the istihsän of AbU Hanifah do so 
because they believe it is based on personal opinion (ra'y) and the arbitrary departure 
from giyäs with the claim that it is stronger than giyäs. AbU Hanifa's alleged response 
to this was to emphasize that that istiludn that they were contesting is one of the two 
kinds of giyäs, a separate principle invented for the sake of whim and departure from 
the truth without evidence. This is because it is compulsory to act according to a 
stronger giycts in a case where two giycts findings are opposed to each other, whenever 
possible. The stronger giyäs is called isti, sän to indicate the priority of the side that 
should be acted upon, and the fact that it outweighs the other. 
According to Bukhär the opinion of Sarakhsi is that istihsän is so named in 
order to distinguish it from apparent giyds that may be wrongly perceived, since 
istifisän is a dalil opposed to it; when the weaker giyäs is abandoned, the stronger 
giyäs is given the name "istiludn" as an indicator of its superiority. 
Hanaff scholars used the term isti6sän and giyds with the aim of distinguishing 
between two pieces of evidence (dalil) which are opposed to one another. They used 
the term istihsän because acting upon it is to be preferred compared with the other, 
which is different to the method followed in the case of apparent giyäs (explicit 
analogy). According to Bukhäri, Sarakhsi's aim was to defend istihsän against 
criticism and to show what is meant by the isti/asän that is the subject of disagreement, 
rather than intend to offer a comprehensive definition of the term. 
Bukhär continues to explain the confusion that may arise. For example, it is 
permitted to act according to a giyäs which contradicts istiluCin, but acting according 
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to istihsän is better. For example, acting according to giycs al-fard (analogy) is 
permitted, even though acting in accordance with the athar of the Prophet and 
Companions is preferred. Bukhari counters this by saying that acting according to 
istihsärn leads to the departure from giyäs, and acting according to what has been 
departed from is invalid since it is weaker than istihsän. For this reason, acting 
according to giyis cannot be sustained if there is istihsdn: a ruling based on giyds no 
longer carries any weight when opposed by istifasän. This is also the case of the ruling 
by giyäs al-ford with the athar, since tarcf is not a proof while athar is, and therefore, 
how one could allow acting according to giyäs as opposed to istifzsän? The general 
rule is whatever is not a proof (hujjah) should not be acted upon, while that which is a 
proof (hujjah) should. 
This leads to the conclusion that when two pieces of evidence (dalilän) happen 
to oppose each other and one of them exhibits more weight as compared to the other, 
then the one which has more weight should be the basis for action. Similarly, this is 
the case of giyäs with regard to istihsän. This means that istihsän should be the 
preferred action. Perhaps those who consider giyäs to be the course of action that is 
allowed as opposed to istilzsän mean that ruling in accordance with giyis is valid 
when it is faced with no opposition by istifisän which is stronger than giyäs. 
Bukhäri concludes his comments on the Hanafi point of view with the 
assertion that istiludn is a source of law that can be used as a basis for the shah `ah 
rulings. Therefore, he adds, there should be no disagreement as to the validity of the 
principle. 
Then Bukhäri refers to those who objected not to the principle of istilzsän as 
such, but to the term itself. They argued that there is no point in giving a specific 
name to such acting because the whole of Islamic legislation is more or less the result 
Chapter Three 132 
of istihsän anyway, since it is all about recommending what is better and less 
burdensome for the people. Bukhän` replies to this objection by saying that there is no 
point to this disagreement as it is simply a term, and the rule is that there is no value 
in terms as such (la mashähatah ft al-isffläh). 
Those who objected to the name istihsän themselves concocted names for 
every kind of giyäs such as giyäs al dalälah (indication), giyäs al `illah (cause), and 
giyäs al-shabah 52 Furthermore, is it not slightly ironic that mujtahidin who, as we 
shall see shortly, used isti/zsän in their rulings, should criticise others for giving that 
method a name? 
In his book "Tashil al-WusNl 0 `llm al-Ul ar , Mahilläwi states, "We act upon 
the wisdom of the proof of isti? z än when it is stronger than giyäs. The Nanafi 
school's definition of istiInan is one of the adillah (evidences) agreed upon as 
opposed to explicit analogy (giyäs jalil"s3 
This statement indicates that Istihsi n, according to the Hanaf-i School, is far 
from being an issue of personal opinion and whim, used in order to rule against that 
which God has revealed; istikiln is taking action according to the stronger evidence 
(dalil), and no one can say that the stronger dalil is not a valid proof. 
The following statement has been reported in "Fawätih al-Rafamüt 
bi-Sharp Musallam al-Thubiit": 
"To summarise, istifzsän for us is nothing but a dalTI 
opposing giyäs, therefore it is simply an opposition; we 
can say that istibsr n is a kind of giyäs- or, better still, a 
way of revealing the wisdom that lies behind the giyäs: 
52 For more about them and their definitions. See: Ahmad Flasan, "Analogical Reasoning", pp: 76-92, 
294-302; and BukMrl, "Kashf', v: 4, pp: 3,4,5,13. 
53 A1-MahilläwT, "Tashil", p: 237. 
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istifnän simply makes this wisdom obvious. Were it 
otherwise, there would be no need to call it istiizrän, and 
we would have to make do with giyäs, or nass or 
tja' 54 
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Both of the above-mentioned statements indicate the validity of what we have 
presented as the Hanafi viewpoint with regard to what is meant by istiisärt. 
In spite of the above explanations, we have been unable to find one universal 
definition for istiIndn among Hanaff scholars. They have debated many different 
definitions and have discussed various objections and criticisms whilst researching the 
subject. However, before presenting the discussion of these definitions of istilndn, 
they should be simplified so that they can be identified. 
Whoever investigates this concept may encounter only two types of istitnan 
scenario according to Zakiyyuddin Sha`bän. These are summarised as follows: 
1- The jurist departs from a general ruling on an issue to another ruling 
because of a particular evidence which justifies this departure, 
2- Or: The jurist fords an issue with two differing analogies: one is apparently 
explicit, the other hidden or implicit. He then departs from the ruling necessitated by 
the explicit analogy to another ruling necessitated by the implicit analogy. This 
departure was called isti/zsän because the jurist acted according to stronger evidence: 
s such a solution is a "mustalzran" (preferred) affair. 
A jurist may encounter cases that have no explicit ruling in the Qur'an, the 
Sunnah, or ijmä `. If, for example, there are two similar original cases and rulings 
54 Laknawi, "FawätiH', v: 2, p: 321. 
15 Sha`bin, "Ug1", pp: 144-145. 
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which conflict with one another (asiayn)56, and one is based on an explicit `illah 
(cause), easily distinguished, and the other is based on an implicit `illah which 
requires closer examination, the adoption by the jurist of the ruling with the implicit 
`illah is called istihsän or the juristic preference of an implicit analogy over an explicit 
analogy. 
Based on the above istihsän may be defined as: The departure from a previous 
ruling on a certain issue, which is applied to similar issues because of particular 
evidence that necessitates this departure, as viewed by the jurist, regardless of whether 
this evidence is nag (textual), iimä ` (consensus), cfarürah (necessity), `urf (custom), 
maslahiah (benefit), giyäs khafT (implicit analogy), or otherwise, and irrespective of 
whether the method in which the ruling on the similar problem was established by 
dalil `äm (general evidence), gä'idah fiqhiyyah (jurisprudence rule) or qiyas zahir 
fairy (apparent clear analogy). 57 This is the meaning of istilzrän according to the 
Hanafi jurists or others who applied it, especially the Mäliki jurists. 
3.3.1.1 The view of Karkhl (d. 340/952): 
One definition which generally gives the meaning of istihsän as understood by 
the jurists of usül (principles), and also reflects the definition adopted by the Hanafi 
jurists, who consider it accurate and comprehensive, is that of Abü al-Hasan al-Karkhi 
(d. 3401952). He defines istihsän as follows: "isti/hsän is when one takes a decision on 
a certain case different from that on which similar cases have been decided on the 
basis of its precedents, for a reason which is stronger than the one found in similar 
cases and which requires departure from those cases" 
58. This definition has been 
espoused and accepted by many jurists such as Tüfi (d. 716/1317), Shiräzi 
s6 The linguistic definition of "asd" is the foundation or basis on something. It is defined technically in 
many different aspects. The original case (a. ) is one of the four constituents of giyäs (analogy). There 
is, however, a difference of opinion amongst jurists on the definitions of the original case. 
57 Sha`bän, "Usu"', pp: 144-145. 
58 Bukh, "Kash f% part: 4 p: 3. 
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(d. 476/1083), Ghazäli (d. 505/1111), and the contemporary jurist Abü Zahrah 
(d. 1974). It contains all types of istihsän in general 59 
Abü Zahrah (d. 1974) comments on the definition, saying that "This definition 
is the clearest one in which the true nature of istifzrän is expressed by the Hanafi 
jurists, highlighting its aspects, its principle and its essence. The basis of isti/xsän is, 
instead of conforming to one rule, to find a solution with a ruling on the evidence that 
is presented; this evidence could be against the general principle but in keeping with 
the aim of the shari `ah. In respect of the new solution regarding the problem, the 
evidence is stronger than the analogy. "60 Another contemporary scholar `Abd al- 
Wahhäb Khalläf, considers Karhki's definition as "the best", saying that "in my view 
the definition is the definition of Karhki from Hans, Ibn Rushd (d. 595) from among 
the M likis and TUf (d. 716) from among the Hanbalis" 61 The clearest and most 
comprehensive definition of istihsiln that the researcher has found is that of Khalläf: 
"In the view of the jurists the technical definition of isti, sän is the authorisation to 
depart from an established ruling to a different ruling when legal evidence is 
presented. The legal evidence which is presented is known as the authority of 
isti1Nän. s62 
To summarise, istifisän is evidence which is preferred over an accepted 
established ruling after ensuring that this evidence does not contravene the Islamic 
legal ruling. In fact, Khalläf's definition is not a new one; the only difference is its 
expression, and thus the meanings of the two definitions are similar. 
According to Karhki, "departure" must be based on particular evidence which 
warrants a move from an established ruing to a different ruling on a similar case. The 
59 Ghazäli, "Mustagd", i, p: 283; 7uwayni, "TalkhT$,, iii, pp: 311,313. 
60 AbO Zabrah, "U$1", p: 251. 
61 Khalläf, "Mader", p: 71. 
62 Ibid. 
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purpose of the stronger reason or evidence requires the departure; the jurist (m. ujtahid) 
departs from the established ruling because of the stronger reason. I shall illustrate 
this statement by giving an example: 
If a group of people gain unlawful entry into a house, steal goods and decide 
to load the goods on to one person's back and that person carries the goods outside 
while the others carry nothing, what would happen? 
According to giyäs, the punishment applies only to the person who carries the 
goods. However, according to "isti1 sän" the punishment is applied to all of those who 
are involved in the robbery. 
63 Here, there are two contradictory ac (original cases): 
The first case is: a group of people encourage one of the group to rape a 
woman; in this case there is no conflict among the jurists, who agree that the penalty 
is only applied to the rapist. This is a ruling of analogy which is opposite to the ruling 
of istit%-dn. The second case is: a group of people gather with the intent to attack and 
kill people robbing them of their goods; here the penalty of highway robbery is 
applied to all. In this case, there is no conflict amongst the jurists; they all agree that 
the punishment is applied to all who are involved in highway robbery. 
According to the Qur'an: "The recompense of those who wage war against 
God and His Messenger and do mischief in the land is only that they shall be killed or 
crucified or their hands and their feet be cut off from opposite sides, or be exiled from 
the land. That is their disgrace in this world, and a great torment is theirs in the 
Hereafter. Except for those who (having fled away and then) came back (as Muslims) 
with repentance before they fall into your power; in that case, know that Allah is Oft- 
Forgiving, Most Merciful. "M After careful investigation, we see that comparing the 
63 S&ajdaST, "U u1", ii, 201; 7assäs, "Fusül", iv, 238. 
" Qur'än: 5/33-34. 
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house robbery to highway robbery is a clearer solution than comparing it to rape. 
65 
The departure from one case (ag) to another case (as1) because of the stronger reason 
is called istihsän. This definition of istibsr n was chosen by Ibn Qudämah A1-Magdisi 
(d. 620/1223 )66 
Shiräzi (d. 476/1083), who is a follower of the Shäfi`i school, says: "If Hanafi 
and Karkhi (d. 340/952) say that "Istihsän is the giving of a ruling with the stronger 
reason rather than the weaker reason" then we agree with it, and therefore the dispute 
between us have been solved. "67 After quoting the definition of Karkhi, Ghazäli 
(d. 505/1111) says that there is "no dispute against the definition". 
68 Ghazä. 1 defines 
istihsän as: "A departure from the established ruling to a certain case which is similar 
to previous cases where this ruling was applied due to particular evidence taken from 
the Qur'an or the Sunnah. 69 Ghazäli s definition differs from that of Karkhi's. None 
of the jurists among the Shäfi`T school of thought has defined istifzrän as Ghazäli did, 
identifying different kinds of istihcän such as, isti/zsän based on "nass" (textual 
evidences), which is based on the Qur'an and the Sun nah. However isti/zsän is not 
confined to these two, and Ghaz-ali's definition is narrower than that of the Hanafis' 
view because it is far less comprehensive in its scope. 
While citing Karkhi's definition, Sarakhsi says: "the precedent which is set 
aside by istihcän normally consists of an established analogy (giyäs) which may be 
abandoned in favour of the superior proof, namely the Qur'an, the Sunnah, necessity 
(darürah) or a stronger analogy (giyas)"70. 
65 Ja, 5 As "Fuser' Iv, 239. b61bn Badrsn, "Sharh Rawdat", part i, p: 497. 67 Shiräzl, "Shark a! -Luma ', ii, 970. 6" Ghazßlt, "Al-Mustagd", v. i, 283. 69 Ghazali, "AI-Mustagii", v. i, p: 273. 70 SarakhsT, "A1-Mabsül', x, 145. 
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Karkhi's definition has been criticised for involving in isti4sän the 
particularization of the general (takhsi) and naskh (abrogation) in spite of the fact 
that they do not belong in istifaän. 71 Muhammad b. Husayn Bahit (d. 1354/1935) says 
that if Karkhi definitely meant such a particularization, then they would have a right 
to accuse him; however, he continues, it was not actually meant; what was meant in 
his definition was the particularization of analogy by the evidence of implicit analogy, 
text, ijmä`, etc. Istihsän might be considered as part of particularisation, but the 
concept of abrogation (naskh) is completely different to istihsän. Abrogation is 
confined to the time of the revelation, while istiiasän is not. The objective of isti, sän is 
usually to move from difficulty to ease; however, abrogation is not considered in that 
context. 72 
3.3.1.2 The view of al-Jaffä (d. 370/981): 
The definition of istihsän according to Jas s is the "Departure from a ruling 
of qiyas (analogy) in favour of another ruling which is considered preferable. "73 
According to the translation of Ahmad Hasan: "Istifxsän means to depart from the 
obvious analogical reasoning (q yas jali) and to adopt that which is better. , 74 
Jassä points out that istifzsän is performed in two ways: 
The first: a parallel case (far')75 which has similarity with two original cases 
(asi), where the rulings in those cases are different. Istihsän involves abandoning one 
of the original cases and taking the other as a basis because of the preference of the 
Jurists. 
71 Taftazänl, "T aiwilt', ii. 163; BukharI, "Kashf', iv, 3. 
" Bahusain, "Raf al-Kiuuitf', pp: 378-379. 73 Kamalr, p: 24; Al-Jasssäs, "Al-Fwsül", v. iv, p: 234. ?' Hasan, "Analogical Reasoning", p: 410. 'S Far' (parallel case): This is a parallel or fresh case which is not covered by the text (nass. A jurist 
finds out a rule of law for this case by the use of gi), äs. This is also known as magfs (the case which is 
analogically compared with a textual rule); See: Ahmad Hasan "Analogical Reasoning", p: 16. See 
also: Al-7aä, - UXr,, p: 226; Ghazäll, "Al-Mscstaä", p: 324; AmidT, "AI-I/ cäm", v: 3, p: 276; Basri, 
"Al-Mu `tan 1", v: 2, p: 703; Ibn Amfyr al-Hajj, "Al-Tagrir', 3/124. 
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The second: is the particularisation of a ruling with an existing legal cause 
(`iilah) 76 This is achieved by considering the text, iadith, ijmd' (consensus), another 
analogy or custom. 77 Jassäs has considered istiludn in the second type as a 
particularisation of ruling (hohn) with the legal cause; however it is not a 
particularisation of a ruling (hukm). Sarakhsi and Bazdawi and most of the Hanafi 
jurists do not accept this theory. 79 
3.3.1.3 The view of Bazdawi (d. 482/1089): 
Bazdawi defines istihsän as, "It is one of the two giyäs"79. `Abd al-`Aziz al- 
Bukhäri, who interprets U AI al-BazdawT, points out that, "it is a particularisation of 
giyäs (analogy) due to stronger evidence. "80 Al-Izmiri (d. 1102 A. H) agrees with 
this ß1 Khalläf and others cite Bukhäri's definition as though it was Bazdawi's82, 
however, it is not. The mistake was made when Bukhäri (d. 730 A. H) quoted the 
definition without stating the originator, saying that "as the master pointed out". 
83 
The following example, concerning the issue of prepaid sale (salam), serves as 
an illustration of Bazdawi s definition, and the "particularization of giyäs". In a 
normal sale, the good should be available at the time of purchase, as stated in the 
/vdith. The Prophet explained to a Companion, Hakim b. Hizäm, when asked whether 
he could sell a commodity prior to purchasing it himself, "Sell not what is not with 
you". " According to giyds, this jvdith means that the salam contract is invalid. 
Nevertheless, salam has been validated by the express terms of other hadith in spite of 
76 Jassäs, "Al-Fusül", v. iv, p: 234. 
77 Ibid, pp: 243-49. 
ý For particularization of the cause (takh$sal-`illah) see: Jasses, "Fusel", iv pp: 243-249; SarakhsI, 
`°Usul", ii. 204-208; BazdawT, "U$ l", iv. 7-32; Bukhäri, "KasFf', iv. 8,32; Nasafi, "Kashf al-Asrar", 
H. 293-299; Ibn Amir al-ft, "Tagrir", iii. 177. 
79 Bazdawi, "UsO', iv. 3. 
B0 Bukhäri, "Kashf', iv. 3; Taftazäni, "Talwiil', ii. p: 163; Ibn al-Häjib, "Muntaha", p: 207 
81 IzmlrI, "Mir'ät al-U5ä1", ii, p: 335. 
B2 Khalläf, "Masäder", p: 69; ZaydAn, "Al-Wajrz", p: 217. 
" Ibrahim Kafi Dönmez, "Isläm Hukuk'unda Kaynak Kavrame", unpublished PhD dissertation, 
Istanbul, 1981, pp: 128-129 
84 See: Karnali, "Istihsän", p: 47. 
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the non- existence of the goods at the time of purchase. Furthermore, a contract 
cannot be attributed to the future existence of usufruct because monetary 
compensations are not open to attribution to something in the future. Qiyäs invalidates 
salam but the Sunnah approves it, for the Prophet says: "Whoever concludes salam, 
let him do so over a specified measure, specified weight and specified period of 
time. "85 Eventually, salam has been validated by way of isti1f sän, which is contrary to 
giyäs. 
When we reconsider Bazdawi's definition we see that there are two kinds of 
giyäs: the obvious (jali), and the hidden or assumed (khal). Jai is the one which is 
easily intelligible to the mind while khafr requires deep consideration and pondering. 
khafi is stronger in effect than jali, thus khaf( is called istikan or giyäs mustaiisan 
(approved analogy). 86 In certain situations, qiyas is called istiIndn owing to the power 
of its evidence. 87 Shaybäni says, "Some of the giyäs involves istihsän". 88 There are 
minor differences between the two. IstiInan is more general than giyäs khafi, because 
the former applies to things other than giyäs khajT. Sadr al-Shari`ah (d. 747 A. H) 
observes that when the word giyäs is used absolutely, it means giyäs jar; when the 
word istilzsän is used it means giyäs khal. 
89 Bazdawi says that the giyäs which has a 
weak effect is called giyäs, and the giyäs which has a strong effect is called istihsän. 90 
3.3.1.4 The view of SarakhsT (d. 483/1090): 
Sarakhs defines istiftsän in a way that is different to other Hanafi scholars; he 
looks at the nature of istiIndn, the wisdom behind the ideas of istihsän, and the 
wisdom of its use. Isti judn represents simplicity, ease and the lifting of difficulties. 
85 Bukhäri, "Sz 11', iii, 243 No: 441. 
86 Sarakhsr, "Al-Mabsüt', x, 145. 
g7 Bazdawi, "Usül", iv, p: 6; Nasafii, "Kashf', ii, pp: 293-204. 
ea 7a55ä5, "FusüP', iv, pp: 234,237-238. 
89 Sadr al-Sharl'ah, "A1-Tawdh ", ii. p: 82. 
90 Bazdawi, "USW', ii. 84. 
The Concept of Istilzsän 141 
Sarakhsi defines isti(sän as "abandonment of an opinion to which giyäs would 
lead in favour of a different opinion when supported by stronger evidence and adapted 
to what is acceptable to the public. " Sarakhsi has mentioned four other definitions. 
These definitions have been quoted by `Abd al-`Aziz al-Hulwäni (d. 44811050)91: 
a- `it means to seek ease and convenience in legal injunctions whether al-khäs 
(the specific) or al-'dm (the general)", 
b-"to depart from giyäs (analogy) and adopt what is more suitable for the 
people" 
c-"to adopt what is accommodating and to seek mildness" 
d-"to adopt tolerance and to seek what gives comfort". 
These definitions indicate the general idea of deviating from a law which 
causes hardship and adopting or creating a law which provides ease and comfort. 
One of the main objections levelled against Sarakhsi and his definitions is this: 
is the departure from one ruling to another, on the ground of ease, really based on 
evidence, or is it merely a reflection of personal taste or whim? Sarakhsi himself does 
not explain satisfactorily. He says that, "briefly, those expressions mean that 
abandoning hardship for the sake of ease is the base of the religion" quoting the 
Qur'an: "God intends for you ease, and He does not want to make things difficult for 
you. "' The purpose of the divine injunction is to provide ease and comfort. 
Sarakhsi looks at isti¬lsän from a different perspective and categorises it in 
two types: the first one is called: "ijtihäd al-tagdtff', which allows jurists all to give 
rulings and on which there is no cause for disagreement amongst the scholars. The 
second one is the evidence (dalil), which is in the mind and is set against the explicit 
analogy. According to Sarakhsi, evidence which opposes the established ruling 
91 Önder, "Haneft Mezhebinde", p: 77. 
92 Qur'an: 2/185 
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appears stronger after considering evidence concerning similar cases; therefore ruling 
with evidence at hand is called istiIndn. 93 
3.3.1.5 The view of Nasafi (d. 710/1310): 
Abn al-Barakät al-Nasaff has defined istihsän as: "Evidence which takes the 
opposite side to giyäs jail (obvious analogy), or it is the opposing evidence to the 
obvious analogy (giyas jai)". 94 It would appear that the differences between the 
previous definitions and this one are slight; the meanings of the two definitions are for 
all intents and purposes the same. 
As I explained regarding the issue of forward sale (salam), the obvious 
analogy (qiyas jali) requires invalidating the sale, and then the departure comes owing 
to hidden analogy (khaf giyäs), which validates the salam, for the simple reason that 
the effective cause is obvious and visible. However, other evidence, which is stronger, 
affects the ruling and became opposite to the established evidence. Therefore jurists 
practise istifzcän with the stronger evidence that naturally is going to be the opposite 
of the giyäs. The evidence has to be nass (from the Qur'an or the Sunnah) or 
consensus or necessity and hidden analogy. 
3.3.1.6 The view of Ibn Humäm (d. 861/1457): 
The Hanafi jurist Ibn Humäm defines istifnän as "An evidence which is agreed 
upon textually or consensually, by necessity and by hidden analogy, if it happens to 
be opposed to a qiyas which leads to its understanding. " A similar definition is: "The 
evidence which contradicts the apparent analogy and which needs to be understood 
through contemplation. "95 In addition, a similar definition was reported in Rahawi s 
(d. 774 A. H) footnotes; however the commentator did not mention the term 
93 Sarakhst, "U I", ii, 200. 
94 Nasafi, "Kashf', ii. p: 164. 
9s Rahawi, "hiyät", p: 811. 
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"necessity", and this is explained in the following statement. "The general opinion 
settled on evidence whether agreed upon, textually, consensually, or by hidden giyäs. 
If it happens to be the opposite of giyäs, which understanding leads to, this name will 
not be given to the same evidence without opposition. "96 With a closer look at this 
definition, and in addition to what Rahawi mentioned, despite the fact that the words 
used differ substantially, the meaning remains more or less the same as the previous 
one. The term istihsän which is used in fqh (jurisprudence) books is mostly 
considered to be giyäs khafä (hidden analogy) 
97 It has been pointed out in works such 
as "Talwif'98, "Fath al-Ghaf är"99, "Mirät al-U, 1s100, and " fäshiyat al-Nasarnät al- 
As((r"101 that the technical meaning of istiIndn as used by jurists is "hidden analogy", 
or istihsän which was based on evidence such as nass (text), ijma` (consensus), 
darirah (necessity), which opposed explicit analogy. 
One of the outstanding scholars of the Ottoman Empire in the last period `Ali 
Haydar Afandi (d. 1936), also held the view that istihsän is hidden analogy, saying: 
"There are two types of giyäs: one is explicit analogy, known technically as "giyäs"; 
the other is "hidden analogy" (giyäs khan, known as istihsän". 
1°2 
3.3.2.0 The view of istihsän among the Shäfi`I Jurists: 
The Sh5fi`i School definitely rejects the principle of isti/uän as a source of 
Islamic law. Imam Shäfi`i103 (d. 204) wrote a book titled "Ibtdl al-Istihsän" 
(Invalidating Juristic Preference) and declared famously: "Whoever approves of 
96 Ibid, p: 812. 
9' Ansär1, 'Fawäti, l', ii. p: 320. 
98 Taftazäni, "Talwih", ii. P: 163. 
9' Ibn Nujäym, "Fath al-Ghaffär", iii. p: 30. 
10° Molla Husraw, "Mirät al-U91", ii. p: 335. 
101 Ibn Abidin, Muhammad `Amin (1252/1836), " 1ashiyät al-Nasamäl al-Ashär", Mu$ afä BAb al- 
Halab3, Cairo, p: 150. 
102 `Ali Haydar, "Usüii Figih", p: 387. 
103 For more about Imäm al-Shäfi see: Abü `Iyd Hasan Muhammad Salm, "At-Imam al-Shafi7wa 
Atharuhu fiU$21 al-Figh", unpublished PhD dissertation at Faculty of Shar Iah and Qänün Al-Azhar 
University, Egypt, 1976. 
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juristic preference is making himself the lawmaker ", 
104 However, Shäfi`i jurists have 
given some definitions of istihsän, but the definitions that they provided are not their 
own, and they have taken what they have understood about istifisän and attributed 
those definitions to the Hanafi School. 
in order to explain the opinions of the `ulamä' who reject istiludn, we will 
present some of the statements from Shdfi`i's "Al-Umm and al-Risälah". 
In the chapter entitled "Invalidating Istihsän" in "Kitäb al-Urnen ", Shäfi`i 
says: Any qualified Governor or mufti is not permitted to rule or issue fatwä unless it 
is supported by an obligatory report from a source such as the Qur'an, and then the 
Sunnah, and then what the "people of knowledge" agree upon, or from giyäs that is 
based on some of these sources. He is also not permitted to rule or issue fatwä by way 
of istiIndn since istihsän is not obligatory in any of these meanings. 
He then quotes the Qur'an, citing 75: 36 "Does man think that he will be left 
uncontrolled, (without purpose) sedan" The people of knowledge never disagreed 
over the Qur'än, as I know, that sudan is the one who neither is instructed to act nor 
prohibited from taking action. According to Shäfi`i, the word sudan, which Yusuf Ali 
translates as `uncontrolled", denotes someone who is neither commanded to perform 
an action nor prohibited from carrying it out. Whoever gives a fatwa or rules in a 
manner opposing God's commands will fall under the category of sudan. God makes 
it known to him that He has left him as sudan, and that if whatever he says is opposed 
to what the Qur'an has revealed, he has therefore opposed the path of the Prophet and 
the general rule of the group of scholars who narrated the Prophet's words. Shdfi`i 
says that if anyone were to ask, "Where in the Qur'an, or the practice of the Prophet, 
do you find authority for rulings? " 
104 AnsAri, "Ghayat al-Wuq7-P', p: 139; Alwäni, "The Ethics", p: 75; Ghazäli, "Musta spa", i. p: 274, ibid, 
"MankhEP', p: 374; Isnawi, "Nihäyat at-SM", iv. p: 399. 
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He should be shown 6: 106 and 5: 49: "Follow what thou 
art taught by inspiration from thy Lord: there is no god 
but He: and turn aside from those who join gods with 
Allah. "los And "And this (He commands): judge thou 
between them by what Allah bath revealed, and follow 
not their vain desires, but beware of them lest they 
beguile thee from any of that (teaching) which Allah 
bath sent down to thee. And if they tum away, be 
assured that for some of their crimes it is Allah's 
purpose to punish them. And truly most men are 
rebellious. " 106 
145 
Shäfi`i then relates how a group of people asked the Prophet certain questions about 
the `People of the Cave' (ahl al-kahf), and how the Prophet replied that he would 
respond to their questions as soon as he had received revelations concerning them via 
the angel Gabriel; God then revealed verse 22 and 23 of the sura entitled al-Kahf. 
Similarly, when the wife of Aws ibn al-Sämit came to Muhammad with complaints 
against her husband, the Prophet did not reply until the first verse of the sura entitled 
al-Mujddila had been revealed. Another example was when al-Ajläni came to the 
Prophet with the allegation that his wife had committed adultery. Muhammad replied 
that nothing had yet been revealed concerning the issue of adultery; when verses were 
eventually revealed, the Prophet called both of them to bear witness, in accordance 
with the dictates of the Qur'an: "0 David! We did indeed make thee a vicegerent on 
105 Qur'an: 6/106 
106 Qur'an: 5/49 
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earth: so judge thou between men in truth (and justice): nor follow thou the lust (of 
thy heart), for it will mislead thee from the Path. *A07 
According to Shäfi`i, nobody is ordered to rule according to /Izq (truth) unless 
he knows what hezq is and fxxq cannot become known unless it is from God either as 
text or by indication, as God made fxxq in his Book and in the Sunnah of his Prophet. 
Hence, there is no problem that one faces for which the Book has not given an 
indication of a solution, either in the form of text or in general. Shafi`i adds that if one 
asks, "what is the text and what is the generality? ", text is what God has prohibited or 
permitted textually, such as marriage with mothers, sisters, grandmothers, aunts and 
all others mentioned; all other women are permitted. He had also prohibited carrion, 
blood, pork and fawdhish (corruption) hidden or explicit, as well as other things. 
These are all clear in the text. As for generally, this is whatever God has ordained 
concerning salät, zakit and hiajj (pilgrimage), and in a general sense; it was down to 
the Prophet to show how to perform the ritual prayers, the numbers of prayers, and its 
times and the actions performed during prayers. He also introduced zakät and 
specified the kind of money, time and amount, and he also explained hiajj and its 
requirements". log 
In the same manner Shäfi`i continues: 
"I am not aware of any knowledgeable people who can 
give accreditation to any thinkers and literate people to 
issue a fatwä' or rule according to his own opinion, if he 
is not equipped in the field of giyäs which revolves 
around the book (Qur'an) or the Sunnah or ijmä ` and 
`aql, which explains the similar cases. If they claim 
107 Qur'an: 38126 
108 ShAfi'i, "Al-Umm", v: 7, pp: 298,299. 
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they are capable of issuing a fatwd' or ruling, we would 
ask them why thinkers who are more capable than many 
of those who are knowledgeable in the Qur'an, the 
Sunnah and fatwä', were not permitted to have a say on 
issues that were revealed, since both groups know that 
isti/zsan is not from the Qur'än, the Sunnah, or ijmä`, 
and they are more intellectual and more capable of 
explaining than their public. If it is said those who reject 
istifzsan have inadequate knowledge of usül, then you 
will be asked, "What evidence do you have in your 
knowledge of usül if you rule without any base of usül 
or giyäs based on usül? Do you think that the scholars 
who have no command of `ilm al-usl will not be able to 
effect giyäs in what they do not know, and that your 
knowledge of usül will enable you to perform giyäs or 
permit you to depart from such giyäs based on such 
usül? If you are permitted to depart from these ucl, then 
they are permitted to rule as you do; then they will 
depart from giyäs based on this u$ül or they will get it 
wrongs1°9 
Shäfi`i continues: 
"If a ruler or a mufti in an issue in which there is neither 
a text reported or giyäs says "I prefer", then he has no 
choice but to accept others who pass rulings opposed to 
147 
109 Ibid. v: 7, p: 300, 
Chapter Three 
his on the same issue. Then different rulers (mufti) in 
different places rule according to what each of them 
prefers, resulting in various rulings on one issue. If this 
is permitted, they will ignore the others and rule as they 
wish, and if it is not permitted then they are not allowed 
to rule as they wish. If the one amongst them who 
departs from qiyas says that people should follow what 
he says, then he will be asked: "Who ordained that you 
should obey others or that others should obey you? if 
any one claims the similar, will you follow him? For my 
part, I will only follow the one I have been asked to 
pursue. Similarly, no one is obliged to follow you 
because obedience is only to the one that God and His 
Prophet ordained. The /aaq to follow is only what God 
and His Prophet ordained. God and His Prophet indicate 
textually or by indications: if God enjoins prayers on 
one who is incapable of locating the direction of the 
Ka`ba. He makes it possible for him to discover it by the 
way of ijtihäd by seeking the indication to that 
direction"l 10 
148 
These are some of the arguments that Shäfi`i mentioned in the chapter 
"Invalidating istitndn" in the book "Al- Umm". 
110 Ibid. v: 7, p: 301 
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Anyone following the statements of Shäfi`i will observe that he does not 
recognize istihsän in any form whatsoever. As he explained, the rulings can only be 
deduced from the Qur'än, the Sunnah, ijmä `, giyäs. 
As far as istihnän is concerned, Sh5fi`i does not recognize it as a basis to issue 
a ruling. He says that acting according to istitudn leads to situations where human 
beings are left in a state of lawlessness (sudan), that is, what ever his desire dictates to 
him and is naturally at odds with the above quoted äydh (verse). 
Actually, everybody, including those who recognize isti/zsän, reject istiAvan 
that is based on personal desire. Sh5. fi`i said, with regards to the case of the thinkers 
and the literate, that if they were allowed to rule by istihrän it would be in 
contradiction to the use of istit, sän, as those who recognize istihsän understand that its 
meaning is the departure from giyäs to a stronger dalil. The situations are such that 
the dalil can only be expected from a mujtahid who is competent in the sharr'ah 
rulings and the dalil, while it is unacceptable from thinkers and the literate who are 
not qualified. 
As for the allegation of adultery against the wife of Aws, the Prophet waited 
for a revelation so that he could issue a ruling. It is generally accepted that during the 
period of ongoing revelation, there was no need for the application of istihsän, giyäs 
or ijtihäd. With the death of the Prophet, the revelation ceased, and so some form of 
ijtihäd, and istihsän, was needed. This is discussed in the section on "invalidating 
istihsän". As we have seen, Shäfi`i does not recognize istihsän completely, as is 
mentioned in the book of "al-Umm". In his Risälah, in the section "tahrim al- 
istihsän" Shäfi`i regards istiluän as talazzuz (deriving pleasure). " This does not 
differ too much from what is reported in "al-Umm", except in the formulation of the 
111 Shäfi`% "AI-Risälah", v. 3, pp: 219,220,221. 
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words. As far as invalidating isti, sän is concerned, the statements in both books are 
the same; however, the statement in the "Risälah" mentions that it is prohibited 
(ixrräm) for anyone to act according to istihsän. The "Risälah" statement rules in 
effect that acting according to istilzsän is irardm (prohibited). 
3.3.2.1 The view of Shiräzi (d. 476/1083): 
Another definition of istihsän, which is attributed to Hanafis, is one given by a 
Shäfi`i jurist, Shiräzi, as: "Something which is considered good by the faculty of 
reason (`aqi) and depends on assumption rather than evidence. "112 However, 
according to Zarkashi (d. 794/1392), this definition is not quoted directly from Abü 
Hanifah, but is simply Shäfi`is interpretation of what istii sän meant to Abü Hanifah. 113 
According to Shiräzi and Zarkashi this definition and attribution was rejected by the 
Hanafi's. 114 
The Shäfi`is considered that the definition attributed to Abü Hanifah was used 
in conjunction with a case where there was no evidence to support the practice of 
istihsän. For example: If a man commits adultery and the four witnesses testify that he 
has committed the crime, the punishment (ixý is to be inflicted on the accused, on 
the basis of istihsän, in the opinion of Abü Han1fah. Generally, of course, there should 
be no punishment if the evidence is doubtful. Abil Hannah might have interpreted the 
evidence by saying that each one of the witnesses might have seen him at different 
moments. This would not constitute the standard evidence according to Shiräzi, and 
would save the accused from conviction. Alternatively Abü Han1fah could have 
argued that the fornicators might have moved around during their act of fornication 
and, as a result, been seen by four different people, at four different moments, from 
112 Mäwazdi, "Adab ai-QaQP', i. p: 651. 
113 Zarkashi, "Al-Bahr al-Mu ffl", vi. p: 94. 
114 ShiräzT, "Sharp 
al-Lwnah' ", ii, p: 969; Zarkashi, "AI-Bahr", vi. p: 93. 
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four different positions, thus explaining the divergence in testimonies. But for Shiräzi, 
this cannot be evidence; it might be only an istzhsän, which is not evidence. 
115 Ghazäli 
said that it was a ridiculous law based on istihsän that condones the shedding of 
Muslim blood. 116 
There is another definition given by the Shäfi`i Bishr b. Ghiyäs (d. 218/833) 
which is attributed to Abü Hanifah: "lsti/xsän is a departure from analogy that is based 
on personal opinion, in which case it can be considered valid without the support of 
7 evidence. "' 
Zufar gives a similar example in Sarakhsi's book, al-Mabsüf "If a man 
commits adultery and the four who witnessed the crime testified that he committed the 
act but in different corners of the house, the punishment (hrzdd) shall not be inflicted 
on the accused on the basis of giyäs (analogy). Since the act is seen from two different 
sides of the room, it could appear that the act of adultery took place in two different 
rooms, and, therefore the punishment (faadd) is applied to the adulterers according to 
istifasän; this is the opinion of AbU Hanifah and other imams. The witnesses are 
unanimous on the adultery and only disagree on what they actually witnessed, and 
therefore it should be accepted that the crime of adultery was committed and that 
punishment should be administered, even if it was impossible to describe the dress the 
woman was wearing at the time or to observe every detail. 
The Hanafis opposed this definition, as the evidence was not conclusive in the 
Hanafi Us l (methodology) books. This invites doubt about the attribution and the 
possibility of its accuracy. The doubt caused al-Bag! (d. 436/1044) to respond by 
saying: "the advocators of the concept of the definition know the purpose of their 
115 Shlräzi, "Sharp", ii. P: 970. 
116 GhazälT, "AI-Mankhül", p: 377. 
10 Zarkashi, "Ai-Bahº", vi. p: 93; Shirazi, "Sharp", ii. p: 970. 
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ancestors who evidently stated in many cases `we approved istihsärn depending on this 
athar (tradition) and evidence'. We understand that they do not approve istii sän 
without positive evidence. "118 Therefore, what al-Basri said confirmed that the 
attribution of the definition to Abü Hanifah may be incorrect. 
3.3.2.2 The View of GhazAlT (d. 505/1111): 
Ghazäli gives three different definitions of istilndn. The first he describes as: 
"That which the jurist prefers using the intellectual faculty; the Jurist (al-Mujtahid) 
uses his own judgement to arrive at the decision. s119 After giving the definition, he 
criticizes it. According to him, before the appearance of istihsän, the Muslim 
community had unanimously accepted that the mujtahid would not give any fatwä' 
(ruling) without depending on adillah al-shari`ah (proofs of Islamic law) rather than 
depending on his own desires. Ghazäli rejects the concept by saying, "We approve 
(nastahsinu) the invalidation of istilzrän". 120 Amid! (d. 631/1233)121 and Isnawi 
(d. 772/1370) 122 also have mentioned the same definition. 
Scholars other than those of the Shäfi`i School also mention a similar 
definition. One such scholar is Mob!, who added the expression "and tends to it by 
his opinion". 123 Shäiibi, when discussing the definition, explains that when looking 
closely at the definition and those who adopt it, it is their custom to use istihsän to 
give the people their desires; however, this should not contradict the evidence of 
shari `ah. In such a case, ruling by istit sän is acceptable as long as it does not 
contradict shari `ah. 
1e Basri, "AI-Mu`tamad', ii, p: 295. 
19 Ghazäli, "AI-Mesta a", i. p: 137. 
120 Ghazäli, "AI-Mesta fX', i. p: 138 
'Z' Amid, "Al-Ihn", iv. p: 138. 
122 Isnawi, "Minh4i" iii. p: 141. 
123 Shätibi "AI-I`tisäm", ii. p: 136 
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Shätibi continues, "This definition may apply to certain acts of worship which 
are the evidence that is the invention of certain people but which have no textual 
basis 
in the Book of Allah. Such definition is aimless since it follows that istihsän has to be 
divided into the good (Ixasan) and the bad (gabih), which means that not all of istihsän 
is correct. It could be understood that Shätibi did not accept this definition; the mind 
(`aql) often accepts that which is incorrect and based on desire, even if it distances 
one from what is right (/xiq). Shätibi mentions a comment that contains a similar 
meaning to such understanding in "al-I'tisäm". He says: "Scholars agree, if customs 
and habits lean towards this definition, it is acceptable to have a ruling (hinan) based 
on istihsän, though this ruling must not contradict the sharT-`ah. This shows that some 
acts of worship can be without textual basis, thus leading to what is known as 
"bid`ah"; consequently it has to be either good or bad since not every istihsän is right 
"124 Shätibi states as an objection to this definition that "whatever the mujtahid 
selects by using his mind (`aql), leads to another objection which is: "Is it with 
evidence (dalzl) or without evidence? " Scholars in general concur that it should be 
based on evidence (dalrl) but there is nothing in the definition that shows reference to 
evidence (dalil). Shätibi continues: "If the opinion of the scholar is based on evidence 
of Shan `ah it could have been more accurate and representative of the case, but since 
such things are not mentioned in the definition, the definition consequently is no 
longer valid for istifsdn" It is possible that the scholars who gave a different 
definition of isti/z an reflected their own point of view without evidence. 
The definition that has been criticised and rejected by al-Juwayn! 
(d. 478/1085), his pupil Ghazäli and other Shäfi`i scholars such as Amid and IsnawT, 
has not been found in any Hanafi U0411 sources. The reality is that Abü Hanifah and his 
124 ShätibT "Al-I `tisäm", ii. p: 136 
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followers have used isti? i än in their judgements. However, after examination and 
investigation of the examples of istihsän, we can clearly see that these examples have 
been based on a validated proof and its preferred analogy (giyäs) with a legal 
reason. 125 
Consequently, whenever they approve istituan it is simply a case of ijtihäd 
based on personal desire, because they have performed istihsän after investigation and 
hard work. If it is merely based on personal desire, then laborious work is 
unnecessary. 126 
Nobody can reject the role of `aql (intellect) when dealing with matters 
pertaining to people or the methods of finding evidence to reach a ruling or the reason 
why it is acceptable since it is not against the aim of shari `ah. As al-TUfi (d. 716/1316) 
explains, `The definition is accepted according to what is generally agreed by 
scholars, if it concords with shari`ah proof; otherwise it is rejected. "127 
3.3.2.3 The view of Amidl (d. 631/1233): 
Amidi, a Shafi`i jurist, views istitnan as a proof that action should be based on 
evidence. He considers that istifzsän is not a subject of disagreement if it is supported 
by text, or ijma ` or others. 
In such situations there is no disagreement over its validity as a proof, 
although there can be disagreements over the terminology. 
Actually, his opinion is that the disagreement stems from the use of different 
words to describe istihsän. Additionally, this disagreement is of no use since the 
words are used to describe what the mujtahid prefers based on dam and the public 
preference (maýlafaah mursalah) without any proof of shari `ah. The meaning here is 
125 `Iwad, "Ai-Istihrän `inda `Utamä' U; SUP', v: 5, p: 31. 
126 Ibid: p: 32. 
127 Tnfi, "Shari) Mukhtasar al-Rawdz", iii, pp: 190-193. 
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isti/tsän that is based on a darn thus becomes a proof, and there is no room for 
disagreement over such an issue. 
It can be concluded that Amid! views istilzsän as a proof so long as the 
departure from giyds stems from the availability of a stronger dalili28. 
Amidi has defined istifxsän as: "An evidence embedded (yanqadihu) in the 
mind of the jurist that words will not assist him to express or show ., '129 Ghazäli said 
much the same in his second definition. 130 Shätibi gave the same definition; 13 1a 
similar definition was given by Isnawi, although he applied different words. He 
defined istilndn as: "Evidence embedded in the mind of the jurist, but unexpressed by 
word. s132 Similar definitions were also given by Ibn al-Subki, Shawkäni, al-Taftazäni, 
and Shaykh `Abd Allah Diräz (d. 1351/1932), who defines istihsän as: "Evidence 
embedded in the mind of the jurist who finds difficulties to express it in words". 133 
Criticism has emerged about whether the definition hesitates between 
acceptance and rejection. The explanation for this is as follows: the first section of the 
definition "evidence embedded" makes one wonder what is meant by "embedded'; it 
is meant as confirmation of the evidence and it should be applied, which is the general 
agreement. There is no lack of explanation on the part of the jurist. His explanation 
may differ to what others understand, but the jurist himself does not have any 
problems because he understands the evidence. If, however, the "embedding" is taken 
as a knowledge of the evidence, but has been mixed with some doubt, then it will be 
rejected according to the general agreement of the scholars. A hukrn (ruling) can not 
128 Amidt-, "Al-Ihkäm", iv. p: 138. 
129 Ibid, iv, p: 138. 
130 Ghazdli, "AI-Mustasfa~', i, p: 138. 
131 Shätibi, "Al-I'ti. äm", ii. P: 137. 
132 Isnawi, "Minhäf', v: 3, p: 140. 
133 Ibn Subki, "Sharhal-Jalät al-Ma/aulli', v: 2, p: 395; Taftazäni, "Talwih" v: 2, p: 8l; Diräz, "Shark 
a! -Muwäfagät", v: 4, p: 206. 
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be adopted with doubt and probability. 134 These objections, which Ghazäli and `Adud 
al-Din al-Iji (d. 756 AH) report, '35 show that this definition is not valid for istihsän. 
It is essential for hukm to be dependent on evidence that is clearly taken from 
shari-`ah. This is to enable the jurist to distinguish whether the evidence is true or 
false. Therefore if the evidence could not be expressed, it follows that /ukm cannot 
depend on it. 
3.3.3.0 The view of istikan according to the Mäliki School: 
It is generally accepted that Mälikis recognize istihsän, as is clear from the 
definitions mentioned previously in the first part. It was narrated that Imam Mälik 
(d. 179 AB) said, "lsti&dn represents nine-tenths of human knowledge' 136. According 
to Ashba' adopting istihsdn may outweigh giyäs. 137 
If this is so, then we can not imagine isti, sän being defined by some as 
"Whatever is preferred by mujtahid rationally and through self inclination based on 
personal opinion". Nor is it "a proof that emerges (yangadihü ft nafs al-mujtahid) in 
the mind, but the mujtahid could not express it in words". Such istihsän cannot be 
viewed as nine-tenths of human knowledge; nor will it outweigh qiyas as one of the 
proofs. Shätibi says, in what could be seen as support for istihsän, "I used to agree 
with those scholars and dismiss istihsän; however, it gained support and was 
strengthened, since we can find a number of rulings (fatilwä) of the Caliphs and the 
learned Companions and those around them, and so there can be no denial. After that I 
changed my mind and began to support it. "136 
It was reported in "Sharp al- `AOR(f `alä al-Muntahaý' that "istifzsän, over which 
there is disagreement, went unnoticed because they mentioned in its interpretation 
III Al-Majallah: clause: 74. 
135 GhazalL, "Al-Mustagd', v: 1, pp: 138-139; Ij% "Sharhal-Mukhtasar", v: 2, p: 288. 
136 Abü Zahrah, "Usül", p: 207; Shätibi, "A1-I'tisam", ii. P: 137. 
137 Ibid: ii. p: 138. 
138 Ibid: ii. P: 147. 
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issues that do not amount to a basis for disagreement. Some of these issues are 
generally accepted, others lie somewhere between being generally accepted and 
rejected. As to those who define it as what emerges (yangadihufl nafs al-mujtahid) in 
the mind of the mujtahid but which can not be expressed in words, this constitutes a 
quandary between acceptance and rejection. Otherwise, what does it mean to say 
emerges (yangadihu)? If it means the realization of confirmation of evidence, then 
acting according to it becomes obligatory by general agreement, irrespective of the 
inability to express it in words. If the meaning of it emerges (yangadihu) and is 
difficult to express in words because one has doubts about the da! rl, then isti/zsdn is 
rejected in this case by general agreement because the rulings are not confirmed by 
probability and doubt. If istilzsän means that the mujtahid prefers rational thinking 
and is inclined to his own opinion, then this is rejected by general agreement. Since 
there is no difference between a member of the public and a scholar, this would spring 
from personal desire. If however, istiluan means the departure from a ruling on a 
similar case to a different ruling due to stronger evidence, then this is generally 
accepted and there is no disagreement. "139 
It can be concluded from both of the above statements that the Mäliki School 
recognize istifzrän and accept it is a proof on which a number of figh cases have been 
established. 
Shawkäni (d. 1834 AD) says that the view of Qurtnbi (d. 671 A. H) is that Im .m 
Mä1ik denied istifrsäm and did not adopt it. Shawkäni also claims that it was Imäm al- 
Haramayn (d. 478 AH) who attributed the recognition of istihsän to Imam Malik. 
According to Shawkäni: "Imäm al-Haramayn attributed istifxsän to Mälik and Qurtübi 
139 Taftazani, "Sharhal-`Acid', v: 2, p: 288. 
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denied istihsän and said it is unknown according to Imam Malik's madhhab"sao This 
statement is in fact at odds with the reports in the books of the M Ji1 School. 
Perhaps the reader will note, from the statements we have reported that there is 
no indication anywhere of the denial of isti1 sän by Mälik rather than the recognition, 
by Mälik, as was mentioned earlier. 
Consequently, it can be seen that the M iliki School recognize istihsän as a 
proof of shari `ah; however, their views of istilzsän are somewhat different from those 
of the Hanafi School. The Mäliki School views istiIndn as departure from giyäs due to 
public interest; istiinän for them does not go beyond being a mas1afaah (public 
interest) that requires the departure from giyäs, even though this maslahah depends on 
a proof of shari-`ah. The departure from giyäs is due to a necessity so that people do 
not suffer from hardship. 
This is explained in the book al-Muwäfagät: "The one who `prefers' (i. e. to 
make isti/sän) does not refer to his own personal taste or desire, but is simply trying 
to obtain the purpose of the Legislator (i. e. God) which is to discover what are the 
obligatory duties. For example, in an issue that requires giyäs, but in which giyäs may 
leads to missing a ma#ahnh or bringing about mafsadah, the application of giyäs in 
absolute terms will inevitably lead to hardship in some of its sources, and therefore 
the possibility of harm must be avoided. " , 141 
This statement shows that the previous explanation is correct. Reference to a 
group of figh issues will be referred to in the section on the effects of the application 
of istil sän on the construction of Islamic f: qh. Al-Shätibi concludes his sayings by 
too ShawkAni, "Irshäd", P: 240- 
141 Shatib% "A1-Muwäfagät", v: 4, pp: 206,207. 
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asserting that this is a technique of proof (dalil) that shows the correctness of this rule 
and is the basis on which Malik and his followers constructed their views. 
142 
This would explain the direction of the Mäliki School in recognizing istifardn, 
as it is limited to a maýiahah (public interest) as opposed to giyäs, while the Hanaff 
school says this proof may be athar, ijma', giyäs khafiy, necessity, or masia/ah. 
3.3.3.1 The view of Abu al-Wal-id Al-Bäji (d. 474/1081): 
Quoting from Mäliki jurist Ishäq bin Khuwaydh Mindäd (d. 390/1000), al-Bäj! 
defines istihsän as "Acting on a ruling based on a stronger dalil as compared to 
another"143, Qarafi (d. 684 A. H) comments on this definition saying that "in this 
manner, it becomes hujjah by ijmd `, while actually it is not". 144 In fact, this definition, 
although it agrees with other definitions as far as meaning is concerned, is criticized 
for the wordings or terms it uses. This definition is general and does not have any 
limitation because it is based on stronger evidence. 
Shätibi (d. 790/1388) gives the following explanation: "Istihscn according to 
us and the Hanafis is "practising on a ruling based on the stronger of two evidences 
(dalllayn)". 145 On the other hand, this is also applicable to ndsikh (abrogating) with 
mansükh (abrogated); general (`äm) with particular (khäs), and absolute (mutlaq) with 
muqayyad (constrained). 
3.3.3.2 The view of Ibn al-`Arabi (d. 543/1147): 
According to Ibn al-`Arabi, istihsän is "To abandon what is required by the 
law, when applying the existing law would lead to a departure from some of its own 
objectives. s146 It is clear that Ibn al-`Arabi indicates that the essence of istiihän is "to 
apply a ruling based on the stronger of the two evidences (darlayn)". The explanation 
142 Ibid, v: 4, p: 207 
143 QarafT, "Sharp TangT t', p: 451; BäjI, "11*dm al-FusÜP', v: 2, p: 693. 
" Ibid: P. 451. 
145 Shätibi, "At-Muwäfagä", v: 4, pp: 117,118. 
146 ShätibT, "Al-I'tisäm", v: 2, p: 139; Shätibi, "Al-Muwiifagät", v: 4, p: 207. 
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of this definition is that there would be a dalil, which concerns general principles, and 
which would be applicable to various cases. In some such cases, a da1il may later 
emerge which is different -and preferable- to the first. This new dalil necessitates a 
ruling different to the earlier one. In such situations the mujtahid departs from the 
general ruling based on the first dalil by the way of exception for this case; he acts on 
the basis of the new da17 to deduce another ruling which departs from the generality 
of the earlier dalil. The reason for this action of the mujrahid is based on the general 
principle of the jurisprudential maxims, which holds that: "Repelling an evil is 
preferable to securing a benefit"147, or to keep away a mafsadah rather than obtaining 
masla/ ih or to bring about a masiiak h, which would otherwise be missed if the 
mujtahid acted on the basis of the first dalrl. 
Shätibi comments on this definition, saying: "It is the departure from a ruling 
for `urf, ma#aivh, or ijnO' avoiding the hardship in respect of the preference of ease 
to facilitate people's affairs. '48 
3.3.3.3 The view of Ibn Rushd (d. 595/1198): 
Ibn Rushd says that "Istihsän's usage is so common that it exceeds giyäs; it is 
the departure from a giyäs that leads to extremity and exaggeration in the ruling of a 
case which is based on the meaning of an effective cause ('illah) and thus influences 
the ruling of the case. 149 Despite all of these different explanations, the meanings are 
compatible with Ibn a1-`Arabi's definition. 
3.3.3.4 The view of Ibn A1-Abyari (d. 618/1221): 
Shams al-Din Abü Husayn al-Abyäri defines istihsdn as `%sing partial 
ma#a/ah (in the interest of the public) as opposed to general giyäs (analogy). "150 
147 Majallah: clause 30. 
148 Shatibi, "A1-Muwäfagärt", v: 4, p: 208. 
149 Shatibi, ` I'ti¢äm", v: 2, p: 139. 
150 ShItibT, "Al Muwäfagärt", v: 4, p: 206. 
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Sha ibi interprets this as: "the implication of using partial masla/ ah is to bring 
forward the mursal (discontinued) evidence (istidlal mursal) to giyirs". '5' To explain 
this `Abd Allah Diräz (d. 1351) gives the example of someone who buys goods of his 
own free will and on his death leaves his heirs in disagreement as to whether to keep 
or return the goods. Istihsän, Diräz explains, would dictate that if the vendor refuses 
to take the goods back, then it is acceptable to keep them. 152 
Consequently, isti vain thus defined cannot be expanded, as it is limited to 
masla, x h mursalah. The discussion of this definition shows that it does not succeed in 
defining istihsän; it only makes isti jn4n applicable where the dalil, particularizing the 
giyäs, is considered as nothing other than maslahah mursalah. 
3.3.3.5 The view of Shatibi (d. 790/1388): 
Abü Ishäq Ibrähün a1-Shätibi, a Mäliki jurist, is one of the prominent scholars 
dealing with the concept of magaýid (objective of the shad'ah). He considers istibsän 
as a source of Islamic law, but says that the interpretation should not be based on 
desire, and that the jurists must have a full understanding of the intention of the 
Lawgiver. When presented with a new problem the jurists will resort to istihsän if the 
use of the strict application of analogy will lead to loss of maslal ah or the possibility 
of evil. He defines isti/isän as "An evidence embedded (yanqadihu) in the mind of the 
jurist but which words will not allow him to express". 153 The same definition has 
been given by Amidi (d. 631) and a similar definition given by Ibn al-Subki (d. 771), 
Shawkäni (d. 1250), Taftazäni (d. 793), and Shaykh `Abd-Allah Diräz (d. 1351). 
3.3.4.0 The view of IstiInän amongst the Hanbali School: 
151 Ibid: v: 4, pp: 205,206. 
ist Ibid: v: 4, pp: 205,206. 
1 Shätibi, "I `ti cam", v: 2, p: 137. 
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The narrations reported about the Hanbali School's views on isti/zsän as a 
principle of shad'ah differ: some narrations reported that ImAm Ahmad (d. 241 A. H) 
recognized istifzsän, while others reported that he did not. 
Abü Yä'1ä (d. 458/1065) defines isti/ sän as "leaving one hukm (ruling) for 
another stronger or better /xckm (ruling). " He points out that the Qur'än or the Sunnah 
and ijma` will be reliable proofs while performing istihsän. 154 
Qadi Yä`qüb reports that istihsdn is the way of Imam Ahmad. It is "The 
departure from one ruling to another which has priority; no one can deny this. If the 
name differs there is no point in disagreement over terms when there is an agreement 
on the meaning. "155 This is based on the statement which Ibn Qudämah (d. 620/1223) 
narrates from Qadi Ya' qüb, who contended that isti, sän with its meaning is generally 
agreed upon. 
Ibn Taymiyyah narrates from Hulwäni: "Hulwäni interpreted isti/zsän in 
different ways. In my opinion istihsän is probably the departure from giyds jail and 
other proofs to a dalli from the text of a solitary fadith (khabar al-wdfid) or another 
dal-il, or the departure from giyäs to a saying of a companion when giyäs does not 
apply. I have noted that al-Fakhr Ismä`il, in his book, "Al-Jadal", reports a similar 
interpretation of istibsän. The Hanafi School agreed with us in that when a companion 
said something in which giyäs finds its way, then it is taken as if the companion had 
said that to avoid incorrect interpretation. The Shäfi`is opposed us on this issue. 
Similarly, the Hanafis agreed with us on istihsän whilst Shäfiis disagreed with us"156 
Ibn Taymiyyah's statement shows that recognizing istiizsän in the narration 
which Qad-i Yd'qüb reported from Imäm Ahmad, and which Hulwäni and al-Fakhr 
154 Ab11 Yä`1ä Muhammad bin al-Husain bin Muhammad bin Ahmad bin al-Farrä' Hanbali 
(d. 458/1065), "Al- `Uddah f( Usül al-Fiqh", edt: Ahmad Sayr al-MubAraki, Muassasah al- 
Beirut, 1400/1980, v: 5, p: 1607. 
'55 Ibn Qudämab, "Rawpht", p: 85. 
116 Ibn Taymiyyah, "Al-Musawwadah", p: 451. 
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Ismä'1 support, is a proof if it is based on dalil. This means that we depart from giyäs 
based on such a dalrl whether this dalil is a solitary khabar or another report. if the 
departure was due to a saying of a Companion, then following this method confirms 
that istihsän is a proof for them (Hanbali) and there can be no disagreement over this 
issue. The narration confirming isti, sän as a proof comes from Maimüni, and is 
quoted by Ibn Taymiyyah: "Our shaikh said that Ahmad used istilzsän in many cases". 
In the Maimüni narration, Imäm Ahmad is quoted as saying: "I prefer (astahsinü) 
tayammum for every prayer, and the giyäs here is on equal footing with water where 
the ritual prayer can still be performed until the wuo1 (ablution) is invalidated or until 
the water becomes available"157. This narration thus shows that isti, sän is a proof for 
Imäsn Ahmad where it can be traced clearly in manyfiqh issues. 
However, Abü Talib reported that Imam Ahmad did not resort to istibsän. He 
says that when the followers of Abn Hanifah encountered an issue opposed to giyäs, 
they then adopted it and departed from giyäs. This leads to the conclusion that when 
faced with an issue which is opposed to giyäs the correct thing to do is depart from 
giyäs to istiizsän. 
156 
This leads to the conclusion that from the Hanbalis point of view, one cannot 
depart from one giyäs to another giyäs; rather, departure from giyäs can only be 
sanctioned by nass be it a vdith or other reports. This could be explained best by 
Abü al-Khatb (d. 510/1116) who is reported in the Musawwadah as saying: "For me, 
he (imäm Abmad) denied the istihsän without evidence, which is why he said that the 
Hanafrs departed from giyäs which they claimed was right (? qq). If istih än was 
based on dalil, they adopted it and he (imäm Ahmad) did not deny it, because it was 
157 Ibid: p: 452. 
158 Ibid: p: 452 
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right (/iaq). And he said: I follow the hadith and I do not perform giyäs based on it, 
this means that I depart from giyäs by khabar, which is istibsän by dalil"159 
Ibn Taymiyyah explains this as meaning that when he sees an indication which 
is stronger than giyäs, the mujtahid is led to depart from giyäs and to adopt that 
indication without invalidating giyäs itself. This is about departing from giyäs zähir 
(explicit analogy) to giyäs khafty (implicit analogy) which is stronger and refers to 
specifying the cause (takhscq al- `illah). Ibn Taymiyyah prohibits the specification of 
`illah while he supports the adoption of istihsän, whatever the reason for the departure 
from giyds and when it refers to a stronger dalil, be it text or other reports. 160. 
Ibn Taymiyyah refers to what Qa(f said in reply to AbU al-Khattäb's 
statement. He says that there is a difference between the specification of `illah and 
the departure from giyas to khabar (report). This is because whoever speaks of the 
validity of takhsfs al- `illah may depart from giyäs for a dalil or without a dalil; this 
prevents its meaning from being subjected to takh is (specification) with evidence. Ibn 
Taymiyyah responds by saying: "If we do not adopt takhsfs al- `illah this takes away 
the restriction located in takhsfs and makes it a restriction in the `illah (cause); this 
explains that the 711ah is incomplete. As explained by the specified (al-mukhassas) 
that it is not completed, thus there is no difference between the specification and non- 
specification of 711ah. This is what Abü al-Khattäb said and it is in agreement with 
the saying of a1-Bari and Ibn Al-Khatib and others. s161 
This leads to the conclusion that istilzrän for Abü al-Kha äb is an `illah which 
is stronger than the giyas and is opposed to giyäs, irrespective of whether this dali! is 
a khabar or implicit giyäs (giyäs kha, fiy). Thus he supported the departure from one 
159 Ibid: p: 452. 
160 Ibid, p: 453. 
161 Ibid, p: 454. 
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giyäs to another; this departure is known as takhsfsal-`illah. Thus this Hanbali Scholar 
has invalidated the report in the second narration. 
Al-Hulwani (d. 44811050) however, sees istihsän with the same view as the 
Hans. For him, istihsän is more general than both Abü al-Khaatäb's definition and 
what has been reported in the earlier narration. In one case he says that it is the 
stronger giyäs and in another, he says, it is the stronger dalil, and this is more general 
than the first. This would mean that istihsän for him may be based on the Qur'an, the 
Sunnah, or ijmd `162 
For Najmuddin al-Tuff (d. 71611316), the definition of istitWn was similar to 
that of Ibn Qudämah. However, his definition was more comprehensive in spite of Ibn 
Qudämah confining the evidence to the Qur'an and the Sunnah. Al-nfi- expands the 
meaning of istilzsi n to cover all of the adillah sharT`ah (legal proofs). He defines 
istiizsän as "A departure from the existing precedent, by taking a decision in a certain 
case different from that on which similar cases have been decided in the light of 
special adillah shari `ah (legal proof). 
"163 
In conclusion, the Hanbalis recognize istilzsän in spite of their disagreement 
over the meaning; some interpreted it as the departure from giyäs to the saying of a 
companion or a solitary fadith (khabar al-wähid), while others saw it as a departure 
from one giyäs for a stronger dalil, or as a departure from one giyäs to a stronger one. 
Only Abü Talib dismisses istf 
. 
ludn as a ruling based on personal desire. 
When we examine the Hanbalis and what they said on the subject of istifxsän 
the following could be concluded: 
1-The majority of the Hanbali Scholars agree that istihsän is the departure from 
giyäs to a dalil stronger than that giyäs, even though they use different expressions. 
162 Tbid, pp: 454,455. 
163 Al-Tüfi, "Sharp al Mukhta, sar", v: 3, p: 197. 
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Some of them say that it is the departure from what giyäs requires to a dalil which is 
that which is stronger compared to that giyäs. Others say it is the stronger of two 
giyäs, and so on. 
2-All of them- based on this definition- accept isti/zsän, and consider it to be 
the way of Imam Abmad, whom they portray as resorting to isti'isän based on this 
definition. 
3-Given the above, istihsän is not an independent proof, but is related to 
weighing proofs against each other, as Ibn Taymiyyah confirmed earlier. 
4- They reject any kind of istihsän that is based on personal desire without 
dalil, and consider this to be legislating in shah `ah that which God forbids. 
5- They are not in disagreement with other scholars, as all scholars recognized 
istihsän as long as the departure was from one dalil to a stronger one. 
6-The report which claims that Ahmad denied istihsän does not convey a clear 
denial. In spite of this Abü al-Khattäb (d. 510/1116) interprets this as denial of istihsän 
which is not supported by a dalil. In such situations the original rule remains intact. 
That is Abmad recognized isti? vdn as long as the departure from giyäs is by a dalil. 164 
In short istitnan is a principle of shad'ah for the Hanbahs in spite of their 
disagreement on how to arrive at istilzsän. As for those who said it is not a principle 
(e. g. Abn Tälib), they were referring to istiludn without a dalil, which springs from 
hawä' (desire); there was no disagreement over this. 
Thus it can be said that the Hanaf s, Mälikis and Hanbaiis agreed upon the 
recognition of isti judn in spite of the different ways they conceived of the departure 
from one ruling to another. 
"I `Abd Allah b. `Abd al-Muhsin Turlü, "USt l Madhhab al-Imam Ahrnad Ibn flanbal- Diräsah 
Usüliyyah Mugäranah (UUtiI comparative studies)", Cairo, First Print, 1394 H-1974 'Mn Shams 
University Press, Cairo, p: 515. 
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3.3.5.0 The view of istihsdn amongst the ShI`ah Jurists: 
3.3.5.1 The Imami Shi'ah: 
The Imami Shi'ah do not accept isti j sän at all and rejects the performance of 
giyäs (analogy). It is their belief that istilnin has been approved without evidence, 
and thus they do not give any credence to the istitniln rulings. '65 They claim that 
istihsän and giyäs are not considered as proof if they are not based on explicit textual 
or reasonable evidence; furthermore, they are obviously forbidden as they are based 
on assumption. 
166 
3.3.5.2 Zaydiyyah jurists: 
The concept of istihsän among the Zaydiyyah thought is close to the Hanafis. 
The Zäydiyyah and Hanafi jurists consider istitVdn as part of analogy. 167 It is defined 
as "A departure from one established ruling to a stronger one. "168 The Zayd! 
definition of istiludn is very close to the Hanaff definitions. While Karkhi's definition 
and that of the Zaydis is similar, the meaning is exactly the same even though 
Karkhi's definition has been criticised because it included the takhgs al-`illah 
(particularization) within the scope of istilman. 169 
In the Zaydiyyah school of thought, the condition upon which istihsän can 
occur is if the departure is from one speculative proof to another. First, both must 
fulfil the conditions of eligibility and one of them must be stronger and preferable. 170 
if the proofs are both giyds, or one is giyäs and the other is a hadith (khabar, athar), 
there is nothing to be considered, since istihsän is based on the principle that "No 
165 Abt Zahrah, "A1-Imwn al-5"adiq", pp: 527-529. 
161 Ibid, pp: 527-528. 
167 Abü Zahrah, "Al-Imam Zayd yätuhii wa `A; cuhu- Arduhu wa Fiqhuhu", Dir al-Nadwah al- 
Jädiydah, Beirut, p: 438. 
168 Ibid. p: 438. 
169 Basil, "Al-Mu`tamad", v: 2, p: 296; Taftazäni, "Talwi, t', v: 2, p: 162; Ibn al-Fiajib, "Muntahd', p: 
207; Bukhärl, "Kashf al-Asrär", v: 4, p: 3. 
170 Abü Zahrah, "Al-bndm Zayd', p: 439. 
Chapter Three 168 
conflict occurs between two definite proofs". The conflict between two definite proofs 
is only to be taken into account when considering naskh (abrogation), and so it is not 
an istilxsän. 
Indeed, the Zaydiyyah declare that istihsän can not be based on definite 
proofs, owing to the jurisprudential principle which accords priority to definite proofs 
over speculative proofs. Conflict arises only when both proofs are speculative. The 
Zaydiyyah also point out the conditions of giyäs, which is against the isti/zsän, must 
be fulfilled. 171 
3.3.6.0 The view of istilhsff'n amongst the Zähiriyyah Jurists: 
The foundation of Zähiriyyah (Literalists) thought is based on the literal 
meanings of the Qur'an and the Sunnah. The jurist Dawild Ibn `Ali (d. 270/884) is the 
founder of this school; his most famous disciple was the belletrist, poet, historian, 
theologian, jurist, philosopher, and polemicist Ibn Hazm (d. 456/1064). 172 The 
Literalists instructed their followers in the superficial rather than the deeper meaning 
of the Qur'an and the Sunnah. 
According to the Zähiriyyah, the primary source of the Shari `ah is the text of 
the Qur'än, in accordance with the verse: "0 you who believe! Obey God and obey 
the Messenger (Muhammad) and those of you (Muslims) who are in authority. (And) 
if you differ in anything amongst yourselves, refer it to God and His Messenger if you 
believe in God and in the last day. That is better and more suitable for final 
determination. s173 Citing the verses "... we have neglected nothing in the Book, "lea, 
175 "the Book is an exposition of everything". "... I have perfected your religion for 
1" Ibid. p: 439. 
172 A. G. Chejne, "Ibn Ham", preface, Kazi Publications inc. Chicago, USA, 1982, p: vii. 173 Qur'an: 4/59 
174 Qur'än: 6/38 
375 Qur'an: 16189 
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you, completed my favour upon you.. "176, "and that you may explain clearly to men 
what is sent down to them. .. "177, Ibn Hazm indicates that every aspect of life and all 
human needs be they material or spiritual, are provided for in the Qur'än, and 
therefore no divergence is allowed from the text of the Qur'än except where one verse 
is abrogated by another. 178 
As indicated in the Qur'än, the second source of the shara`ah is the Tradition 
(herdith), which is a record of the Prophet's acta and dicta. The Prophet is deemed 
totally trustworthy, as the Qur'än itself confirms: "Nor does he speak of (his own) 
desire. It is only a Revelation revealed. s174'80 
The last source is consensus (ijmä `) which for Ibn Hazrn signifies the general 
agreement of the Companions of the Prophet. However, it is a further condition that 
they all should be aware of the matter agreed upon and no one should have any 
disagreement. Beyond this he does not accept any other principle as a source of law; 
therefore he rejects giyäs (analogy). lsl 
Accordingly, istihsän is also rejected on the following grounds: "Those who 
listen to the Word and follow the best thereof those are the ones whom God has 
guided and those are men of understanding. " 182 Ibn Hazm says that this verse is 
evidence against, rather than support of, istifsän and giyäs. God does not say they 
should follow what they consider best; He says, "Follow what He considers best". 
Therefore, the best words are those which conform to the Qur'dn and the With, and 
not to something that man considers best. Also ijmä `(consensus) fits in with this, and 
whoever apposes it, will be considered a non- Muslim. According to Ibn Hazm, God 
X76 Qur'än: 5/3 
171 Qur'än: 16/44 
118 Ibn Ham, "AI-Nubadh", p: 43. 
179 Qur'an: 53/3-4 
180 Ibn Hazm, "Al-I/ am", v: 2, p: 253. 
181 Ibn Haim, "A1-Nubadh", p: 44; Ibn Ham, "AI-Ilkäm", v: 2, p: 197, 
' Qur'än: 39/18 
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explains this with the following verse: "... and if you differ in anything amongst 
yourselves, refer it to God and His Messenger, if you believe in God and in the Last 
Day. That is better and more suitable for final determination. " 183 Here it can be seen 
that God does not say `refer it to what you consider best' (mrr tastahsinü); in addition 
it is impossible that the truth (al-fxigq) will be in what we like (mä nasta/i inü) 
without proof. If it were so, God would have commanded something that he did not 
wish, in which case textual evidence and proofs would contradict one another. This 
would also mean that the God had ordered us to differ when He actually prohibits us 
from doing so. It is impossible that all scholars would like the same thing, taking into 
consideration the difference in their inclination, nature and objectives, so it is 
impossible to achieve complete agreement on any one issue. He goes on to say "We 
see that what the Mälikis consider good, the Hanafis may consider bad and vice versa. 
This proves that consideration of istihsän is wrong because God's religion does not 
revolve around other people's considerations; it would apply only if the religion were 
not complete. But the religion is complete without requiring any extension or 
supplementation. 'The truth is the truth (al-hagqu faagqun) even if people dislike it, 
and wrong is wrong (al-bäilu bätilun) even if people like it. " He later describes 
istihsän as a passion (shahwah), an inclination (hawä'), and an error (daläl). 1M 
Ibn Hazm believes that the very fact that one accepts a giyäs and then departs 
from it is enough to invalidate isti. nan as a principle. For there would be nothing to 
favour one jurist's istihsan over another's. If the religion of Islam were based on 
istikdn everyone would have the right to legislate whatever they desire. 185 
183 Qur'dn: 4/59 
184 Ibn Hazm, "Ai-1 *dm", v: 2, pp: 195-196; Chejne, "Ibn thzm", p: 122. 
185 Ibn Hazm, "Mulakhkhas", edt: Said a1-Afghäni Dimishq, 1960, p: 50. 
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It can be concluded from this statement that Ibn Hazm categorically objects to 
istifzsän and believes it is not a principle of law. The invalidity however is not only 
confined to istiInan but also is extended to giyäs. Those who denied istihsän, 
including Ibn Hazm, seem somewhat extreme. What is the motive behind their denial? 
For as we have seen from the views of those who support istihsän, the principle does 
not go beyond the departure from a ruling due to a stronger dal-H. 
Ibn Hazm, among others, seems to be lumping the juristic preference of 
scholars together with the opinion of the layman, implying that a jurist's ruling based 
on a considered proof is the same as a layman's opinion that is based on personal 
desire. 
In short, the group who denied istilndn did so to preserve the agreed dalil and 
to avoid any other rulings. The scholars who are mujtahid recognized only the rulings 
of the Islamic shah `ah and considered the abuse of such rulings a remote possibility. 
3.3.7.0 The view of istitw n amongst the Mu'tazilah jurists: 
Bishr b. Ghiyäs b. Abi Karimah `Abd a1-Rahmän al-Mar si (d. 218/833), a 
follower of the Sh `Ts, the Murjirtes (Mu`tazili) and the Hanafis, was also a special 
disciple of Imäm Abn Yüsuf (d. 182/798) and a famous theologian. He attributes to 
Abü Hanifah the following definition: "Istilndn is a departure from analogy based on 
personal opinion which can be considered right without requiring evidence. " Al- 
Bash (d. 436/1044) recognizes istihcän as a principle of shah `ah as long as the 
departure from giyäs depends on a dalV. Al-B aýri's view holds more credence than 
that of others who disagreed with the Hanaf s, bearing in mind the fact that he himself 
was from a different school. His view is also confirmed by other scholars of different 
jurisprudential persuasions. 
186 Zarkashi, "AI-Bah", A. p: 93; Shiräzi, "Sharhal-Luma"', ii, p: 969. 
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In al-Mu `tamad, al-Basil explains: 
"Let it be known that what has been said by the 
followers of Abü Nanifah is that he recognizes istihsän, 
and many of those who rejected istitudn thought that 
they (the followers of Abü Hanifah) meant that is it a 
ruling without dalil. In addition, what the later Hanaffs 
stated is "Istiludn is the departure from one ruling to 
another that is stronger. " This has priority over what 
those who disagree with them thought; the people of 
knowledge are more aware of the aims of their 
predecessors. They stated in many issues: "We preferred 
this athar, for such a reason" and thus we came to know 
that they did not prefer something without following the 
proper procedure. That which invalidates such a ruling is 
either its being a ruling out of desire, or one based on 
whatever comes to mind first; or tann (speculations); or 
an amärah (indication) to that ruling. These are as 
attainable by a child or a member of the public as they 
are by the scholar. This would mean that we would have 
to accept all of them equally, and nobody would be 
blamed for ruling in that way, because these matters deal 
with baqq (right) and bä(il (wrong), and because znnn 
(speculation) without amärah (indications) is not 
distinguishable from the speculation of a mad man. The 
172 
talk about istifxsän as explained by the followers of Abü 
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Hanifah concerns both meaning and definition. As for 
the meaning, some indications (amOrah) are stronger 
than others. It is permissible to depart from one amärah 
to another without invalidating the one that has been 
departed from This is referred to as takhgs al- `illah 
(specification of the cause). "187 
173 
Al-Basrfs views afford us the best defence so far of the recognition of 
istilzsän. As a theologian, al-Basri recognizes istifzsän as a principle whether it is a 
departure from giyäs owing to a naffs or ifmr ', or a departure from giyäs Ahir 
(explicit analogy) to a giyäs khafty (implicit analogy) stronger than the first. He 
defines it clearly with the following words: "Isti'sän is a departure from the 
established ruling to another ruling, when the reason (dalil) in the second is stronger 
than the one found in the first, and other fresh evidence is provided (hukin al-kzri) vis- 
ä-vis the previous one. "' 88 
Al-Basri states that many of those who reject istihrän assume that it is the 
derivation of rulings without evidence. However, he believes that the disciples of Abü 
Hanifah did not perform isti/zrän randomly. Rather, they used proper methods and 
ways of reasoning, as is evidenced by statements such as "we approved istihsän 
depending on this athar and evidence (istabsannä hädha al-athar, wa liwajhi kadha)". 
This makes it clear that they do not approve isti jndn without depending on 
evidence. 189 
187 Basil, "AI-Mu`tamad', ii. pp: 838,839. 
188 See: Hasan, "Analogical Reasoning", p: 410. 
189 Bagri, "AI-Mu tamad", v: 2, p: 295. 
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Al-Basri s view seems entirely logical, for it is unreasonable to assume to that 
so many scholars from the different schools of jurisprudence were given to producing 
rulings on a whim and without sufficient evidence. 
These are the opinions of the scholars who gives their opinion about istilarän 
as a principle; I have presented their views separately, since they differ from one 
madhhab to another. 
3.4.0-FURTHER EVIDENCES OF THE VALIDITY OF ISTIFISAN 
In the previous section, I discussed the various technical definitions of istihx n 
according to various schools and scholars. Anyone who examines these definitions 
should be able to distinguish between those who consider istitWln as a principle and 
those who reject it. The historical development of istilzsän has been traced. Lastly, 
opinions of the early Hanafi scholars and their applications of istihsän have also been 
expounded. 
I shall now look in greater depth at the ways in which different groups either 
accepted or rejected istiizsän as a valid principle of Islamic law. 
First, isti? sän was defined as a departure from a ruling on an issue to another 
for a reason that is stronger. Similarly, some scholars consider istihsän as evidence 
opposed to qiyas or departure from one qiyas to a stronger one. Such scholars see 
istilzsän as a principle of shari`ah, the effect of which appears clearly in many issues 
of figh. Hanafi, Mäler, Hanbali and Zaydi schools of thought followed this path, but 
for the Mäli cis istilzsän differs from the others. 190 
Secondly, those scholars who consider istifsdn to be whatever the mujtahid 
bases his intellectual judgment on, or judgments judged by personal opinion, 191 do not 
190 Bukh3d, "Kashf', part 4 p: 3; Hasan, "Analogical Reasoning", p: 410; Bukhäri, "Shay//' v: 4, p: 3; 
Taftazän. i, "TalwT"r, v: ii, p: 163; Ibn al-liajib, "Mw, tahX', p: 207; Nasafi, "Kashf', v: 2, p: 164. 
191 MäwardT, "Adab al-Qa{! i", i, p: 651; Ibn Fiazm, "Al-Ahkitm", 61757. 
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consider isti, sän as a principle of shari `a. Rather, they see it as a ruling that has been 
arrived at out of personal desire and whim without any evidence from the Qur'an, the 
Sunnah or ijmä'; as such, it constitutes nothing other than a man-made law that has no 
place in Islamic jurisprudence. 192 Hence the well-known statement of Shafi`i, who 
represents the group of scholars who reject istihsän as a principle of shari `ah "Man 
istalzsana faqad sharra'ah"(whoever approves of juristic preference is making 
himself the Lawmaker). 193 This will be clearer when we discuss the views of scholars 
in detail. It is represented by the Shafi`is, zdhiris and the Shi`ah. However, Amidi and 
Taftazäni, both of whom follow the Shäfr i school, recognized istifxrän194 as did the 
Mutakallimün (Theologians) and Abü al-Husayn al-Base . 
195 
Lastly, there are those who took the middle ground between the two sides; 
they did not view isti/hsän as an independent principle, but referred it to the other 
principles already agreed upon among scholars, namely the Qur'än, the Sunnah, 
ijmä'and giyäs. 196 IstiInan according to such points of view does not extend beyond 
these four principles, which have been agreed upon. Thus the holder of this view 
neither rejects the proof of istihsän, as Shäfi`i did, nor does he say that it is an 
independent principle, as the Hanafi, Mdliki and Hanbäli jurists did. This group of 
scholars is represented by ShawkänI (d. 1834). 
147 
It should be noted that some Mäliki and Hanbali scholars reject istiludn while 
other scholars of these two schools accept it, as was discussed in detail earlier when 
we explored the views of various jurists. 
19' ShWfi`1, "Al-Risälah", v: 3, pp: 219-221. 
193 AlWani, "The Ethics", p: 75; Ansar , "Ghäyat al-WusüP', p: 139. 
194 Amidt, "Al-I/1cäm", iv, p: 136, Al-Taftazäni, "Al-Talwili', v: 2, p: 82. 
'95 Basil, "Al-Mu`tamad', ii. p: 838; Amtr Pädishah, "Taysir", v: 4, p: 78; Ibn al-Humäm, "Al-Tagrir" 
v: 3, p: 222; Iji, "Shar/f', v: 2, p: 288; Ibn Qudämah, "RawGht", p: 85. 
'9 `Abd al-I fiz, Madiha `Ali, "Al-Istihsän wa Atharuhü ft-Bina al-Fiqh al-Islirmi ', PhD dissertation 
at Faculty of Arabic and Islamic study at Al-Azhar University, Egypt, 1984, p: 76. 
197 Shawkäni, "Irshdd', p: 231. 
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This section will explain the reason behind the disagreement over istihsän as a 
principle of law and will be elaborated on, following an overview of the various 
evidences to justify the claims of those who consider it to be a valid principle of 
shah `ah, and those who do not. Both groups discussed each other's arguments with 
the aim of invalidating each other's claim while upholding their own. As the 
discussion was not limited to the opinion of one group, but included the opinion of 
their opponents and supporters, it gave way to many discussions, which we will 
discuss separately. 
3.4.1 Reason for disagreement over the validity of istihsä'n 
Before discussing the views of the `ulamd' (jurists) on istitndn, it is worth 
exploring the reasons behind the disagreements among them as to whether istihsän is 
a principle of shari`ah or not. 
The opponents of isti jndn are those who see it as "Arbitrary law making 
within religion", mainly because they did not understand what the supporters of 
istihsän -the Hanafis, M Wilds, and Hanbalis- meant by the term. 
In the early Islamic period, the term istihsän and its exact meaning were not 
directly defined; it was applied in judgments without any specific definition or 
explanation being given. Supporters' considerations are based mainly on the 
fundamental principle of securing ease and avoiding hardship. This procedure of the 
usage of istihsän was misunderstood by its opponents. 
Shätibi is of the view that the point of dispute relates to several issues: 
1- Istihsän relates to "the people of innovation" (ahl al-bid `ah) who make 
statements that are far from the ahküm al-din (rulings of religion) and attempt falsely 
to present it as the form of istilzsän that the scholars have adopted. 
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This may have been one reason why scholars refused to accept istifiic n as a 
principle; this refusal might have been because they intended to tighten the noose 
"around the people of innovation" and thus prevent misguidance wherever possible. 
These scholars believed that since it is possible for anyone to use istitndn, it could be 
used as an excuse to propagate self-opinion and thus lead to the collapse of the 
principles of religion. 
2- Istihsän does not materialize unless there is a mustalnin that makes istihsän 
valid; such a musta/sin has to be either the spar` (law) or `aql (intellect). If it is spar` 
then the issue is already resolved as the evidence in shari `ah has shown, and 
consequently following the daIFI (evidence) cannot be called istihsän. In such 
situations there is no need for additional interpretations to the Qur'an, the Sunnah, 
ijmä ` and whatever is derived from them in the form of giyäs and dalil. 
As for `aql, if isti&dn by way of `aql is based on a dalil (evidence) then there 
is no point calling it istifasän; since the reference here is the dalil and nothing else. If, 
however, istihsän is by the way of 'aql without any dalil, then it is a bid'ah 
(innovation). This might have been the reason why some scholars said that istifzrän is 
not valid, or the reason that made some refer istirnan to other sources. 
3-Those who differ with the above view do so if the action is based on the 
stronger of the two dalils (proof) which they state is a proof when the general (`am) 
continues and when the giyäs is directly proportional. Both Abü Hanifah and Mälik 
specify the general by implicit or explicit dalil (proof). Although Malik prefers to 
specify generality by masla/xzh (public interest) whilst Abü Hanifah prefers to specify 
by solitary (a j d) fxidith from the companions when it is opposed to giyäs, they both 
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recognize specifying giyäs and disqualifying the cause (`illah). However once the 
evidence is established, Shäfi`i does not accept specifying the `illah of shay"". 
198 
This is what could be understood from Shätibi who clarifies the point of 
disagreement by saying: "As for istif sän, since the "people of innovation" have links 
to istihsän it cannot be without a mustatnin (recommending), and this can either be 
`aql (reason) or shar'. As for shar', to approve or disapprove is immaterial since the 
issue is already settled; the evidence has already decided the case and calling it 
istiizsän is of no use, nor is attempting to lay down any extra interpretation. The 
exception to this rule is that which has been established by the Qur'an, the Sunnah 
and ijmä' from giyäs or by istidläl (inferences). Only one thing remains -`aql 
(reason)- as the tool of choice. If reasoning is with evidence then there is no point in 
calling it isti1 sän, since as a reference it becomes the da! ii. If it is without dalil then it 
is bid'ah (innovation). M51ik and Abü hlanifah recognise that it is worth considering 
istihsän in aiiiäm; this view is opposed by Shäfi i who denies it to such an extent that 
he said: "Whoever gives approval places himself as the Law-giver. " What could be 
concluded from their madhhab (i. e. Mälik and Abil Hanifah) is that it refers to acting 
according to the stronger of two dalrls. This is what Ibn al-`Arabi (d. 543/1148) 
stated: "the general if it continues and giyäs if it is directly proportional, and Malik 
and Abn Hanifah see takhqý; of the general by any dalil, implicit or explicit. " He (Ibn 
al-`Arabi) said; "Malik prefers to specify with maslalxrh and AbU Hanifah prefers to 
specify with the solitary saying of a companion, which is opposed to giyäs. " He said: 
"And both specify giyäs and reject the cause, whilst Shy `i does not accept any 
specification of `illah (cause) of spar' once shar' has been proved ss199. 
198 Shätibi, "Al-1`ti cam", v: 2, pp: 136,137 
199 Ibid, v: 2, pp: 136,137. 
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It is possible that the above statement is Shätibi's explanation of the 
disagreement the scholars have over the validity of istilxsdn to deduce the shari-'ah 
rulings. 
The reasons of disagreement might be very different; for example, it may refer 
to the linguistic meaning of istii sän. Linguistically istiiacan covers all meanings 
including the mujtahid's preference based on evidence (dalil); whatever is preferred 
by way of personal desire (tashahhi and hawa); and whatever the public prefer. It is 
this general linguistic meaning which might have been the reason for some to reject 
istitisän as a principle of law. The linguistic terms have already been discussed in 
previous chapters. 
The above summarize the reasons behind the disagreement among the `ulamä' 
of ucül (jurists of the principles of Islamic law) over the validity of istihsdn. 
The main point of discussion concerning the validity of istihrän is, as far as I 
know, what Shibi stated was a precautionary measure against those who would 
tighten the noose around the "people of innovation" (ahl al-bid `ah), who try to 
interpret the religion and invent whatever is necessary to suit their own interests and 
desires. 
We now turn to the opinions of the `ulamä' (jurists) who consider istihsän as a 
principle and those who reject it altogether. We will explore the opinions and discuss 
the evidence they provide to determine whether istihsän is a valid proof that should be 
acted upon. 
3.4.2 The `ulamd' who recognize istilwan 
As we have seen, most scholars confirm that the concept of istilzrän is 
recognized by the Hanafi, Mäler, Hanbali and Zaydi schools. However, despite the 
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fact that `ulamä' from these different schools recognized the validity of istihsän as a 
principle they often disagreed over the meaning of the term. 
The cause of the differences of opinions about the way istifzsän is directed 
towards the deduction of juristic rulings is the technique with which each madhhab 
(school) presents those rulings. Hanafi scholars have used two techniques to prove the 
validation of istilydn. The first technique is to identify its true nature and framework, 
then distinguish the types of istifnän. Following this, they consider the various 
relationships between types and then relate a particular isti/sr n individually in the 
context of shar`i dalil (valid sources) 
200 which is a recognized proof by the other 
schools of thought. The second technique is the expending of effort in order to prove 
the validity of istiizsän as a recognized concept for everyone201 The first technique 
was discussed earlier through in various examples. We now turn to the second 
technique, which is presenting the evidence needed to prove its validity. 
The supporters of the validity of istihsän resort to proof from the Qur'an, the 
Sunnah, and ijmn`. According to Hanafi scholars, to perform isti? z do is to comply 
with Qur'anic verses which command man to follow what is best, good and 
beautiful. 202 Three verses from the Qur'än are mentioned by this group to support 
their claims. The first is the verse in which God addresses Moses concerning the 
Torah: "(and said): Take and hold these with firmness, and enjoin thy people to hold 
fast by the best in the precepts". 203 
The people of Moses were ordained to follow what is best; this is a common- 
sense given, and leads to the conclusion that acting according to the best is evidence 
by way of `aql and is supported by shari`ah. Generally it is accepted that istinsän is 
200 Dönmez, "Kaynak Kavranu", p: 168. 
201 raeeas, "Fusül", 4. pp: 227-229; Sarakhsr, "'Usül", 2/200-201; Bukhari, "Kashf al-Asrär", 4/6. 
21' Sarakhsi, "Uü1", v: 2, p: 200; Nasafi, "Kashf al-Asrär", v: 2, p: 299. 
203 Qur'än: 7/145. 
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the departure from the good and acting according to the best when it is based on a 
stronger dalil. It is not possible for any one to raise an objection to the ruling in this 
verse by claiming that it is a specific commandment for the children of Israel only. 
And it cannot have been abrogated by the Islamic shari `ah since Islamic law states 
that any ruling for those who came before us is also a ruling for us unless the text 
explicitly specifies it as abrogated. As will be shown in the following verses, acting 
according to the best has not been abrogated by the Islamic shari-`ah; rather, the 
shad'ah supports of it. "Those who listen to the Word (good advice), and follow the 
best of t.,, 2°4 
The above verse mentions the praise and appreciation of those who depart 
from what is good in order to follow the better or the best. Nobody can deny that the 
praise for taking an action, and the punishment for not acting, implies that acting 
according to the best is obligatory. But in the case where acting according to the best 
leads to praise for the action, but not to punishment for inaction, then acting according 
to istihsän becomes optional (mandüb). 
This shows that istilzsän falls between mandiib (optional) and wäjib 
(obligatory). However, those who validate istihsän may deem it wäjib as explained by 
the following verse; "And follow the best of that which was revealed to you from your 
Lord. "205 
According to Sarakhsi, "The whole of the Qur'än is beautiful, but here it 
requires following the best"2°6. The verses praise the best of those words that were 
204 Qur'än: 39/18. 
205 Qur'an: 39/55. 
20' SarakhsT, "Al-Mabsüf', v: 10, p: 145. 
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heard and listened to, and command man to follow the best of what is revealed. 
Istihsän is included in this and therefore it too is praised indirectly. 207 
The above verse enjoins man to follow the best and to leave the evil. Istil, sän 
does not by its nature stop the jurist from departing from the good to the best, which is 
a command; and a command implies obligation, according to `ulamä' of 'u AI (jurists 
of the principles of Islamic law). Therefore, following the best is obligatory and this is 
what is required as far as istihsan is concerned. Therefore, what is good should be 
obtained and what is bad should be avoided. 
208 
Such proofs were put forward by those `ulamä' (jurists) who recognize 
istiizsän. They can be referred to in the same references mentioned earlier during the 
discussion on the views of the `ulamä' recognizing the validity of isti/zsän. These 
verses strengthen each other and show the validity of istikan. 
3.4.4 Denial of the validity of istitwffn: 
The group who denied the validity of istihsän discuss the proofs put forward 
by the group who recognize isti/ sän in the following way: 
As far as the first dal-11 from the Qur'än209 is concerned, the opponents of 
istihsän state that this dalil is contrary to what the supporters of istihsän claim, and is 
against rather than for isti/uän. This is because the order (amr) in the verse is not 
aiming at acting according to istihsän as an obligatory principle; here, God orders the 
children of Israel to act according to the best that was revealed in the Torah, and not 
the isti, sän claimed by its supporters. God orders the `children of Israel' to take the 
best of the texts that were revealed in this divine book. The ruling at hand' then has 
been deduced from the text rather than from an opinion or a whim. Even if we accept 
207 Amidr, "AI-I( m", v: 4, p: 393; Bukhäri, "Kashf ', v: 4, p: 13. 
208 Ijt, "Shari Mukhtasar", ii. 384. 
20 Qur'an: 7/145 
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that this text implies permission to act according to istitzsän, then this permission was 
specific to the Jews rather than the Muslim community, and most of these rulings 
have been abrogated by the Islamic shad ah. 
The opponents of isti jndn criticize the interpreting of verses in this manner by 
the principle's supporters. Ghazäli claims that the objective of the verse that requires 
following the best is the evidence: whenever people see something is good by their 
`aql (intellect) alone it should not be considered as a dalrl (proof). 210 
As for the second evidence from the Qur'än211, the opponents of the validity 
of istiludn put forward three objections, according to a1-Mäwardi 12 
First objection: God ordered him (Moses) to follow the best (al-absan) and not 
what is perceived as the best (al-mustahsan). Al-ahsan (the best) is that which in itself 
contains goodness, while al-mustafzsan (what is perceived as best) is what others view 
or prefer as good, even if it is not. Hence, both types are very different and it becomes 
obligatory to follow the best (al-ahsan) rather than that which is viewed or preferred 
as best. 
Second objection: It is clear that the best has to be followed, since there are 
rewards for obedience and punishment for disobedience. This is obvious and has 
noting to do with istihsän. 
Third objection: As the gisds verse (2: 178) demonstrates, the best is 
understood as that which man must fulfil in order to do what is right. In the contrast of 
this verse, for example, forgiveness, while portrayed as better than giSäs, is still 
optional rather than obligatory. 
210 Ghazäl7, "Musta s W', v: 1, p: 277. 
211 Qur'än: 39/18 
212 Mäwardr, "Adab al-Qädi ', v: 1, pp: 655,656. 
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The group who recognised istihsän tried to substantiate their claim by 
resorting to the Sunnah, by following the padith narrated from the Prophet which 
states: "Whatever the Muslim community views as good is also considered by God as 
good"213 In the interpretation of this Ixrdith it was said, that if it was not a hujjah 
(proof) then on the side of God it would not be considered as good. 214 
Whenever Muslims who are knowledgeable in the field of deducing the 
share `ah ruling, and have the ability to judge the stronger from the weaker, are shown 
something which is good and stronger than other things that the mujtahid approved, it 
becomes hujjah (proof) to what God describes as good. Istilirän is by nature of this 
sort. 
The group who recognized the validity of istiIndn based on this nth faced 
two objections: 
First objection: Ibn Hazm is of the view that this x dith was never transmitted 
from the Prophet in any form whatsoever, there is no doubt that this iadith does not 
exist in any transmitted hradith, we only know it from ibn Mas`üd. 215 
Second objection: If we assume that this fvadith is valid then it is not its 
intention to allude to istihsän, since it does not say "whatever some Muslims view", 
but "Whatever Muslims view". This statement conveys the validity of ijmä ` and is 
generally agreed upon among the mujtahiduL216 
The group who recognise istihsän also use ijmä` to support their claims, 
particularly on juristic rulings which appear to be at odds with the dalil involved. For 
example, people entering a public bath without specifying the time or the amount of 
water to be used is contrary to the normal contract of rent (ijärah), in which jurists 
213 Ibn Hanbal, "Al-Musnad", v: 1, p: 379; Ibn Mäjah, "Sunan", ii. 784, hadith No: 2340. 
214 Amifii, "AI-i/7dtäm", v: 4, p: 394. 
2151bn Hazm, "Al Ai1i i m" v: 6, p: 759. 
216 A1-Mäwardi, "Adab al-Qadi", i. pp: 656,657; Ibn tiazm, "AI-A/*dm", v. 6, pp. 759; Amid-i, "Al- 
Ifikäm", v, p: 394. 
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agree that for the contract to be valid it is necessary to specify the period and the due 
amount of rent. Traditionally, it was also accepted that drinking water without 
specifying the amount or the value of money to be paid also contradicts the conditions 
for the contract to be valid. These are considered good (istiIndn) by the `ulamä. 217 As 
the Sunnah shows, this is also supported by the generally accepted custom during the 
life of the Prophet, even though it is contrary to the usül followed in rent and sales 
contracts. There is a possibility that it might have also been the custom during the life 
of the Companions; if this was the case, then the evidence (dalil) becomes ijmä' 
which everyone accepted. The evidence in such cases is the Sunnah or ijmä ` 
(consensus) and this is the sort of istitndn that no one would deny. 218 
The arguments based on ijma ` face the following objections: 
First objection: With regard to the public bath example, the `ulamä' did agree 
that this is permissible and hence the departure from the asi (base) is constructed on 
ijma' and not on istifzsän. 
Second objection: What people accept and tolerate in these transactions that 
some claim to be based on istifzsän is simply what they are used to. The public do not 
object to such transactions so long as they do not lead to indecency. If judgment is 
required on such matters, we must refer back to the principle rules and not to 
ist i¬SC fl 
219 
These are the arguments that were put forward by the `ulamil' who recognized 
isti/zsän together with the objections of its opponents. The `ulamä' who rejected 
istihsän will be discussed below. 
3.4.4 The `ulamä' who reject istihsän: 
217 Amidi, "Al-i/Y äm", iv. p: 393; Ghazälr, "Mustag ", i. p: 279. 
218 Mawardi, "Adab al-Qäoi", i. p: 652; Izmirr, ", Y shiyah", v: 2, pp: 335,336. 
219 Mawardi, "Adab al-Qddi', i. p: 657. 
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As I have mentioned earlier, the first figure to reject istitxsan was imam Shäfi`i 
(d. 204)220, whose book "Ib(äl al-istilzsän" (invalidating juristic preference) contains 
his famous statement: "Man istahsana fagad sharra `a" (whoever approves of juristic 
preference is making himself the Lawmaker) 221 Among those who agreed with him 
on this issue were: 222 Isnawi (d. 772/1370); Bishr b. Ghiyäs (d. 218/833); Shiräzi 
(d. 476/1083); Ghazäli (d. 50511111); Däwnd al-Zähiri (d. 2701884); 223 Ibn Hazm; 224 
and the Imämi Shi' ah225 
Those who rejected istilhsän put forward both scriptural (nagli) and rational 
(`agii) arguments to support their claim. 
One example of scriptural evidence is: 
"0 ye you believe! Obey Allah and obey the Messenger, 
and those charged with authority among you. If ye differ 
in anything among yourselves, refer it to Allah and His 
Messenger, if ye do believe in Allah and the Last Day: 
That is best and more suitable for final 
determination. , 226 
This verse confirms that the best is that which is taken from the Qur'an or the 
Sunnah of the Prophet. Rulings are taken only from these two sources, since they are 
the origin of the shari-`ah. As for anything taken from other than these two sources, it 
will evidently lead to dispute, which must be avoided. The verse directed the Muslim 
community to refer to the Qur'an and the Sunnah for rulings; no mention is made of 
ZZ° Shaft'!, "Al-Risälah", p: 503; and "Al-Umm", v: 7, p: 309. 
221 Ansari, "Ghäyat al-WuWl", p: 139; Alwäni, "The Ethics", p: 75; Ghazälr, "Musta ", v: 1, p: 274, 
Ghaz -l, "Mankhül", p: 374; Isnawi, "Nihdyat al-Sül", iv, p: 399. 
222 Shi z, "Sharp al-Luma", v: 2, p: 969; JuwaynT "Talkhis", v: 3, p: 310; Ghazäli, "Musta ', v: 1, 
274; GhazAli, "Al-Mankhul", p: 374; Räzi, "Ma/isül", v: 2, p: 559; Amid!, "Al-Ifdtam", v: 4, p: 390. 3 ShirazT, "Tabagät al-Fugahd", p: 92-93; Ibn Subki, "Tabagi-rt", v: 2, pp: 284-293. 
224 Ibn Hazm, "AI-Ihkdm", v: 6, p: 192. 
225 Zahrah, "A1-Imäm al-, a-diq", pp: 527-529. 
226 Qur'än: 4/59. 
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istihsän, or the community adopting what it prefers. Who is to say that one preference 
is better than another? If isti/xsdn and the adoption of personal desire as a criterion for 
rulings were to be implemented, religion would suffer: halal may be deemed 'i rdm, 
and hagq may be deemed bää1, and vice-versa. There is no need for this, since the 
religion is clear enough as it is, and anyone with common sense can understand it. 227 
That the Qur'än and the Sunnah are the principle sources of Islamic shad'ah 
is not to be denied. Moreover, whoever opposes them and rules by his own opinion is 
likely to miss the right path and end up actually opposing the principles of the 
shari `ah. However, the type of istihsän that is recognized by its supporters is 
somewhat different; for them, istihsän is based on text (nass), ijmd', necessity or 
ma, dahrih (public interest). As such, it should not lead to disagreement, and religion is 
not in jeopardy: iigq will not become bail, nor will /zzläl become haräm. In fact such 
situations arise only when the source of istihsr n is hawä and tashahhi (pleasure 
taking), and nothing as such is accepted by the `ulamä' who recognize the validity of 
isti hsän. 
Another example of scriptural evidence is: 
"This day I have perfected your religion for you, 
completed My Favour upon you, and have chosen for 
you Isläm as your religion. , 228 
According to the opponents of istihsän, God is saying here that the religion has been 
perfected, and therefore adding to the shari `ah is not permitted; if the religion had 
been incomplete, then istihsän would have been permitted. Haqq is h. aqq even if 
people despise it and bäß1 is bäß1 even if people prefer it; this is enough to prove that 
isti/zsän means ruling by the way of desire and pleasure as well as misguidance. As far 
227 Maward% "Adab al-Qädi', v: 1, p: 653; Ibn Ham, "Al-Alicirm", v: 6, p: 758. 
228 Qur'an: 5/3. 
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as the Qur'än229 is concerned, the religion has been perfected and istifzsän is 
unnecessary230 
However, this argument is weak. After all, does anyone who recognizes the 
validity of istil sän actually consider the religion to be incomplete, that istiizsän is 
there for the completion of the religion? Supporters of istifasän clearly do not 
subscribe to this view. There is no doubt for them that the religion is complete. 
However, there are always new issues that arise after the revelation has ceased. The 
`ulamä' sought for ijmä ` and giyäs to give rulings on such issues and istifzrän is one 
principle on which some rulings are based. To rule istihsän as invalid is to invalidate 
ijtihäd per se. Yet no-one holds this view, since the Prophet approved ijtihäd as the 
/idith of Mu'adh ibn Jaba1231 confirms. 
Another Qur'anic example is: 
"And follow that which is inspired in you from your 
lord. Verily, Allah is Well Acquainted with what you 
do. "232 
According to the opponents of istitndn, here God is ordering the Prophets to follow 
revelation, and nothing else, since following anything other than revelation constitutes 
disobedience to God's command; ruling through desire is nothing but misguidance, 
which goes against what God asks us to follow. God explicitly prohibits this 
according to the Qur'än. 
233 Ruling according to istitndn is nothing but ruling by aznn 
(probability) and through personal desire and whim (hawä'). No one is ordered to rule 
by f aqq until he becomes aware of what hrrgq is, and hrlgq cannot become known 
from anyone other than God. God has enshrined ingq in the Book (the Qur'an), and 
229 Qur'än: 5/3. 
230 Shäfi`% "Al- Umm", v: 7, p: 294; Ibn Hazm, " Al Abkäm", v: 6, p: 758. 
231 Abü Däwud, "Sunan", 1 Edith no: 3585. 
232 Qur'än: 33/2. 
213 Qur'an: 38/26. 
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then in the Sunnah of His prophet, and thus there is no solution for any obstacles that 
one may encounter without the Qur'an indicating this solution either directly or 
34 indirectly? 
The opponents of isti jndn claim that the principles of the shah `ah were 
generally accepted at the time of the Prophet because revelation was still in progress 
and nothing else could be followed while the revelation continued. The best evidence 
that can be put forward for this is that ijmä ` was not accepted as principle of law 
during the lifetime of the Prophet. 
While this writer aggress that there is neither ijmä' nor isti/sän nor giyäs 
while revelation is in progress, after the death of the Prophet, ijmä' became a reality 
as the Prophet validated ijtihad for the companions whom he sent to teach people in 
certain remote areas. 
The best scriptural support for this is the hiadith of Mu`ädh. When the Prophet 
intended to send Muldh to Yemen, the Prophet asked him: 
"How will you judge when the occasion of deciding a 
case arises? He replied, I shall judge in accordance with 
A115h's book. The Prophet asked, "What will you do if 
you do not find guidance in A115h's book? " He replied, 
"I will act in accordance with the Sunnah of the 
Messenger of Alläh. The Prophet asked, "What will you 
do if you do not find guidance in the Sunnah of the 
Apostle of A115h and in A115h's book? " He replied, "I 
shall do my best to form an opinion and spare no pains 
in my search for truth. " The apostle of Alläh then patted 
234 Shäfi`% "Al-Umm", v: 7, p: 298. 
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him on the chest and said: "Praise is to Allah who 
helped the messenger of the Apostle of Alläh to find 
something, which pleases the apostle of Allah. 99235 
From the /xrdith it can be concluded that the Prophet approved ijtihäd because 
Mu`ädh was far from the Prophet and thus had less access to revelation than 
companions who were at the Prophet's side. This 'idith clearly does not support the 
argument that when the revelation was still in progress, nothing else should be 
followed, under any circumstances. And after the death of the Prophet, the community 
was in need of some sort of ijtihad supported by a dalil; and isti jndn falls within this 
category of ijtihad. 236 
According to Ibn Hazm, the supporters of istilsän base their claim on the 
following rational proof: istilzsän, conceived during the era of Abn Hanifah and Malik, 
is seen as a precaution there to remove hardship from the people; it is closer to 
custom, to what people are familiar and feel comfortable with, then it is to true 
principles of law. God in the Qur'än237 states that this is bäßl. All of the verses 
adduced by the supporters actually serve to invalidate their claims. No-one could be 
more compassionate towards the believers than God the Creator, the Sustainer and the 
One who sent the prophets for guidance. Precaution means following the order of God 
and what is despicable is disobedience to Him. Nothing is good except what God has 
ordered His prophet to permit, and nothing is despicable other than what God has 
238 prohibited. 
Regarding the evidence which states that isti/ sän in the era of Abü Hanifa and 
Malik was invalid on account of its being based on convenience it is necessary to 
235 AN Däwud, "Sunan", nth no: 3585, 
16 `Abd al-Fiäfiz, "Al-Isti&dn", p: 142. 
237 Qur'an: 79/40-41; 12153; 30/29. 
'3S Ibn Hazni, "Al Ahkdmt', v: 6, p: 760. 
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point out that scholars such as Abü Hanifah and Malik did not recognize istifxsän 
according to their desire without any dalil; rather, all cases in which they resorted to 
istihsän were based on dalil shari. Therefore, what their opponents claim is nothing 
more than a false allegation. The supporters of istibsän never mentioned any istihsän 
that was opposed to either the Qur'an or the Sunnah. 
Opponents of istihsän counter this by pointing out that the Prophet did not 
speak out of his own desire; nor did he give a ruling on issues pertaining to the affairs 
of religion by way of preference. Rather, he followed the revelation, and when he did 
not receive a revelation he waited for one. If this is the case for the Prophet, who was 
not permitted to say anything other than that which had been revealed to him, or to 
use means other than analogy, then it becomes a priority for others not to speak on 
affairs of religion unless they are following the same path as the Prophet. 239 
The second rational evidence adduced by its opponents is the assertion that 
istifzsän was never practiced by the Prophet. He never gave any fatwä' based on what 
he preferred concerning the affairs of religion, and always waited for revelations. If it 
is not permitted for the Prophet to rule according to personal opinion, then, it is 
automatically prohibited for people other than the Prophet to do so. 240 
The supporters of istifxsän respond to this by saying that it is pointless to 
discuss the application or non-application of istitudn during the time of the Prophet. It 
is obvious that the Prophet did not perform istilzsdn, for the simple reason that 
revelation was incomplete and ongoing. A mujtahid today, however, does not receive 
revelation, which is why he has to rely on ijtihäd. If we say that istik n is not 
permitted because of the cessation of the revelation, then we would have to rule out 
giyds and ijmd ` on the same grounds. Yet the opponents of istihsdn, do not deny giyds 
'39 Shdfi`x, "AI-Umm", v: 7, p: 299. 
240 pbid pp: 143-144. 
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or ijmä'. It is crucial that we recognize that isti, sän depends on dalil. It should be 
noted that Shäfi`i denied istitn n but recognized giyäs. How did he differentiate 
between the two? 
The third rational evidence adduced by the opponents of isti? ndn is that giyäs 
is stronger than istihsän, as it is permitted to specify the `ämm (general) by giyäs, but 
not by istihsän. Thus it is not permitted to put istihsän before giyäs. If istifzsän had 
been a dalil, then it would have been permitted to make the departure from isti/zsän as 
an evidence, thus proving istiflsän will lead to its own invalidity. 241 
The supporters of istihsän respond by saying that istifzsän cannot come before 
a stronger giyäs when the departure from giyäs for istiizsän is a weak giyäs, and there 
is no restriction on invalidating the weaker in deducing the fiqh rulings. It is 
confirmed in the books of `ulamä' who recognize isti/zsän that they never departed 
from giyäs in favour of istilzsän unless it was stronger. A stronger giyds cannot 
invalidate istitzsc n because istiIndn only invalidates the weaker giyc s, and naturally 
this cannot be a principle of shari`ah 242 
These are the arguments that both sides have put forward, to defend their 
positions. We now turn to the application of istihsi n by the early Hanafi school. 
3.5.0 APPLICATION OF ISTIHSAN IN THE EARLY HANAFI SCHOOL 
In this part of the study I aim to cover the implementation of istifzsän in the 
early Hanafi school. This should provide ample proof that istilzsän was applied in the 
early period of Islamic legislation. The main scholars covered here will be the spool's 
eponymous founder, Abü Hanifah (d. 150 All) together with Zufar (d. 158 AH), Abu 
Yüsuf (d. 182 Ate, and Shaybäni (d. 189 AH). 
3.5.1 Abu Han1fah and the concept of isti/: sän 
241 Mäwardi, "Allab al-Qäß", i. p: 655. 
242 Mawardi, "Adab", pp: 144-145. 
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The area in which Abn Hanifah lived attracted many scholars and developed 
into a thriving intellectual milieu. 243 Abü Hanifah's father's occupation as a trader 
enabled him to associate with those who took an active part in the social and 
economical activities of their society. 
244 Abü Fianifah stood against the government245 
was a staunch supporter of ahl al-bays (the household of the Prophet) and used qiyas 
and isti, sdn when asked for guidance in various situations. He had a powerful 
understanding of giyäs, and in the words of Imam Shy `i, was described in terms of 
great respect: "Many scholars could be considered the heirs of AbU Hanifah in their 
use of giyäs and istifxsän. "2`6 
The failure of Abü Hanifah to leave any written manuscripts explaining the 
concept or procedure of istii sän, or the conditions of its validity, is a source of 
conflict amongst the jurists, for the lack of written material has led him to be accused 
of judging cases without depending on any textual evidences. When he made the 
following statement: "giyas is such and such but we apply istikdn"247, he was 
criticized by many scholars such as Ibn Hazm (d. 456/1064)248 and especially imam 
243 Küfa was one of the biggest cities of Iraq, consisting of various tribes and communities, and was a 
center of the ancient civilizations. Before Islam, schools were established there for the teaching of 
Greek philosophy. It was also later the base for Shi ah, Mu'tazilah, Khawärij and mujtahid 
`Successors' such as: Alqamah b. Qays (d. 62), Masrüq b. al-Ajdä' (d. 63), al-Aswad b. Yazid (d. 75), 
Shuraykh b. al-I rith (d. 78), who spread the teaching of the Companions, `Ali Ibn AbrTalib (d. 40), 
Ibn Mas`üd (d. 32), ibn `Umar (d. 73), ibn `Abbas (d. 68), of the Prophet. See: Abo Zahrah, "Abü 
yan fah", pp: 30,31. 
244 AN Flanifah's father was a silk trader. AN IHantifah grew up in a wealthy family and took over the 
business from his father. Sha'bi (d. 110) one day advised him to attend a scholarly gathering, which he 
did. The rest is history. See: Makki, "Managib", v: 2, p: 106. 
? '°S Abü Fianifah lived 52 years of his life in the period of Umayyad dynasty, and the remaining 18 years 
under the Abbasid dynasty. He lived under the rule of the despot governor Hajjäj b. Ytisuf Thagafi and 
was witness to the murders of various members of the ahl al-bayt. He was also imprisoned. Later on, 
he understood that the Abbasid dynasty was a continuation of the same tyrannical system; he took a 
stand against them, which caused him to be persecuted. See: Abü Zahrah, "Abi ffin fah", pp: 19,104, 
107,108. See also: Khatlb Baghdädi, "Tärikhi Baghdad", v: 13, p: 239. 
246 Saymari Husain b. `Ali (d. 436/1045), "Akhbär Abü /hnifah wa Asikibuh", Beirut, 1985, p: 26. 
247 Bazdawi, "Kaslf', p: 1125. 
24$ Ibn Hazm, "Al-I17käm", v: 2, pp: 195-196; Chejne, "Ibn /Malm", p: 122. 
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Shäfi`i, who said "Whoever approves of juristic preference is making himself the 
Lawmaker". 
249 
However, it is not entirely true to say that there is no trace of any reports 
regarding Ahü Hanifah's techniques; in fact he left writings giving indications as to 
his methods of performing ijtihäd and his use of the principle of isti/zrän. He 
expressed this method as follows: `°I read God's book to obtain guidance. If I am 
unable to find any guidance in the Qur'an then I resort to the Tradition (Sunnah) of 
the Prophet and the true reports (iidith) which have been transmitted from generation 
to generation by trustworthy narrators. If neither the Qur'än nor the Sunnah yields 
any guidance, I then refer to the opinions of the Companions. Consequently, when I 
make my personal decision then I do not ask others' opinions. However, if a matter 
has been considered by Ibrähim al-Nakhä'i (d. 96), Shä'bi (d. 103), Hasan (d. 110), 
Muhammad b. Shinn (d. 110), Said b. al-Musayyab (d. 94) et al. I also act on their 
ijtihäd. "25° 
Abü iianifah also seriously considers the issue of abrogated /. idith. 
Accordingly, his way of recourse to the Tradition was to research intensively a 
Tradition and to see whether it had been narrated through trustworthy narrators from 
the Prophet through the Companions; if it had, he would then apply it in his 
judgments. 251 In addition to his authority in hadith and fiqh, he was also aware of the 
customs ('urf) and traditions of the people, and how previous ijtihäds had been 
incorporated and practiced. 252 He was also a master in giyäs. Abn Hanifah explained 
his methods when applying gyäs as follows: "We make giyäs from one matter to 
another based on the Qur'an or the Sunnah or ijma' (consensus) of the Muslim 
149 Alwäni, "The Ethics", p: 75; Ansgri, "Ghäyat al-Wusüf', p: 139. 
250 Makki, "Managib", v: 1, p: 80; Saymar , "Akhbär", p: 24; Baghd5di, "Tar7kh", xiii, p: 368. 251 Muhammad Qasim `Abduh Härithi, "Makänät al-Imäm Abil Ijan`rfah bayn al-Mufxiddithiyn", p: 23, 
PhD dissertation, at the University of Islamic studies, Pakistan, p: 23. 
252 Makki, "Mandgib", v: 1, p: 80. 
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Community. We consider seriously our ijtihads and whether they adhere to certain 
principles or not. "253 He points out that R'iyas would not be applied to every case 
without a reason, saying: "Qiyas cannot be applied to everything". 254 The application 
of giyäs is a great responsibility because it may cause unexpected results and bad 
solutions. In this respect he says "To urinate in a mosque is better than some kinds of 
glyäS 5 
Abü Yüsuf (d. 182) made a statement regarding his master's method of 
performing ijtihä saying, "In any case which is presented to Abii Hanifah, his first 
requirement is information as to whether there are any Traditions (athar) regarding 
this matter. When we show him what there is, he then applies his knowledge after 
examining the case and ensuring that it is according to procedure. If two opinions are 
given and the information is stronger in the Tradition then the stronger opinion is 
chosen to resolve the issue. However if the two opinions are similar, he judges the 
case on his own personal opinion (ray). Thirdly, if any Traditions do not exist 
relating to this issue, he refers it to giyäs. Whenever giyäs yields an unacceptable 
result, he eventually abandons it in favour of isti&, In. 
256 
Abü Zahrah summarizes Abü Harüfah's method of performing ijtihdd 
similarly: "He performs ijtihäd when he can not find any guidance in the Qur'an, in 
the Sunnah or within the qawl al-sa übah (the saying of the Companions). To ensure 
a competent judgment, he assesses a case on opinion and investigates it using 
different aspects of deduction. Sometimes he goes with giyäs and occasionally makes 
istiIndn. He considers people's benefit and obeys the principle which states that "No 
253 MakkT, "Manägib", v: 1, p: 74. 
u' Ibid. 
255 Saymari, "Akhbär", p: 27; Makki, "Manägib", v: 1, p: 81. 
256 Makki, "Managib", v: 1, p: 85 
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harm shall be inflicted or reciprocated in Isläm"257. If he decides to use giyäs when its 
results conflict with the custom of the people, he then applies istihsr n. Whatever he 
chooses to perform, whether giyäs or istii sän, the customs of the people are taken into 
consideration. 258 
Abü Hanifa's connection with trade life gave him an intensively absorbed 
knowledge on how to deal with the common practices and needs of the people, and 
the newly-occurring problems of daily life. This knowledge gave him the flexibility to 
depart from the unexpected results of analogy and arrive at rulings that might benefit 
the people, through the principle of isti/xsän. 259 
According to Shaybäni, "Abi! Hanifah was discussing giyäs with his friends 
who always debated with him fiercely in order to arrive at the truth. When Abi! 
Hanifah said, "I am making istiftsän", nobody could fault him because he had judged 
so many cases on the grounds of the principle of isti/zsän. Eventually everyone 
abandoned their previous opinions and followed him. , 
260 
The reason for Abü Hanifah's success is that he automatically recognizes the 
effective causes ('illah), distinguishes between the explicit and implicit, and applies 
the ruling that is consonant with the people's benefit, thereby obtaining justice and 
equity. 261 His use of the principle of istilzsän was performed proficiently without 
contradicting the main principle of religion and the soul of the shari-`ah. Ibn 
Shubrumah extols Abü Hanifah's supremacy in the application of istifzsän by saying, 
"If someone is allowed to present just one opinion in God's religion, it can only be 
2$7 Ibn Mäjah, "Sunan", ii, 784, hadith no: 2340; Shätibi, "Muwäfagaf", iii, 17; Khudari, "Tärikh", p: 
199. 
258 Abü Zahrah, "Abü Hanifah", p: 342, also see: Uzunpostalci, "Ebu Hanife", DIA, X, 136. 
'259 Abü Zahrah, "Abi Han fah", p: 75. 
260 Saymari, "Akhbär", p: 25; Makkl, "Manägib", v: 1, p: 81. 
261 Abü Zahrah, "Abü fianifah", pp: 330,332,334; Uzunpostaci, ibid x, 136. 
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Abn Hanifah's saying, "1 approve isti j sän". 262 In addition to this, Abü Hanifah was 
reported to have said about the validation of this principle "istik5n is a principle that 
is necessary for the production of legal rulings in the religion. s263 
Abn Zahrah points out the main factors behind Abü Hanifah's confidence and 
his success in performing istiludn: "He used the principle of istitndn perfectly. Use of 
this principle, requires deep perception and awareness of the benefits of people, and a 
knowledge of their current transactions and lifestyles. Besides these, it demands an 
awareness of God's commands which constitute the main principle of shari `ah, the 
ability to deduce implicit effective causes, and to find appropriate qualities (was) and 
connect rulings to them; to be dexterous in departure from explicit analogy to implicit 
analogy, and to understand the applicability or non-applicability of different 
rulings. ? 2264 
As for this statement "Qiyäs is such and such, but we apply istihsän", 265 Abü 
Hanifah did not explain either the meaning of this concept nor its conditions for 
validation. As we have seen earlier, the reason behind the disagreements amongst the 
scholars is there that were not enough explanations and definitions available to them. 
Nevertheless, Abü Hanifah used to refer his judgments to the athar (fiadith)266 or 
riwäyah (transmitted hridith) and rely on its authority that they narrated from the 
Prophet or approved precedent. This might not have been generally known to others, 
which is why he made a statement saying: "If it had not been for precedents, I would 
262 Makki, "Mandgib", v: 1, p: 84. 
263 Mäwardi, "Adab al-Qddi", pp: 649-650. 
264 Abu Zahrah, ibid, p: 364. 
265 Bazdawi, "Kashf al Asrdr", p: 1125. 
266 Athar: impact, trace, vestige; also deeds and precedents of the Companions of the Prophet. See: 
Kamali, "Principle of Islamic Jurisprudence", pp: 47-48; also see: Schacht, `The Origins", pp: 78,119. 
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have decided here according to giyäs", or "If it had not been for the sake of riwäyah 
(transmitted With), I would have decided the case by giyäs"267 
In the writings of his disciples, Abü Yüsuf (d. 182) and Shaibän. i (d. 189), the 
use of the concept of istihsän by Abn Hanifah and the early Hanafis is explained, 
primarily in the context of the notion of "departure from giyäs". Abü Hanifah based 
his method of judgement on departing from applications of giyäs to the principle of 
istihsän based on distinctive and specifically valued evidence and prudence. 268 The 
examples of the practice of istihsän in the writings of Abü Yüsuf (d. 182) and Shaibäni 
(d. 189) reveal that the use of the concept could mean the following: 
a- Leaving giyäs due to the precedents of the Companions: 269 
The sayings of the Companions of the Prophet (qawl al-Safzibfl, as mentioned 
earlier, is a valid yet a controversial principle of shari `ah270 For example, if a man 
grants his wife the authority to choose whether or not she will remain with him, and 
she chooses divorce, her right to divorce him is ruled invalid according to giyäs: only 
men, and not women, have the right to instigate divorce proceedings. However, 
according to `Umar (d. 23), `Uthman (d. 35), `Ali (d. 40), Ibn Mas`nd (d. 32), Ibn `Umar 
(d. 73), A'ishah (d. 58), Abn Hanifah and his disciples such a divorce on the authority 
of the woman is possible, thanks to isti/zrän. 
271 
Abü Hanifah's departure from giyds is based on the sayings and practices of 
the Companions. The following example illustrates the comparison between giyäs and 
istihsän. If someone has pigeon excrement on his clothes, giyds does not allow that 
267 BazdawT, "Kashf', pp: 1126-1130. 
268 Baltac3, "Manahij ai-Tashriy', v: 1, p: 357. 
269 Sarakhsi, "Usu! ", v: 2, pp: 105,108,110,113; Baltaci, "Manähij", i. p: 359; Abi Zahrah, "Abii 
h(anifah", p: 311. 
b° ShawkAni, ` Irshdd', p: 213; Ghazäli, "Al-Mustagc-? ', v: 1, p: 135; Amid-i, "Al I* am", v: 3, p: 133; 
ShirAzi, "AL-Luma"', p: 50; Molla Husraw, "Mar'ät al-Usul", v: 2, p: 250; BannAni, "Häshiah"v: 2, p: 
288. 
271 Sarakhsi, "A1-Mabsüt', v: 6, pp: 210-211, v: 13, p: 17; Sarakhsi, "U. "', v: 2, pp: 105-106,110- 
111; Maklä, "Mandgib", v: 1, pp: 83-84. 
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person to perform ritual prayers since according to giyäs, pigeon excrement is ritually 
impure and therefore any form of prayers would be considered void. However, 
istihrän allows that person to go to prayers based on the practice of Ibn Mas`üd (d. 32) 
who once brushed pigeon excrement from his clothes using his fingers before going 
on to pray. Ibn `Umar, when faced with the same problem, wiped the bird excrement 
from his clothes using a piece of stone, then went to pray. According to giyäs, since 
excrement is considered impure it should prevent a person from prayer; however Abü 
Hanifah and his disciples departed from a ruling in giyäs and applied istihsän, 
concluding that the bird excrement is considered natural and should not prevent any 
prayers, based on the practices of the Companions Ibn Mas`üd and Ibn 'Umar. 272 
Istihsän is preferred over giyäs even if it is a practice of only one Companion. One of 
the Hanafi scholars, Abti Said Ahmad b. al-Birdü (d. 317/929) said: "We have 
understood from our masters that even only one person's qawl (word) from among the 
Companions may be preferred over giyäs; on that word, giyäs would be left" 273 When 
there is more than one opinion from the Companions (qawl al-, %zMbi) then Abu 
Hanifah chooses the more preferable one. 274 
b- Leaving giyäs owing to the consensus (ijmä `)275 of the Companions: 276 The 
consensus (ijmä`) of the Companions is confined to the time of the first four Caliphs 
and represents their established practices. The Caliph `Umar in particular, consulted 
the Companions on new cases and announced their decisions in open 
congregations. 
2-n Sarakhsi reports a case of apostasy (irtidäd) from Islam, in which a 
husband and wife apostatise together. According to giyäs such a couple must separate, 
27' Sarakhsi, "Al-Mabsüc', v: 1, pp: 56-57. 
273 Ibid, v: 2, p: 105. 
274 Haythami, "Al-H-tydt al-/-isän"; Makki, ' Managib", v: 1, p: 74; Saymari, "Akhba ", p: 24. X75 For more about ijma' see: in introduction chapter. 
276 Baltaci, "Manahij al-TashrP", v: 1, p: 359. 
277 Shäfi`i, "Kitäb al-Umm", v: 7, p: 242; Abti Yüsuf, "Kitäb al-Atha", p: 192 
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as apostasy is an obstacle to nikiii (marriage) and the continuance of a marriage. 
However, Abü Hanifah and his disciples Abü Yüsuf and Shaibäni departed from the 
ruling of giyäs based on the consensus of the Companions with regard to the case of 
the Bann Hanifah. It is known that the Banü Hanifah tribe avoided paying obligatory 
alms and therefore were deemed to have apostatised from the religion. 278 This crisis 
caused Abü Bakr to announce a war against the rebels unless they agreed to pay 7akät 
(alms), repent and return to Isläm. Even when they repented, the Caliph did not ask 
them to renew their marriages (nik i, ); nor would any other Companions require it279 
as the consensus of the Companions not recognize this as case of apostasy. 
c- Leaving giyäs in favour of sadd al-dharä'i ` (blocking the means) : 180 In the 
case of fornication, if a man is accused of committing adultery and discrepancies are 
found in the witnesses' evidence, then according to giyi s the accusation is doubtful 
and no lx dd punishment is administered. However, AND Hanifah disregarded this and 
gave his opinion based on istihsan, namely that the /xzdd punishment should be 
administered in order to deter others from committing such criminal acts 28' Ghazäh 
opposed Abü Hanifah's ruling, saying that the .? add punishment should be carried out 
only when the evidence is indisputable. 82 
d- Leaving giyäs due to authentic Tradition (Ix th Shrb): 293 
According to giyäs, eating and drinking in RamapEin, whether consciously or by 
mistake voids the fast and necessitates expiation. However, Abü hlanifah and his 
disciples observe that according to istiln5n, eating or drinking by mistake or through 
278 Bukhari, "Zakat", 1; Muslim, "Iman", 8. 
279 SarakhsT, "Al-Mabsü£', v: 5, p: 49. 
280 For more on this, see: introductory chapter. 
281 SarakhsT, ibid, v: 4, p: 138. 
282 Sarakhsi, ibid, v: 4, pp: 138-140. 
293 Sarakhsi, "Usul", v: 1, p: 339; Baltaci, "Manähij al-Tashri"', v: 1, p: 359; Abü Zahrah, "Abü 
Hanifah", pp: 290-291,293-294. 
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forgetfulness does not annul fasting. 84 Accordingly, Abii Hanifah says, "I would have 
decided according to analogy if there had been no narration"285 since such incidents 
are out of one's hands. For example, a fly may be entering a man's mouth and he may 
swallow it: this should be considered as a kind of eating or drinking by mistake. Abü 
Hanifah discusses this point, saying that this circumstance is beyond the control of one 
who is fasting, and compares it to a person swallowing dust whilst speaking. 
286 
Another example regarding this concept is that laughing out loud while 
praying annuls the ablution. According to giyäs ablution is annulled when something 
is expelled from the body; however laughing cannot be used as a comparison. If 
laughing invalidated the ablution during the ritual prayer, it stands to reason that it 
would invalidate ablution outside of the prayer too: laughter is laughter whenever it 
occurs. Laughing outside of the ritual prayers does not invalidate ablution according 
to giyäs. In spite of the ruling of giyäs the rule of istihsän287 says that laughing annuls 
the ablution, based on a report narrated from the Prophet, who said "Whoever laughs, 
let him repeat his prayer and ablution". 
288 
Abü Hanifah and his disciples were highly respectful of the Traditions, and 
used them in their ijtihad; even if it was a lAadith Of (weak tradition) they would 
prefer it over giyds. Ibn Hazm has affirmed that Abn Hanifah and his disciples were 
united concerning the effectiveness of a weak /x dich against giyäs, considering it to 
be on a higher level 
289 
Yahyä b. Adam (d. 2031818) comments on Abü Hanifah's method of departing 
from giyäs due to a hadith Sah h (authentic tradition): "Whoever says that Abü 
2" Jas$äs, "Fusül", v: 4, p: 116; SarakhsT, "Al-Mabsüt", v: 3, p: 65. 
285 Dihlawi, "Huff at Allah", v: 1, p: 16; ShaybänT, "Al-Hujjah `alä Ahl al-Madinah", v: 1, p: 392; 
Haythami, "Al-lYayät al-HEsän", p: 104. 
286 Sarakhsi, "Al-Mabsül' v: 4, p: 93. 
237 Jaý$, "°Fusül", v: 4, p: 116; Sarakhsi, "al-Mabsül', v: 1, pp: 77-78. 
2" BayhägT, "Al-Sunan", v: 1, pp: 146-147; Hawarizmi, "Jämi ` al-Masänid', v: l, pp: 247-248. 
299 Haytami, "Al-Hayat al-osän", pp: 42,106. 
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Hanifah approves giyäs over athar (With), is making an unfair accusation. Abü 
Hanifah's practices and his disciples' writings are full of examples of his departing 
from giyäs and applying the rule of athar (With) . 
290 
e- Leaving explicit analogy (giyäs jai) for something that is more effective 
and beneficial: 291 
If a person who performs a supererogatory prayer, begins praying whilst 
standing and wants to continue the prayer sitting down, without an excuse, then 
according to Abü Hanifah, this is allowed, based on the principle of istiizsdn. 
However, Abü Yüsuf and Shaib5n do not give permission, based on analogy. They 
compared it to an obligatory prayer: a person is not allowed to perform two rak'a 
standing and then, without an excuse continue to pray whilst sitting. According to 
Abn Wifah, sitting without an excuse in a supererogatory prayer (näjilah) is like 
sitting with an excuse in an obligatory prayer (faro); therefore, it is certainly 
considered the same as an obligatory prayer. There are no differences whether one sits 
at the beginning of, or during an obligatory prayer. 
92 
Abti Hanifah in this case preferred to compare someone who performs a 
supererogatory prayer to someone who prays sitting, with an excuse. However it is 
unimaginable to compare this situation with someone who intends to pray two rak`as. 
Someone who intends to pray two rak'as of ritual prayer commits himself to fulfill 
that duty. Someone who begins to perform a supererogatory (näfilah) prayer also 
commits himself to complete it. 
293 At the beginning of the performance of worship, 
290 Jassäs, "Fusul", v: 4, pp: 116-117; Makld, "Manägib", v: 1 p: 83; also for more examples, see: 
Sarakhsi, 'A1-Mabsüt', v: 1, pp: 53,169, v: 13, p: 122, v: 17, pp: 63-64. 
291 BaltajT, "Manähij", v: 1, p: 361. 
292 Sarakhsi, "AI-MabsüE', v: 1, p: 208 and similar examples are: v: 1, pp: 49-50,183; v: 7, p: 8; 
Shaibän3, "AI-Jämi ` al-Saghi? ', pp: 90,192-193,212,245. 
293 Sarakhsi, "Ucii", v: 1, pp: 115-116. According to the Hanafis, to complete a started supererogatory 
worship is obligatory (wäjib). 
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those who intend to perform the supererogatory prayer are free to do so; however 
once they begin to worship, they are under obligation to complete it. 
294 
However, Abil Hanifah did not compare this to the explicit analogy; instead be 
used isti jndn, through implicit analogy (giyäs kh , even though the first thing which 
comes to mind is explicit analogy. The reason to give permission for someone with an 
excuse to sit during obligatory prayer is to alleviate hardship and difficulties. The 
supererogatory (ndfilah) prayer is an optional act of worship and not an obligatory 
duty; therefore asking someone who is performing the supererogatory prayer to fulfil 
the duties of obligatory prayer is not alleviating hardship and difficulties. Sitting 
during supererogatory prayer has been permitted in order to alleviate hardship and 
difficulties. 95 
f- Leaving analogy in favour of wide spread common custom (`urf). 296 
Example: if someone buys goods on the condition that they be delivered to his 
home, according to the principle of analogy, that condition is void and the transaction 
cannot take place. Despite this Abil Hanifah has approved making such a condition, 
since this was the people's custom. 
297 
On the other hand, Abil Hanifah does depart from custom; one example is the 
custom of marking animals (ish'är). This was one of the Prophet's traditions, applied 
during the luajj to indicate that the animal was intended for sacrifice. The Prophet, 
after performing the afternoon prayer at Dhu -1-Hulayfa, asked for a camel, which he 
then marked on the right side of its hump. 
298 Despite this, Abü Hanifah disapproved of 
the custom because of the cruel manner in which the Iraqis branded their animals. 
294 Baltaci, "Manähif', v: 1, p: 362. 
295 Sarakhsi, "U I", v: 1, p: 115. 
296 For more on the concept of custom see the introductory chapter. 
297 Sarakhsi, "Al-Mabsüt', v: 12, p: 199, also for more on this concept, see: Makki, "Managib", v: 1, p: 
75; and also see: Sarakhsi, "Al Mabsut', v: 11, pp: 159,180-181,192-193, v: 12, pp: 84,159-161. 
291 Ibn al-Athir, "Jämi` al-Ucül", v: 3, pp: 338-339. 
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Abü Hanifah was not against the ik dith, because it was clear that the Prophet forbade 
cruelty to animals. 299 
After an in-depth investigation of Abn Hanifah's works, we can see how and 
why he used the term isti jndn. In short, isti judn is to depart from explicit analogy to 
implicit analogy which is discovered only after very careful consideration. This kind 
of istihrän is debated among the scholars. Abü Nanzfah was also using istihrän in the 
sense of departing from an already established rule or giyäs, or from something which 
caused difficulties for the Muslim community, in favour of Prophetic Traditions, 
consensus, rulings of the Companions of the Prophet, and custom. 
This kind of isti juCln -departing from explicit analogy to implicit analogy- is 
based proofs and evidences which may not be accepted in the viewpoint of others. 300 
The use of istii sän from the viewpoint of Abü Hanifah indicates that he was departing 
from giyäs not only for the sake of the benefit of people, but also with regard to a 
hadith (tradition) or a custom which is common and prevalent among the community. 
This does not mean that he simply preferred istifxsän to customs or whenever it was in 
line with traditions: he preferred custom or traditions whenever it was in the people's 
best interests. 301 
Abü Hanifah also paid attention to matters between individuals where one has 
a natural priority over the other. For example, if a man tells his wife: "If you are 
menstruating, consider yourself divorced", and the woman says that she is indeed 
menstruating, then according to Abü Han fah, the divorce is valid, even if the husband 
disbelieves her and claims that she is lying. This is because a woman has natural 
priority over a man when it comes to being believed with regard to women's issues 
299 MOsa, "Abü /Yanifah", pp: 76-79. 
30° Baltaji, "Manähzj", v: 1, p: 363. 
301 Hasan, "The early"p: 145. 
The Concept of Istihsän 205 
such as menstruation, pregnancy and so on. However, according to giyäs, her 
statement is not accepted and she is not divorced. Hence, Abü Hanifah departed from 
giyäs on the grounds that only women can be certain in such a matter. 
302 
3.5.2 Zufar303 (d. 158) and the concept of istihslin: 
Zufar was the first of the three students of Abü Hanifah. Later the other two, 
Abü Yüsuf and Al-Shaybäni, became more famous than Zufar. 304 At the beginning of 
his academic career Zufar was known for his adherence to the Traditionalist School 
(Ahl al-tiadith). Impressed by Abü Fianifah's teaching, he studied fiqh and was 
thoroughly educated in ray (opinion) and giyäs (analogy). He quickly made a 
reputation aruongst the disciples for his sensitive and sharp analogy. 305 He has been 
quoted as saying ""We do not approve of opinion (ray) when there is a Tradition 
(athar) available; whenever an athar comes through we depart from opinion. "306 
Zufar's method of practising ijtihäd is based on the Qur'än, the Sunnah, ijma', 
qawl al-Salxrbah (the sayings of the Companions of the Prophet), giyäs, istihsän and 
turf. As such, it was not so far removed from the methods of his master, Abn Hanifah 
and his friends, Abü Yüsuf and Shaybäni These methods were based on the teachings 
of their master. The other disciples used slightly different methods in many cases and 
had different points of view when they were implementing these principles. 307 
302 SarakhsT, <"U; s l", v: 2, p: 202. 
303 Imam Zufar: Zufar b. Huzayl b. Qays al-AnbAr , from the Tamim tribe. He was a judge (gadl) and 
one of the best friends of Abü IHanºfah. He originated from Iran (Isfahan): his father was an `Arab and 
his mother Iranian. He lived in Basra and died there in 158h. it is not known whether he has left any 
work of jurisprudence. See: Isma`111 Sha`bän Muhammad, "Ugl al-Fiqh Tärikhuhu wa Rijdluhu", p: 
46; Abü Zahrah, "Abü /*nifah", pp: 244-245. 
31 Ibid. 
305 KhudarT, "Tärikii', p: 240; Saymari, "Akhbdr", pp: 24,112-113; Abü Zahrah, "Abü Hanrfah", p: 
244; Kha4b, "Tärikh", v: 14, p: 246. 
306 Isma'i1, "Ucü1" p: 46. 
307 Baltaji, "Manähif", v: 1, pp: 400-401. 
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For example, if a husband gives permission to someone to divorce his wife in 
accordance with the principle of taläq raj 'Y ("revocable")308 but the person who is 
authorized to give the divorce pronounces the divorce to be absolute (taläq bä'in)309, 
according to Zufar this divorce is not recognised because he has misused the authority 
which was given to him. However, Abü Hanifah, Shayb5n and Abü Yüsuf disagree 
with Zufar on this issue and consider that this is recognised as taläq raj ä. 
31o 
Zufar's method of approving istifrsän is based on public interest, so long as it 
is not in contradiction with the principles of shari `ah. However, at times he favours 
giyäs where others favour istifisän. When a matter was being considered the 
application of giyäs was approved if the outcome was not negative and not opposed to 
the required purpose; where the application of giyäs produced negative results, then 
istificsän would be approved as it aims to seek the reason why giyäs resulted in 
negativity, thus benefiting the people. Zufar usually prefers to approve the rule of 
qiyas rather than istifxsän. However, if there is a dispute between giyäs and istihsän, 
he would approve istifxsän in the sense of implicit analogy which is based on nass, 
3°8 TalAq Raj`T: A husband has the right to take back his wife, who still menstruates, as long as she has 
not yet entered her third menstruation in the course of the iddah (waiting period); it is the third in the 
case of a free woman, and the second menstruation in the case of a slave woman. See: Al-Qayrawäni, 
"Risälah", babfi al-nikdh wa al-lbläq, p: 89-97 quoted from: Doi I. "Shari`a", p: 177. The first two 
pronouncements of divorce followed by the periods of retreat from the wife with whom marriage is 
consummated are called talaq raj `i. It is based on the following Qur'an verse: 21229 "A divorce is only 
permissible twice after that the party should either hold together on equitable terms or separate with 
kindness. " In this kind of divorce the spouse can still enjoy the usual benefit from each other since the 
marital relationship is not over. If one of them dies, the other will inherit from him or her, as the case 
may be. Maintenance will still remain available to the wife and children. The raja (return) is the right 
of the husband. As Qur'än says: 21228 "And the husband has the better right to take them back in that 
period if they wish for reconciliation. " It will suffice just to utter the words like "I take you back" or 
the return can be effected through actions such as resuming sexual relations or kissing. See: ibid. 
30TalAq Bain: This is divorce with three pronouncements of divorce before the consummation of 
marriage. There is no possibility of return to the conjugal relationship when the three divorces are 
completed. There are two kinds of talaq bain: Baynünah 2sghrä and baynuna kubra. The baynünah 
pghrä decreases the conjugal rights of the husband. In the event of the death of one of the parties, the 
other will not inherit from him or her as all the conjugal rights cease. The former husband cannot even 
re-marry the former wife unless she marries another man and he voluntarily divorces her without any 
intention of taf7ifl. See: ibid. 
310 Is mä `11, " U$1,, p: 46. 
The Concept of Istihsän 207 
qawl al-Saherbah (the saying of the Companions of the Prophet) and present `urf 
(custom). 311 
3.5.3 Abü Yüsuf (d. 182 AH) and the concept of istihrän: 
Abü Yüsuf was appointed312 judge of Baghdad during the time of al-Mahdi 
(d. 169 AH), al-Hädi (d. 170 AH) and al-Rashid (d. 193 AH). 313 This position gave him 
the opportunity to practice Hanafi law in order to resolve the problems presented to 
him, and so his rulings and his practice of istihsän come from both actual life and 
juristic theory. 314 Schacht asserts that the first technical user of isti jndn was not Abü 
Yüsuf, 315 who he claims inherited this method from his master, Abü Hanifah. Abü 
311 Baitaji, "Mandhif', v: 1, pp: 422-423. 
312 He is one of the greatest followers of Abü l lanifah. He was also an Imäm in his own right. Abü 
Yüsuf was a descendand of the AnSdr and , Sahabah, Sa'd b. Sibät. He was born in Kufah in 113 or 117 
h. and passed away in 182 h. He regularly attended Abo Hanifah's circle of lectures and acknowledges 
of his mastery infiqh. He was attending Ibn Abi Laila's lecturers at first: "I would attend Ibn Abi 
Lailä's circle, who recognized my potential, however when some issue would arise, he would apply 
Abü l anifah's ijtihäds. Owing to this, I considered that I should go to Abü Ilatnfah's circle and study 
and gain more benefit from him. Eventually, I attended regular circles of Abo Fianifah. " He followed 
his master's method of ijtihäd and reached the level of mujtahid mutlaq (absolute independent legal 
thinker). After the death of his master he moved to Baghdad. In 150 h. was appointed qadi (judge) by 
the caliph al-Mahdi and carried out this duty for 16 years; he was also given the highest legal post in 
the entire khilafah, namely that of gadi al-qudät (chief Justice). Abü Hanifah said of him: "If God 
forbid, this man (Abü Yüsuf) dies, the world will lose one of its great scholars. " A narration from Abu 
Hanifa about the participants of his own lecture: "Among the students there are 36 mature men: 28 of 
them are capable of being judge, 6 of them are good for the position of giving Iegal opinions, and 2 of 
them are capable of being both chief justice (raTs al-qudat) and giving legal opinions (ifta'), they are 
AbÜYÜsuf and Zufar". However, al-Shaybän3 was only 18 years old when Abü Hanifah died. He 
actually became famous after the death of his master. (See: ibn Bazzaz, "Mandgibi Imam `Azam", v: 2, 
p: 125. quoted from Abü Zahrah, "Abil Jfr(fah", pp: 222-223). His most famous teachers are A'mash, 
Hishäm b. Urwah, Sulaimän b. Talmi, Abü Ishäq al-Shaybäni, Yahyä b. Sa'Td al-Ansäri (d. 146), Malik 
b. Anas (d. 179), Sufyan b. Uyaynah, Hasan b. Dinär, Hanzalah b. Abo Sufyan. He learned maghazi 
(military history and siyar (international law) from Muhammad b. Ishäq and knowledge of fiqh from 
Muhammad Abr Lailä (d. 150). He was endowed with so much intelligence and such a good memory 
that he learned all these disciplines simultaneously. Abü Yüsuf was ranked so high in Tradition 
(/bdith) as to be considered a /aäfizin it. Ibn Jarlr Tabari used to say: "Q50i Aba Yüsuf Ya`qüb b. 
Ibrahim is a faqih (jurist) and `alim (scholar). He knows 'dich, he is famous for reciting Iladith by 
memory, and he used to visit and attend the lectures of muhaddithin and at one sitting learn 50 to 60 
traditions. After the lecture he would dictate them". See: Ibn `Abd al-Bär, "Intiqa", p: 172; Bilmen, 
"IStllafktti Fiqhiyyah", v: 1, p: 392. 
313 Ismä `il, "USÜI", p: 53. 
314 Abü Zahrah, "Abü hänifah", p: 225. 
315 Schacht, "The origins", p: 112. 
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Ynsuf practiced istifnän very skilfully in his ijtihäd thanks to his position as judge, 
despite his allegiance to Tradition (kidith) 316 
Abti Ynsuf's method of judgment with regard to the principle of istijndn can 
be found in his rulings, words and writings. According to the sources, he would pray 
to God, saying: "0 my Lord! As you are aware, whenever I face a problem I look for 
guidance. First I look in your Book and if I find guidance there then I take it; 
otherwise I continue, looking in your Prophet's traditions. If the guidance can not be 
found either in the Book or in the Prophet's traditions, I then take into consideration 
the Companion's words. "317 Sarakhsi points out that Abil Yüsuf s method considers 
the saying of the Companions (qawl al-Sahrxbi) and is preferable to giyds. 
318 Karkhi 
(d. 340/952) was reported as saying "Abu Yüsuf used to say: "Qiyäs is such and such, 
but I left it because of athar (tradition)". 
According to Karkhi the meaning of athar here is an opinion of the 
Companions where no opposing opinion has been recorded. It obviously means that if 
any of Abü Yüsuf s contemporaries had a conflict of opinion, then applying the 
Saying of the Companions would be deemed more preferable. 319 Abn Yasuf followed 
his master's methods of ijtihäd, seeking guidance first in the Qur'än, the Sunnah and 
the Sayings of the Companions; the Saying of the Companions were given priority 
over giyäs. 320 In his use of the principle of istifrän, he also followed his master, and 
mainly used it to oppose the rule of giyäs. 
321 
316 Matlüb, Mahrnüd, "Abü Yüsuf', the University of Baghdad, Iraq, 1972, p: 129. 
31 Ibid, p: 129. 
318 Sarakhsi, "Uc l", v: 2, p: 105. 
319 rassig, "Fu4WI", v: 3, p: 361. 
320 Salim Ögüt, "Ebu Yusuf', x, DIA, p : 263. 
321 Taha'1, "Mukhtasar", pp: 211,342,402; Abts Yüsuf, "Kitäb al-Kharäf', pp: 178,182,189; 
Sarakhsi, "A1-Mabsüt ', v: 1, pp: 37-88,183, v: 2, pp: 13,214; v: 3, p: 105. 
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Abn Yiisuf embraced the principle enshrined in the following quote: "It is an 
accepted fact that the terms of law vary due to changes of the times". 
322 An example 
is the case of kharäj (land tax), which was fixed for a certain amount by the second 
Caliph `Umar. Abü Yüsuf, however, did not hesitate to change and reset it according 
to the circumstances of the times. 
323 Abü Ytisuf took the opposite view to Abü 
Hanifah on the matter of usury. If the Prophet ruled that goods could be sold in 
different units of weights and measures, according to Abü Hanifah and Shaybäni, 
custom ( `urn could not be taken into consideration. However, Abü Yüsuf has a 
different opinion, and rules that since circumstances have now changed, trading 
should be in accordance with local or popular custom. 
324 
Abü Yüsuf sometimes uses the term "I approve" (astaizrinü), to mean "I 
believe it is the right thing to do", and sometimes uses the opposite term "I 
disapprove" (astagbifiü), meaning "I believe it is the wrong thing to do". For example, 
if a man is attacked by a camel, and the man then kills the camel, according to the 
opinion of Abü Hanifah and Shaybäni based on giyäs, the person who has been 
attacked must pay compensation to the camel's owner. Despite their opinion, Abü 
Yüsuf points out that it is the man who is entitled to compensation. This is a kind of 
isti/xsän for he says "I disapprove (astagbif7ü) of him compensating the owner of the 
camel. "3ý 
After considering Abü Yüsuf's writings and rulings on the basis of the 
principle of isti, sän, we can see that he uses isti, ' sän in the following senses: 
322 Matlüb, "Abü Yüsuf', p: 130; Majallah: clause: 39. 
323 Abi Yüsuf, "Kitýrb al-Khasi"', p: 84. 
324 Ibn a1-Humäm, "Shari) Fath al-Qadir", v: 7, p: 15. 
325 TahawT, "Al-Mukhta$ar", p: 258. 
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a- Leaving the explicit analogy (giyäs jäliý, which is based on discretion and 
prudence, in favour of an alternative analogy that has a stronger effective cause 
(`illah): 
For example, if someone performs four rak `as of supererogatory prayer but 
does not sit within the required time of tashahhud326 at the first sitting, according to 
Abü Hanifah and Abü Yüsuf his prayer is valid. This is a type of implicit analogy 
within istikiin. They have compared the four rak`as of supererogatory prayer to four 
rak'a of obligatory prayer, and have arrived at the logical conclusion that the four 
rak'a supererogatory prayer, despite the fact that the required time of sitting has not 
been adhered to, is as valid as an obligatory prayer, since it was performed of his own 
free will 327 
Next is an unusual example of istilisän approved by Abü Yüsuf, in favour of 
the general benefit of Muslims: If a Muslim steals from an infidel who is living in a 
Muslim country and who abides by the laws of that country and pays tax (jizyah) the 
Muslim will not have his hand amputated. According to giyäs, however, a Muslim 
thief will have his hand amputated. 328 This type of legal opinion is a very peculiar 
example of istikiln in that it appears to be an unjustified decision. In spite of the 
difficulties of understanding the judgment of Abn Yiisuf which is not to amputate the 
hand of the Muslim thief, Ahmad Hasan presumes that it was his intention to 
discourage the entry of foreigners into Muslim territories in order to keep society 
immune from their influence. 329 
b- Approving istifzsän based on the text (nags): 
326 To say while sitting: "There is no god but Allah and Muhammad is Allah's Apostle. " 
32' Sarakhsi, "Ai-Mabsüt", v: 1, p: 183, for more examples see: Al-Shaybani, "Al-Jämi` al-saghir", pp: 
90,204,212,243,245,319; Tahawl, "Al-Mukhtasar", pp: 342,402; Sarakhsi, "Al-Mabsü', v: 2, pp: 
13,214, v: 6, p: 28, v: 12, p: 12. 
328 Abu Y4suf, "Kitab al-Kharlif', p: 117. 
329 Oasan, "The early", p: 147. 
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The following examples explain Abü Yüsuf's departure from giyäs and approval of 
isti/san based on nass, which is the authentic Tradition: laughing out loud during 
prayer negates the ablution330; fasting is not invalidated when someone eats or drinks 
by mistake; 331 and the validation of the agreement of crop sharing (muzara `ah) and 
share tenancy. 332 
c- Approving istihsän based on the consensus (ijmä `) of the Companions: one 
example is when a husband and wife apostatise together, their marriage (nikäh) 
continues as it is. 333 In a similar case, if a woman apostasizes from Islam during a 
terminal illness, the husband should inherit her estate; this is based on istihsän 
according to Abii Ylisuf and Abü Hanifah. According to giyäs, the husband is 
excluded from the inheritance. 
334 In these circumstances Abü Yüsuf gives the 
explanation that the woman's apostasy during terminal illness must be out of pure 
malice, as it is clearly her intention to disinherit her husband. Therefore, the 
circumstances surrounding apostasy should be absolutely clear in the situation of 
terminal illness. According to giyäs the husband does not inherit her estate as it does 
not distinguish between the different circumstances of normal and terminal illness 335 
d- Approving istitudn based on the Saying of the Companions of the Prophet 
(qawl a1-, I7afnbi): 336 For example, if someone in authority -a ruler, say, or a judge- has 
witnessed a crime of theft, adultery or the consumption of alcohol, they cannot pass 
judgment based on their personal knowledge; they can only pass judgment when the 
legal evidence has been established. Abn Ynsuf indicates here that "this is a kind of 
330 Sarakhsi, "Al-Mabsüt', v: 1, pp: 77-78; Jass5s, "Fust7l", v: 4, p: 116 
3317assäs, "Fu*l", v: 4, pp: 116-117. 
332 sarikýsl, "Al-Mabsü? ', v: 23, pp: 2,32. 
333 ibid v: 5, p: 49. 
334 According to Islamic law, Muslims are prohibited from inheriting from unbelievers and vice-versa. 
See: Bukhär3, "Hajj", no: 44; `Faräi(f", no: 25; Muslim "Far-W", no: 1: (Ld yarith al-Muslim al-Kaffir 
wa la al-Kdfir al-Muslim). 
335 Abti Yüsuf, "Al-Jämi ` al-Saghir", pp: 182-183. 
336 Ja! p , "Fuül", v: 3, p: 361; Sarakhsi, "U, sW', v: 2, p: 105. 
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istifxsän based on a Tradition (athar) which is reported from Abü Bakr and `Umar. 
However, according to giyäs, they are able to execute their judgment on the basis of 
their personal knowledge. 337 Through istifzsän, justice is established. The authority is 
powerless to judge without evidence. If the judgment had been allowed by mere 
personal knowledge, it may be an arbitrary decision as it creates. turmoil within 
society, causing people to lose their trust. However, the requirement of evidence 
ensures that the people continue to have faith in the judicial system. 
e- Approving istitvdn on the grounds of necessity, the pursuit of ease, and 
avoidance of hardship or the removal of that which is harmful: 
338 
The following are considered as forms of istihsän: Friday prayer is permitted 
to be held in more than one mosque in the same town, in order to alleviate any 
difficulties within the Muslim community; 339 after a successful battle, the booty 
(ghanimah) is collected and, if it is not possible to forward it to the treasury (bayt al- 
mal), the commander may distribute it among his men; 
340 and muzdra `ah and musägät 
(share tenancy) agreements are deemed valid in order to alleviate hardship. 1 
f- Approving isti/zrän on the grounds of custom. For example, a person 
employs a labourer to dig a well without first asking permission from the ruler. The 
well is dug beside a path along which Muslims walk, and afterwards someone falls 
into the well and dies. According to giyäs the labourer must accept the responsibility 
of the death. According to the general custom, an individual must have the ruler's 
permission before he can have the well dug. Abü Yüsuf says that giyas should not be 
considered in this case because the labourer had already taken permission from the 
Hasan, "The Early", p: 146; AN YOsuf, "Al-Kharaf, p: 178. Also for more examples see: Jassäs 
"FuS il", v: 3, pp: 361-362; Sarakhsi, "U$71", v: 2, pp: 106,110. 
338 Maflüb, "Abi Yüsuf', p: 130. 
339 KASSAi, "Badai' al-Sanäi "', v: 1, p: 260; Sarakhsi, 'Al-Mabsüt', v: 2, p: 120. 
340 Sarakhsi, "Al- Mabsüt', v: 10, p: 34. 
341 ibid v: 23, pp: 17,32,41,46. 
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employer, and therefore, according to istitudn, it is the employer who has to accept 
the responsibility for the crime. 42 
According to Abü Ynsuf, another example of the use of istihsän would be in 
the case of a husband paying zakdt al-fit? 3 on his wife's behalf but without her 
permission. This is valid according to istikiin because custom dictates that the 
husband is responsible her paying zakdt al-fitr and therefore his wife's permission is 
not necessary. According to the rule of giyäs, this is not valid. `ý 
g- Departing from a ruling of giyäs due to doubt and uncertainty over the 
evidence: 
According to giyäs, if a man is accused of fornication (zinä') by four people, 
the penalty prescribed by the Qur'an is one hundred lashes. 345 However, what 
happens if two people give evidence that the accused is married? 346 Will he be 
punished with the hundred lashes first and then by being stoned? 
According to giyäs, if the witnesses withdraw the accusation while the accused 
is being punished, he must still be subjected to the rest of the lashes. However, 
istihsän rules that the accused person should be relieved of both the penalty of lashes 
and stoning. 347 Because of doubts and uncertainty over the evidence, istilzsän 
overrules giyäs in accordance with the shari-`ah, which dictates that a /aadd 
342 AbU Yüsuf, "Al-Jämi ` al-. Saghir", p: 182. 
13 The charitable donation paid at the and of the month of Ramadan. 
34'0 Sarakhsi, "At- Mabsüt', v: 3, p: 105, for more examples see: v: 5, pp: 194-105,213, v: 8, pp: 135, 
186, v: 12, p: 142, v: 18, p: 190, v: 19, pp: 77,78,93,100,117. 
345 Qur'an: 24/ 2: This verse indicates that one hundred lashes is for an unmarried person who commits 
illegal sexual intercourse. A narration from Abü Hurairah (d. 59) states that God's Messenger judged 
that the unmarried person who was guilty of illegal sexual intercourse should be exiled for one year and 
receive the legal punishment that is one hundred lashes. See: Saft al-Bukhdrf, v: 8, no: 819. 
346 A married who commits adultery is stoned according to Shari`ah: According to a Narration from 
Jabir b. `Abd Allah al-Ansäri, "A man from the tribe of Bani Aslam came to God's Messenger and 
informed him that he had committed illegal sexual intercourse and he bore witness four times against 
himself. God's Messenger ordered him to be stoned to death as he was a marred person. See: Sahih al- 
Bukhäri, v: 8, no: 805. 
347 Abti YGsuf, "Al-J&mVal-Saghir", p: 165. 
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punishment should not be established where there is uncertain evidence. 348 Therefore, 
istihsän departs from the ruling of giyäs on the ground of uncertain evidence in order 
to secure justice for the people. Also, had giyäs been enforced, the accused person 
would be faced with two different punishments for a single crime; carrying out double 
punishments for one offence is considered unjust and therefore must be avoided. 
349 
3.5.4 Shaybini (d. 189) and the concept of istiltsan: 
Shaybnni 350 is also a Traditionalist and depends on Traditions for his rulings 
to a greater extent than AbU Yüsuf. 351 He points out the importance of balance 
between tradition and ra'y saying that "Tradition can only work when it is hand in 
hand with opinion . (ra'y), and vice versa. Knowledge of ray or Tradition is not 
enough to judge or take the place of a mufti (the authority of giving fatwd'-ruling). "352 
In this context, Shaybani follows Abu Hanifah, and is careful not to make any rule 
arbitrarily without depending on legal evidence. To avoid an arbitrary decision he 
applies analogy; if no guidance is found in the Qur'dn and the Sunnah, or results in a 
bad decision, he departs from giyäs and applies istifzsän. He also made the condition 
348 See: Haskafi, "Al-Durru al-Mukhtäi", 3/150. It is based on this statement: "Drop the hudud in cases 
of doubt as far as possible. " See: SuyüI, "Ai-jdmi'u al-Saghir", no: 313-314; TabrizT, "Mishkät al- 
Macabiff', ii. 1061, no: 3570; Ibn al-QayyTm, "1`lam", i. 209. 
344 Abd Ynsuf, "Al-Jämi' al-Saghir", p: 165. 
350 Shaybäni is also one of the outstanding disciples of Abti Ilanifah. He was born in 135 h. and passed 
away in 189 h. He attended for about 2 yrs the lectures of Imäm Aba Hanifah, was 18 years old when 
his master died, and upon the latter's death he completed his education under Abu YUsuf. He also 
studied for 3 yrs the Muwatta' under Imam Malik in Medina. He has a prodigious knowledge of 
literature and language. Imam Shäfi i said: "Muhammad b. I asan would fulfil both the heart and the 
eye; whenever he expounded a point of law, it seemed as if the revealing Angel had descended upon 
him. " Also he took knowledge from Syrian Awzä'T (d. 176! 792), Sufyan b. Uyaynah (d. 198/813), and 
`Abd Allah ibn Mubärak (d. 181) from Khorasänian. He synthesized the principle of AN al-/bdith and 
the principle of ahl al-ray. Despite associating with the caliphs, he did not bow down to them. He was 
appointed qä (judge) during the time of Härun al-Rashid. See: Abo Zahrah, "Abii 15hnlfah", pp: 233- 
234. Al-Shaybäni occupied himself with the narration of traditions (hlzdith) at first; later he adopted the 
principles of the Iragians from Abu Hanifah. Imam ShäfiT also met 
him 
and studied his books. See: Al- 
Khudarä, "Tdrikh al-Tashri' al-IsldmP', p: 240. He was a judge and afaqih who was famous for giving 
quick solutions. Because of his post as judge, he had ample opportunity to practice his knowledge of 
fcgh. In addition, he decreased the disputes and different view points between the Iraqi and Hijaz 
schools due his knowledge of both groups. See: Osman Keskioglu, "Ftkth Tarihi ve Islam Hukuku", 
Ankara, 1980, p: 106. 
351 Schacht, "The Origins", p: 305. 
352 Nasafi, "Kashf'v: 1, p: 11; Sarakhsi, "U; Sl", v: 2, p: 113. 
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that the one eligible to perform ijtihäd to give a fatwä' (ruling) will be the one "who 
knows the Qur'än, the Sunnah, the Sayings of the Companions of the Prophet, and 
Muslim jurists' considerations of istikiin. He must be versed in performing ray 
(opinion) ijtihäd and giving fatwäs, which are validated rulings on obligatory acts 
such as praying, fasting, and pilgrimage; and forbidden acts such as drinking alcohol, 
fornication, and dealing in usury. When he performs ijtihdd, he uses the faculty of 
reasoning and compares it to something similar, and even if a mistake is made with 
the judgment, applying it is permissible. "353 
Shayban often uses the following statement "I depart from giyäs and approve 
istihsän". 354 His definition of the isti udn that sometimes refers to athar (tradition) 
was called ra'y at the time of the Companions. 
355 He used istihsän in the sense of 
taking an opposite side and departing from giyäs. 356 Without giving an explanation 
that is opposite of giyäs, he simply says: "this is istifxsän" or "According to isti/zsän, it 
is as such: JaSS and Sarakhsi give some quotations from Shaybäni s book called 
"Kitäb al- Isti/xsän". 357 
Shaybäni criticises the kind of istihsän which is performed against clear 
evidence and considers it to be an arbitrary decision. He condemned the ahl al- 
Medinah for what he saw as their hypocrisy in their use of istihsän: he saw them as 
people who would abandon their Traditions when faced with a problem, and approve 
istirnan which was not supported by athar (Traditions) and the Sunnah, and which 
went against their own narrations. How, he asks, could they be ahl al-athar 
353 Ibn al-Qayyzm, "I'lam", v: 1, p: 102. 
354 Shaybäni, "Al-Asi', v: 2, pp: 238,370,392,406, v: 3, p: 320, v: 4, pp: 423,457, v: 5, pp: 111,169- 
170,190,206-207; ibid "Al-Siyar al-Kabis", v: 1, pp: 447,521,552, v: 3, pp: 850-851,907,932, v: 4, 
pp: 1217,1366,1451,1573, v: 5, pp: 1807,1813,2125. 55 Khudan, "Tarikh" p: 210. 
356 Shaybänl, "Al-Jämi` al-$xghir", pp: 90,192,212,243,245,332,410,411. 
35' Ibid, pp: 122,204,295,319,361,376; Jass4, "Fu& 1", v: 3, pp: 167,173; Shaybäni, "Usül", v: 1, 
pp: 328,332,336,338,370,372, v: 2, pp: 22,24,25. 
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(Traditionalists) when they depart from their own narrations? This confirms that 
Shaybäni never approved istilzsän over Tradition. 58 For example, the ahl al-Medinah 
on inserting the saläm (conclusion of prayer) between every two rak`a of canonical 
prayer. Shaybäni responded saying, "How dare they approve this with isti/zsän! " A 
narration had been reported concerning the Prophet who prayed four rak'as at noon 
without separating them by a saldm 359 These examples clearly indicate that Shaybäni 
was insistent that istif sän be based on legal evidence. 
Shaybäni applied the principle of istifxrän in the following ways: 
a- Using istihsän based on textual nass 
According to Shaybäni, giyäs is not a valid principle to be applied when there 
is textual evidence. 60 Shaybiin opposes the Medina jurists and their claim that 
someone who has eaten by mistake or through forgetfulness during Ramadan has to 
repeat the fast. He says: "Of course the Medina jurists are sure that ray (opinion) 
would not be applied in the presence of definite proof as Abii Hanifah said, `I would 
have ordered the fast to be repeated if there were no narrations' , 361 
In the case of laughing whilst praying, the Medina jurists, despite the presence 
of textual evidence, applied the ruling giyäs, saying, `Laughing out loud whilst 
praying does not annul ablution; ablution is annulled when some kind of excretion 
occurs from the body, which cannot be compared with laughing. If laughing had 
invalidated ablution at prayers it would also have invalidated ablution outside of the 
prayer: laughter is laughter wherever and whenever it occurs. In spite of the istil sdn 
ruling which says that laughing invalidates ablution during prayer, according to giyäs 
358 Shaybäni, "AI-Hujjah", v: 1, p: 222. 
359 1bId v: 1, p: 272. 
360 Ibid v: 1, p: 316, v: 2, p: 382. 
361 Ibid v: 1, p: 392. 
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laughing does not invalidate ablution. 62 This istifzsdn ruling is based on a report 
narrated from the Prophet, who said: "Whoever laughs let him repeat his prayer and 
ablution" 363 Given such clear evidence (athar), giyäs is not applied. Shaybäni 
criticizes them, saying "If athar (Traditions) were not present when the jurists of 
Medina were considering practising giyäs, it would be acceptable, but since they are 
present, athar has to be followed. 3M 
b- Using the principle of istihsän based on the Sayings of the Companions: 
Shaybdn approves the use of istiMdn to validate the continuation of a 
marriage (nikäh) of a husband and a wife who have apostatized together, on the basis 
of the agreement of the Companions. 
365 
c- Using the principle of istifzsän based on avoiding hardship: 366 
If a small piece of animal faeces is dropped into a well, according to giyäs the 
water cannot be consumed, since it is ritually impure. However if very little has 
contaminated the water, according to istitadn it is considered pure; as wells are 
located on open lands it is difficult to prevent the wells from becoming contaminated 
from the various germs carried by the wind. 367 This ruling is based on the maxim of 
the Shari'ah: "Necessity renders prohibited things permissible". 368 
In the subject of the forward sale (salam) one of the requirements is that the 
goods must be physically present at the time of the contract; if they are not present, 
then, according to qiyas, salam is invalid. An example is when one of the 
362 ra s, "Full", v: 4, p: 116; Sarakhsi, "Al- Mabsüt', v: 1, pp: 77-78. 
363 D5raqutni, "Al-Sunan" v: 1, pp: 161-171; Bayhägi, "Al-Sunan", v: 1, pp: 146-147; Hawarizmi, AN 
Muayyad Muhammad b. Mahmüd (d. 665/1267), "Jämi ` Masäni! al-Imänc", Där al-Kutub al- 
'Ilmiyyah, Beirut, v: 1, pp: 247-248. 
314 ShaybWI, "Al-Hujjah", v: 1, p: 204; for this example seep: 199 in this thesis. 
365 Sarakhsi, "Al- Mabsüt', v: 1, p: 49. For more examples, see: ibid: v: 1, p: 56, ibid "U s "', v: 2, pp: 
106,110,112, For more about contemporary approach of apostasy, see: An-Näim, "Toward", pp: 9-11, 
49,109,130,150,107-114,183-187. 
366 Ibid , pp: 242-243. 367 Sarakhsl, "Al- Mabsüc', v. 4, p: 155, for more examples, see: v: 2, p: 89, v: 4, pp: 89,132. 
368 Majallah: clause: 21 
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Companions, Hakim b. Hizäm, asked the Prophet if he could sell a commodity prior 
to purchasing it. The Prophet answered: "Sell not what is not with you". 
369 Despite 
qiyas invalidating salam, another /xelth approves salam: "Whoever concludes salain, 
let him do so with a specified measure, weight and within a specified period of 
time. s370 Shaybäni uses isti/zsän to legitimize forward sale in order to prevent hardship 
for Muslims. 371 Similar business transactions such as mupärabah, 
372 muzära`ah, 373 
musagäh374 are also validated by istifzrän, despite giyäs invalidating them. 
d- Using the principle of istihsän based on custom: 
The consideration of (`urJ) plays an important role in the legal thinking of 
Shaybäni. 375 For example if a certain town and its residents ask Muslims for 
protection, then according to the ruling of istii sän the agreement of protection would 
also cover the belongings of those people mentioned 
in that agreement. The terms 
qal'ah (fort) or madina (town) in their common usage (`urj) 
does not simply apply to 
the buildings but all the contents in the buildings. However, according to giyäs, it 
would only apply to the fort or the town, and it would exclude the contents. 
376 
e- Using the principle of istifzsän to explain an ambiguous statement: 
if a man says to his wife "Consider yourself divorced if you enter the house" 
while his wife is in the house, " Shaybäni says that according to isti/zsän: "the 
369 Abra Däwüd, "Buyre "', 70; Nasäi, "Buyü "', 60. 
370 BukhärI, iii, 243, k dith no: 441. 
371 Shaybäni, "At-Asi", v: 1, p: 27. 
372 Mu{ilrabah: This means a contract of co-partnership, in which one of the parties (the proprietor) is 
entitled to a profit on account of the capital (ra's al-mäl) he has invested. He is designated as the owner 
of the capital (rabb al-m&). The other party is entitled to profit on account of his labour and is 
designated as the mudärib (or the manager) in as much as he derives a benefit from his own labour and 
endeavours. 
373 Muzara `ah: This is a contract between two persons whereby one party is the landlord and the other 
the cultivator. They both agree that whatever is produced by cultivation of the land shall be divided 
between them in specified proportions. 
374 Musaqah: This is a contract between two parties whereby one party takes charge of the fruit tree of 
the other partner on condition that the crops shall be divided between them on specific terms. 
37S Muhammad Dastiki, "AI-Imäm Muhammad bin Hasan al-Shaybimi', Qatar, 1987, p: 242. 
376 Shaybani, "Al-Siyar al-Kabir", v: 1, p: 270. Sarakhsi, 'Al-Mabsüc', v: 15, p: 171, v: 8, pp: 135,186, 
v: 12, p: 46, v: 15, pp: 170,172,174. 
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condition would only be fulfilled if the woman re-entered the house after having left 
it. However, according to giyäs, the presence of the wife in the house at the time when 
the husband pronounces this statement is taken into account, and the very fact that his 
wife is in the house fulfils the condition of the husband's statement. "377 This 
statement is unclear: if he applies his condition whilst she is still in the house then he 
is contradicting his own oath, and therefore it remains ambiguous. Isti? ndn explains 
that the husband's statement is unclear and, rather than applying giyäs ambiguously, 
states that the oath only applies if the wife leaves the house and then re-enters. 
Conclusion: 
As founders of the theory of isti&dn, the Hanaf jurists defined the term in 
various ways. However, the definitions, although explained differently, have the same 
meaning. 
Methodologically the first to define istilzsän was Karkhi who lived in the 
third and fourth century. The key word in his definition is "departure" (al- `udül), 
which points to the heart of the objective: simple departure is not enough; there must 
be a stronger reason for a departure. The word tark (departure) and the word "better" 
(awls) were used by Jass4 (d. 370/981). After one century, the way of expressing 
istihsän changed slightly. The different key word given by Bazdawi (d. 482/1089) was 
"particularization" (takhos) with a stronger reason. Sarakhs (d. 483/1090) had four 
definitions, each with a different perspective, and used the key words, "ease, 
convenience, suitability, accommodating, seek mildness, tolerance" which appear to 
be the main goal of istihsän in departing from giyäs (analogy). Nasaff (d. 710/1310) 
and Ibn Humäm's definitions also have more or less the same meaning, and use the 
key phrase "evidence, opposing giyäs jail (explicit analogy). " 
3T' Al-Shaybäni, "A1-Jämi' al-Saghir", p: 1310. 
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Briefly, the main common point of the Hanafi jurists concerning istilzsän is the 
idea of departure from one ruling to another, or to prefer one decision to another378, or 
to set aside giyi s jai (obvious analogy), 379 or to adopt what is more suitable, easy, 
convenient and comfortable. 380 
"Whoever approves juristic preference is making himself the lawmaker". 381 
Shäf`i's criticism of istiluan is based on the above statement, which rejects istihsän 
altogether. Nevertheless, the Shäfi`i scholar Amid! (d. 631/1233) appeared to 
recognize istil sän when giving the definition and using the key phrase "an evidence 
embedded (yangadihu) in the mind of the jurist". Rather than agreeing with Shiräzi 
(d. 476/1083), who said, "Depending on assumption rather than evidence", he shares 
the same idea as Ghazäli (d. 50511111) who said "Use your own judgment to arrive at 
a decision". Besides the SUR'! jurists, the Irrami Shiites also rejected istibsän, 
considering it to be assumptions without proof. However, the Zaydis, despite being an 
offshoot of Shi`ism, considered istihsän as a valid principle of shari`ah. In addition, 
the Zaydis made further conditions that the proof which allows the departure must be 
eligible for the conditions of $ aat, which must be stronger or preferable. 382 
As we are aware, the opinions of the Mälild jurists about the definitions of 
istitadn are not far from those of the Hanafis. "Departure from a giyäs that would lead 
to extremity and exaggeration in the ruling, " is a quote from Ibn Rushd (d. 595/1198). 
"Preferring or acting on a ruling based a stronger dalil" is the opinion of al-Bäji. In 
addition, the basis, while departing from one ruling to another ruling, should be one of 
379 Sarakhsi, "AI-Mabsüt", v: 10, p: 145. 
379 Nasafi, "Kashf, v: 2, p: 164. 
380 Khalläf, "Al-Ma$ddir", p: 75. 
391 Alwäni, "The Ethics", p: 75; Ansän , "Ghayat aI-Wustir', p: 139. 
592 Abt Zahrah, "AI-Jmam Zayd', p: 439. 
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the following: spar'! dalil (legal proof): `urf (consensus), maslahah (benefit), or ease, 
raf al-haraj (removal of hardship) 
383 
Hanbali jurists concur with Hanafis on istiiarän, despite different definitions. 
According to the Hanbalis, departure must be based on consideration of the main 
principles, (the Qur'än, the Sunnah and ijmä `). The key words in Hanbali definitions 
are "leaving, returning and departure" because of stronger or better reasons; 
"abandoning the q yas jail (explicit analogy)" are the same as the key phrase given by 
the Hanafi jurist Nasafi. 
Ibn Hazm and the followers of the Zähiri school rejected istihsän 
unconditionally. According to them, everything one needs is available in the Qur'än: 
"... we have neglected nothing in the Book"384. Ibn } lazm likens istiftsän to a passion 
(shahwah), a whim (hawä') and an error (daldl). 385 He says that the truth (al-hiagq) 
will not be what we like (mä istahsannä) unless there is proof for it. If it were so, God 
would have commanded something that is not pronounced; then the realities of things 
would be invalid, and textual evidence and proof would contradict each other. 386 
Lastly, Basri (d. 436/1044) considered istihsan to be a principle of shari'ah; he 
did not believe that the Hanafi jurists' use of istihsän depended on self-opinion and 
personal judgment without evidence. 
387 However, Bishr bin Ghiyäs (d. 218/833) 
despite being a Mu`tazili, considered it to be self-opinion which does not depend on 
evidence. 388 
Examining the views of the `ulamä' regarding the validity of istihsän, we 
conclude the following: istihsän is a valid principle according to Hanafi, Mälild, 
383 Shätibi, "Al-Muwafagät", v: 4, p: 117; Shäobi, "AI-I'ti, m", v: 2, p: 139. 
394 Qur'än: 6/38 
385 Ibn Hazm, "Al-L*äm" v: 2, pp: 195-196; see: Chejne, "Ihn fhun", p: 122. 
386 Ibn Hazm, "Al-Ihlcäm", v: 2, p: 196. 
387 Basri, "Al-Mu'tamad', v: 2, p: 295. 
389 Zarkashl, "AI-Ba/lral-Muift", vi, p: 93; Shiräzi, "Sharhal-Luma"', ii, p: 969. 
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Hanbali, Abü Al-Husain Al-Bash from the mutakallimün, and Al-Amidi who is from 
the Shäfi`i scholars. Istifzsän is not a valid principle according to Shäfi`r, Ghazäli, 
Isnawi and Ibn Hazm al-Miff. 
As the application of the concept of istii än has been elaborated throughout 
the research, with its varieties of practices and the early period of Islamic law, we 
have seen that istiInan has been practiced based not on personal desire but on valid 
legal evidence. These applications were sometimes based on the text (nass); the 
sayings of the Companions (qawl al-Sahrrbi); the consensus of the Companions (ijmä 
al-catiabah); authentic tradition (nth ralnh); implicit analogy which is more 
effective and beneficial; wide spread common custom; necessity and needs that are 
based on ease, avoiding hardship and removing that which is harmful; and whenever 
there was doubt due to the uncertainty of the evidence. 
On the validity and disagreement over isti, sän the Hanafi viewpoint can be 
summarized as follows: Hanaf jurists divided istihsän mainly into two categories. The 
first is a kind of giyirs, which is based on implicit analogy. The second is based on text 
(the Qur'än, the Sunnah), consensus (ijmä `), necessity (chrürah) etc. Amongst the 
schools of thought there is no disagreement on rulings deduced from proofs which are 
based on the Qur'än, the Sunnah, ijmd', darürah, qawl al-cahiäbi, `urf. However, it is 
difficult to say that there is no disagreement over istifzsän which is based on an 
implicit analogy that is preferred to an explicit analogy, because its effective cause is 
stronger than the explicit effective cause. Shäfi`i gave much attention to giyäs, 
considering it as a main principle of shad'ah; his views on the components of giyäs 
differ to those of Hanafis with regard to the determination of `illah. 389 In fact, 
opponents do not contradict Abü Hardfah's view of istiizsän which is based on nass, 
389 Baltajl, "Mandhij", v: 2, pp: 846-847. 
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ijmä `, and pkrürah because these are unanimously considered valid amongst the 
scholars. 
However, they did oppose Abn HanIfah when they believed that he was 
implementing personal opinion (ray), which is considered to be the abandoning of 
giyäs by whim and personal desire. 
390 It is obvious that opponents have criticized Abü 
Hanifah abandoning the explicit analogy and preferring implicit analogy irrespective 
of the power of its effective cause; this was considered to be an approval of it without 
dalil where there was no reliable basis, and his judgment was seen to be based purely 
on arbitrary opinions inspired by intellectual reasoning. Therefore, Hanafi scholars 
focused on this criticism and tried to prove that their use of istifzsän was valid and 
legal. 
Moreover, the Nanafis sometimes determine the `illah (effective cause) of the 
implicit analogy by way of ijtihäd. The way that the `illah is determined differs from 
one scholar to the next, which is unavoidable. Because of this, different approaches 
occurred amongst the Hanafi scholars. In some cases Abii Ha ifah approved istihsän 
by implicit analogy while Abii Yüsuf and Shaybäni approved istihzsän by explicit 
analogy; sometimes it would be vice-versa. I would say that if internal conflicts 
within one madhhab are inevitable, then different approaches and interpretations on 
legal issues between two different schools of thought are entirely to be expected. 
When we take into consideration the evidence presented by the group which 
recognizes the validity of istihsän, we see that on the whole they are more than 
enough to refute any objections raised against them. The istihsän that has been 
objected to by those `ulamä' who refute the principle is somewhat different from the 
istitsdn described by the groups who recognize its validity. This is because the group 
390 Bukhärl, "Kashf, v: 4, p: 4. 
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supporting isti, sän do not accept it unless it is supported by strongly validated 
evidence. As for the istifxsän that relies on whim and personal desire, this is not 
supported by evidence, and since its source is what the person himself prefers 
rationally (by `aql), this istihsän is not approved by the group that recognize istihsän. 
As it is understood from the evidence which has been proposed, the reason 
Shäfi`i and others rejected isti, sän is that they assumed it was the giving of a ruling 
not based on the Qur'an, the Sunnah, ijmä ` or giyäs, but rather solely through aql 
(intellect) and desire. 391 Such istihsän is to deviate from what is right for the sake of 
personal pleasure: "Isti/zsän is merely doing what is agreeable. , 392 
As we have shown in the previous chapters there is a lot of confusion 
regarding the concept of isti/sr n, which is why the scholars' debate on the validation 
of istifxrän is centred around whether istihsän could be a principle of Islamic law or 
not. 
Debates concentrated mainly on the true relationship between the lughawi 
(linguistic) and the islilä1' (technical) meanings of isti, sän. Some scholars saw the 
lughawi (linguistic) meanings as positive, others as negative. There are many isti1a 
definitions of istihsän. 
Shiräzi and Juwayni from the Shäfi`i school opposed istihsän but after citing 
both the definitions of Karkhi and other recognized definitions they said "If these 
definitions are what they mean when they say `istifzän' then there is no dispute. "393 
Ghazäli was of a similar opinion. "Me principle is not disputable; however, naming it 
391 ShM'T, "Al-Risälah", p: 25. For English translation of "Al-Risälah" see: MAjid Khaddnri, "Islamic 
Jurisprudence Shäfa'l's Risälah", p: 70, The Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1961. 
392 Shims `T, "Al-Risalah", p: 507. 
393 ShIr zT, "Sharp al -Luma"', v: 2, p: 970; Juwayni, "Talkhis", v: 3, p: 313. 
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isti? lsän will be rejected! "394. Here he was concerned with the terminology rather than 
the concept. 
Later Shaft'! scholars such as Räzi, Amidi, ibn al-Subkr, and Isnawi rejected 
Ghazäli s approach, claiming that his reasoning did not come from the Qur'än and the 
Sunnah, and was not used by previous scholars in their ijtihäd. 395 
Taftazani (d. 792 A. H) made the following statement pointing out the 
disagreement over istihsän: 
"Many arguments have been made on both sides and 
whoever accepted istifxsän has been criticized. The 
arguments occurred because no investigation had been 
undertaken to identify the real facts and neither party 
understood the others' intentions. Both parties issued 
hurtful criticisms and they were unkind and insensitive. 
Advocators of istihsän believe it is one of the four main 
principles. The statement "whoever performs istilasän 
puts himself in place of the Lawgiver", which means 
whoever approves a rule from his own personal desire 
and pleasure without basing their judgment on the 
proofs approved by the Shäri` put themselves in place 
of God, has nothing to do with istiizrän. In fact, there is 
no reason to dispute the concept of istilxsdn"396 
394 Ghazäll, "Mustasja~', v: 1, p: 283. 
395 R WI, "Ma/uü1", v: 2, p: 561; Amidi, "AI-Ihkäm", v: 4, p: 390; Ibn Subki, "AI-Ibadf', v: 3, p: 203. 
396 Taftazäni, "TaIwili', v: 2, p: 162. 
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Taftazäni gives examples explaining that there is no dispute over the term, 
quoting several definitions of istii sän which are unanimously accepted as a principle 
397 of Shad'ah 
Shäfi`i and the disciples who followed him in many cases approved rulings 
according to istihsän. Al-Suyüt (d. 911/1505) in accordance with the maxim of fiqh 
"Any needs, whether of a public or private nature, are so dealt with as to meet the 
exigencies of the casei398, said that on issues involving matters such as rent and 
transfer of property, for example, isti jndn may be used rather than giyäs. 399 
In my opinion the disagreement over the validity of istitnan is without 
substance as no-one recognizes istihsän without the support of evidence. Additionally 
istihsän which is based on a stronger dalil and departs from a weaker dalil is accepted 
by all `ulamä'. There are issues based on istihsän which Shi fi`i adopted that 
demonstrate this. These have mentioned by al-Mäwardi in his book "adab al-gädl". `! 0° 
Some of these issues are as follows: 
For example, Shäfi`i is reported to have said: "If there was no disagreement 
presented against a solitary saying of a Companion, the Companion's opinion 
becomes valid evidence (hujjah)". Moreover, Shäfi`i performed istifabäb too by saying 
"I approve this (astaf iibu)". 401 Therefore Sarakbs claimed that there is no difference 
between astafxsinu (I approve the preferable) and astafibibu (I deem the preferable), 
4°2 but the term istihsän is more clear and preferable then the term istz/jinb. 
The right of the claimant to ask for pre-emption (shuf `ah) within three days 
following the sale of the property is according to Shäfi`i, an example of istiftän not 
397 Ibid, v: 2, p: 163. 
398 Majallah: clause: 32; Suyiir, "Ai-Ashbäh wa al-Nazäir", p: 62; Ibn Nujaym, "Al-Ashbäh", p: 91. 
399 SuyuIV, "Al Ashbäh", p: 62. 
400 MAwardi, "Adab al-Qä0'', v: 1, pp. 658,659,660. 
401 Sh5fi `I, "Al- Umm", v: 5, p: 52. 
402 Sarakhsi, "Usti! ", v: 2, p: 201. 
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an asir. 403 This shows that Shafi`i adopted isti(sän although the ail is the right of the 
claimant to seek pre-emption immediately. The way of isti jndn here is that people 
generally agreed to delay the right of pre-emption as near as possible to the pre- 
emption deadline. If the sale became known to the claimant at night it would be 
delayed until the next morning; the time allowed includes the time it would take for 
him to eat and dress. The Qur'än set the 3 day limit 404 This istihss n is based on nas. 
and ijno ` together. It was Shäfi `i who said that when governors require an oath it 
should be taken on the Qur'än; he considered this good (hasan). Here isti/i än 
confirms that an oath taken on the Qur'an is binding when applied to various issues 
relating to money; it also makes the karah obligatory, which persuades people to 
take it seriously 405 This is istihsän as the principle rule is that an oath should be taken 
in God's name only. 
Shäfi`i also ruled that cupping the ears with the hands whilst performing azän 
(the call to prayers) is good. The reason for this was the precedent set by Biläl, who 
was in charge of performing the azän during the Prophet's time and the Prophet 
tacitly approved (sunnah tagririyyah) this as basis for this istihcän. 
When a question was asked of Shäfi`i as to whether `umra could be performed 
in the month of kajj, he said "it is good, I deem it good (astatninu)"406 A1-Mäwardi 
states that Shi fi`i never adopted istilxsän without an associating dalil; istibsän based 
on dalil is unproblematic, while isti/ sän that is not associated with dalil is rejected 407 
When we study the statements of both early and contemporary scholars, the 
usage of istihsän becomes clear. ShAtibi was in the beginning one of the `ula, nä' who 
denied istifisän as he thought it was ruling only through desire and personal opinion. 
4031bn Subkl, "Al-Ibhäj", v: 3, p: 204; Amid-i, "Al-Ihkwn", v: 4, p: 391. 
Qur'an: 11/65 
aas Ibn Subki, ibid, v: 3, p: 204; Amide, ibid, v: 4, p: 391. 
'Shäfi`1, "Al-Umm", v: 7, p: 268. 
407 Al-MIwärdi, "Allab al-QaQ ", vol. 1, p: 660. 
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He. eventually understood that the point of view of those who recognized isti judn had 
to be based on dalil. This was mentioned in the rulings (fatawä) of the well known 
Companions of the Prophet. He was motivated to support the view that istihsän is a 
valid source of shari `ah. Shätibi thus states in his book "Al-I'ti; Qäm": "I also said the 
same as those 'ulamä' who dropped istilzsän and whatever was based on it, until 
istihsän, after being traced through the fatawä of the caliphs, the well known 
Companions and their followers, and without any objections from other companions, 
became stronger and firmer. Thus for me, it gathered more strength, it gave my soul 
tranquillity and my heart trusted in it willingly. I followed the Companions and took 
them as an example, may God be pleased with them all". 
408 
This statement shows that whoever understands and recognizes the real 
meaning and rationale behind istihsän, will find that, basically, there is no 
disagreement between the 'ulama'. 
Shaikh Mahilläwi states in his book "Tashil al-wusül ilä 'ilm al-usül': 
"Actually, no istihsän over which there is disagreement could be realized, and if it 
meant simply that which the mind (`aql) considers good, no one would ever deem it 
valid. If it is intended to mean what the Hanafis meant, then it is a valid source for all, 
and it is a matter that is not worthy of disagreement". 
409 This statement shows that 
there was no real disagreement over the validity of istihsän. To explain this issue 
further we refer to the opinions of contemporary scholars: 
Khalläf says: "What widened the gap of disagreement in this and similar 
subjects is that the followers of the four main imäms were exaggerated in advocating 
the view of their individual imam, for whenever one of the followers of a particular 
imäm catches a statement of another imäm and such statements appear to have some 
40e Shätibi, "Al-I `ti$am", v: 2, p: 147. 
40 Mahilläwi, "7'ashil" p: 237. 
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contradiction, he (the follower) withholds this apparent meaning and starts to reply 
invalidating the concept of istiJ san. In turn whoever comes after him from the same 
school also exaggerates, and thus the disagreement is widened farther. Had there been 
good intentions without suspicion, and had they accepted it with good intentions, 
there would never have been room for disagreement! . 
41 Khalläf continues: "Had 
those who disagreed with each other specified exactly the point of disagreement 
before exchanging the proofs (hujjah), Muslims would have been saved the trouble of 
having to research and clarify many different terminologies. "411 
This view of Khalläf continues what we have uncovered during the research 
concerning the opinions of the various schools supporting and opposing the validity of 
istiendn. Therefore, the view that outweighs other opinions is the view of the group 
who recognize the validity of isti, sän, on the condition that the departure from the 
principle rule is in favour of isti, sän and is supported by a dalil. IstiIndn is a valid 
source as long as it is not based on personal whim and is supported by one of the 
shari`ah proofs. 
We can conclude that as long as istihsän remains the departure from the rule 
on the grounds of the existence of a stronger dalil, there is sufficient ground for 
recognizing its validity. In cases where istifzsän is without any dalil, but depends on 
personal desire, then it is not permitted. This ensures that the doors are closed in the 
face of those who do not have adequate knowledge of the rules of Islamic shari `ah to 
perform iftä' and legislate laws. Consequently, the `ulamä' who recognize istitndn 
disapprove of istihsän without dalil. As I elaborated earlier, all of the reported cases in 
which istihsän was performed were issued based on a dalil. Hanafi, Mäliki and 
410 Khalläf, "Ma$ddir ", p: 77. 
40 Ibid. 
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Hanbali scholars have recognized isti/zsän as a source of shari`ah and have used it to 
find solutions in circumstances where there is no textual source available. 
Chapter Four 
4.0 VARIOUS TYPES OF ISTI NSAN 
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Scholars divide istitndn into many types depending on the school of thought and 
the basis based on which they recognize the validity of the principle. We have touched on 
this issue in the previous chapter; now we will discuss it in greater detail. 
Isti/uän appears originally as a reaction to the concept of giyäs, and mainly when 
a jurist is faced with a problem for which he can not arrive at a ruling from the definitive 
sources of law within the Qur'an and the Sunnah, and when he then searches for 
precedent and tries to find a solution by making a comparison with a previous case. His 
investigation may reveal two different solutions: one of which is based on an explicit 
(jail) analogy and 
the other on an implicit (khaj analogy. If they contradict each other, 
then the jurist may reject the former in the favour of latter. The implicit analogy is 
considered to be more effective and therefore is preferred over the explicit. Departure 
from one type of giyäs, i. e. jali, to another type of q yäs, i. e. khaji-, is simply called 
isti1ran. 
Despite the controversy over the division of isti/isrni, it is divided mainly into two 
categories a: analogical istitadn, which consists of a departure from giyas jail to giyäs 
khafi and b: exceptional istilisän (istihrän istithna-1) which consists of making an 
exception to a general rule of the existing law; it is approved when the jurist is convinced 
that by making such an exception, justice might be better served. ' After confirming the 
division of giyäs into two types -the explicit and the implicit- $adr al-Shari `ah 
(d. 74711346) calls the implicit (khai) analogy istilsän. However, istihsän is more 
comprehensive than implicit analogy: while every implicit analogy can be called istihsan, 
1 Ibn al-Humäm, "Tah*Tie', v: 4, p: 78; Bazdawi, "Kashf' v: 4, pp: 3,5-6; Ja$p, S, "Al-Fu, r' v: 4, pp: 234, 
243; Sadr al-Shaii'ah, "Tawcl1', v: 2, pp: 162-163. 
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not every case of istiizsän can be called implicit (khan analogy. Istilzsän is an evidence 
(dalil) which is established against explicit analogy. $adr al-Shari'ah then says that it is 
divided into several types such as ijmd', carürah (necessity), athar etc. 2 
Another jurist Bazdawi (d. 48211089) also indicates that istihsän is an implicit 
analogy, and says that its other types consist of athar, ijmd ` (consensus) and cfarürah 
(necessity). 3 
The contemporary scholar Khalläf (d. 1376/1956) divides isti, isän into two main 
types4: I. istihsän which is departure from one ruling to another. It includes: a- the 
requirement that the departure be from giyäs jail to giyäs khafi, b- the requirement that 
the departure be general text (nass `äm) to a specific ruling (/a¬km khäs), and c- that the 
departure be from the general rule of the existing law to an exceptional law. 2- Istibsän 
based on sanad (evidence), which the departure requires. 
The second type of isti/zrc n is considered by the schools of thought (madhhabs) 
along the following lines. The Hanafis divide istifasän into four types: a- istihsän based on 
athar, which is the textual evidences in the Qur'än and Sunnah, b- istihsän based on 
ijmä ` (consensus), c- istifrsän based on chriirah (necessity), d- istikän based on giyäs 
khafi (implicit analogy). Ibn Nujaym (d. 970/1562) has summarised the divisions 
recognized by the Hanafis as follows: istihsän is based on nags (athar), ijmä ` (consensus), 
pbrürah (necessity) and gyäs khafl (implicit analogy). 5 
The Hanbali School has not pronounced officially on the divisions within isti/uän. 
However, particularly, their istihsän can be divided into three types: a- departure from a 
2 ibid v: 2, pp: 161-163. 
3 Bazdawi, "U 71', v: 4, p: 3,5-6. See: An$ärT, "Fawätiff' v: 2, pp: 320-321; Sarakhsi, "UXr', v: 2, pp: 200,202-203. 
4 Khallaf, "Masäder", p: 72, 
5 Ibn Nujaym, "Fathal-Ghaffär"v: 3, p: 30. 
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ruling in favour of Nass, b- departure from giyäs in favour of the saying of the 
Companions, c- departure from giyäs in favour of a stronger one. They have also pointed 
out that the departure from q yäs may be in respect of na; w of which khabar al-wahid 
(isolated Tradition), Indith mashhür (well known Tradition), hadith mutawätir (widely 
spread Tradition) and textual evidences from the Qur'an are some examples. Sometimes, 
the departure occurs in favour of the saying of the Companions, even if it is against 
istihsän. These types are agreed upon among the scholars. In spite of this, if the 
departure applies to another analogy, the scholars on this issue are in disagreement. In 
addition, departure in favour of a stronger analogy is recognised. 
The Malik-is divide istihsän into four types: a- isti, sän based on `urf so long as it 
does not contradict textual evidence, b- istilzsän based on maslatah (benefit), c- istihsän 
based on ijmd ` (consensus), d- departure from q yäs in order to avoid hardship and secure 
benefit for man. 6 
In spite of the disagreement over the division of istii sän, some common issues 
with regard to the types of istihsän are generally agreed upon. As Sarakhsi points out, the 
first type of istilndn -departure from jali to khafi- is agreed upon by all the scholars, and 
opposition to it is unthinkable. Therefore it is regarded as ray ghälib 
7 
Ra'y ghälib can be defined as: "The application of isti/ än by interpretation 
through the most appropriate opinion resembling the ruling whose application the 
Legislator has entrusted to our opinion". 8 It is illustrated in the example of the fixing of 
maintenance (mut'ah) and alimony (nafaqah) as mentioned in the Qur'dn `But bestow on 
them (a suitable gift), the rich according to his means, and the poor according to his 
6 Shätibi, "AI-Muwafagät', v: 4, p: 208. 
7 SarakhsT, "U$91", v: 2, p: 200. 
19 See: Yüsuf, "The Theory", p: 111; also see: Dönmez, "Kaynak Kauroms", p: 132. 
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means, a gift (mut`ah) of reasonable amount is a duty on the doers of good". 9 Another 
example is fixing the cost of the mother's food and clothing as indicated in "The father of 
the child shall bear the cost of the mother's food and clothing on a reasonable basis. "lo 
and, "For divorced women, maintenance (mut`ah) (should be provided) on reasonable 
(scale). "" In the Qur'än the maintenance (mut'ah) of women, and the cost of their food 
and clothing has been made obligatory on those, responsible according to their financial 
capacity. Fixing the exact amounts involved is entrusted to the discretion of the 
mujtahid. 12 
Approving such ijtihdd based on prevailing opinion is called ray ghälib, which is 
the prevailing opinion in istiMdn. 13 Other issues such as the types of punishment for 
killing an animal in the protected places (Haram), the evaluating of an animal to be 
sacrificed, or the evaluation of the blood money in the case of injury have been left to the 
discretion of the jurists, which is based on the most prevalent opinion (ra'y ghalib). '4 
4.1 Istiftdn in the sense of departing from one ruling to another ruling: 
As I have touched on above, this can be divided into three types as follows'5: 
4.1.1 Departure from giyäs jalrto giy5s khan: 
Hanafis divide giyäs into the jail (explicit) and the khafi (implicit). Jail is an 
analogy where the 'illah (effective cause) appears at first glance, without careful 
consideration needing to be given to it. For example, the prohibition of nabidh appears to 
follow on by analogy from the prohibition of wine. However, giyäs khafi is one where the 
9 Qur'im: 2/236 
lo Qur'an: 2/233 
Qur'an: 2/241. 
17 Sarakhsi, "U. 2F', v: 2, p: 200. 
13 Ddnmez, "Kaynak Kavrami", p: 132; `Ali Bakkal, "Islam Hukukunda Hikmet, filet ve Jclimn `i Väkra 
Munasebetlerinin Hukuki Neticelen"', unpublished PhD dissertation, Erzurum, 1986, p: 333. 
14 Ja$ý4, "Fusül", v: 4, p: 233. 
15 Khalläf, "Masäde? ', p: 72. 
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effective cause (111ah) is understood after careful consideration and reflection. 
16 In other 
words, giyäs khaf is preferred over giyäs jai if they are opposed to each other, on 
account of the effective cause (`illah) which is stronger in khaft. Therefore, 
it is called the 
giyäs of juristic preference (istihsän al-giyäs). 
17 
Hanafi jurists point out that the gyäs khaf(, which they called istihsän is in reality 
a kind of giyäs and therefore, its ruling can be moved referred (ta `diyah) to other cases. 
18 
In order to refer a ruling of giyäs, it must be related to an effective cause ('illah) that is 
based on another cause (`illah). Every ruling which is based on `illah would be referred 
to other cases (furü `) which have a similar `illah. This is the ruling of the validated giyäs. 
Ta `diyah (referring a ruling to another case) is an indispensable factor of an effective 
cause (`illah) according to the Hanafis19 
We can see how giyäs khaf is preferred over giyäs jali in the following examples: 
a- According to Hanaf-i rulings, when transferring the ownership of agricultural 
land, all of the ancillary rights (/zzgq al-irtijq) attached to the property, such as the right 
of water (hagq al-shurb), the right of passage (taqq al-murür) and the right of flow (fngq 
al-mash'), are also transferred. This is indisputable, even if it is not stipulated explicitly in 
the document. Besides this, in the contract of lease (ijärah), even if the ancillary rights 
are also not explicitly mentioned in the document, the usufruct (intifa `) is considered as 
part of the contract. So, the leaseholder is able to benefit from these rights. 
16 Hasan, "Analogical reasoning", p: 92. 
17 Bazdawi, "U$E", v: 4, p: 6; Sarakhsi, "U$21", v: 2, p: 203 
18 Sarakhsi, "UWN, v: 2, pp: 202,203,206; BazdawT, "UAl", v: 4, pp: 3,6,10; Nasafi, "Kashf', v: 2, p: 
296; Sadr al-Shari'ah, "Taws 1', v: 2, pp: 162,169. 
19 Karamasü, "Al-Wajiz" p: 185; Bazdawi, "U l", v: 3, p: 389; Sarakhsi, "USÜC', v: 2, pp- 192,206; 
Bukhäri, "Kash, ', v: 3, p: 389; v: 2, p: 11. 
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Another transaction, which resembles both contract sales and leases, is called 
waqf (charitable endowment). If it is considered from the point of view of the donor, waqf 
resembles a contract of sale, because the ownership changes hands. Considering it from 
the side of the donee, waqf resembles a contract of lease (ijarah), because both involve a 
transfer of usufruct (intime `). However, the ownership is not transferred to the other party. 
According to these explanations, the contract faces two different giyäs (analogy) 
rulings when the property is donated as waqf (charitable endowment): if it is compared to 
a contract of sale, what is not included in the contract and is not specified in it, such as 
the ancillary rights (haqq al-irtifäq) will not be included. If it is compared to a contract of 
lease, the ancillary rights will be included in the scope of waqf, even if these are not 
explicitly mentioned and specified by the donee. Here, the first instinct is to compare 
waqf with a contract of sale; comparing it to a contract of lease comes to mind only after 
investigation. Therefore, comparing waqf to a sale is called an explicit analogy (giyäs 
jali), while comparing it to a lease is called implicit analogy (giyäs khan. 
Consequently, including the ancillary rights in the transaction of the waqf without 
requiring any statement or permission from the donee is a ruling of istihsän. If, however 
the ancillary rights are not included it is a ruling of giyäs (analogy) 20 The main reason for 
the preference of istihsän over analogy is that such analogy would lead to unfair results: 
the waqf of cultivated land without its ancillary rights would frustrate the basic purpose 
of waqf, which is to facilitate the use of the property for charitable purposes. Usufruct is 
the essential purpose of ijärah, and this would enable us to say that waqf can be deemed 
20 Sha'bän, "Islam Hukuk Ilminin Esaslarc", p: 168; Khalläf, "Masäder", p: 72. 
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valid even if it does not specify the ancillary rights to the property in detail. Therefore, it 
is compared to a lease in order to avoid hardship for the people. 21 
As we see, the effective cause of the implicit analogy, which is not contrary to the 
Shari `s (Law-maker) purposes, is stronger than the explicit analogy, and therefore it is 
preferred over explicit analogy so that the benefits of the people will be secured. 
b. if a husband tells his wife "Consider yourself divorced if you are 
menstruating", and his wife says "I am menstruating", according to the rule of giyäs, her 
statement is not accepted unless her husband approves or it is made clear that she is 
definitely menstruating. However, the wife's statement is considered true and the divorce 
is actualised based on istitadn. 
The original case (au), based on giyäs, is when a husband says to his wife "If you 
enter the house you are divorced" or "if you speak to someone you are divorced", and the 
wife immediately says "I entered the house after your stipulation" or "I have spoken with 
someone". After that, if husband denies her word, the wife would not be divorced. 
However, if she has evidence to verify it, or if her husband has confirmed her claims, she 
is then divorced, even if another original basis (ag) is found and its effective cause is 
stronger. The ruling of istiizsän is therefore based on the new asl (original case) as 
mentioned in the Qur'än: "And it is not lawful for them to conceal what God has created 
in their wombs, if they believe in God and the Last Day"22 . In addition, a narration from 
`Ubay b. Kdb verifies this: "To trust a woman of her honour is a necessity. s23 The Qur'än 
and faadith advise women that concealing menstruation is forbidden. Therefore, it is 
21 Ibn al-Humäm, "Fat 7 al-Qadir", v: 6, p: 215; Khalläf, "Masäder", pp: 72-73; Sha`bän "Islam Hukuk 
Ilminin Esaslari ' p: 168. 
22 Qur'dn: 2/228. 
23 Bayhägi, "Al-Sonn al-Kubr-Y', v: 7, pp: 371,418; Ibn Fiajar, "Fathal-Bari', v: 9, p: 392; Hakim, "Al- 
Mustadrak", v: 2, p: 458; Ibn Abi Shaybah, "Al-Musnnaf', v: 4, p: 199. 
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necessary to trust women on those issues which can only be recognized by them. The 
ruling of the Qur'än and lvdith have become an a (original case) for the statement of 
women on that issue. In addition, if woman says, "my period has ended" then her 
statement must be taken as true. Therefore, her statement in the issue of divorce when she 
says "I have a period" is also accepted on the basis of this asl (original case), according to 
isti hsän. 24 
c- If a group of people gain unlawful entry into a house, steal collected 
commodities and load them on one person's back and that person carries the commodities 
outside while the others are not carrying anything, according to giyäs, the punishment is 
only applied to the person who carried the commodities. However, according to isti, znan 
the punishment is applied to all of those who were involved in the robbery. 25 
In this case, there are two contradictory asl (original cases): the first involves a 
group of people who encourage one of their number to rape a woman. In this case, there 
is no conflict among the jurists and the penalty is applied only to the rapist. This is a 
ruling of giyäs as opposed to istihsän. The second case is that of a group of people who 
congregate with the intention to attack, kill and rob people of their commodities; in this 
case, the penalty of highway robbery is applied to all. This case is not disputed by jurists 
because they agree that the punishment must be applied to all who are involved in the 
highway robbery. According to the Qur'än: 
"The recompense of those who wage war against God and 
His Messenger and do mischief in the land is only that they 
shall be killed or crucified or their hands and their feet be 
24 Jaý§4, "Fu,! ", v: 4, pp: 234-236, Sarakhsi, "U Ir', v: 2, p: 202. ' Sarakhsl, "Uxl", ii, 201; Ja W4, "Futil", iv, 238. 
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cut off from opposite sides, or be exiled from the land. That 
is their disgrace in this world, and a great torment is theirs 
in the Hereafter. Except for those who (having fled away 
and then) came back (as Muslims) with repentance before 
they fall into your power; in that case, know that God is 
Oft-Forgiving, Most Merciful. "26 
239 
After investigating carefully, it becomes clear that comparing the house robbery to a 
highway robbery offers a clearer solution than comparing it to rape. 27 The departure from 
one original case (ate to another because of the stronger reason is a solution sought by 
istihrýin in order to better protect society. 
d- If a man sells goods, such clothes, with a specific weight or measure under a 
contract of forward sale (salam)25 to someone, but then withdraws the offer of sale before 
being paid, the transaction becomes null and void. However, if this transaction is 
completed in the normal way and the seller does not withdraw the offer of sale, the 
transaction is valid according to istihsan because the customer is able to take his goods 
any time he wants and the possibility of illegal action is therefore avoided. This is in spite 
of the fact that, according to giyäs both transactions are similar. As is normal, the goods 
will be delivered later in the forward sale (salam). If the money is not taken in advance, 
both parties may discontinue the transaction, which then causes harm to either the seller 
26 Qur'dn: 5/33-34 
27 7as555, "Fu92f' iv, 239. 
28 Salam. This is an investment as a forward sale contract involving the current payment for assets to be 
delivered in the future. The goods or assets to be purchased do not need to be in existence or in completed 
form at the time of contracting, but must be ascertainable. The Prophet said: "Whoever concludes salam, let 
him do so over a specified measure, specified weight and specified period of time". See: Bukhäri, ". ahFN', 
v: 3, p: 243, ftadith no: 441. 
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or buyer or both. Paying in advance is preferred as the contract will be more secure. The 
condition29 of a forward sale (salam) naturally includes guarantee of security. 30 
We can draw a conclusion regarding implicit analogy as follows: 
a- Departing from explicit analogy to implicit analogy indicates that the explicit 
analogy, at the appearance of the effective cause (`illah), could not secure the benefit of 
the people and is thus unable to manifest the wisdom of the shari `ah. 31 
b- To prefer the explicit analogy is to risk the occurrence of unexpected and 
unwanted results, which would not be conducive to the public good. When istihrän, 
which is the implicit analogy, is preferred, the purposes of the Shdri ` will obviously be 
achieved. 
c- While rulings based on explicit analogy are suitable for specific issues with 
textual (nass) evidence, implicit analogy is more suited to non-specific issues with no 
29 Conditions of Salam: l. It is necessary for the validity of salam that the buyer pays the price in full to the 
seller at the time of the sale. In the absence of full payment, it will be tantamount to sale of a debt against a 
debt, which is expressly prohibited by the Holy Prophet. Moreover, the basic wisdom for allowing salam is 
to fulfil the "instant need" of the seller. If it is not paid in full, the basic purpose will not be achieved . 2. only those goods can be sold through a salam contract in which the quantity and quality can be exactly 
specified. Precious stones cannot be sold on the basis of salam because each stone differs in quality, size, 
weight and their exact specification is not possible. 3. Salam cannot be effected on a particular commodity 
or on a product of a particular field or farm e. g. Supply of wheat of a particular field or the fruit of a 
particular tree since there is a possibility that the crop will be destroyed before delivery and given such a 
possibility, the delivery remains uncertain. 4. All details in respect to quality of goods sold must be 
expressly specified leaving no ambiguity which may lead to a dispute. 5. It is necessary that the quantity of 
the commodity be agreed upon in absolute terms. It should be measured or weighed in its usual measure 
only, meaning what is normally weighed cannot be quantified and vice versa. 6. The exact date and place of 
delivery must be specified in the contract. 7. Salam cannot be effected in respect of things which must be 
delivered on the spot. 8. The commodity for salam contract should remain in the market right from the day 
of contract up to the date of delivery. 9. The time of delivery should be at least fifteen days or one month 
from the date of the agreement. The price in salam is generally lower than the price in a spot sale. The 
period should be long enough to affect prices. But Hanafi frgh does not specify any minimum period for the 
validity of salam. It is alright to have an earlier date of delivery if the seller consents to it 10. Since the 
price in salam is generally lower than the price in a spot sale, the difference in the two prices may be a 
valid profit for the Bank. 11. A security in the form of a guarantee, mortgage or hypothecation may be 
required for a salam in order to ensure that the seller delivers. 12. The seller at the time of delivery delivers 
commodities and not money to the buyer who would have to establish a special cell for dealing in 
commodities. See: Meezan Bank: salami httpJ/www. meezanbank. com/knowledge-islamic-section-4-5. asp. 
30 Shaybäni, "Al-Asl", v: 5, pp: 42-43. 
31 Bakkal, "Neticelen"', pp: 348-349. 
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clear textual evidence to support them. Indeed, implicit analogy may realize the purpose 
of nass more effectively than explicit analogy. 
4.1.2 Departure from naffs to a specific ruling: 
Under this sub-heading, I will give some information about the `äm (general) the khäs 
(specific) and takhss (particularization). 
4.1.2.1 The `am (general): This is a term that involves general principles or issues rather 
than details or particular issues: it is not confined to one particular case or amount and 
may be generalized to cover a wide range of different issues and people. For example; in 
"(as for) the thief, the male and the female, amputate their hands in recompense for what 
they earned (i. e. committed) as a deterrent punishment from God. God is Exalted in 
Might and Wise. 02, the words "al-säriqu wa al-särigatu" (the male and the female thief) 
apply to all who commit that crime, and no-one in particular is specified. 
4.1.2.2 The khds (specific): This is a term that denotes detailed and exact meaning 
connected with only one specific thing or person. For example, `Umar, man, woman etc. 
Besides this, even if it contains plurality, and that plurality is restricted, then the term is 
considered as kha for example; two, three, four, a hundred, two thousand etc. 
Scholars unanimously agree that the khhäss (specific) definitely indicates a 
determined meaning, so long as contrary evidence against its specificity does not exist. 
The specific meaning cannot define the term to be anything other than what it is. 33 For 
example, in 
"God will not impose blame upon you for what is 
meaningless in your oaths, but He will impose blame 
32 Qur'an: 5/38; 
33 Sha`bän, 'Islam Hukuk liminin Esaslarf', p: 265. 
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upon you for (breaking) what you intended of oaths. 
Therefore, expiation is the feeding of ten needy 
people from the average of that which you feed your 
(own) families or clothing them or the freeing of a 
slave. But whoever can not find (or afford it) then a 
fast of three days (is required)s34, 
242 
The words "raqabah", (neck), "`ashara", (ten), and "thaläthah", (three) are khäss 
(specific) and denote the expiation of broken oaths, namely the freeing of a slave, the 
feeding of ten orphans, or fasting for three days. Indicating these with khdss (specific) 
terms excludes any possibility of their having other meanings 
35 
4.1.2.3 Takhsr4s (particularization)36: The thing or issue which prompts particularisation 
is called mukhass: s (particularising agent), while the thing or issue particularised is 
known as the mukhassas(particularized agent). 
7 
Departing from a general ruling to a specific ruling in order to uphold the spirit 
and purpose of the shari `ah is considered a type of istihrän. In the ruling of giyäs, 
particularization is not recognized under any conditions; however istirnan allows the 
particularization of the 711ah in order for istihsän itself to be applied. As we know, one of 
the definitions of istilrsän given by the Hanafi jurists is the "abandoning of one judgement 
in favour of another"38. For example, according to the general rulings in the Qur'an, 
Muslims are prohibited to eat unlawful meat (nzaytata) which has not been slaughtered 
3' Qur'an: 5/89. 
35 Sha`bän, ibid, p: 266. 
36 This term was translated as specification, particularization, specialization or limitation. George Makdisi 
used it in the meaning for "limitation". See: Makdisi "Ibn TaymiyyahAuthograph Manuscript on Istihrän" 
in the Arabic And Islamic Studies In Honor of Hamilton A. R. Gibb, Cambridge: Harward University Press, 
1965, p: 446. 
37 Atar, "Fikih Usulü", p: 195; Sha`bän, ibid, p: 297. 
38 Ibn Taymiyyah, "Mas'alah", pp: 457-458. 
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ritually: "Forbidden to you (for food) are: al-maytata (the dead animals-cattle 
beast not 
slaughtered)... s39. Here the word "al-maytata" (dead) is comprehensive and covers sea 
animals as well as others. However, the Prophet's saying "Huwa al-tzhüru mäuhu al-/i llu 
maytatuhu"40, particularizes the word to mean all animals apart 
from sea animals 41 
From a different perspective, if someone's life is in danger and there is nothing 
for him to eat except carrion (maytata), then the general ruling has to be reconsidered and 
put aside, since protecting the live of Muslims is considered to be one of the five essential 
values of the shari `ah. The `illah (cause) of the particularization of the general ruling 
here is starvation, which may lead to death. Hence, particularization is aimed at securing 
a better understanding of the general principles of the shari `ah and its proper 
implementation by means of isti1nan 42 This kind of implementation, according to Hanafi 
thought, is considered part of istitnan, which is based on the na$, q of the Qur'an and 
Sunnah. 43 
More examples here will help to further illustrate this. According to the general 
text of the Qur'an, theft is absolutely forbidden and the thief is punished by the cutting 
off hands. "And (as for) the male thief and the female thief, cut off (from the wrist joint) 
their (right) hands as a recompense for that which they committed, a punishment by way 
of example from God. And God is All Powerful, All wise. "44 The naffs of the Qur'an 
requires that the thief's hand be amputated if the condition of stealing is fulfilled. General 
rulings of Islamic law require the cutting off of the thief's hand even in the year of 
39 Qur'an: 5/3. 
40 Abü Däwüd, "Tahärah", 41. 
41 Sha`bän, ibid, p: 299. 
42 Shätibi, "Al-Muwdfagät", v: 4, p: 208. 
43 Ismä`i1, "Usül" , v: 
2, p: 77. 
"Qur'an: 5138. 
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famine, because of the generalized meaning of the word "säriq" (thief). However, the 
scholars are in agreement that during a famine, no amputation would take place. As 
`Umar practiced such particularisation, no one opposes the consensus. 
45 
Nevertheless, the consensus is restricted by the condition that the person who 
steals would not be able to find food to eat. If he has sufficient rations and he survives, he 
will then be penalized. In spite of the ruling of giyäs, which requires amputation because 
the text does not distinguish between the obligatory or non-obligatory nature of 
amputation, scholars have said that it is not necessary, based on istihsän. Ibäd b. 
Shurahbil, narrates the following anecdote: During a year of famine, hunger forced me to 
steal food, which I hid in my clothes. When the owner found out, he thrashed me and 
took me to the Prophet. The Prophet said: "If he is uneducated, educate him; and if he is 
starving, feed him. " He then ordered the owner to return my clothes and gave me a 
container of food. 
46 In the light of this hrrdith, Ibn Qudämah said that, as narrated from 
Ahmad Ibn Hanbal, if a needy person steals, his hand will not be amputated during the 
year of famine. It was also narrated by `Umar ibn Khattab that "amputation will not take 
place during the year of famine" and according to'Umar's practice, the penalty was 
avoided. 7 This is because the /add penalty was never carried out when there was doubt. 
Consequently, `Umar particularized the general text of the Qur'an because of the year of 
famine and avoided the cutting off of the hand based on the concept of istihsän. 
4.1.3. Departure from the general rule of the existing law to an exceptional law: 
Exceptional istitu n is represented here by the example of charitable endowment 
(wagf) made by someone mentally defective (sash) who is under the protection of a 
as Ibn Humam, "Fath at-Qaä: r", v: 4, p: 299; Khalläf, "Masider", p: 72; Ismäll, "Ugrl, v: 2, p: 79. 
46 Abü Däwud, "Sunan", v: 3, pp: 426,427. 
47 Ibn Qudknah, "Rawdat", v: 10, pp: 288,289 
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guardian. This is based on the istihsdn ruling which permits the mentally defective to 
make such endowments regardless of whether or not they are under someone's 
guardianship. It is based on the benefits of the people because permitting it by way of 
istihsän may encourage people to do charitable and good works. According to giyäs, 
however, a mentally defective person cannot make a charitable endowment (wagt) under 
protection of a guardian. The charitable endowment is a kind of donation (tabarru') and a 
person under guardianship is not eligible to give donations 
48 Istihsän departs from the 
established ruling and thus validates the donation. 
However, if the one under guardianship does make a charitable endowment, what 
is the position? 
According to the general rule, which is giyäs, this donation is not valid if the 
mentally defective (saflh) makes a donation. Al-Khussäf, a Hanafi jurist, observes that 
this donation may cause harm to his self, and therefore is not valid. However, Abi) Yüsuf 
is of the opinion that it is valid. However, all Hanafi scholars agreed that if he donates 
something after he leaves the guardianship, it is valid 
49 
4.2. Isti/adn based on sanad in terms of the departure: 
Under this sub-heading, I am going to discuss the types of istihsän based on 
sand. We know that istihsän is invalid if it is not based on dalil, in which case it would 
be seen as acting according to one's own wishes and desires. Therefore, relating it to the 
evidence is vital, otherwise it is not recognised. Jurists divide istihsän into different types 
as I have mentioned earlier. 
ae Zaydan, «Al-Wajiz' p: 232. 
49 Ibn Huunm, "Fath al-Qadir", v: 6, p: 201. 
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We encounter, in general, three types of istihsän, which are based on explicit 
evidences, according to the Hanafi sources. These are istitWin based on athar (the Qur'än 
and the Sunnah); on ijmä ` (consensus); and on necessity (c(arürah). In addition, they 
considered implicit analogy as one of the types of istihsdn. 
50 Beside this, we also come 
across kinds of istihsän based on the sayings of the Companions, 51 on `urf; on 
masla, nh; 52 on raf al-t raj (avoiding hardship) ; 
53 on precaution (ifxiyät); and on the 
consideration of current needs.. a 
Hanafi Jurists have also used the term athar (tradition)55 more than the term nag 
(text), and include the sayings of the Companions56 in this term. 57 They used to say, "We 
approve istihsan on the ground of athar" which is based on the sayings of the 
Companions. 58 
5o Molla Jiwän, "Sharp Nur aI Anwär", v: 6, p: 164. 
51 Sarakhsi, "Ai-Mabsüc", v: 4, pp: 93,130, v: 8, p: 140, v: 9, p: 121, v: 12, p: 129, v: 13, p: 99,137, v: 26, 
pp: 127,190. 
52 Sarakhsi, "AI-Mabsüt", v: 3, p: 113, v: 4, p: 168, v: 10, pp: 126,127, v: 11, p: 5, v: 12, p: 62, v: 14, p: 
123, v: 15, p: 50, v: 17, p: 83, v: 23, p: 124. 
53 Sarakhsi, "Al-Mabsüt", v: 10, pp: 36,75, v: 11, pp: 25,142,251, v: 12, p: 12,145, v: 14, p: 133, v: 15, 
p: 131, v: 19, p: 151, v: 23, p: 124. 
54 AN Yüsuf, "Al-Kharäj°', p: 189; Sarakhsi, "Al-Mabsüt", v: 9, p: 76, v: 11, pp: 27,88. 
55 Athar literally means the remains of something the plural is äthär and uthür, See: lbn Manzar, "Lisän al- 
'Arab", v: 4, pp: 5-6; Al-Zäbidi, "Täj al-`Arils min Jawähiral-Qämüs", v: 10, pp: 12- 14, Firizabädi 
"Qämus al-Muffl', pp: 435,436. In the science of i dith it is used with the same meaning of khabar and 
tradition (? 2dith). Athar not only contains the acta dicta, sayings and tagrirs of the Prophet, but also 
contains akhbär which is related to the Companions. Some scholars have named their books athar, e. g. as 
Al-Shaybäni s "Al Athar" which contains the narrations from the Prophet and the Companions. Also 
Tahawl called his book, "Sharpal-Ma`ani athar" which contains the same j diths, al-Bayhäki 
(d. 458/1066) also called his book "Ma `rifah al-Sonn wa al-Athar". See: Sahawi, Abü `Abd Allah 
Muhamad, "Fathal-Mughis bi Shar/7[ Alfiyat at-Madith Ii al-Irägiyyah", edited by `Ali Husayn 'All, Där al- 
Imätn al-Tabarl, 1992, v: 1, pp: 123-125; Jaläl al-Din `Abd al-Rahmän Suyuti, "Tadrib al-Rawl fi Sharht 
Tagrb al-Räw? ', edited by `Abd al-Wahhäb `Abd a1-Latif, Dar al-lhyä' al-Sunan al-Nabawiyyah, Beirut, 
1979, v: 1, pp: 184-185. 
56 Sahaw7, "Fat/7al-Mughith", v: 1, pp: 124-125. 
57 Bazdawi, "Us37C', v: 4, p: 5,10, Sadr al-Shari`ah "Tawdd11', v: 2, p: 163; Jassy , "Fu$ r', v: 4, p: 246, 
247; Häd. irni, "Majämi ` al-Hagäiq" , p: 
234; Karamasfi ; `AI-WajTi', p: 187; Molla Husraw "Mir'ät at- 
U 7l", p: 336; Nasafi, "Kashf', v: 2, pp: 290,296; Ibn Kamäl, "Taghäyir al-Tangfh ft al-U97f', p: 192. 
59 Sarakhsi, "Ai-Mabsüt', v: 26, p: 127; AN Yüsuf, "Al-Kharäf ', p: 178. 
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As Shädbi shows, Mäliki scholars also divide istifzsän into four types; 59 istihsän 
based on `urf (custom); on maýla xh (benefit); on raf al-haraj and mashaqqah (avoiding 
hardship); and ijma' (consensus) 60 
Comparing the Hanafi and Mälik viewpoints, we see that they agree on isti, isän 
which is based on custom (`urf), or on benefit (ma5lalxh). Khalläf adds that benefit 
(maýIaixsh) contains that which the Hanafis call necessity (ýkirürah), and which the 
Mälikis refer to as avoidance of hardship (raf al-faaraj). Departure from a ruling inferred 
by gryäs or from a general ruling or established ruling to another ruling on the ground of 
custom (`urj) or benefit (ma-4aizlh) which brings ease and avoids hardship is called 
isti/zsän by both schools. 61 
However, they disagree as to what the evidence is based on, and whether it is nass 
(text) or implicit analogy (giyäs khafi). However, to describe something as istihsän based 
on nag or implicit analogy does not make sense, since a ruling that is based on nass is 
established by nass (text) and giyäs too. Therefore, istihsän based on naffs is an 
exception. 2 
Despite this disagreement, the scholars do not reject rulings that are inferred; their 
disagreement is purely academic. 
Consequently, we may consider isti/zsän based on sanad into five types: 1- 
Istihsän based on athar, which is the Qur'än, the Sunnah and the saying of the 
Companions. 2- Istifzsän based on ijmä` (consensus). 3- Istiftän based on necessity 
59 Shätibi, "Ai-Muwäfagät", v: 4, p: 208; Shätibi, "Al-I`ti, 95m", v: 2, p: 139. 
60 The first three types of Isti/zsän have been mentioned in the book "Al-I `titsäm" v: 2, p: 139, and the last 
one which is ijmä ` (consensus) is mentioned in the book of "Al-Muwäfaq&', v: 4, p: 208. 
61 Khalläf, "Ma c der", p: 75. 
62 Ibid. 
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(dzrurah) and the avoidance of hardship (raf' al-laaräj). 4- Istihsdn based on benefit or 
public good (ma. cla(i. h). 5- Istitudn based on custom (`urf). 
The Qur'an, the Sunnah and the saying of the Companions will now be considered in the 
context of textual evidence (nass). 
4.2.1 Isti/aJn based on athar: 
The meaning of isti? ndn based on athar is the departure from the ruling of giyäs 
jäli (explicit analogy) to a ruling that is proved by nass which opposes the ruling of 
giyäs. 63 The ruling of nass is considered as stronger evidence, whether it is from the 
Qur'än or the Sunnah or from athar. The ruling of giyäs cannot charge the opposition of 
nass Considering many cases based on the general rulings and general texts using 
analogical reasoning is quite possible; however, it may oppose the Lawgiver's purposes 
64 and thus run counter to the public good 
There is no dispute among the scholars that mutawatir65 and mashhür hadith 
(well-known fv4Tth}6 narrated from the Prophet are preferred over giyäs. 67 Isolated 
traditions (khabar al-wähid) are also seen as a valid source of law 68 However, in the case 
63 Bazdawi, "Kashf', v: 4, p: 5. 
6' Sarakhsi, "U9il", v: 2, p: 202. 
65 Mutawatir: literally means continuously recurrent. In the present context, it means a report by an 
indefinite number of people related in such a way as to preclede the possibility of their agreement to 
perpetuate a lie. Such a possibility is inconceivable owing to their large number, diversity of residence, and 
reliability. See: Karnali, "Principles", p: 68; Khudarl, "U$W', p: 214; Aghnides Nicolas P. "Muhammadan 
Theories of Finance", New York, Longman Green &Co. 1916, reprint, Lahore: Premier Book House, 
1957, p'. 40. 
66 Mashhir: is defined as a hadith which is originally reported by one, two or more Companions from the 
Prophet or from another Companion but which has later become well-known and transmitted by an 
indefinite number of people. See: Aghnides, "Muhammedan Theories", p: 44; Abü Zahrah, "UXl", p: 84. 
67 SarakhST, "U 21", v: 1, p: 282; Bazdawl, Vgl", v: 2, pp: 360-369. 
68 SarakhsI, "Until", v: 1, p: 321; Nasafl, "Kashf, v: 2, p: 14; Bazdawl, "USW', v: 2, p: 370. 
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of a dispute between a khabar al-wäfiid (isolated tradition) and analogy, which is a 
subject of disagreement among the scholars, the former is usually preferable. 
9 
However, Zargä criticises the kind of istilzsän which is based on naV and athar, 
saying that isti/zsän which is based on naV and ijmä ` could not be called istihsän because 
these rulings are already based on nass and ijmä and have nothing to do with isti, isän or 
giyäs. He says that istihsän is the departure from analogy due to the non-existence of 
written legal rulings. Of course, the Qur'an, the Sunnah and ijmä ` have priority over 
giyäs (analogy). Therefore, neither giyäs nor istihsän is needed and it is incorrect to call 
this istihsän because it causes confusion 70 
Despite Zargä's comments, his view seems erroneous because giyäs would not be 
approved with the existence of nass and ijmä `; only when nass and ijrnä ` are absent may 
giyas or general rulings be applied. 
1 In fact, jurists who approved istihsän used the 
statement "We left this giyäs because of athar"; "If athar is not existent we would 
approve it according to present giyäs. " 
4.2.1.1 Istilaän based on the Qur'an: 
This kind of isti, sän is illustrated by the following examples: 
a- A highway robber repents after stealing goods and after a while recompenses 
the owner of the goods. According to giyds, he must be prosecuted because of his original 
crime. This case refers to a thief and a highway robber; and on the basis of hiräbah 
(highway robbery), punishment is obligatory. However, istihsän departs from this and no 
longer considers it highway robbery after repentance. Repentance (tawbah) releases the 
69 Preferring an Isolated tradition (khabar al-wähid), which is narrated by a just and honest narrator, to 
giyas (analogy) is also considered a kind of istihsän and therefore it is disputable. 
° Zargä, "AI-Madkhal", v: 1, pp: 85-86. 
71 Taftazäni, "Al-Talwih" v: 2, pp: 163-164. 
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guilty party from the charge of highway robbery and drops the punishment of iaadd, based 
on istihsän, as indicated in the Qur'an: `Except for those who return (repenting) before 
you overcome (i. e. apprehend) them. And know that God is forgiving and Merciful"72. 
This verse necessitates the departure from the ruling of giyäs and the dropping of the 
fiiadd. An example is that of Harith ibn Zayd. He was a highway robber who later repented 
and was not executed, even though he had committed the crime. `Ali ibn Abi Taub 
approved the departure from the ruling of giyäs based on the above mentioned nag73 
b- An elderly person is incapable of performing the obligatory fast. He is allowed 
instead to pay a sum of money for each day of the missed obligatory fast, based on 
istihsän. However, he is not allowed to do this according to giyäs because there is no 
connection or similarity between fasting and the feeding of poor people. Despite the giyäs 
ruling, God has shown leniency to those who are incapable of fasting: "So whoever 
among you is ill or on a journey (during them) then an equal number of days (arc to be 
made up). And upon those who are able (to fast, but with hardship) a ransom (as 
substitute) of feeding a poor person (each day). 9974 Therefore, it is allowed based on the 
textual nass75 
c- A Muslim does not have to pay upkeep to his father if the latter is a non- 
Muslim, according to analogy based on the fact that they do not inherit from each other 
after death. However, Hanafi jurists base their judgment on the verse "Accompany them 
in this world with appropriate kindness"76 and approve istihrän against the ruling of 
giyäs, thus departing from the established ruling to one which says that a Muslim has to 
72 Qur'an: 5/34 
73 SarakhsT, "Al-Mabsa ', v: 9, p: 204. 
74 Qur'dn: 2/184. 
TS Marghinäiü, "Al-Hidäyah", v: 1, p: 127. 
76 Qur'dn: 31/15. 
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pay upkeep to his poor elderly parents who are non-Muslims. In addition, Hanafi jurists 
base their judgements on the following rational reason, namely that rights of upkeep and 
financial maintenance between parents and a child are a natural matter of birth rights 
(wilädah), and that leaving parents in poverty is an unkind act. 
7 
4.2.1.2 Isti jaän based on the Sunnah: 
This kind of isti/zsän is illustrated by the following examples: 
a- Eating and drinking in Ramadan by mistake nullifies the fast and requires 
expiation, according to giyäs. However, Abü Hanifah and his disciples observe that 
according to istihsän, eating or drinking by mistake do not nullify the fast 
78 Eating and 
drinking by mistake is compared to cutting short the prayers by mistake, which does not 
nullify the prayer. 79 According to istihsän, the eating or drinking is not purposeful and 
thus does not nullify the fast. Therefore, istihsän is validated and preferred over the ruling 
of giyäs. It is based on nafs for the Prophet says "Whoever eats or drinks by mistakes, let 
him complete his fasting because it is a gift from God. " And: "If a person who is fasting 
eats or drinks by mistake, it is a rizq which God feeds him with and no compensation is 
required", similarly "Whoever breaks his fast by mistake in the month of Ramackin is 
neither required to repeat the fast nor to pay karah (penance, expiation). ""' 
Consequently, giyäs is departed from on the grounds of naff (Padith), and isti/hsän is 
approved. Abü Hanifah says: "I would have used giyäs if narrations had not been 
found". 81 Naturally, eating or drinking by mistake is beyond one's power. Also a fly 
Yavuz, "Ictihad Felsefesi"', pp: 313-314; Sarakhsi, "Al-Mabsüt ", v: 5, p: 206. 
'B Jg5ä$, "Fussel" v: 4, p: 116; Sarakhsi, "Al-Mabsüt", v: 3, p: 65. 
79 Ibn Rushd, "Bidäyat al Mujtahid" v: 1, p: 303. 
80 Shawkani, "Nay! al-Awl ", v: 4, p: 231. 
81 K4 äff, `Badäi` a! -, Sanäi "', v: 2, p: 90; Dihlawi, ", %. at Allah al-Bälighah", v: 1, p: 161; Shaibäni, "A! - 
Njah" v: 1, p: 392; Haytami, "A! -/hyät al-/7isän", p: 104. 
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entering the mouth is considered the same as eating or 
drinking by mistake. Abt Hanifah 
says that such incidents are beyond one's control whilst fasting, and 
dust entering a 
person's mouth whilst speaking. 
82 
b- Forward sale (salam), for example, is invalid because of failing to satisfy one 
of the requirements of a valid sale, which is that the subject matter of the sale must 
be 
physically present at the time of contract. According to giyäs forward sale is invalid. 
The 
Prophet was asked by one of the Companions, Hakim b. Hizäm, whether he could sell a 
commodity prior to purchasing it himself. The Prophet replied: "sell not what is not with 
you". 83 Despite the fact that giyas rejects forward sale, the is th approves salam with the 
following statement: "Whoever concludes salam, let him do so in a specified measure, 
specified weight and specified period of time. "84 Based on this liadith, Hanafi jurists 
validated forward sale (salam) according to istihsän 
as 
4.2.1.3 Isti/tsan based on athar: 
The meaning of athar, as I have explained earlier, refers to the acta and dicta of 
the Prophet and the Companions. 
86 Provided that there was no disagreement concerning 
it, a Companion's opinion was acceptable by Hanafi jurists as a kind of implicit ijmä' 
(ijmä ` suküt» that was preferred to giyäs. 
S7 
Istihsän based on athar will be illustrated by the following examples; a- A judge, 
ruler or political authority who witnesses witness a crime of theft, adultery or the drinking 
of wine, may not judge or punish on the basis of his own witnessing and must wait until 
82 Saraldisi, "Al-Mabsü " v: 4, p: 93. 
83 AN Däwüd, "Buyü "', 70. 
94 BukhärT, ", Sa/1 t', iii, 243, nth no: 441; Muslim, "Muscigät", 25; Abü Däw id "Buyü"', 57. 
85 Nasafi, "Kash, ', v: 2, p: 291; Sarakhsi, "U i1", v: 2, p: 203. 
86 SuyütT, `T'adrib al-Rawr ' v: 1, pp: 184-18; Sahawi, "Fath al-Mughifh" v: 1, pp: 123-125. 
87 Nasafi, "Kashf', v: 2, p: 177; Ibn Humäm, "Tahrir", v: 3, p: 133; An$äri, "Fawdtia1 al-Rahamüf', v: 2, p: 
186. 
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legal evidences are established. This kind of istihrän is based on a tradition (athar) 
reported from Abü Bakr and `Umar. However, according to giyas they are able to execute 
the judgement on the basis of their personal knowledge and witnessing. 
88 
b- If a person is unconscious and the time for prayer passes, according to giyäs the person 
should not have to make up the prayer later. However, Hanafi jurists departed from the 
ruling of giyäs to the ruling of isti, sän based on the behaviour of `Ammär, one of the 
Companions. He was once unconscious for a whole day, then woke up and prayed the 
prayers he had missed. Therefore, the Hanafis ruled that whoever misses their prayer in 
such a circumstance should make up that prayer. 
89 
c- A group of people attack a person and kill him; according to giyäs, retaliation (ga, Fäs) 
is not required against the whole group. The chief condition in retaliation is equality. 
Killing more than one person is considered as transgression and oppression. However, 
Hanafi jurists departed from the ruling of giyäs based on the practice of the Caliph `Umar. 
It is narrated that seven people had killed a person during an attack. Umar was reported 
to have said "I would have ordered retaliation against the whole of the population of 
San' ä if they had joined in the killing of one person". 90 
4.2.2Istifisdn based on consensus (ijma`): 
Ijmä` 91 is the unanimous agreement of the mujtahidün of the Muslim community 
of any period following the demise of the Prophet Muhammad on a religious issue. 
Istihsän based on ijmä' is illustrated here by the following examples: 
89 AN Yüsuf, "Al-Kharäf", p: 178; Hassan, "The Early" p: 146. 
89 Ja äS, "Fu$cl", v: 3, p: 361. 
90 Mälik, "Muwat0' "', v: 2, p: 871; Bayhägi, "Sunan", v: 8, pp: 40-41; Ibn Abi Shaybah, "Al-Musannaf, 
v: 5, p: 410,429; SarakhsT, "Al-Mabsüf", v: 26, p: 127; Zayläi, "Nasb al-Rä'yah" v: 4, p: 353. 
91 For more about ijm .' see in the Introductory 
Chapter. 
92 $adr al-Shan`ah, "Al-TawOll', ii, p: 41; Bukhari, "Kas1f', v: iii, p: 227; Amidi, "Ihkä, n", I, p: 196; 
GhazWT, "Mustaf' I, p: 110; Qarafr, "Sharp', p: 141. 
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a- Hanafi scholars mainly illustrate this kind of istihsän by the concept of isticnä' (the 
contract for manufacturing of goods) 
93 For example, if someone places an order with a 
craftsman for certain goods to be made at a price which is determined at the time of the 
contract, according to the general rule of shari`ah, it is invalid. This is because the object 
of the contract does not exist at the time the order was made. Making a transaction for a 
non-existent object is invalid according to the Prophet's prohibition, "Sell not what is not 
with you". 4 
However, the danafis use istifsdn and depart from the established ruling of giyds 
on the grounds of the consensus of the Companions. During the time of the Companions, 
this customary transaction was prevalent and no one scholar rejected it. Dabbüsi 
(d. 430/1039) says: "They depart from the ruling of giyäs because of consensus which is 
based on the customary transactions, and it is accepted in, and uncontested by, the 
Muslim community. "95 A similar point has been made by Sarakhsi: "Qiyäs does not deem 
this contract valid, yet we left the ruling of giyäs on the grounds that the transaction in 
question has been customary since the time of the Prophet". 
6 People were implementing 
this transaction, and none of the scholars rejected it; custom is a factor that must be 
considered in social and economic issues such as this. Following custom reflects the 
Prophetic Tradition: "What the Muslims deem to be good is good in the sight of God"97 
93 Isti91Q'. This is the giving of an order to a labourer or artisan to make a definite article with agreement to 
pay a 
'definite price for that article when made. See: $Ileh A. Nabil, "Unlawful gain and legitimate profit in 
Islamic jaw', Cambridge University Press, 1986, p: 61. 
94 Abo Däwüd, "Buyü "', 70; TahawT, "Shares' v: 4, pp: 38,40. 
95 Nasafi, "Kashj', v: 2, p: 292; Ibn Malak, "Shari1', p: 813. 
96 Sarakhsi, "U4W', v: 2, p: 203. 
97 Sha ibi, "1'tisäm", v: 2, p: 319; Amid!, "Ilicäm", v: 1, p: 214; Ibn Hanbal, "Al-Musnad", v: 1, p: 379; 
Hin, "Mustadrak", v: 3, p: 83; Tabaräni "Al-M `jam", v: 4, p: 58. 
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and "My community will not agree on an error. When you see disagreement, you should 
follow the overwhelming majority. s98 
b- According to Sarakhsi, if a husband and wife apostatize together, they must separate, 
according to giyäs. This is because the situation of apostasy is an obstacle for performing 
nikäh (marriage) in the first place; and secondly, it hinders the continuance of nikäh. 
However, Abü Hanifah and his disciples, Abü Yüsuf and Shaibäni, depart from the ruling 
of giyäs because of the consensus of the Companions, based on the case of the Banü 
Hanifah. It is known that the Banü Hanifah tribe had apostatized in order not to pay 
zakät. 99 Because of this, Aba Bakr declared war on them, while inviting them to repent. 
After their repentance, the Caliph did not ask them to renew their marriages (nikäh), and 
no other Companions required it either. 100 
The example indicates the consensus of the Companions with regard to this case. In fact, 
not all the Companions gave their opinion on this case, but expressed their tacit approval 
by not rejecting Abn Bakr's decision. That is why this consensus is considered as a kind 
of tacit consensus (ijma' suküti)lol Hanafi Jurists apply istihsän based on consensus 
without indicating that it is a kind of tacit ijmä `. 
c- A man dressed in ihram102 points out an animal to another man, who may or may not 
be dressed in ilrram. The second man then slaughters that animal. Given that to slaughter 
an animal while in the state of ihram is forbidden, who is to be punished: the man who 
pointed out the animal in the first place, or the one who slaughtered it? According to the 
rulings of giyas, punishment is not required. However, punishment is required according 
98 Ibn Mäjah, "Sunan", in abwäb a1 fitan, 8; Hakim, "Mustadrak" v: 1, pp: NO, 201. 
99 Bukhäri, "Zakin", 1; Muslim, 8. 
100 Sarakhsi, "Al-Mabsut', v: 5, p: 49. 
101 For more about tacit consensus, see the Introduction Chapter. 
102 ihram: the ritual garment worn for tnj . 
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to the consensus of the Companions. Istilzrän departs here from the ruling of giyäs based 
on the Companions' agreement. Someone asked Ibn `Umar: "I pointed out a deer while 
we were in ihram, and then my friend killed the deer. What should I do? " `Umar then 
asked `Abd al-Rahmän ibn Awf for his opinion. The latter replied that a sheep must be 
sacrificed as expiation. 'Umar said: "I agree with the opinion". A similar case has been 
reported from `Ali and Ibn Abbäs. 103 
4.2.3 Isti van based on necessity (V rürah) and the avoidance of hardship (raf al- 
Oardi): 
It is important to point out that Hanafi scholars use the term `necessity' where 
Mäliki scholars use the term `avoiding hardship'. 
104 
In order to understand the concept of necessity, I shall first explore the meanings of 
cirürah. 
Linguistically, the word "chrürah" has an opposite meaning to the word ma, slaIiah 
(benefit). It is derived from the root pLr-r, one of the derivatives of which is chrar or 
`harm'. Früzabädi (d. 81711414) explains "duar'' as `straits', and then mentions the 
words ic'trär (harming) and pzrürah (necessity), which also are included in the meaning 
of i tiyäj (need, exigency, necessity) and muhtäj (needing, necessitous). IOS The word 
"upWrra" also appears in the Qur'an with the meaning of `forced' 106. "But whoever is 
forced (by necessity), neither desiring it nor transgressing (its limit), then indeed, your 
Lord is Forgiving and Merciful. s107 
103 Sarakhsi, "Al-Mabsüc', v: 4, p: 79. 
104 Shätibi, "A1-Muwäfagät', v: 4, p: 208; Shätibi, "A1-1`tiscim', v: 2, p: 139. 
105 Ftrüzabä&, "Qcnnüs", p: 550- 
106 Ibn Manzür, "Lisme", v: 4, p: 484. 
107 Qur'än: 6/145; also see: 21173; 16/ 115; 5/3. 
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According to Jassas, ¢arürah means necessity, and he interprets its meanings 
which come in the verse "He has explained in detail to you what He has forbidden you, 
excepting that to which you are compelled. "108 The permissibility alluded to in this verse 
may be adapted to any kind of compulsion during danger. The necessity in that context is 
because it may cause danger to part of the body. It covers circumstances such as when a 
starving person cannot find anything to eat except a dead body, or when a person is 
forced to eat a dead body even though there is edible food present, provided that eating 
the edible food is riskier than eating the dead body. 
109 
Hance Scholars consider the concept of ikräh11° (coercion) in the field of darürah 
as a necessity too. If for example someone is threatened to be killed or maimed in order 
to make him to eat or drink something unlawful, then in that context it becomes necessary 
to carry out their commands. 
" However, if the person is threatened with jailing for life 
or beating, then he is not allowed to commit unlawful things; the condition of `necessity' 
is that it be life-threatening. To commit unlawful acts in order to avoid non-life 
108 Qur'an: 6/119. 
109 Jassäs, "Ahkäm", v: 1, pp: 156,159. 
1 LO lkräh: at-ikräh means forcing someone to do or say something against his will. See: Nyazee, "Theories 
of Islamic Law" p: 100. The coerced person is called "mukrah". Its opposite is al-Ikhtiyär which means 
choice, free wills. The juristic scholars have defined it as follows: "Forcing somebody to something which 
he had never agreed to do, and never will desire to do while he had free choice. " See: Taftazäni, "TalwT", 
v: 2, p: 196; also see in "Kashf al Asrdr": "the person threatening is capable of that thing which he 
threatens: a threat which the coerced person is really frightened of. " See: v: 3, p: 1503. 
If this coercion accompanies threats to kill or destroy some parts of the body, then it is called "ikräh muljr'. 
Tortures by robbers or oppressors would constitute 'ikräh muljT'. At such instances, it becomes necessary 
to carry out their commands. Coercion through jailing or beating is called light coercion. Anyone who is 
faced with light coercion is not permitted to bow to the oppressor's commands. Thus ikräh is divided in to 
two types a: ikräh mulji: someone threats to kill or destroy some parts of the body or deliver a strong blow, 
b: ikräh ghairi mulji: someone makes a threat lower than that, for example jailing or beating. 
There are some conditions: l- The person who threatens must be capable of carrying out the threat and 
must be serious in his in threat. 2- The threatened person has overpowering assumption to go ahead with 
the action. 3- Coercion must involve the threat to kill or destroy some parts of the body. 4- The coercion 
must be a serious hazard. 5- It must be directed to the five essential values of human life, which are 
religion, life, intellect, lineage, and property. 6- ikrah must be unjust, otherwise it is not considered as an 
ikräh. See: Saymen, "Borclar Hukuku", v: 1/1, p: 276; Bukhäri, "Kashf', v: 4, p: 1502; Ibn al-Qudämah 
"Al-Mughnr', v: 7, p: 120; Shiräzi, "Al-Muhazzab" v: 2, p: 83. 
111 Bukhäri, "Kashj' v: 4, p: 398. 
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threatening consequences is not accepted. 112 These kinds of ikrdh (coercion) are called 
light coercion. 
However, if a beating with lashes were to reach to limit that would be unbearable, 
then the condition of necessity (dirürah) is fulfilled. The pain threshold of individuals 
differ and it is at the discretion of the person who is in that situation. 113 
If an act reaches the level of ckirürah (necessity), it naturally becomes lawful. 
This is enshrined in fiqh maxim: "Necessity renders prohibited things permissible. "' 14 
Ansäri (d. 1180/1767) indicates that 4YUrfirah must reach the level of necessity before it 
becomes valid. 115 According to `Ali Hayd5r Afandi (d. 1936) Oarürah refers to a situation 
which involves doing something by force or eating things that are forbidden by the 
religion. 116 Consequently, phrürah is generally concerned with fear of destruction and 
threat to one of the five essential values of human life, namely: religion, life, intellect, 
lineage and property"7, which must be protected from harm. lls 
The concept of a(2riirah is closely related to legal concepts such as ihtiyäj (need), 
¢a rar (harm), raf al-/iiraj (avoiding hardship), mashaqqah (hardship, difficulty), and 
`umicm al-balwä (general calamities). Explanation of these terms now follows. 
4.2.3.1 I{tiyäj (need): Technically the term ihtiyäj (need) here means "a situation 
of facing difficulty and hardship, such as when a hungry person cannot find food to eat. " 
In the "Fawäti#' it is described as: "a circumstance which does not reach the level of 
112 BukhWi, "Kashf' v: 4, p: 398 
13 Saraksi, "AI-Mabsüc', v: 24, pp: 46,48,49-50. 
114 Al-Majallah al-Ahkäm al-Adliyyah (the Ottoman courts manual (IIanafi): clause: 21; Ibn Nujäm, "AI- 
Ashbäh", p: 85. 
lls Ansäd, "Fawäti#', v: 2, p: 262. 
116 `Ali Fiaydar, "Sharhal-Qawaid', p: 76. 
117 Shä ibi, "Al-Muwafagät", v: 1, p: 476. 
118 Ibn Mubaak, "Nazariyyät al-Qarürah" p: 28. 
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darürah. "119 Zarkä defines it as: "A case which necessitates ease in order to achieve a 
goal". Need (ihtiyäj) is a less significant than pbrürah. The reason for this is that whilst 
rulings approved by need are continual, they are only temporarily accepted in the case of 
0irürah. 120 
Needs are divided into two types: a- General needs, both of the individual and of 
the whole Muslim community (Ummah), irrespective of ethnic group or class 
distinctions. Examples are: salam (forward sale), bay` wa shirä' (trading), ijära (leasing), 
wagyyah (will, testament) and so on. b- Specific needs, namely those of people who live 
in a particular country, or of a member of a particular occupational group. Other 
examples include the use of gold teeth because of illness; the wearing of silk; and a 
doctor examining the usually clothed parts of a woman's body. 
121 The concept of cfirürah 
became a law enshrined in the Ottoman court manual: "Any need, whether of a public or 
private nature, is so dealt with as to meet the exigencies of the case". 
122 
4.2.3.2 ¢zrar (harm): This term is similar to cfirürah; however, it is used more 
comprehensively. Every pbrarah may be a ckzrar, but the opposite is not the case. 
Sarakhsi says that irürah has a close similarity with eirar, as the pkirarah is defined as 
"Having fear that one may lose life or limb through lack of food. " In addition, many such 
cases are based on the principle of raf al-piirar (avoiding the harm) to approve 
istihsan. l23 
119 A145r7, "Fawätil1', v: 2, p: 262. 
120 Ahmad Zarkä (d. 1938), "Sharp Qawäid al-Fighiyyah", Beirut, 1983, p: 155. 
121 Suyü1, "At-Ashbäh" , v: 1, p: 191; Zarkä, "Sharp Qawäid" pp: 155-158; Ibn Humayd, pp: 175-182, 
Ibn Nujäym, "Al-Ashbdh" pp: 91-92. 
122 Al-Majallah al-Ahkäm: clause: 32. 
123 Sarakhsi, "Al-Mabsü ", v: 11, p: 141, v: 12, pp: 62,139, v: 14, p: 133, v: 23, pp: 45-47. 
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Suyt4I considered the term darürah together with the term of (Eirar and pointed 
out that the fiqh maxim "Necessity renders prohibited things permissibles124 was. derived 
from the principle of avoidance of harm. 125 Actually, all these maxims are derived from 
the Prophet's Judith: "Harm must neither be inflicted nor reciprocated". 126 As we sec, 
chrar and Oariirah are virtually the same, and are involved in many cases, such as 
returning goods due to a fault'27 and most contracts involving freedom of choice 
(Miyär). 128 However there is some disagreement as to whether chrar and 4iarfirah covers 
issues such as fraud, bankruptcy of the buyer, hijr (limitation of someone's legal 
competence), shufah (right of pre-emption), retaliation (qa0 ), 129 al-hudüd 
(punishments) or kaffardt (expiation). 130 
4.2.3.3 Rafal-#araj (avoiding hardship): 
Linguistically the term " 12raf' means tight, close, straitened, narrow, sin, 
prohibition, narrowness, and critical point. Beside those meanings, it is also means 
`forest'. The most prevalent of all these meanings is narrowness and closeness. '31 
Technically, it is defined as "A thing which causes immoderate harm to life or any 
parts of the body or properties, at present or in the future. "132 Therefore, "avoiding 
"'° Al-Majallah: clause: 21. 
'25 Suyüti, "Al-Ashbäh", v: 1, p: 165. 
'26 Ibn Mäjah, "Sunan", v: 2, p: 784, nth No: 2340. 
'27 Returning the goods is only for the reason of avoiding harm ((Yarar) for the customer. 
128 The goal of freedom of choice is to avoid harm and to protect people's honour and properties, and to 
prevent oppression and cheating. The freedom of choice is based on the Prophet's saying, "The buyer and 
seller are on option till they do not become separate till they choose". See: Fazl al-Karim "Mishkin al- 
Magbi'l', Där al-Ishät, Karachi, Palistan, 1994, v: 2, p: 272. 
129 See Qur'än: 2/179: "And there is (a saving of) life for you in (A1-Qac $) the law of equality in 
punishment, o men of understanding, that you may become AI-Muttaqün ( the pious). " 
130 SuyüG, "A1 Ashby h", v: 1, p: 168. 
131 Ibn Manzür, "ii sin", v: 2, pp: 233-235; Firüzabädi, "Al-Qiunüs", pp: 234-235; Zabidi, '749' v: 5, pp: 
473-476. 
132 Ibn Humayd "Raf al-I rfif', p: 47 
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hardship" is the effort made to keep away from all kinds of difficulties in the first place, 
or to try to make it easy and mitigate it, and if it happens, then to seek to halt it. 133 
In the Hanafi sources, the term was formulated in order to make things easier and 
thus facilitate human needs. 134 In addition to the term "raf al-hiaraf, the terms "daf' al- 
laraf', "wad' al-/araf', and "naf'y al-parat are also used. 
135 
The principle of "avoiding hardship" is especially considered by the Lawgiver as 
a purpose of the general law when rulings are established. Hence the verse: "God intends 
for you ease and does not intend for you hardship"136 Here the Lawgiver wishes to make 
things easy and to avoid imposing hardships on people and thus does not obligate anyone 
more than his or her capacity: "No one is charged with more than his capacitys137 
Accordingly, the Prophet enjoined the Community (Ummah) to pursue ease and 
avoid hardship as far as possible, as seen in his saying, "The best of religion is that which 
brings ease". 138 Suyüh and many jurists have taken this principle into consideration based 
on the Shari `s purposes and have then applied it successfully, in accordance with the 
maxim "Latitude should be afforded in the case of difficulty, that is to say, upon the 
appearance of hardship in any particular matter, latitude and indulgence must be 
shown". 139 Difficulty thus requires ease that is to say in times of hardship, consideration 
must be shown, and cases which were not permissible by analogy must then be 
permitted. 140 
133 Ibid. p: 48. 
134 For more examples see: SarakhsT, "Al-Mabsit', v: 11, pp: 25,159,251; v: 25, pp: 131,160 
135 BAhusayn, "Raf al-ffu4J", p: 6. 
136 Qur'än: 2/185; 4/28; 5/67; 30/30. 
J37 Qur'an: 2/233. also see: 2/286; 5/6; 7/42; 22/78; 24/61; 33/37 
138 Ibn Hanbal, "Al-Musnad', v: 3, p: 582, hadith no: 15942. 
139 SuyüyT, "Al-Ashbäh", p: 157; Zarka, "Sharhal-Qawdid', p: 111; Al-Majallah: clause: 18. 
140 'Ali Haydar, "Sharp al-Qawäid', p: 72. 
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Such permission is only allowed during a time of hardship. It is disallowed when 
the difficulties no longer exist. The original ruling is then restored as soon as the 
extraordinary situation finishes. This is in accordance with the maxim, "When a 
prohibition is removed, the thing to which such prohibition attaches reverts to its former 
status of legality. "14' 
Many cases of Islamic jurisprudence, such as the transfer of debts and loans, are 
derived from this principle; the latitude and indulgence shown by Islamic scholars in their 
rulings are all based on this rule. 
142 
4.2.3.4 Mashaqqah (hardship): 
The dictionary definition of "al-mashaqqah" is "hardship, difficulty, trouble, 
discomfort, inconvenience". 143 In its technical sense, it became a very important norm 
(gäidah) in Islamic law as the basis of many shay i rulings. This norm is alluded to in the 
maxim, 'Difficulty begets facility"144. Commenting on this maxim, Ali Haydar Afandi 
says, "difficulty is the cause of facility and in time of hardship consideration must be 
shown; in another words, it is necessary to make ease in the time of hardship. "145 It is 
based originally on the verses: "God intends for your ease, and He does not want to make 
things difficult for youi146 , and "The 
best of religion is that which brings ease". 147 
1417., arkä, "Sharhal-Qawäid' , p: 111; `Ali 
Ilaydar, "Sharhal-Qawäid", p: 72; Al-Majallah: clause: 24. 
142 See: Al-Majallab: clause 17. 
143 Ibn Manz ir, `Zisän", v: 10, pp: 181-184; FirozabAdi, "AI-Qämüs", p: 1159; Zäbidi, "Täjf°', v: 25, pp: 
511-512. 
144 Al-MajallalL clause: 17. 
145 Ali Fiaydar, "Durar al-/ kkam", p: 70. 
146 Qur'dn: 2/185 and see: 22) 78. 
147 Ibn Hanbal, "Al-Musnad', 3/582, i. idith no: 15942; and the similar meanings see: ibid, 5/314, hr dith 
no: 22354; ibid: 6/130, fxrdith no: 24908; TabarUni, "Al-Awsat', 1/300-301, PadFth no: 1006; Bukhäri, "Al- 
Wup4 ", 1/386, nth no: 220; AN Däwüd, "Al-Tahärah", 1/101, fkudth no: 380; ibid, "A171m", 1/196, 
ftzdlth: 69; Muslim, "Al-Jihdd', 3/1359, faadith 8/1734. 
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Suyüi suggests that all ease and latitude in Islamic law can be linked to this norm. 
The situations in which this principle is involved include such as travelling, illness, 
oblivion (forgetfulness), illiteracy (ignorance), general calamity ('umum al-balwä) and 
deficiency (nagc). 148 
Not every difficulty or hardship is considered as a reason for leniency. Therefore, 
mashaqqah (hardship) is divided into different types: Shäibi considers mashaqqah as 
having two main categories; a- genuine hardships, b- imaginary hardships. 149 Suyüii also 
divides it into two types, albeit slightly differently. First, he says there are hardships 
which come from `ibädät (worship) itself. Examples of these include: making minor or 
major ablutions with cold water; fasting on long hot days; enduring long journeys to hajj; 
jihad; and the hardship of punishments such as the stoning of adulterers and the 
punishing of murderers. Such hardships are seen as an inextricable part of these acts of 
worship and obedience, and cannot be removed. 150 However, the permissibility of 
tayammumis1 because of fear of possible illness from taking ablutions with very cold 
water, is an exception. 152 
Secondly, he considers hardships which do not come from `ibddät (worship); 
these he divides into three: 
1- Fear of disaster or loss of life or limb. 
2- Insignificant hardships. Examples might include slight headaches, for example, or 
nausea. Such difficulties are insignificant and cannot be cited as a reason for the 
sae Suyü , "Al- Ashbi h", v: 1, pp: 
158-162; Ibn Nujaym, "Al-Ashbäh", pp: 75-78; for more on this see: 
Ahmad Zarkä (d. 1938), "Sharpal-Qawdid', pp: 105-109. 
149 Shä ibi, "Al-Muwdfagäe',, in Turkish translation, "Islämi flimler Metodolojisi"', by Mehmet Erdogan, iz 
yaymcdik, Istanbul 1999, v: 1, p: 336. 
150 Suyütl, "Al-Ashbäh", v: 1, p: 162; Ibn Nujaym, "Al-Ashbäh", p: 82; Zarkä, "Shark al-Qawäid', p: 105; 
Jum`a"Rarf` al-/hrd ', pp: 35-36. 
M Tayammum: to wash with clean sand or earth where water is unavailable. 
152 Suyüti, "Al-Ashbäh", v: 1, p: 162. 
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relaxation of laws. Gaining the benefits of worship is more important than repelling these 
kinds of difficulty which are relatively unimportant. 
3- Intermediate hardships. For example, a sick person fasts in Ramacn and worries that 
the fast may delay his recovery. Under such circumstances, the person is allowed to 
discontinue the fast. Similarly, someone for whom water may be dangerous is allowed to 
make tayammum even when water is available. 
153 This third category of hardship is very 
difficult to quantify, and so jurists tend to judge each case in the light of the criteria 
pertaining to the first two categories alone. 
154 
4.2.3.5 The Conditions of thrürah (necessity): 
To be valid, darürah (necessity) must fulfil certain conditions. 
1- There must be absolutely no doubt as to the existence of darüra& or to the 
impossibility of escaping from the situation which invokes the principle without recourse 
to a change of ruling. The reason for invoking this principle must be a situation which is 
life threatening, or which jeopardizes the health or property of an individual. lss This 
concept is clearly alluded to in the Majallah in the words "No weight is attached to mere 
supposition". 
is6 
2- The compelled person must consider the general purposes of the lawgiver (Slow) 
while acting on something. The five essential shari`ah values, which are religion, life, 
intellect, lineage, and property, must be given protection. '57 
'53 Ibn Nujäym, "AI-Ashbäh", pp: 82-83. 
Asa Zuhayli, "Nazariyyät", p: 202, for more on this see: Ibn Mubärak, "Nazariyydt al-Airürah", pp: 51-59; 
Ibn Humayd, "Raf al-I hra ', pp: 33-41. 
155 ZuhaylT, "krah", p: 69; Ibn Mubarak, "l k rürah" p: 312. 
156 Al-Majallah: clause: 74. 
151 Zuhayli, ibid, p: 70; Ibn Mubärak, ibid, p: 305. 
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3- Avoiding a situation of d2rürah must not lead to greater evil or harm. In other words, 
doing something prohibited out of necessity should not bring about a worse situation than 
the original one-158 Jurists have added to the maxim "Necessity renders prohibited things 
permissiblei159 the caveat that the case for Oarürah has to be a compelling one. 
This condition is based on the principle of choosing the lesser evil. (ahwan al- 
sharr). Obviously, if there are two benefits to choose from, the greater and more general 
good is preferred over the minor and specific one. 
160 However, if there is a benefit and a 
harm; then first the harm must be removed, and then the benefit pursned. The Lawgiver 
gives more attention to the avoidance of the prohibited than implementation of the 
obligatory. 161 
An example of choice between evils is as follows. Consider three prohibited 
things; kufr (unbelief); gatl (murder); and zinä (adultery), all of which are forbidden in 
Islamic law. 162 However, if someone is forced to deny his belief, he will be forgiven as 
long as he keeps his belief in his heart. To force others, on the pain of death, to commit 
murder is prohibited. If such coercion actually leads to murder, giAY will not be exacted 
from the killer, but from the one who forced him to kill. And similarly, if someone is 
coerced into committing adultery, he or she will not be punished by law, despite the fact 
that the law abhors such a crime and, considering its far-reacting social implications, 
deems it more destructive than the killing of a single individual under threat. 163 
lse Ibn Mubärak, ibid, p: 319; Bähusayn, "Raf ` al-Ikrär', p: 602. 
159 A1-Majallah: clause: 21. 
160 Ibid, pp: 87-90. 
161 Ibid p: 90. 
(62 Zarkä, "ý7agdacYaklasunla Islam Hukuku", tr. by Servet Armaltan, Tima¢, 1993, Istanbul, v: 2, p: 689, 
163 Haskaf , "Al-Duran", elause: 
lkrah, Beirut, 1979, v: 5, p: 85. 
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This concept has been articulated by jurists in the following maxim: "A private 
injury is tolerated in order to ward off a public injury. s164 The prohibition from practice 
of an incompetent physician is derived from this principle. Similar maxims include: 
"Severe injury is removed by lesser injury" 65, "In the presence of two evils, the greater is 
avoided by the choosing of the lesser", "The lesser of the two evils is preferredi167, and 
"Repelling an evil is preferable to securing a benefit". 168 
4- The limits of nfarürah should not be exceeded. The person who is in difficulty should 
be content with a solution that is just enough to rescue him from darürah. 169 For example, 
if a starving person can find only ritually impure food, he must eat as much as will allow 
him to survive; exceeding the limits is prohibited, in accordance with the statement 
'17o "Necessity is estimated by the extent thereof 
When the circumstances of ¢arürah are over, the permission to benefit from the 
prohibited is also terminated, in accordance with the ruling: "A thing which is 
permissible by reason of the existence of some excuse thereof, ceases to be permissible 
with the disappearance of that excuse". 171 
5- An evil cannot be removed by an evil of similar gravity: when both are equal, choosing 
one in order to remove the other is prohibited. For example, a starving man is not allowed 
to take food from another man if it means that by depriving him, he too will starve. This 
164 A1-Majallah: clause: 26. for more on this see: ZarkA, ibid, v: 2, pp: 681-683. 
10 Al-Majallah: clause: 27. 
166 Ibid. 28. 
167 Ibid: 29. 
Ibid: 30. 
ZuhaylT, "LAirürah", p: 71, Ibn Mubärak, "Lärürah", p: 336; Bähusayn, "tarürah", pp: 602-603. 
170 Suyfº , "Al-Ashbdh", v: 
1, p: 170; Al-Majallah: clause: 22. 
171 Ibid: 23. 
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concept is in accordance with the juristic norm, "an injury can not be removed by the 
commission of a similar injury". 
172 
Another example is that no one has the right to violate someone else's personal 
rights in order to satisfy his needs. Selfishness can never be a reason. In fact, if a person 
takes someone else's food in a situation of necessity, under threat of force or without 
permission, then the fkirar attached to the victim has to be compensated for. For example, 
if a hungry person eats bread belonging to another, that person must later pay the value. 
This rule is based on the following statement: "Necessity does not invalidate the rights of 
another 91 . 
173 
4.2.3.6 Examples of isti(an based on necessity (QEzrarah): 
There are many examples of istihsdn based on pUrürah according to the Hanaff 
School of law. Some of them are as follows: 
a- A letter is sent by a judge from one place to another in order to provide evidence in 
support of a court case, since he is unable to be there in person. Under the rule of 
dzrarah, the evidence given by letter is as acceptable as evidence given in person in this 
particular case, since it eases hardship and secures the rights of those involved in, or 
affected by, the court case. According to giyäs, however, for a judge to provide evidence 
in this way is deemed invalid: giyäs does not recognise the personal information given by 
a judge to a court outside his jurisdiction. However, it is considered as evidence by 
d narah due to the needs of the people. 174 
b- The cleaning of wells and pools. According to the established ruling of giyäs even if 
wells and pools have been totally emptied, they are still not considered ritually pure. 
172 Suya , ibid, v: 1, p: 178; Al-Majallah: clause: 25. 173 Al-Majallah: clause: 33; Hädimi, "Majämi ` al-fiFigäiq", p: 312. 
04 Ibn al-Humäm, "Fath al-QadF? ', v: 7, pp: 461-462; Ibn Abidin, "Radd al-Mukhtn? ', v: 5, p: 499. 
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Emptying some of the water does not mean that it cleans all of the water. Even if all of 
the water is taken out, there is no difference. Fresh spring water from the well, or dropped 
into the well, will never be clean if the fresh water mixed with the polluted water remains 
adjacent to the wall of the well or pool and on the ground of the well _However, Hanafi 
jurists have departed from the general established ruling in this case, and have declared 
that the water will be considered clean by emptying just some of the water. This ruling, 
despite its opposition to giyds, is accepted by Hanafi jurists based on isti, sän because of 
necessity and avoidance of difficulties for the people. l"s 
c- If a flying or running animal collapses and dies immediately after it has been shot, this 
animal is edible according to istihsdn. According to giyds, however, it may not be eaten, 
since there is doubt that it may have died not from the actual shot but from the impact 
with the ground. 
In this case, this kind of game is known as mutaraddiyah (dead by headlong fall), 
as indicated in the Qur'an: 
"Forbidden to you (for food) are: al-maytata (the 
dead animals-cattle beast not slaughtered), blood, the 
flesh of swine, and the meat of that which has been 
slaughtered as a sacrifice for others than God, or has 
been slaughtered for idols etc., or on which God's 
Name has not been mentioned while slaughtering, 
and that which has been killed by strangling, or by a 
violent blow, or by a headlong fall, or by the goring 
of horns -and that which has been (partly) eaten by a 
175 Sarakhsi, "Us r, v: 2, p: 203; Bukhäri, "Kashf al-Asriir", v: 4, p: 6. 
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wild animal- unless you are able to slaughter it 
(before its death)- and that which is sacrificed 
(slaughtered) on numb (stone altars)... ". 176 
Istihsim ignores the doubt concerning the actual cause of death in such cases, since it is 
almost always impossible to tell. 
177 
d- The contract of sale on foodstuffs such as nuts, eggs, fruit, vegetables and so on is 
valid even when the buyer discovers that some of them are spoilt, provided that the 
damaged food is little. This is the ruling of istihrän; the buyer is always at risk of such 
minor damages, which are unavoidable. However, if most of the food is spoilt, then the 
contract is null and void. Despite the ruling of istii san, the contract is considered invalid 
by q yas, regardless of the amount of damaged food. 
178 
4.2.4 Isti jwan based on benefit or public good (ma 'ajmh): 179 
As I have shown earlier, masia/aah is one of the most controversial sources of 
Islamic law. It is also a principle that is used to drive rulings based on isti4vdn. Some 
examples are as follows: 
a- According to the established ruling in the Hanafi School, even if someone has not yet 
paid the dowry in full, he may establish their home wherever he wishes even if his wife 
disagrees-180 However, this ruling has been challenged by many scholars, who believe 
176 Qur'an: 5/3. 
"' Sarakhsi, "Al-Mabsüt", v: 11, p: 251; Marghinäni, "AI-Hidäyah", v: 4, p: 122. 
'S Ibn Huunäm, "Fathal-Qadir", v: 6, pp: 372-373. 
179 For more on maOa1bh see: Ramadan al-BGti, "Dawdbit"; Mustafa Zayd, "AI-Ma, fiaf h"; Husayn 
Hamid Hasan, "Nazariyydt al-Ma$a/Yh"; Sener, "Islam Hukukunun Kaynaklarindan Kcyas, lsti/2sdn ve 
Isti, lirh", pp: 137-156; Zarki, "Al-Isti$dhwa al-Mascilihal-Mursalah"; Sa'd Muhammad al-Sanawi, 
"Madai' t jät li al-A%kli bi Nazariyyät al-Magafbh al-Mursalah fr al-Figh al-Islamr ', Cairo, 1981; Ferhat 
Koca, "Islam Hukukunda Maslalbh Mursalah wa Najm al-Din al-Tüfi'nin bu konudaki görugerinin 
de erlendirilmes? ', ILAM ara$tirnia dergisi, v: 1, n: 1 (January- June 1996), pp: 93-116; Jamal al-Din 'Abd 
al-Rahmän, "Al-Mastalxih al-Mursalah wa makdnätuhä fc al-Tashri "", DAr al-KitAb al-Jämi', Cairo, 1983. 
180 Marghinärn, "Al-Hidäyah", v: 4, pp: 211-212. 
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that it often leads to mental cruelty, with women being forced to live far from their places 
of birth and families. Therefore, they rule, even if the dowry is paid in full, her husband 
cannot force her to go anywhere. The new ruling is given in consideration of the need to 
protect from unforeseen hardships that may arise. This ruling has been chosen as the 
preferred ruling among all the schools, and is based on the principle of masla/7ah. 181 
b- According to the established ruling of the Hanafi School, a person is free to dispose of 
his own property as he wills. For example, one may dig a well on one's own land or build 
whatever one wishes. Such activities cannot be stopped even if they might cause harm to 
one's neighbours. '82 However, despite this ruling, at some point during the 8th and 90' 
century183, Hanafi jurists declared that the rights of personal ownership are not absolute. 
Therefore, the condition must be that disposal of one's property is allowed so long as it 
does not harm others. 184 In order to avoid harm and protect the public good a new ruling 
is established based on the principle of maaal c, which is a major consideration in 
istihsin. 
While one may dispose of one's personal property as one wishes as far as giyäs is 
concerned, istilvan changes this by considering what is more beneficial for the majority. 
c- According to giyäs both contract of mucrabah (a contract of co-partnership) and the 
contract of lease are nullified when either one of the partners dies. However, some 
situations are considered as exceptional in order to avoid hardship and secure the greater 
good. For example, if the joint owner of a piece of agricultural land dies before the 
18' Ibn 'Abidin, "Radd al-Mukhtdr", v: 3, pp: 146-147; Ibn Humazn, "Fach al-Qadi-r", v: 3, p: 373. 
182 Marghin-arg, "Al-Hidäyah", v: 3, p: 109; Sarakhsi, "AI-Mabsiit", v: 15, p: 21; KäsänT, "Badäi al-San45i" 
v: 6, p: 264, v: 7, pp: 28-29. 
183 Saffet Köse, "Islam Hukukunda Haklan Köti$ye Kulantimasi", Istanbul, 1997, p: 199. 
194 Ibn Humäm, "Fathal-Qadir", v: 7, pp: 326,327; ZaylaT, "Ta'yin a1-fkgäiq" v: 4, pp: 195-196; 
Haskafi, "Durar al-MukhW', v: 5, pp: 443-448. 
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harvest has been collected, his partner is not obliged to sell and for vacate the land at the 
behest of the dead partner's heirs, despite the general ruling which deems the contract 
null and void. This istifasän ruling is given in order to protect people's rights. 185 The same 
ruling is applicable for the contract of musägät. 
186 
4.2.5Istifsün based on custom (`urt): 
From the point of view its validity, custom ('urf) can be divided into two types: 
'urf, Xlnh (acceptable custom), which is a valid source of law according to the Qur'än 
and the Sunnah; and `urf fäsid (reprehensible custom), which is not accepted as a definite 
source of 187 
Custom is further defined as being either gawli (verbal) or fi'li (actual). 188 
'Urf gawli consists of the agreement of people as to the meaning of words established for 
functions other than their literal meaning. Consequently, the agreed meaning can be 
understood by itself without any explanation. 
189 
For example, the word "dirham" has been used to mean money that is presently used as 
currency. As such, it points only to this meaning rather than any other. 190 
However, dirham in fact literally means "silver coin", a meaning which does not come to 
mind when it is used on a day-to-day basis. 
191 Another example of verbal `urf is the word 
"walad", which literally means offspring, whether a son or daughter, but which in popular 
usage is used for son only. It occurs in the Qur'än: "God commands you as regards your 
185 Sarakhsi, "Al-Mabsüt", v: 23, p: 45. 
1816 Musägdt: This is a lease contract for palm gardens in which one partner provides the land and seed and 
the other the oxen and labour. 
187 Khalläf, "Magde? ', p: 146; Ibn `Abidin, "Nashr al- `Urf', v: 2, p: 116. 
188 AbU Sunnah, "Al-'Urf wa al-`Adak", p: 18; ZarkA, "Al-Madkhar', v: 2, p: 845; `Ali Haydar, "Sharp al- 
Qawäid a1-Ku11iyyah", p: 95; Izmirli, "`Ilmi Khi110', p: 110. 
189 Zarkä, "ibid", v: 2, p: 845. 
190 Sarakhsi, "U$il", v: 1, p: 190. 
191 Karaman, "Adät", Diyanet Islam Ansiklopedisi (DIA), v: 1, p: 370. 
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children's (inheritance): to the male, a portion equal to that of two females ...... 
192 An 
example of actual (fl'li) 'urf is the "bay' al-4a'ati" (give-and-take sale) which is normally 
concluded without utterance of offer and acceptance. 
Consequently, jurists have asserted that "the original meaning of the word is 
departed from with respect to current custom". 193 According to al-Majallah, "In the 
presence of custom, no regard is paid to the literal meaning of a thing". 194 For example, a 
man takes an oath and says: "If such-and-such happens, I will make sure my clothes press 
against Ka'ba. " According to giyäs, however, no action needs to be taken, since there is 
no such act of worship as `pressing one's clothes against the Ka'ba. Where giyäs focuses 
on the literal meaning, istihsän adopts the customary interpretation of the oath. The literal 
meaning of this oath is not that the person will give his clothes to charity, and indeed 
isti/nsän supports 195 
Actual custom (`urf fc `lid consists of commonly recurrent practices that are 
accepted by the people, such as the ways in which payment is made on houses and shops; 
the payment of dowry in marriage, where a certain amount is paid at the time of the 
contract and the rest is paid later; the delivery of purchased commodities at a buyer's 
house or shop, and so on. 196 
'Ur f, regardless of whether it is gawli (verbal) or f `li (actual), is also divided into 
two types: al-`ämm (general) and al-khdV (particular): `urf am denotes customs which 
are practiced by all, regardless of time and place; `urf khdcs denotes customs which are 
192 Qur'än: 4/11 
193 Sarakhsi, "U, 9il", v: 1, p: 190; Nasafi, "Kashf', v: 1, p: 267; Ibn Nujäym, "Al-Ashbäh", p: 93. '94 A1-Majallah clause: 40. 
195 Bukhari, "Kashf', v: 2, p: 97. 
196 Zarka, "Al-MadkhaF', v: 2, pp: 846-847. 
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particular to a certain country, locality or group. 197 
273 
We now turn to examples of situations in which custom may be invoked as a 
reason to overturn an established legal ruling. 
The importance of custom as a consideration in the formulation of law cannot be 
overestimated. Because of the dynamic nature of human custom, consideration of this 
principle is crucial. 198 
We have already indicated that custom is a valid source of Islamic law. According 
to al-Majallah, "Custom is an arbitrator: that is to say, custom, whether public or private, 
may be invoked to justify the giving of judgement". 199 This in turn is derived from the 
saying of the Prophet "What the Muslims deem to be good is good in the sight of 
God.,, 200 
Many issues fall within the remit of custom-based isti/zsän: contracts; waqf 
(endowment); public rights; personal rights and so on. 
a- Shaybäni has pointed out, under the subject of usury, loans and the borrowing 
of money, that lending and borrowing bread between neighbours is permitted, based on 
the principle of istihsän, since everyday need has made it into a custom. Later, rulings 
were established by Hanafi jurists based on the opinion of Shaybani. However, strictly 
speaking, and according to nass goods exchanged must be of the same kind and of equal 
value; if not, shortage or surplus may lead to unlawful usury, thus annulling the 
contract-201 However, even though the lending and borrowing of bread may not always 
'7 Abu Sunnah, "ibid", p: 19; 'Ali E1aydar, "Sharhal-Qawaid" pp: 93-94; Ibn 'Abid-m "Nashr al-'Urf', v: 
2, pp: 116,132; Izmirli "Ilmi Khilif', p: 110. 
198 Zarkä, "Al-Madkhal", v: 2, p: 850; Karaman, "Ader", DIA, v: 1, pp: 369-372. 
199 AI-Majallah clause: 36. 
200 ShAAibi, "I'ticm", v: 2, p: 319; Suyütj, "AI-Ashbah", v: 1, p: 193; Amid!, `! *d m", v: 1, p: 214. 201 Ibn Humäm, "Fath al-Qadir", v: 7, p: 37; Ibn 'Abidin, "Radd al-Mukhtä ", v: 5, p: 185. 
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involve exactly equal exchange, istilasmn allows it on the ground of custom. Custom 
ignores small differences and only takes into the consideration the number of items 
involved, 202 thus ensuring that these the transactions remain fair. In the example of the 
lending and borrowing of bread, a slight discrepancy in the amount exchanged is not 
enough to warrant a charge of usury. 
b- According to most Hanafi jurists, the conditions and stipulations inserted into 
contracts are recognised so long as they are accepted by society in general. This istibsän 
ruling is clearly based on custom. In fact, conditions and stipulations which are 
unacceptable to the majority are deemed invalid. This is in accordance with the general 
meaning of the heidrth "The Prophet has forbidden sales with stipulations". 203 For 
example, to stipulate handing back a house after staying in it for a month, or handing over 
a field after cultivating it for a year; selling something to someone on the condition that 
they later sell it back-all of these nullify the contract204 However, Hanafi jurists permit 
two exceptions to this Prophetic norm: a- stipulation of the freedom to choose, b- 
stipulations which are customary 205 
According to most Hanafi scholars, such conditions should be recognised and 
considered. According to al-Majallah, "A matter recognised by custom is regarded as 
though it were a contractual obligation". 206 For example, according to established rule of 
fzgh, wagt' (charitable endowment) is a "lasting" endowment that can only involve 
112 Ibn `Abidin, "Radd al-Mukhtär", v: 5, p: 185. 
203 Zayläi, "Nap al-Rä'ya", v: 4, pp: 17-18; TirinIz , "Buya-, 19. 2'4 Zarkä, "Al-Madkhal", v: 2, pp: 905-906. 
205 Zark-a, "AI-Madkhal", v: 2, p: 906; Al-Majallah clause: 186: (If a contract of a sale is concluded with an 
essential condition attached, both sale and condition are valid), 188: (In the case of a sale concluded subject 
to a condition sanctioned by custom established and recognised is a particular locality, both sale and 
condition are valid. ), 300: (The vendor, or the purchaser, or both, may insert a condition in the contract of 
sale giving them an option, within a fixed period, to cancel the sale or to ratify it by carrying out the term 
thereof. ). 
206 Al-Majallah clause: 43. 
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immovable property. Therefore, movable property, which is susceptible to damage and 
However, Shaybäni put aside this general rule and loss, is not to be included in wagf. 207 
validated the waqf of movable goods such as books, in keeping with popular custom. The 
reason behind this is to encourage people to practice charity and do good works. Here, 
Shaybäni overrules giyäs and chooses istii sän, based on popular custom. 208 
c- Bay' bi al-wafä209 (sale with right of return) was considered invalid before it 
was recognised by popular custom. Such a sale is considered to be permissible in view of 
the fact that the purchaser has a right to enjoy the goods he has purchased. It is also in the 
nature of an avoidable sale in as much as the two parties have the right to cancel it. It is 
also in the nature of a pledge, in view of the fact that the purchaser cannot sell the 
property sold to any third party. 
210 
This sale had been used commonly in the region of Bukhärä and Balkh as a valid 
sale because of people's needs since the 6`h century. Nasafi (d. 537/1142) explains, saying 
"This is a kind of sale which people were accustomed to in order to avoid usury; 
however, in fact, it is a kind of pledge". 211 In this context, nullifying nass (text) and 
ignoring it is not an issue, since application of custom here is actually in keeping with the 
purpose of nap' (text). 12 
d- According to most Hanafi jurists, the right to water (hagq al-shurb) may not be 
sold on its own, independently of the agricultural land which is irrigated by it, owing to 
the ambiguity over the contract of such a sale. Obtaining ownership of water can occur 
2°1 Zaydän, "Islam Hukukuna Giri. s"', tr. 'Ali Safak, Kaythan Yayuilari, Istanbul, 1985, p: 305. 
2'N Sa'bän, `Islam Hukukllminin esaslarf', p: 170; Kamäli, "Istihsän", pp: 55-56. 
2,09 A sale subject to a right of redemption is a sale in which one person sells property to another for a 
certain sum of money, subject to the right of redeeming such property, upon the price thereof being 
returned. 
210 Karaman, "Anahatlarcyla Islam Hukuku", v: 3, p: 271; Al-Majallah clause: 118. 
211 Ibn `Abidin, "Radd al-Mukhtär", v: 5, p: 276. 
212 Ibn 'Abidin, "Nashr al-'Urf', v: 2, p: 121; Zarka, "A1-Madkhal", v: 2, pp: 907-908. 
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only by actual possession; it can not be possessed while it is actually in the watercourse. 
However, some Hanafi jurists consider this permissible by way of istihsän, which is based 
on the customary approval of such a sale. In fact, the selling of the water on its own is 
against the general established ruling. Therefore, the new ruling is preferred by way of 
istifzsän in respect of the common custom, and departs from the rule of giyäs. 213 
4.2.5.1 Conditions of validity of `urff. 
Scholars assert that certain conditions must be fulfilled before custom (`urJ) can 
be deemed valid. 
a- The principle of `urf must be relevant and actually applicable; it must also be 
prevalent. As is indicated in al-Majallah, "Effect is only given to custom where it is of 
regular occurrence or when universally prevailing"214 and "Effect is given to what is of 
common occurrence; not to what happens infrequently' . 
215 These statements form 
important maxims of figh. 
b- 'Ur must be actually be in practice at the time of the case which is referred to 
it. To rule on the basis of past or future custom is invalid. 216 Ibn Nujaym says `"Thc `urf 
connected to a case must be recent or current; possible future custom is not given any 
eº21? 
credence. 
c- Custom must not contradict evidence which is stronger than itself. If custom 
opposes a ruling of naA and cannot be reconciled to it, then it is neither valid nor 
recognised. Hence, no ruling can be adopted on such kinds of custom. 218 
"3 Sa`bän, "Islam Hukuk 1lminin Esaslart", p: 171 
214 Al-Majallah, clause: 41. 
2'S ibid: 42. 
216 Abü Sunnah, "Al-`Urß', p: 65; Izmirli, "'11mi Khiläf', p: 116. 
217 Ibn Nujäym, "Al-Ashbah", p: 101. 
218 Abü Sunnah, "Al-`Urf', pp: 61-64; Khalläf, "Ma$dde, ", PP: 146-147; Karaman, "Adet", v: 1, p: 370. 
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We now turn to those instances in which custom contradicts nag or other 
principles. Can such customs still be considered a valid source of law? 
In this context, `urf may contradict nac, in two ways. Firstly, it may contradict a 
specific nag involving a specific situation and meanings. Secondly, it may contradict the 
general nass involving general situations and meanings. 
4.2.5.2 Opposition of `urf to a specific nah 
A specific na$$ is one which involves specific matters, for example, adultery, 
gambling, alcohol, usury, and so on. If such acts are customary in a society, the fact that 
they are `urf carries no weight or credence: these are acts which are outlawed by the 
shari `ah, and they are thus non-negotiable. Islam aims to abrogate some customs 
completely, to accept some of them as they are, or to rehabilitate some of them. 
219 For 
example, regarding a contract which clearly contradicted a Indith, Sarakhsi says: "An 
'Urf which contradict a nag. F is not valid" 
220 
The question which arises in this context is whether a specific na W can change a 
custom? Abü Hanifah and Shaybäni preferred to follow a specific nass than custom. Abü 
Yiisuf, however, tended to prefer the custom. 22' 
An example of scholarly disagreement concerned the nth about usury which stipulated 
that in lending and borrowing, the commodities exchanged had to be the same kind, 
amount and value: "Gold for gold, silver for silver, wheat for wheat, barley for barley, 
dates for dates, salt for salt and like for like' 222 Abü Hanifah and Shaybäni were of the 
opinion that the hrrdith must be followed to the letter. However, Abü Yüsuf points out 
219 Ibn 'Abid"m, "Nashr al-' Urf', v: 2, p: 116; Karaman, "Adel' DIA, v: 1, pp: 369-372. 
0 Sarakhsi, "Al-Mabsüt", v: 12, p: 196. 
221 Abü Sunnah, "Al-'Urf', pp: 62-63; Ibn 'Abidin, "Nashr al-'Urf', v: 2, p: 118; Karaman, "Ädet', DIA, v: 
1, p: 370. 
"Abü Däwud, "Buyül", 12; Bukhäii, "Buyü"', 74,76,77,78; Muslim, "Musagät", 79,82. 
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that custom often dictates other ways of exchange in these circumstances, and that as long 
as it is acceptable to the people and considered normal, then there is nothing wrong with 
it. In this case, it is `urf and the habitual practice (`adat) of the people that has to be taken 
into consideration. If the only difference between `urf and nass is, as in this example, one 
of details only, then it cannot be considered as an actual contradiction of the purpose of 
the na. S, . 
223 
Abü Yüsuf's practice was to focus on the meaning of the text and understand the 
exact purpose of it by application of `urf, not by preferring `urf to text, or ignoring the 
text, or falsifying and confining its limits? 
The first type of opposition of `urf to nas'is not considered valid since it is not in 
accord with the aims of the shari`ah. Therefore, it is not included within the scope of 
istihsan. The first thing for isti, zvdn is that there must be valid evidence. However, Abo 
Yüsuf s judgement does not amount to istihsan. 
4.2.5.3 Opposition of `urf to a general nah 
When a general nass contradicts an `urf qawli (verbal), the use of the latter in society is 
considered. For example, the people of a country may depart from the literal meaning of a 
word and become accustomed to understanding that word in a different context. For 
example, in some communities, the word `food' is understood as referring to maybe no 
more than one or two foodstuffs, and they may be unaware of the vast range of things that 
the general word `food' actually signifies. Thus the nass becomes particularized in 
accordance with the specific `urf. That specific `urf is then considered to be an exception 
to the general meaning of the nass Jurists are in agreement on this issue. In this case, the 
Ibn Humäm, "Fat, i al-Qadi ", v: 7, p: 15; Sarakhsi, "AI-Mabsüt ", v: 12, p: 142; `Abidin, "Nashr al- 
'Urf', v: 2, p: 118; Karaman, "Adel' DIA, v: 1, p: 371 
224 Koca, "Takh$$', p: 256. 
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general nass is interpreted according to the custom. The general naffs is particularized by 
the custom in that its indication to a particular meaning is approved, based on istihsän 
according to Hanafis 225 However, if the metaphorical meaning of a word becomes `urf, 
Hanafi jurists disagree as to which is to be preferred, the literal meaning or the 
metaphorical. According to Abü Hanifah, the actual meaning is the preferable one, while 
Abu Ynsuf and Shaybäni prefer the metaphorical meaning that has become customary. 26 
For instance if someone vows to walk to the Ka'ba, then he has to fulfil either hajj 
or `umnah. This is the view point of Abü Yüsuf and Shaybäni. However, nothing is 
required according toAbn Hanifa based on giyäs. The reason why nothing is required is 
that a vow becomes obligatory if there is a customary act of worship available through 
which that vow may be fulfilled. In this context, there is no obligatory (wdjib) duty of 
walking to Ka'ba, and so the vow is nullified. However, Abii Yüsuf and Shayban 
performed isti, sän, claiming that `walking to the Ka'ba was a customary way of meaning 
/xajj or `umrah. Therefore, they preferred this custom to the actual meaning of the 
word 227 
The main reason of the disagreement among Abn Yüsuf, Shaybäni and Abü 
Hanifah concerns the availability of the one of the conditions of the validation of `urf, 
which is that "`urf must be in existence at the time a transaction is concluded". For the 
custom to be valid, it has to fulfil certain conditions; otherwise, it will be invalid. 228 
Zu Sarakhsi, "Urstil", v: 1, p: 190; Nasafii, "Kashf', v: 1, p: 267; Bazdawi, "U, 1", v: 2, p: 95; Ibn 'Abd al- 
Shak5r, "Musallamat al-Subüt", v: 1, p: 345; SuyUG, "AI Ashbäh", p: 66; Abi Sunnah, "Al-'Urfu wa al- 
Ädah", pp: 122-123; Koca, "Takhg$', p: 257. 
226 Ibn Humäm, "Ta/? r r" v: 1, p: 317, v: 2, p: 57; Molla Husraw, "AI-Mir'ät', v: 1, pp: 445,448; Nasaf i, 
"Kashf', v: 1, pp: 256-257,260-262,267-271 
227 Sarakhsi, "UXI", v: 1, p: 191; Bukhän, "Kashf, v: 2, p: 97; Bazdawi, "Usur', v: 2, p: 97. 
228 Baal, "Kasltf', v: 2, pp: 97-98. 
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In actual custom (`urf `amal)i, the main point is to discover the Shäri`s objectives. 
`Ali Haydar Afandi explaining the maxim "Custom is an arbitrator; that is to say, custom, 
whether public or private, may be invoked to justify the giving of judgement"229, says 
"'urf (custom) and ädat (tradition), whether general ('ämm) or specific (klag), are as a 
judge who validates the legal ruling". 230 Here it is indicated that 'urf would take a role in 
determining legal rulings; however, it must not actually ignore nass or alter it. Where 
there are two contradictory proofs, the one which is more suitable and adequate to 
materialize the Shäri `s purposes is preferred to the other. In fact, the conflict here is not 
between `urf and nass, but rather of two evidences. 
The question which arises here is that if `urf is a type of specific custom, can it 
particularize the general nass or not? Most Hanaff scholars claim that a specific custom 
will not particularize the general nass. In order for a specific custom to be a source of 
law, it has to be in use everywhere. 23' According to al-Majallah, "Effect is only given to 
custom where it is of regular occurrence or when universally prevailing". 232 Nevertheless, 
al-Nasafi (d. 424/1033), and Ibn Nujaym (d. 970/1562) claim that the general naffs maybe 
particularized by a specific `u1 f. 233 
However, specific `urf will not be valid if it contradicts nag 234 Furthermore, if a 
custom does not wholly contradict a nass and there is thus a way to reconcile it with a 
naffs or a spar i evidence, then it is considered as valid, based on one of the principles of 
229 A1-Majallah clause: 36. 
230 `Ali 0aydar, "Shar/l al-Qawäid', p: 93. 
231 Ibn Nujaym, "Al-Ashbäh", pp: 94-95; Abu Sunnah, "Al-`Urf', p: 58; `Al Haydar, "Sharha! -Qawäid", 105-106; Zarkä, "Shari al-Qawäid", p: 179. 2 
Al-Majallah clause: 41. 
233 Ibn Nujaym, "Al-Ashbäh", p: 103; Ibn 'Abidin, "Nashr al- `Urf', v: 2, pp: 116-117; Abo Sunnah "Al- 
`Urf', p: 58; 'Ali I1aydar, "Sharhal-Qawdid", p: 95; Zarkä, "Sharhal-Qawdid", 166. 
23' Ibn 'Abidin, "Nashr al- `Urf', v: 2, p: 132; Aba Sunnah, "Al- `Urf', p: 60. 
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Sunnah Tagrirri, ijma' (ijmä' suküti) or ofnrurah, and as was practised in the example of 
bay' al-wara235 (sale with right of return) and istisnä `. Otherwise, it would be rejected 236 
4.2.5.4 Isti! isän based on the opposition of 'urf to qiyas: 
This kind of istit än becomes relevant when people are accustomed to practices 
that contradict a ruling of giyäs or an already established general ruling. Sarakhsi 
expresses the importance of custom by declaring that to obstruct people in their practice 
of what is customary is to do them much harm. 
237 According to al-Majallah, "A matter 
established by custom is like a matter established by law. "238 
In Hanaff works there are many examples of this type of istihsän, some of which 
are included here: 
a- According to the general established ruling of Abü Hanifah, the endowment of 
movable property is not allowed. However, Abü Yüsuf allowed endowment of horses and 
war equipment based on the athar (practices) of the Companions. In addition, Shaybani 
condoned the endowment of camels, axes, ropes, shovels, saws, cauldrons, clothes, 
funeral equipment, and the Qur'an- in short anything moveable which it was customary 
to endow. In this respect, he departed from giyds in favour of custom. Later, many Hanafi 
scholars followed Shaybäni and gave judgements according to his opinion. 239 
b- In the case of bay' al- wad, the practice was prevalent in order to meet people's needs 
without charging interest! In fact, in Islamic law, pledging a condition in advance in 
order to benefit from that pledge is considered as a kind of ribä (interest) and is therefore 
'5 Karaman, "IslamHukuku", v: 3, pp: 270-271; Abü Sunnah, "Al-'Urf', pp: 96-98,100-101. 
136 Ibid. p: 95; 
23' Sarakhsi, "AI-Mabsüt", v: 11, p: 159, v: 13, p: 14. 
23e Al-Majallah clause: 45. 
239 Ibn `Abidin, "Radd al-Mukhta? ', v: 4, pp: 363,365; Ibn al-Humam, "Fathal-Qadir', v: 6, pp: 216,218. 
M0 Ibn Humäm , "Fat/ al-Qadir", v: 
6, p: 291. 
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not permitted. One interpretation of it is that it is a kind of "valid agreement" which a 
buyer has the right to benefit from; it is a kind of "nullified agreement" in respect of the 
buyer's right to nullify; and is a kind of "pledge agreement" in respect of the buyer's 
inability to sell the commodity. However, later it became a custom because of people's 
need and is therefore, based on the principle of istil. ndn. 
241 A similar transaction is bay' 
al-istighläl (sale by sub-letting). According to al-Majallah, "A person may make a valid 
pledge of property borrowed from some third person, provided he has received the 
permission of that person. This is known as a pledge of a borrowed article". 242 These 
kinds of transaction have become a customary and are thus permitted by isti, zudn. 243 
c- According to Abü Hanzfah, selling bees and silkworms is not allowed, because at his 
time they were not a valuable commodity. Abü Hanifah compared their sale to the sale of 
reptiles such as snakes and lizards. Abü Yüsuf's opinion is similar to Abü Hanifah, 
although in the case of silkworms, he says that if they are used to make silk, then it is 
permitted. Despite Abü Hanzfah's opinion, Shaybäni departs from giyäs to istihsän, based 
on the judgment that the sale of such things had become customary among the people. 244 
Conclusion: 
Different scholars posit different typologies of istilvan. On the whole, it is divided 
into two main types a: analogical istitnin, which consists of a departure from giyäs jali to 
giyäs khaf, and b: exceptional istihsan (istihsdn istithnäi) which consists of making an 
exception to a general rule of existing law, and which is approved when the jurist is 
241 Ibn 'Abidin, "Radd al-Mukhtde', v: 4, pp: 363,365; Bilmen, "Is#1äfkiti Fighiyyah Kamusu", v: 6, pp: 
126-129; Abü Sunnah, "Al-'Urf', pp: 167-168; Karaman, "Islam Hukuku", v: 2, pp: 328-331; al-Maja]lah: 
clause: 118. 
242 Al-Majallah: clause: 726. 
243 Ibn 'Abidin "Radd al-Mukhtä ", v: 5, p: 279; Karaman, "Islam Hukuku", v: 2, p: 331. 
144 Ibn'Abidin, ibid v: 5, p: 68; Ibn a! -Humäm, "Fathal-Qadir", v: 4, pp: 419-421; Abu Sunnah, "Al-'Ur 
103. 
'f, 
Chapter Four 283 
convinced that in making such an exceptions, justice might be better served 245 Besides 
this main distinction, scholars divided isti/zrän into many different types and sub-types, as 
246 I have mentioned earlier. 
We can see that istihsän which is based on na, 5,5, ijmä ` and rrürah is not 
extendable to parallel cases when we compare the two main types of istihsän, namely the 
analogical and the exceptional. Hanafi jurists point out that the giyds khafi, which they 
called istituan, is in reality a kind of giyäs (analogy) and therefore its ruling can be 
extended (ta`diyah) to other cases. 247 In order to move a ruling of giyäs, the `illah must 
be the same in both cases. This is the ruling of the validated giyds. Ta `diyah applying a 
ruling to other cases is an indispensable factor of ijtihäd. 248 However, the ruling of giyäs 
is not extendable to similar cases if the applicability is uncertain or unreasonable. Despite 
this, istii san which is based on implicit (khan analogy is extendable by further analogy 
to parallel cases 249 
When we compare the Hanafi and Mäliki views of istiisän, we see that the Hanafi 
isti/zsän derives much of its substance largely from necessity (trürah). The Mäliki 
approach to istiMn, however, is based on ma, clafiah and the removal of hardship (raf' al- 
/i ray). Despite the different methods they used to approach the problem, they eventually 
arrived at the same results. Their use of maaahah differs mainly in respect of the degree 
of importance they accord it. Hanafis resorted to istihsän where th ere was conflict 
between obvious (jal fl and implicit (khayrz) giyas which inclined to a stronger evidence 
z°s Ibn al-Humäm, "Tahrir", v: 4, p: 78; Bazdawi, "Kashf' v: 4, pp: 3,5-6; Ja$ s, "A! -Fu$71" v: 4, pp: 234,243; $adr al-Shari'ah, "Taws 1', v: 2, pp: 162-163. 
246 See: at the beginning of the Chapter Three. 
247 Sarakhsi, "U, S il", v: 2, pp: 202,203,206; Bazdawi, "Uý17C', v: 4, pp: 3,6,10; Nasaff, "Kashf' v: 2 
296; $adr al-Shari'ah, "TawQtt1', v: 2, pp: 162,169. ' 
p: 
2" Karamasti, "AI-Wajiz" p: 185; Bazdaw-t, "USW', v: 3, p: 389; Sarakhsi, "U ü1", v: 2, pp: 192,206; 
Bukhäri, "Kashf', v: 3, p: 389; v: 2, p: 11. 
249 For an example, see; Chapter Three under the title of the departure from giyds jai to giyäs khaf:. 
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and necessity ((iarürah), while the MAlikis were inclined to resort to isti/is n where there 
was conflict between analogy and madatah. 
25° 
A contemporary scholar, Kamäli, discusses the division of istitwan in the context 
of equity. He highlights the unnecessary classification and complains about the 
consideration of istituan in the context of equity and fairness, which he says were not 
considered by the scholars. According to him, istihsön which is based on equity and 
consideration of fairness has not been given a separate category by either the Hanaffs or 
the Mälilcis. Instances of equitable istihsän often seem to have been subsumed under 
consideration of raf al-¬i raj. Removal of hardship is admittedly the nearest concept to 
that of equity and fairness; it has a definite Qur'anic identity and seems an eminently 
suitable basis for istihsän. Yet it is ironic that neither of these (i. e. equity and raf a! - 
/Xxraj) find a separate entry in the scholastic typology of istihsän. It seems that the 
ma#afzih based istilzsän has a strong base of identity with raf al-taraj, and the `ula nä' 
do tend to almost equate the one with the other. This can also be said of custom (`up 
which is recognized as a proof precisely because acting on custom is in the spirit of raf 
al-baraj. Kamäli concludes that when both maslakih and custom are recognized as 
separate bases of istihsän, raf al-Ixiraj, and also equity and fairness (ilndn) could easily 
be added to the existing varieties of isti, sän". 251 
As Kamali indicates, equity and fairness are indeed concepts that would seem to 
be in conformity with isti/asän. After all, linguistically it is derived from ifzsän 
(goodness), and connotes justice ('adl). Therefore, equity and fairness should be 
considered in a contemporary approach. The basis of itnan finds a sufficient support in 
250 MikadT, "Bahth fi al-istihsän", p: 315. 
251 Kamäll, "Istihsän", p: 65. 
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the Qur'an: "Verily, God enjoins al-'adl (justice) and itndn (the doing of good and 
liberality) and giving (help) to kith and kin... ". 252 According to Kamali, the main 
differences between justice and ihsän may be said to be that justice is the normal 
requirement which is to be administered under the shay 'ah. Ihsän on the other hand 
opens up the scope of justice under positive law to considerations of equity and good 
conscience, especially in cases where the application of normal rules may not actually 
secure justice. Then, one should act in the spirit of i, sän and find a method that serves the 
ideas of Qur'anic justice, even if it entails a certain departure from specific rules. 253 
252 Qur'än: 16/90. 
253 Karnali, ibid, p: 66. 
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CONCLUSION 
Deducing rulings is an important element for the development of Islamic law. The 
fundamental sources of Islamic law are the Qur'an, the Sunnah, ijmä ` (consensus), and 
giyäs (analogy) which are unanimously accepted by the majority of jurists. There are also 
other controversial principles that are activated when the fundamental principles are silent 
and unable to help the law for its continuity. 
The /rh of Mu`ädh ibn Jabal is very good example of the fact that Muslims 
believe that Islamic Law is able to find answers for human problems. For this reason, 
jurists must know the main requirements for legislation. The knowledge of jurisprudence 
was formulated as usül al-fiqh (the principle of jurisprudence) and the meaning of usül al- 
fegh combines the understanding of the meaning of u cül and figh individually. 
The term usal is the plural of asl. One of the uses of a-s-1 is the meaning of dalil. 
In Islamic law, the word dalil is used in two ways: dalil tafsYl is like an individual verse 
of the Qur'an or an individual Sunnah in a hadith. We may refer to it as "specific 
evidence", though it is sometimes translated as "detailed proof'. And the dalil ijmäli has 
nothing to do with direct, absolute order and prohibition. However, it produces general 
rulings as wujüb (necessity), tahrim (prohibition) and so on. 
Dalil (proof) is distinguished from amilrah (indication), which literally means a 
sign or an allusion. Dalil could only relate to evidence which leads to a definitive ruling 
or to positive knowledge (`ilm). Amärah on the other hand is reserved for evidence or 
indication that only leads to a zanni (speculative) ruling. In this way, the term da1F1 could 
only be concerned with the definitive proofs, namely the Qur'an, the Sunnah, and ijmä `, 
while the remaining proof which contains a measure of speculation, such as giyas, 
istipsän, isti äb, masälehmursalah, and so on, could fall under the category of amärah 
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(signs or allusions, probable evidence). However, most jurists consider both dalil and 
amärah, whether qat i (definitive) or Zanni (speculative), as a darl (proof). The term a; s! 
is actually dalil, which is a proof or an evidence of Islamic Law. 
The term figh is synonymous with al-fahm (understanding) in the linguistic sense. 
It is used to denote the exercise of intelligence, as in the case of the Successors of the 
Companions of the Prophet, most of whom were fugahä' (jurists) who gave legal 
judgments using their own reason and intelligence; in that respect the term figh is 
actually used for the knowledge of the law. 
The procedure of giving judgments among the Companions was that they used to 
refer first to the Qur'än whenever a claimant-defendant asked them for guidance. If the 
Companions were unable to find the result in the Qur'an, they would then seek a 
judgment in the Sunnah. Failing to discover the answer within these sources, they would 
then consult the righteous men of the community who would convene to discuss the 
matter and arrive at a solution. If they arrived at an opinion which was unanimously 
accepted, the consensus was that they should judge accordingly. 
Despite the controversy among the scholars, it has been shown that the use of 
ijtihäd by ray was practiced from the time of the Prophet; this is evident from several 
narrations such as the hndith of Mu'adh Ibn Jabal or the incident when the Prophet saw 
the people of Medina fertilizing palm trees. 
Between ijtihäd and ray there is a very close relationship. However, as we have 
seen, ijtihäd is more comprehensive than ray. At the time of the Companions and the 
Successors, the constituent parts of ray were clear and extensive, as opposed to the nah,; 
which is not obviously clarified and defined. Following that period, some jurists 
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continued to use ray in the meaning of ijtihdd in a wider range. At the same time, the 
majority of jurists confined the use of inference to issues where there were no na5, s (text) 
to reach a right and just kin (ruling). 
Performing ijtihäd is seen as a religious duty. The Qur'än and the Sunnah of the 
Prophet encourage Muslims to avoid disagreements amongst themselves by using ijtihdd; 
it is said that whenever a judge exercises ijtihdd and gives a right judgment, he will have 
two rewards, but if he errs in his judgment, he will still have earned one reward. 
Therefore, ijtihäd becomes a very demanding requirement in modem day life, and 
sometimes performing it will be an individual duty (fard `ayn) and sometimes a collective 
duty (fard kifayah) for Muslims. Eventually, if the requirement of ijtihäd is ignored then 
the whole Muslim community will be considered sinful. 
There are some conditions which are aimed to ensure the ability of a person to 
perform ijtihad. The earliest complete accounts of the qualifications of a mujtahid were 
given by scholars such as Abü al-Husayn a1-Bari (d. 436/1044), Shirazi (d. 467/1083), 
Ghazal (d. 505/1111), Amidi (d. 63211234), Ibn al-Subki (d. 771/1370) and ShAtibi (d. 
790/1388). They and many others prepared extensive lists of the abilities jurists must 
possess to enable them to perform ijtihdd. Some increased and others decreased the 
conditions. An outstanding scholar, Shatibi, ignored these lists and reduced the conditions 
of ijtihäd to one comprehensive point: the precise comprehension of the magäsid and in 
the light of this comprehension the ability to deduce rules from the sources. 
Regarding the door of ijtihad, besides the early and contemporary Muslim 
scholars, some recent western scholars, in particular Wael Hallaq, and W. Montgomery 
Watt, have indicated that the gate of ijtihad is still open and the term "The closing of the 
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gate of ijtihäd"is a myth. In reality, the gate of ijtihäd was never completely closed, as 
properly qualified scholars must have the right to perform ijtihäd continuously. Ijtihad is 
not confined to the four schools of law and can be performed by all capable scholars. 
Consequently, the gate of ijtihad, in my personal opinion, is still and must remain open. 
Iijtihäd has been practiced largely in terms of isti1 sän. Sometimes when an issue 
is not within the range of a nass giyäs is then used to judge. Here we come across two 
different possibilities: apparent clear analogy and implicit analogy. If the mujtahid finds 
that the second one is stronger (khafi giyäs) the judgment given accordingly is called 
isti/nän. Through istiluan some issues within the range of common naps and criteria 
such as difficulty, complexity, necessity, and need are removed because of their specific 
nature and a new judgement is given to this special situation to implement madalxrh. 
As such it is the Lawgiver (i. e. God) who considers the special situations and 
circumstances with specific conditions, and who abolishes the difficulty, complexity and 
harm. This provides an ideal guide for the mujrahid. On this issue Mustafa Zargä says 
that the Qur'an and the Sunnah are both istillcän, which is the creation of the Shari'. The 
concept of istihsän is to guide the mujtahid when applying the nag of the Shari' to issues 
everyday of life. The mujtahid performing istihsän is inspired by the method that the 
Shari' applies and in this way, the mujtahid implements the Shari "s purpose and 
intentions. We have mentioned some examples in regards to this issue throughout the 
chapter. 
No technical definitions of istifzsän have reached us from the early Islamic period, 
simply because there was no reason for isti&dn to be defined. Abn Hanifah and other 
early Hanafi jurists such as Abü Yüsuf (d. 182) and Shaybäni (d. 189) have directly given 
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rulings using the concept of istihsän without giving any specific definitions or 
explanations. It is said that their judgments were based on the fundamental principles of 
securing ease and avoiding hardship, in line with the Qur'än: "The best of your religion is 
that which brings ease" and "God intends facility and ease for you, He does not intend to 
put you to hardship". ' 
The fact that the Hanafis were attacked by the Shi`i jurists, and especially by 
Shdfi i himself, shows that the SUR' schools did not recognize isti/zsdn as a basis of 
Islamic law. They dismissed it as "Arbitrary law-making in religion". Indeed, Shäfi`! 
jurists did not understand what Hanafis meant by istii än. Hanafi jurists spent much time 
defending their position and trying to show that istihsän was a valid source of law, and 
not merely an ad hoc method. However, among the jurists there was no consensus as to 
the precise meaning and definition of istihrän. Yet in spite of all the different definitions, 
the meanings are very close. In fact all the definitions may be derived from that of Karkhi 
which is arguably more comprehensive than the others as we discussed earlier. 
It is quite difficult to determine the applications of isti/isän in the very early 
period. However, 'Umar's decisions provided the means by which researchers have been 
able to gain some indication of how to implement istihsän in legal matters. Early istihsän, 
then, involved making a decision which was a complete departure from an established 
rule for the sake of equity and public interest. I have not been able to discover any 
authentic source that leads me to believe that the concept of istifzsän was used prior to the 
time of `Umar ibn `Abd al-`Aziz. 
When iyäs b. Muä'wiyah's use of the term istienem is compared to Abü Hanifah's, 
much similarity can be seen. For them, the main purpose of applying isti/zsän was to 
1 Qur'än: 21185 
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avoid the possibility of causing harm to the public interest. The reason for their emphasis 
on istifisan was their desire to avoid the negative results that often occurred when qiyas 
was applied incorrectly. However, istifisän owes its existence to giyäs, and would not 
have superseded it had giyäs not proved to be ineffective in some cases. 
The investigation that I made throughout the research, and the opinions given by 
scholars such as Ibn Hazm, Schacht (d. 1969), Goldziher (d. 1921) and so on, show that the 
first usage of istifydn in its technical sense did not occur before Iyäs bin Muä'wiyah 
(d. 1221740). 
The concept of isti/zsän is recognized by the Hanafi, Mäliky, Hanbali and Zaydi 
schools. Hanafi scholars are adamant that istitudn is a source of law and not in any way a 
form of ruling made according to personal desire. For the Hanafi school istihsän means 
acting according to one of the two forms of giyäs. Istihsän may also be acted upon based 
on athar (f adith), ijmd ` or necessity. However, despite the fact that `ulamä' from these 
different schools recognized the validity of istilzsän as a principle they often disagreed 
over the meaning of the term. The supporters of the validity of istihsän resort to proof 
from the Qur'an, Sunnah, and ijmä`. According to Hanafi scholars, to perform isti/zsän is 
to comply with Qur'anic verses which command man to follow what is best, good and 
beautiful. 
The first figure to reject isti1 sän was Imam Shäfi`i with his famous statement: 
"Man istahsana faqad sharra`a" (whoever approves of juristic preference is making 
himself the Lawmaker). According to Shäf'i`i, nobody is ordered to rule according to 
pagq (truth) unless he knows what /xigq is and /aagq cannot become known unless it is 
from God either as nays or by indication, as God made 17agq in his Book and in the 
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Sunnah of his prophet. Among those who agreed with him on this issue were: Isnawi 
(d. 772/1370); Bishr b. Ghiyäs (d. 218/833); Shiräzi (d. 476/1083); Ghazäli (d. 505/1111); 
Däwüd al-Zähiri (d. 2701884); Ibn Hazm; and the Imämi Shr'ah. 
In reality, everybody, including those who recognize isti/zsän, reject istihsdn that 
is based on personal desire. Shäfi`i said, with regards to the case of the thinkers and the 
literate, that if they were allowed to rule by istihsän it would be in contradiction to the use 
of istihsän, as those who recognize istihsän understand that its meaning is the departure 
from giyds to a stronger dalil. The situations are such that the dalil can only be expected 
from a mujtahid who is competent in the shari `ah rulings and the dalil, while it is 
unacceptable from thinkers and the literate who are not qualified. 
Owing to the lack of written material, Abn Hanifah has often been accused of 
judging cases without depending on any textual evidence, and this is the main source of 
conflict amongst the jurists. However, it is not entirely true to say that there is no trace of 
any reports regarding Abü Hanlfah's techniques; in fact he left writings giving indications 
as to his methods of performing ijtihäd and his use of the principle of istihsän. He 
declared that he used to read God's book to obtain guidance. If he was unable to find any 
guidance in the Qur'än then he would resort to the Sunnah of the Prophet and the true 
reports (fxrdith) which had transmitted from generation to generation by trustworthy 
narrators. If neither the Qur'än nor the Sunnah yielded any guidance, he would then refer 
to the opinions of the Companions. Consequently, when he made his personal decision he 
would not ask others' opinions. However, if a matter had been considered by the likes of 
Ibrähim al-Nakhd' (d. 96), Shä'bi (d. 103), Hasan (d. 110), Muhammad b. Shin (d. 110), 
Said b. al-Musayyab (d. 94) et at, he would also act on their ijtihäd. 
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Moreover, in the writings of his disciples, Abü Yüsuf (d. 182) and Shaibnni 
(d. 189), the use of the concept of istifaän by Abü hianifah and the early Hanafis is 
explained. The examples of the practice of istitzsän in the writings of Abü Yüsuf (d. 182) 
and Shaibäni (d. 189) reveal that the use of the concept could mean the following: leaving 
giyds due to the precedents of the Companions; leaving giyäs owing to the consensus 
(ijm. d'); leaving giyäs in favour of sadd al-dharä'i' (blocking the means); leaving giyäs 
due to authentic Tradition (fxrdith yatip). AbU Hanifah and his disciples were highly 
respectful of the Traditions, and used them in their ijtihäd; even if it was a lvdith d2if 
(weak tradition) they would prefer it over giyäs. 
Division of istihsän among the scholars differs from one jurist to another: mainly 
it is considered as being of two types a: analogical istilzsim, which consists of a departure 
from giyäs jail to giyds khaf( and b: exceptional istifzsän (istit sdn istithnä'r) which 
consists of making an exception to a general rule of the existing law. Sadr al-Shati`ah 
(d. 747/1346) also divides it into several types such as ijmä', Ghrürah (necessity), athar. 
These are actually established against explicit analogy. He considers the implicit (khan 
analogy is istifz n. However, despite the fact that implicit analogy is istihsän, it is more 
comprehensive than implicit analogy. We can conclude that while every implicit analogy 
can be called isti/zsän, not every case of istiIndn can be called implicit (khafi) analogy. 
Another jurist, Bazdawi, also indicates that istiizsän is an implicit analogy. In fact isti/zsän 
is not merely an implicit analogy. In general, the Hanafis considered istihrän as four types 
as follows: isti/zsän based on nass (athar); on ijmd ` (consensus); on ciri rah (necessity) 
and on giyäs khafi (implicit analogy). 
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The Mälikis divide isti/tsän into four types: istifzrän based on `urf; on masia/ah; 
on ijmä`; and on giyäs. Even though there are different opinions over the divisions of 
istibsän, some common issues with regard to the types of istihsdn are generally agreed 
upon, namely the first type of istitnan -the departure from jail to khafi- which is agreed 
upon by all the scholars. 
Hanafis considered that giyäs khaff was istihsän. The `illah (effective cause) of 
giyäs khafi can not be discovered easily. However in giyäs jali the `illah (effective cause) 
appears at first glance without careful consideration being given to it. In other words, 
giyäs khafi is preferred over giyäs jar if they are opposed to each other, on account of the 
effective cause ('illah) which is stronger in khafi. 
So many efforts were made by outstanding scholars throughout the history of 
Islamic juridical life to develop it in order to allow masla/ah to prevail and to prevent 
evil. Abü Hanifah was one of them. He made istifzsän and giyäs essential to usül al-fiqh, 
allowing society the freedom and flexibility with which to function and progress 
healthily, in line with the objectives of the shari `ah. 
Najm al-Din al-Tufi (d. 719/1316) took the concept of masla/ah to the furthest 
extent ever known. He emphasized the importance of the concept and considered it 
suitable for applications in all areas of social life and human relations, apart from ibädät 
(worshiping) and those general principles of law already determined and deemed 
inviolate. The general principles of religion are binding and fixed for mankind until the 
day of judgment; particular principles, however, are subject to public interest (mastafaah) 
and the public interest changes as circumstances change. The Qur'an promotes reforms 
and new solutions by saying that if man does not know, he should go and ask someone 
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who does. As the verse indicates, "So ask the people of the reminder"2. Therefore 
understanding the purposes of the sharä `ah is an indispensable qualification for a 
mujtahid in order to perform ijtihird and realize the role of the concept of istihsän, as 
Imäm Mälik regards it a purpose-centred method of interpretation, adding that isrihsän 
represents nine-tenth of human knowledge. Consequently, contemporary scholars should 
work on the principle of istihsrrn, and develop it in the framework of contemporary issues 
under the light of the fundamental principle of Islamic law. 
2 Qur'an: 2117. 
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GLOSSARY 
`adl : justice. 
adillah (pl. of dalil): proofs, evidences, indication 
adillah al-shari'ah : proofs of Islamic law 
adhan : call to prayer 
of äl : acts 
ai*am (pl. of huhm) : rules, laws, practical rules and ordinances. 
al-ahkam al- `amaliyyah: practical rulings 
al-al*äm al- `agliyyah : rational rules 
ai*äm al-din : rulings of religion 
al-ahkäm al-hissiyyah: law of sense perception 
al-ahkäm al-i` `tigadiyyah: creed/ convictional, which is belief in the existence of God, His 
oneness, His qualities, the truth of the mission of the Prophet, belief in the Day of 
Judgment etc 
al-a/*äm al- khulugryyah ethical and moral rules 
al-ahkäm al-lughawiyyah : linguistic rules 
al-ahºcdm al-mu `ämalät : transactions 
al-ai*äm al-shar'iyya: legal rules 
al-af*äm al-wad`r)yah : declaratory rules 
ahl al-apbah : the residual heirs 
ahl al-bayt : the household of the Prophet 
ahl al-bid `ah : people of innovation 
ahl al-hadith : the traditionalist group or school 
ahl al-kalif : People of the Cave 
ahl al-ra'y : the rationalist group 
ahl al fara'id: those portions for heirs designated in the Qur'än 
al-aluan : the best 
ahwan al-sharr : lesser evil 
`ämm : general 
amarah : indication, signs or allusions, probable evidence 
al-ansäb : gambling 
Arkan : essential requirements 
`aql : intellect, reason 
`agli : rational 
`a, bah : those who are entitled to the remainders of the shares, agnates 
asäs : foundation 
aslzrbi farad : 
ash : root, origin, source, and used original case in the context of analogy. 
ayäh (pl. of äyät) : proof, evidences, lessons, signs 
azän : the call to prayers 
`azimah : strict or unmodified law which remains in its original rigour due to the absence 
of mitigating factors. 
azläm : arrows for seeking luck or decision 
bäfil : wrong, null and void. 
Bayt al-Mal : treasury, exchequer 
Glossary 
bay' al-ta'äti : give-and-take sale 
bid'ah : innovation 
burhan : proof, evidence 
daf al fasäd : avoid evil 
dalä'il : pl. of daliZ. " indication, proof, evidence 
dalal : error 
dalil 'nm : general evidence 
dalil ijmäli or kulli: general evidence 
dalil gari : definite proof 
dalil tafglr : specific evidence, detailed proof 
aärar : harm 
darürah : necessity 
Qarüriyyät : essentials 
dhari'a `, : plural dharä'i' : means 
dirhams : silver coins 
fahm: understanding 
fugahä' (plural of fagfh): jurist, one who is learned figh. 
far' : lit. a branch or a sub-division, and in the context of giyäs a new case 
fart : obligatory, obligation 
far cl `ayn : individual duty and obligation 
farclkifäyah :a collective duty, the fulfilment of which by a sufficient number of 
individuals excuses the other individuals from fulfilling it 
fasad : evil 
fatwä : formal legal opinion 
fawähish : corruptions 
fa'1 : physically 
ghanumah : booty 
ghusl : ritual ablution of the whole body 
nth : tradition 
Padith mashhür : well known Tradition 
¬adith mutawätir : widely spread Tradition 
lv4ith S. i/i : authentic tradition 
fxzjj : pilgrimage, the once-in-a lifetime obligation of pilgrimage to the holy Ka'ba. 
fajiyyät : complementary 
hagrqi : true, genuine, authentic, real and literal as opposed to metaphorical. 
haqq : right 
haqq al-irtifaq : all of the ancillary rights 
haqq al-masil : the right of flow 
haqq al-murür : the right of passage 
haqq al-shurb : the right of water 
friräm : prohibited 
fxxsan good 
hawä' : inclination, whim 
himär : donkey 
iimariyyah : donkey case 
/risst : sensory 
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hujjah : dalil, evidence, proof 
/nckm (pl. ahkäm) : rule, as in hukm shar`i : law, value or ruling of Shari `ah. 
al-hukm al-taklifi : the obligation, creating rule, defining law 
al-tatkin al-wa(i : declaratory law 
Ib/al al-istihsän : invalidating juristic preference 
ihram : the ritual garment worn for tnjj 
iltyat : needs 
ijiirah : leasing 
i `jaz : inimitability 
ijmä `: consensus, agreement 
al-ijmä ` al-srzrrh : explicit agreement 
al-ijmä ` al-suküti : tacit agreement 
ijtihdd : is the expenditure of efforts to arrive at righteous judgement; it could be either 
physical such as walking, working or intellectual such as inference of a ruling, or juristic 
and linguistic theory: Kamäl Ibn Al-Humam defines ijtihad as the expenditure of efforts 
by the fagih to arrive at a juristic ruling, such ruling being either rational (`agli) or 
transmitted (naglj, definitive (gat`i )or speculative (zannr). 
ijtihäd al-tagdrn : which allows jurists all to give rulings and on which there is no cause 
for disagreement amongst the scholars 
ikräh: means forcing someone to do or say something against his will, coercion. 
ilhdm : inspiration 
`illah : cause and reason 
`ilm : knowledge 
imam : founder 
intime `: usufruct 
`igäb : punishment 
i, <7-bah : target 
ishärah : indication, sign, token, and symptom 
ish'är : marking animals 
i'nah : infallibility, immunity from making errors 
istabsana : approved as the better judgment 
istidläl : inference 
istitudn : Juristic Preference 
isti/zsän istithnäi : exceptional istilzrän 
isfilä/n : technical 
istigrä' : induction 
istigrä' Lamm : complete induction 
istigrä' nägis : incomplete induction 
istisMb : presumption of continuity 
isti, c1ah : consideration of public interest. 
isti wäb : discretion 
istithnä : This is the giving of an order to a labourer or artisan to make a definite article 
with agreement to pay a definite price for that article when made. 
`itäb : blame 
`tibar : admonition 
i `tigäd : faith, belief 
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jahd : which means the forbearance of hardship, that is striving and self-exertion in any 
activity which entails a measure of hardship 
falb al-xläh : obtaining benefit 
jinäyat : criminal offence 
judhr: root 
juhd : which means exertion of effort or energy 
junub :a state requiring a ritual ablution of the whole body 
juz'i : partial 
karah : expiation 
kamäliyyät : embellishments 
khabar : news or report 
khabar al-wähid : solitary With 
khamr : wine 
khardj : land tax 
kha4w. specific, individual 
khayr : good deed 
khulwah : privacy 
kufr : unbelief 
kulli : whole 
lughawi : linguistic 
ma1arrät : evils 
madina : town 
mafqüd' : missing person 
mafsadah : harm, evil 
al-Majallah : Ottoman court manual 
makrüh : discouraged, adversity 
makrüh kard/at al-tahrim : strongly disapproved 
makrüh karähzt al-tanzih : disapproval 
mandüb : recommended, optional 
manfa `ah : benefit 
mdni `: impediment, obstacle, hindrance. 
magä, id : objectives, aims, purposes, goals. 
magä zd al- `ämmah: general purposes 
ma. 'ar: source 
mashagqah : hardship, difficulty 
mashhür : is defined as a hadith which is originally reported by one, two or more Companions from the Prophet or from another Companion but which has later become 
well-known and transmitted by an indefinite number of people 
maslaiizh : benefit 
ma lapah mursalah : consideration of public interest 
maytata : unlawful meat 
mindräh : minaret 
migyds : scales 
muallafa' al-qulüb : conciliation of hearts 
mubäh : permissible 
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muýUrabah: This means a contract of co-partnership, in which one of the parties (the 
proprietor) is entitled to a profit on account of the capital (ra's al mdl) he has invested. 
He is designated as the owner of the capital (rabb al mät). The other party is entitled to 
profit on account of his labour and is designated as the muddrib (or the manager) in as 
much as he derives a benefit from his own labour and endeavours. 
mujti : the authority of giving fatwä'-ruling 
mujtahid: competent jurist 
mukallaf : subjects 
mukha4iýws: particularized agent 
mukhascis: particularising agent 
munkar : evil 
mansükh : abrogated 
mu `dmalät : contracts 
mufti : judge 
mugallid : the close and faithful followers of established rules, follower 
muqayyad : dependent, limited 
mursal : discontinued 
murshid : guide, conductor 
musägah : This is a contract between two parties whereby one party takes charge of the 
fruit tree of the other partner on condition that the crops shall be divided between them on 
specific terms; share tenancy. 
mushtarika : shared 
mustagil : independent, 
mut `ah : maintenance 
mutaraddiyah : dead by headlong fall 
mutawatir: literally means continuously recurrent. In the present context, it means a 
report by an indefinite number of people related in such a way as to preclude the 
possibility of their agreement to perpetuate a lie. 
mußaq : absolute 
muzara `ah: This is a contract between two persons whereby one party is the landlord and 
the other the cultivator. They both agree that whatever is produced by cultivation of the 
land shall be divided between them in specified proportions; an agreement of crop 
sharing 
nabr"dh : fermented dates 
näfilah : supererogatory 
nagli : Transmitted 
nags : deficiency 
nasab : lineage and stock 
naskh : abrogation 
nag., text 
na sari : theoretical 
nikäh : marriage 
gä'idahfiqhiyyah : jurisprudence rule 
qadhf : slander, accusation 
gaff : judge 
qal `ah : fort 
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galbi : which takes place in the heart 
gat`i: definitive 
gatl : murder 
gawä'id pl. of gä'idah : principles. 
gawä'id al-kullyyah : general principles 
al-gawäi'd al-fiqhiyyah: general principles of jurisprudence 
qawl" : saying 
gawli : relating to speech, verbal 
qawl al-, 2zA bi : The sayings of a Companion of the Prophet 
giyäs: analogy 
qi9 s: retaliation 
al-gics : the law of equality in punishment 
q yds al-adnä : analogy of the inferior 
giyäs al-awlä: analogy of the superior 
gyas jail : obvious analogy 
q yäs khafi : latent, hidden, implicit analogy 
q yas al-musawat : analogy of equals 
gyds zdhir jalry : apparent clear analogy 
rajih : preference 
re al-haraj : avoidance of hardship 
ra'y : opinion 
ra'y bddl : invalid; null, and void 
ra'y mashkük : doubtful, uncertain 
ra'y sahib : valid, authentic 
riwayah : transmitted iiadith 
ruj/, zrn: preference, preferability 
rukhac : concessions 
rukn : condition, essential requirement 
ru'yah : to perceive an object which is seen 
sabab : cause 
sadd : blocking 
sadd al-dharä'i `: blocking the means 
sz bi : plural of ca/abah: a Companion 
salam : contract of purchase of goods with pre-payment, forward sale, prepaid sale 
saläm : conclusion of prayer 
salät: prayer 
sanad : basis, proof, authority. 
shahädät al-zur : false testimony 
shähid : witness 
shahwah : passion 
Shär `: Lawgiver 
shar` man gablanä : revealed laws preceding to the shari `ah of Islam 
Shari `ah : Islamic law 
301 
shart(pl. of shurüfj: condition 
shufah pre-emption 
shürah : consultation 
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sudan : uncontrolled, without purpose, a state of lawlessness 
to `abbudi : worship 
tadbir : precaution 
ta'diyah : referring a ruling to another case 
tafsir: interpretation 
talzriniyydt : embellishment 
tahrif : distortion 
tahrim: prohibition 
takhg,,;: specifying the general, particularization of the general 
takh 4; al- `illah : specifying the cause 
talab or igti cur': request 
taläq bä'in : divorce to be absolute 
taläq raj `i : revocable 
talazzuz : deriving pleasure 
tark : departure 
ta, carrufät : transactions 
tashahhud : To say while sitting: "There is no god but Allah and Muhammad is Allah's 
Apostle. " 
tawdtur : continuous testimony 
tawbah : repentance 
tayammum : to wash with clean sand or earth where water is unavailable 
al- `udül : the departure 
`ulamä' : scholars 
`ulül amr : those in authority amongst Muslims 
`umum al-balwä : general calamity 
Ummah : the whole Muslim community 
`urf `: custom 
al-`urf al-'ämm : general custom 
al-`urf al-khäs" : special custom 
ucl : plural of a, i; root, origin, source 
usüli : juristic scholars 
usül al-figh: the principle of Islamic jurisprudence 
wahmi : imaginary 
wavy : divine revelation 
wd tb : obligatory 
waqf: charitable endowment 
wasä'il : means 
warf (pl. of awsaf) : attribute, quality, adjective. 
wujüb: necessity, obligation, rendering something obligatory. 
yanqadihu : embedded 
zakah : alms 
inn : speculation, doubt, conjecture. 
zanni: speculative, doubtful. 
zanni ghalib : mostly probable 
mhir : manifest, apparent. 
zinä' : illegal sexual intercourse, fornication, adultery. 
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